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I. Introduction 
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I. The problem 
The main objective of my dissertation is to reexamine the role of Ionia in the 
Mediterranean during the Classical and early Hellenistic periods. The common opinion in 
scholarship is that Ionia flourished in the Archaic period, but gradually diminished after 
the Persian conquest in 540 BCE and suffered through a long, fallow Classical period, 
only to undergo renewed growth in the early Hellenistic period. Thus, Kai Brodersen says 
of Miletus: “it never returned to its former affluence; rather than enjoying its former 
independence, it remained a prize in the conflicts between Athens, Sparta and Persia.”1 
The same sentiment also appears with regard to the rest of Ionia. Most scholarship 
focuses on Archaic Ionia, and the studies that even touch on the Classical period 
conclude either in the fifth century, when the region was dominated by Athens or, at the 
absolute latest, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War in 404.2 Then, there is a 
resurgence of interest in Hellenistic Ionia, aptly represented by Richard Billows’ chapter 
“Rebirth of a Region,” in a collection of recent essays on regionalism in Anatolia.3  
There are exceptions, of course. Graham Shipley’s A History of Samos (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), for instance, covers the period from 800 to 180 BCE, 
recent work by Vincent Gabrielsen takes a comparative approach to imperial interaction 
                                                 
1 K. Brodersen, “Aegean Greece,” in A Companion to the Classical Greek World, ed. 
K.H. Kinzl (Malden: Blackwell, 2006). 
2 e.g. J.M. Balcer, Sparda by the Bitter Sea (Providence: Brown University Press, 1984); 
V. Gorman, Miletos: The Ornament of Ionia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2001); A. Greaves, The Land of Ionia (Malden: Blackwell, 2010). 
3 R. Billows, “Rebirth of a Region: Ionia in the Early Hellenistic Period,” in Regionalism 
in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor, edd. H. Elton and G. Reger (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 
2007), 33-44. 
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in Asia Minor, 4 and Pierre Debord’s L’Asie mineure au IVe siècle (412-323 a.C.) (Paris: 
De Boccard, 1999) locates the origins of the early Hellenistic developments in Asia 
Minor in the fourth century. Alan Greaves’ Miletos: a history (London: Routledge, 2002) 
takes the reader through the Ottoman period, but where he dedicates one hundred and 
thirty pages to prehistoristoric and Archaic Miletus and its geography, he gives only 
twenty pages for the post-Archaic polis.5 Ionia also appears frequently on the periphery 
of histories of Athens, Persia, and the other imperial powers. My dissertation plugs a 
clear hole in the existing scholarship on Ionia because it is the first study of its kind: a 
dedicated history of Classical and early Hellenistic Ionia. 
The second issue that frames my dissertation is how Ionia’s location, surrounded 
by imperialistic neighbors, affected it during the Classical and early Hellenistic periods. 
In the words of Rostovtzeff, “they were, so to speak, fragments of the western world on 
the fringe of the eastern, serving as connecting links between the two.”6 And yet, Ionia 
was peripheral to the considerations of a series of competing imperial powers that 
included Persia, Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Caria, Macedonia, and, finally, the inchoate 
Hellenistic kingdoms of Alexander’s successors. This location centered between imperial 
powers made Ionia a frequent site of conflict. The traditional approach is to evaluate 
these conflicts from the perspective of the major players such as Persia, Athens, and 
Sparta, and to treat the Ionians as prizes. This approach offers a deeply misleading picture 
of Ionia.  
                                                 
4 V. Gabrielsen, “Provincial Challenges to the Imperial Centre,” in The Province Strikes 
Back: Imperial Dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean,” edd. B. Forsén and G. Salmeri 
(Helskinki: Suomen Ateenan-instituutin säätiö, 2008), 15-44. 
5 A. Greaves, Miletos: a history (London: Routledge, 2002). 
6 M. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World v 1 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1941), 81. 
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Studying Ionia vis-à-vis these conflicts successively offers only a partial history 
of the region and presents it as of secondary importance. In contrast, centering the 
narrative on Ionia brings into focus a picture wherein the communities and inhabitants 
were actively negotiating their position within the restrictions placed on them. While 
“autonomy” was a core component of Greek rhetoric throughout the period of this study, 
the Ionian poleis were, by and large, always subordinate to others. But this does not mean 
that the Ionians were irrelevant. Far from it. One of my main contentions throughout this 
dissertation is that the Ionians were not passive victims of imperialism, but partners in the 
imperial project and thus they continued to shape the trajectory of the Aegean world in 
the fifth and fourth centuries in ways hitherto not recognized. 
 
II. Methodological Approach 
I do not subscribe to a single theoretical or methodological approach for the study 
of Greek history. However, two modern works stand out for their influence on the overall 
shape of my dissertation, J.M. Balcer’s Sparda by the Bitter Sea: Imperial Interaction in 
Western Anatolia (Providence: Brown University Press, 1984) and Kostas Vlassopoulos’ 
Unthinking the Greek Polis: Ancient Greek History Beyond Eurocentrism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
Balcer’s Sparda by the Bitter Sea, is, in one sense, the immediate forebear of my 
dissertation. Named after the Persian satrapy that included Ionia, Balcer offers a 
revisionist thesis about imperialism in Ionia from the Lydian and Persian points of view.7 
Sparda is the first study to focus on the intersection of Lydia, Persia, and the East Greek 
                                                 
7 Balcer, Sparda, xi. 
 5
poleis, as well as the relationship of the satrapies at Sardis and Dascylion to the Athenian 
Empire. He first proposes a structuralist interpretation of imperial development wherein 
there is a cyclical pattern to the rise and fall of imperial states and then applies this 
paradigm to the succession of Lydian, Persian, and Athenian imperialisms in Sparda, 
tapering off in the second half of the fifth century. He provocatively concludes that, 
particularly among “the landed gentry,” the Persian Empire was considered more just and 
stable than, and therefore preferable to, Athenian rule.8 
While Balcer’s work is the first to analyze Athenian imperialism from the 
perspective of the consequences of imperialism on some of the affected regions rather 
than Athenian policy, it fundamentally remains a top-down study of imperial interaction. 
My fundamental departure from Balcer’s method is that I invert the focus in order to 
examine the developments from the Ionian point of view in order to demonstrate Ionian 
agency in their interaction with imperial powers. 
Unthinking the Greek Polis, based on Vlassopoulos’ 2005 Cambridge thesis, is a 
deeply theoretical study of the Greek polis as an ideological construct. He states that the 
book is dedicated to unraveling the “exasperating contradictions of the ideology that one 
could call ‘occidentalism’.”9 Vlassopoulos employs world systems theory, globalization, 
and world history to argue that Greek history ought to be liberated from a Eurocentric 
narrative.10 In order to reach this conclusion, Vlassopoulos relies on the work of theorists 
such as Foucault and Derrida. The first part of his book is an Archeology of the 
discourses, ancient and modern, of the polis that identifies the contours of an ideology of 
                                                 
8 Balcer, Sparda, 3. 
9 Vlassopoulos, Unthinking the Greek Polis, 1. 
10 Vlassopoulos, Unthinking the Greek Polis, 8. 
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the polis. Vlassopoulos adroitly demonstrates how ancient Greece generally and the polis 
specifically came to be decoupled from the eastern Mediterranean and consequently came 
to be the “self-referent ancestor of the West.”11  
Vlassopoulos persuasively argues that the polis should not be the fundamental 
unit of analysis for Greek history. Instead, he offers world systems as an alternative 
approach that integrates Greece with the history of the eastern Mediterranean alongside 
the developments of the barbarian world, which is the subject of Vlassopoulos’ recent 
book, Greeks and Barbarians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). I have 
not heeded the call to world systems theory, but my dissertation is shaped by the idea of 
studying Greek history with layers of networks and relationships as the object of analysis 
instead of the polis. In particular, Vlassopoulos argues that the intersection of poleis and 
region, which sits at the heart of my project, is one of the least studied aspects of Greek 
history.12 Finally, Unthinking the Greek Polis, is particularly important for my 
dissertation because Ionia occupied a liminal position and breaking down the traditional 
categories allows us to understand the region with respect to the influences from both the 
Greek and non-Greek worlds. 
There is much about Classical and early Hellenistic Ionia that the problems of the 
surviving evidence render impossible to know (see below). However, these problems also 
offer an opportunity to analyze Ionia as a region that was enmeshed in Mediterranean 
networks. My dissertation is thus part of the growing body of scholarship that eschews 
                                                 
11 Vlassopoulos, Unthinking the Greek Polis, 101. 
12 Vlassopoulos, Unthinking the Greek Polis, 166-7. 
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the lens of the polis and instead seeks to understand ancient Greece through webs of 
flexible relationships.13 
 
III. The Land of Ionia 
I consider Ionia to be the region that consists of the Ionian dodecapolis and its 
immediate environs. Following the order in Herodotus, these poleis are Miletus, Myus, 
Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, Clazomenae, Phocaea, Samos, Chios, and 
Erythrae (1.142).14 These communities were linked by membership in the Panionion, a 
regional sanctuary, that Herodotus says only the only non-Ionians who asked to join were 
the people of Smyrna (1.143). Most of my analysis relies on this list, but I also examine 
the relationship between “Ionia” and other communities, some of which are listed as 
poleis, that were satellites of their larger neighbors. The relationship between Ephesus 
and its smaller neighbor Pygela, for instance, is a point of contention throughout the 
period of this study. 
Geography also complicates the treatment of Ionia as a distinct region. Ionia may 
be divided into three geographical zones: the valleys, the peninsulas, and the islands.15 
Herodotus describes Miletus, Myus, and Priene adjacent to Caria and Ephesus, Colophon, 
Lebedus, Teos, Clazomenae, and Phocaea adjacent Lydia (1.142). Herodotus also groups 
the poleis based on linguistic distinctions, but the former set were in the Maeander river 
valley (modern Büyük Menderes), and the latter in the Cayster river valley (modern 
                                                 
13 C. Taylor and K. Vlassopoulos, "Introduction: An Agenda for the Study of Greek 
History," in Communities and Networks in the Ancient Greek World, edd. C. Taylor and 
K. Vlassopoulos (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1-31. 
14 See the map of Ionia provided. 
15 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 46-7. 
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Küçük Menderes) and Hermus river valley (modern Gediz). The modern Turkish names 
for the Cayster and Maeander river valleys reflect that the two locations were 
conceptually linked. The former means "Big Maeander" and the latter "Little Maeander," 
but, in terms of geology, the two river systems are distinct.16 Two mountainous horst 
ridges cut across Ionia from east to west, forming peninsulas that jut into the sea, Mount 
Mimas (modern Çeşme) in the north and Mount Mycale (modern Samsun Dağı or Dilek 
Dağları) in the south.17 Further complicating the conceptualization of Ionia as a region 
are the islands. In addition to the two large islands of Chios and Samos,18 there were 
numerous smaller islands such as Milesian Leros and Halonnesus in the territory of 
Erythrae.  
Greaves considers the sea, surrounding, separating, and connecting the poleis, to 
be a fourth zone, persuasively arguing that is was this medium that allowed Ionia to exist 
as a region.19 Only one Ionian polis, Colophon, was located away from the sea, and there 
was diversity in the shape, location, and geography in the territory of the other poleis. 
The island poleis all held peraeae (non-contiguous territories) as far away as Atarneus in 
Aeolis, and the island of Leros was a Milesian district. In contrast, the sea was held in 
common. 
It is also important to note that the geography that so defined Ionia was hardly 
stable. Tectonic instability of the region contributed to the changing courses of the major 
                                                 
16 P. Thonemann, The Maeander Valley: A Historical Geography from Antiquity to 
Byzantium (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 21-2, supposes that the link 
in Turkish was a product of territorial claims of the first Turkish emirate in southwest 
Anatolia, since the rivers bounded its territory. Cf. Greaves, Land of Ionia, 50-2. 
17 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 47-50. 
18 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 52-4; Shipley, Samos, 269-78. 
19 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 55-7, 65-8. 
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rivers, but, even more importantly, Ionian geography appears to defy the formula 
described by Braudel that says geological change takes place at a rate too slow for it to be 
observed in human time and therefore that geography is a fixed structure. The rivers of 
Ionia deposited alluvium from far inland in Anatolia into the Aegean at a prodigious rate. 
This process dramatically changed the coastline. The Maeander river filled in the Gulf of 
Latmus, making previously coastal settlements landlocked and frequently introducing 
problems of disease because the area nearby became marshy and stagnant. As Greaves 
puts it, “processes of landscape change in Ionia are...happening at all three levels of 
Braudel’s Annaliste tempos,” and therefore should be viewed as a “dynamic context with 
which the people of Ionia were in an interactive relationship.”20 
 
IV. The People of Ionia 
“Ionian” is a label that can apply equally to multiple groups. It may refer to the 
Greek inhabitants of Anatolia between Sinope in the north and Phaselis in the south, but 
it can also denote a Greek person of the Ionian ethne, which included the peoples of 
Attica, Euboea, the Cyclades, and parts of Anatolia.21 
Ionians I take to be the inhabitants of the land of Ionia described above. Of 
course, the identities are not so clear-cut as this. First, there was not a single Ionian 
language, and Herodotus describes the region as consisting of four mutually 
distinguishable dialects (1.142). Second, Ionian communities were not homogenous, 
consisting not only of Greeks, but also of people of Anatolian descent such as Carians. 
                                                 
20 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 58. 
21 L. Rubinstein, “Ionia,” in An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis, edd. M.H. 
Hansen, T.H. Nielsen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1053. 
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Third, Ionians were not limited to their native communities, but entered into the service 
of Persians and Macedonians and many Ionians lived as metics in Athens and elsewhere 
throughout the Classical and Hellenistic periods. Similarly, there is the problem of exiles, 
including the period during which the Athenians occupied Samos. For the purposes of 
this study, I have chosen to be as inclusive as possible in defining these people as Ionians 
because they are crucial for understanding the region in the Classical and early 
Hellenistic periods. 
 
V. Temporal Scope 
Specific dates provide the bookends to my dissertation. In the front, the year 454 
marks a transition in the relationship between the Ionian poleis and the then-ascendant 
imperial power, Athens. It was in 454 that the treasury of the Delian League movedfrom 
Delos to Athens, supposedly at the suggestion of the Samians, and thus there is often 
accounted a shift in the relationship between Athens and the other league members 
beginning in that year.22 It was also in 454 and the years immediately following that there 
appears from Ionia epigraphic evidence for stasis in the region in what are usually termed 
revolts from Athenian control. While I do not hold that the Ionians were in revolt, this 
transition in how they interacted with Athens and the Delian League is a useful starting 
point. 
My study concludes in c.294. Ending the study after the battle of Ipsus in 301 
would have more evenly matched the usual chronology for the early Hellenistic period, 
but, despite his defeat, Demetrius retained control of Ionia in the immediate aftermath of 
                                                 
22 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
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the battle. It took Lysimachus until nearly 294 before he had the region securely under his 
control.  Ionia did change hands again after the battle of Corupedium in 286, but Seleucus 
quickly took control of Anatolia, so the interactions between the Ionians and the 
Hellenistic kings were more stable after 294 than they were after 301. Admittedly, this 
bookend is more ragged than is the date at the front of the project, but it represents a 
point at which the imperial competition over Ionia stabilized, at least temporarily, rather 
than suggesting that the interactions between the Ionian poleis and the Hellenistic kings 
came to an end. 
 
VI. Sources 
One of the difficulties in studying Classical and early Hellenistic Ionia is absence 
of narrative histories from the ancient world that focus on the region. The result is that 
evidence is patchwork, dating issues manifold, and some avenues of inquiry are entirely 
closed. But these limitations also provide an opportunity. In the absence of a dominant 
voice on Ionian history it is possible to appreciate the sheer variety of sources that may be 
brought to bear. 
First, I have created a collage from the available works from ancient authors. 
Pride of place goes to historians and orators who were alive during the period in question, 
including Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Demosthenes, Isocrates, Aeschines, and 
Dinarchus. Adjacent to this list are philosophers and poets who flourished in the same 
period, such as Plato, Aristotle, and Aristophanes. Then there are authors of the 
Hellenistic and Roman periods, including Athenaeus, Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, 
Polyaenus, Vitruvius, Appian, Quintus Curtius Rufus, Arrian, Justin, Aelian, Strabo, 
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Pausanias, Pliny the Younger, Philostratus, and later encyclopedic works such as the 
Byzantine Suda, which provided commentary on the region and frequently preserve older 
traditions. Finally, I have made extensive use of extant fragments from authors whose 
work is otherwise lost. Notable among these have been the fragments from Attic comic 
playwright Eupolis and from the Ionians Ion of Chios, Theopompus of Chios, and Duris 
of Samos.  
These ancient authors hailed from nearly every Ionian polis, as well as ranging in 
geographic scope from Alexandria to Bithynia, to Athens, to Rome, and temporally from 
the fifth century BCE through the tenth century CE. Each brings its own set of challenges 
in interpretation, but the result is a picture that demonstrates the breadth of Ionian activity 
during the Classical and early Hellenistic periods. 
Second, the incomplete nature of the literary and documentary sources makes it 
all the more imperative to make use of the material remains from Ionia. Here, too, there 
are difficulties. Ionia’s location near the terminus of two major Anatolian river systems 
and the seismically active nature of the Aegean basin means that coastline in much of 
Ionia is substantially different today than it was in antiquity. Additionally, the region 
remains fertile and is under intense agricultural use and multiple Ionian poleis moved at 
least once during the period under investigation here, leaving one or more of those 
locations unknown. The modern Turkish government is particularly keen to encourage 
tourism at the impressive ruins at Ephesus, but those are from the Hellenistic and Roman 
site of the community and it is unknown where the Classical settlement was. Other sites 
in Ionia are better understood. Excavations at Miletus have been particularly fruitful and 
this fact probably contributes to the scholarly focus on the polis. Likewise, the 
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reestablished polis at Priene and numerous sites on Chios have undergone excavations. 
In addition to the archeology of the Ionian poleis, there have been recent advances 
in shipwreck archeology, including a spectacular discovery off Samos in 2015. These 
finds, combined with advances in techniques for analyzes the DNA residue on the cargo 
have provided insights not only into the scale of maritime trade in and around Ionia, but 
also into the variety of goods that were shipped by sea. 
There is also a rich but uneven epigraphical record from Ionia. The region saw a 
veritable explosion in inscriptions from the Hellenistic and Roman periods, but even in 
the Classical period there are a range of inscriptions detailing laws, settlements, civic 
officials, and dedications. Erythrae, despite being one of the Ionian poleis where the 
location of the settlement is disputed, has a particularly large number of inscriptions. 
Further, the local epigraphic record is supplemented by a large number of inscriptions 
from Athens that addressed Ionia. 
Lastly, there are Ionian coins. Ionia was one of the first places in the Greek world 
to mint coins, owing to particularly close ties with Lydia. Although my dissertation is not 
primarily a numismatic study, I have nevertheless brought to bear issues of Ionian 
coinage, including its intermittent absence, and the appearance of Ionian coins outside the 
region. 
 
VII. Going Forward 
The body of my dissertation is divided into two parts. Part One is a reassessment 
of the history of Ionia 454-294 that consists of a prologue, five chapters based on the 
changing situation in the region, and a synopsis of this narrative. The first, 454-412, 
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examines the relationship between Ionia and Athens. Second, 412-387, analyzes the 
period between the start of the Ionian War when the Ionians revolted from Athens and the 
conclusion of the King’s Peace, a period during which Ionia was frequently the site of 
military campaigns. The next chapter, 387-336, runs from the King’s Peace to the arrival 
of the Macedonian invasions of Asia. It was in this period not only that there was a 
division in the region between Chios and Samos, which were declared autonomous, and 
the other Ionian poleis, which were Persian subjects, but also that Athens conquered 
Samos. The fourth, 336-323, examines how the situation of Ionia changed during the 
reign of Alexander the Great, and the fifth, 323-294, works through the developments of 
the early Hellenistic period. These narrative chapters orient the developments of Greek 
history as they affected Ionia, but the main objective is to show how the Ionians 
negotiated their relationships with one another on one level and with their neighbors with 
imperial ambitions on another. 
Part Two is composed of thematic case studies that offer new perspectives on 
Classical and early Hellenistic Ionia. Each chapter addresses a scholarly debate about 
Ionia. 
First, there are six case studies that offer broadly political perspectives on Ionia. I 
first examine the evidence for the Ionian League, arguing that it continued to exist as a 
religious network in the fifth and fourth centuries, but with only an incidental political 
function until the Hellenistic period. Then, in “Ephesus and the Delian League” I argue 
that it is possible to show that Ephesus was decidedly pro-Persian and to show that 
Ephesus was particularly tolerant of Athenian hegemony during the second half of the 
fifth century, but that seeing it in these terms is the result of binary thinking that should 
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not apply to how we think about Ionia. Next, I examine three instances where Ionian 
levies served with Spartan campaigns in Anatolia between 411 and 394, arguing that this 
service was a product of an extension of the Spartan empire to Ionia. Fourth, in “Does 
anyone care about those Greeks living in Asia,” I reexamine the corpus of speeches from 
the fourth-century Attic orators, arguing that there is a conspicuous absence of references 
to Ionia and Ionians, which obscures both continued interaction between Athens and 
Ionia and concern for Ionia in Athenian public discourse. In “Interstate arbitrations in 
Ionia,” I examine the evidence for land disputes between Ionian poleis, showing how the 
settlement of these conflicts was directly related to the relationship with imperial powers, 
while, in contrast, religious disputes were the purview of the Ionian League. Lastly, I 
reexamine the topic of Ionian exiles and Alexander the Great, showing that Alexander’s 
Exiles Decree had little application in Ionia because he had resolved the issue in 334 and 
333, but that our sources link the decree to his decision regarding Samos because of the 
decree’s reception in Athens. 
Then there are five case studies on economic topics. “The Burden of Empire on 
Ionia,” is a reexamination of the Athenian Tribute Lists that builds up to a reevaluation of 
the notorious Assessment of 425 in which I argue that the assessment need not be 
interpreted as exceptionally onerous in Ionia. In “Ionian Coinage and the Delian League,” 
I examine the second part of Athenian imperial regulation, the minting of coins, arguing 
that the Ionians usually closed their mints out of economic interest rather than regulation. 
Then, in “Ionian Commodity Networks,” I query the usual interpretation of the fourth 
century as a particularly tumultuous one for Ionian commerce, instead arguing that there 
was incredible persistence in these networks. Next, in “Monuments to Commercial 
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Prosperity?,” I analyze the construction of monumental temples in Ionia, arguing against 
the traditional view that the appearance of these construction projects is linked to periods 
of commercial prosperity. Instead, I connect these buildings to the relationship between 
the Ionian poleis and non-Ionian monarchs. Lastly, in “Hellenistic Kings, War, and the 
Economy in Ionia,” I examine the intersection of these three categories from the 
perspective of Ionian social history, showing how war imposed numerous new costs on 
the Ionian poleis in the early Hellenistic period and forced changes in Ionian society and 
the economy. 
In the penultimate study, “Accustomed to Obedience,” I examine the reputation of 
Ionians as decadent and soft, showing that moral language about their military ineptitude 
and tradition of subservience to barbarian kings creeps into the literature in the later 
Hellenistic and Roman periods, while Classical authors offer explanations for Ionian 
defeats in terms of military training and leadership. Finally, in “Between Local and 
Global,” I argue that the Archaic Ionian intellectual tradition did not end and shows how 
Ionians in the Classical and early Hellenistic periods continued to function within trans-
Aegean networks. 
By necessity, my dissertation does not cover every aspect of Ionian history, even 
within the limits of our evidence. I have, for instance, avoided extensive discussion of the 
types of constitutions in the Ionian poleis, which is a frequent point of contention in past 
scholarship. In part, I chose to avoid the issue of constitutions because I am mistrustful 
both of the evidence on this topic and of what is being referred to when one terms an 
Ionian polis a “democracy.” Moreover, this topic does not intrinsically reveal anything 
about the relationships between the Ionian poleis or between Ionia and imperial powers, 
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so it only appears when it intersects with those interactions. Instead, I endeavor to offer 
case studies on a wide range of issues that collectively serve to situate Ionia within 
Aegean and eastern Mediterranean networks in order to show that while Classical and 
early Hellenistic Ionia is peripheral to traditional histories of these periods, it was central 
to the development of Greek history.
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1. Prologue: Ionia 478-454 
 
Ionia, along with Croesus’ Lydian kingdom, was conquered by Cyrus the Great in 
c.545. Other than during a revolt against Persia in 499-494, the region was a Persian 
subject for more than the next sixty years. “Liberated” at the conclusion of the Persian 
wars in 478, the Ionian poleis were founding members of the Delian League, which is 
sometimes erroneously referred to as an Ionian alliance.1 The league was, originally, a 
defensive alliance meant to protect against Persian aggression and was named for the 
island of Delos, which hosted the original league headquarters. Ionia lay on the frontier 
with Persia and benefited from the Delian League to some extent, but the combination of 
Athenian demands and the continuing shadow of Persia posed new challenges that 
perpetuated and exacerbated social divisions that had existed already in the Archaic 
period.2 
In its early years, the Delian League probably offered a marginal boost to 
maritime commerce without being a burden to the Ionian poleis.3 The economic benefit 
came in two forms. First, the Delian League supported a network of Aegean markets, 
most notably Athens and the Piraeus, which opened opportunities for Ionian merchants 
who peddled Ionian products, participated in the grain trade, and victualed Delian League 
                                                 
1 L. Mitchell, Panhellenism and the Barbarian (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 
2007), 206. 
2 On these social divisions, see, for instance, V. Gorman, Miletos (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 2002), 106-7. 
3 R. Osborne, “Archeology of the Athenian Empire,” TAPhA 129 (1999), 319. 
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expeditions (see below).4 Thus, the league increased prosperity of its members even 
though Athens siphoned off wealth in the form of phoros demands.5 Second, piracy in the 
Aegean declined during the second and third quarters of the fifth century. Piracy in the 
ancient Mediterranean was a ubiquitous part of life, where λῃστάι (raiders or pirates), 
defined by Aristotle as hunters, preyed upon ships and communities (Pol. 1256a).6 This 
was a common “form of production” in Ionia.7 For instance, the Ephesians attacked 
Chian survivors from the battle of Lade in 494 because they believed them to be pirates 
(Hdt. 6.16) and, during the Ionian War, Milesians instructed the Peloponnesians where 
best to lay in wait for an Athenian fleet sailing from Egypt (Thuc. 8.35).8 Athens was 
probably more concerned with making a show of stopping piracy than in using its navy to 
combat brigandage on the seas,9 but the Athenian alliances and court system in which 
victims could seek redress meant that the number of viable targets of piracy was reduced 
in the Aegean. The Delian League did not offer respite from the long-standing political 
                                                 
4 D. Tandy, “Traders in the Archaic and Classical Greek Koine,” in Traders in the 
Ancient Mediterranean, ed. T. Howe (Chicago: Ares, 2015), 63-72. On Ionian 
commodities and the grain trade, see Part III, Chapter 16. 
5 B. Rutishauser, Athens and the Cyclades: Economic Strategies 540-314 BC (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 81-2. 
6 P. de Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 15-30; H.A. Omerod, Piracy in the Ancient World: an essay in 
Mediterranean history (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1997), 13-36, 68-9; cf. C.R. Backman, 
“Piracy,” in A Companion to Mediterranean History, edd. P. Horden and S. Kinoshita 
(Malden, Blackwell, 2014), 170-83. 
7  As Omerod, Piracy in the Ancient World, 68, describes it. 
8 On Ephesus, see Part III, Chapter 9, on the Ionian war, see Part III, Chapter 3. 
9 Rutishauser, Athens and the Cyclades, 17, contra Hornblower, CT 1, 22-3, who argues 
piracy suppression was a regular activity of the Athenian navy. 
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and economic divisions in and among the Ionian poleis, but, in its early years, it created 
the conditions in which the region could prosper.10 
Ancient tradition held that the Athenian takeover of leadership of the Hellenic 
alliance against Persia in 477 was at the behest of the allies and that Samian and Chian 
leaders played a conspicuous role in proving that the allies opposed Spartan leadership 
(Plut. Aris. 23.4-5).11 In those early years there was little overt opposition to the Athenian 
hegemony in Ionia. One possible explanation is that Athens marketed the league as an 
Ionian federation, thus playing on traditions of mythical ethnic ties in which Athenian 
settlers founded the Ionian poleis.12 Ionian contingents fought alongside the Athenian 
forces at Eurymedon in 365 (Thuc. 1.98.3, 1.100; Plut. Cimon 13.4),13 and at Tanagra in 
457 (ML 36, l. 3; Paus. 5.10.4).14 Ionians were also likely keen to contribute to the 
expedition to Egypt in 454 in order to extend their commercial networks, unaware that 
the campaign would be a fiasco (ML 34; Thuc. 1.104; cf. Hdt. 2.48, 3.60; Ctesias F 14).15 
                                                 
10 This is not itself a novel suggestion, but a variation on what Balcer refers to as “Stage 
One” imperialism, see below Part II, Chapter 2. 
11 Kagan, Outbreak, 33, 39-41; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 42-3. 
12 Mac Sweeny, Foundation Myths and Politics in Ancient Ionia, 11; Mitchell, 
Panhellenism and the Barbarian, 206; see Part III, Chapter 11. 
13 Kagan, Outbreak, 46-7; Shipley, Samos, 110. 
14 Kagan, Outbreak, 93-5; Shipley, Samos, 110. 
15 Balcer, Sparda, 407, implausibly suggests that Samians held this motivation distinct 
from other Ionian poleis or Athens. Cf. Briant, From Alexander to Cyrus, 573-7; 
Hornblower, CT 1, 163-4; A.J. Holladay, “The Hellenic Disaster in Egypt,” JHS 109 
(1989), 176-82; L. Llewellyn-Jones and J. Robson, Ctesias’ History of Persia: Tales of 
the Orient (London: Routledge, 2004), 188; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 107-8, 439-41; 
Shipley, Samos, 111; H.D. Westlake, “Thucydides and the Athenian Disaster in Egypt,” 
CPh 45 (1950), 209-16. P. Salmon, La Politique Égyptienne d’Athenes (Brussels: Palais 
des Académies, 1965), 129-33, argues that commerce was an important consideration, 
but that the driving Athenian motivation was to strike a blow against Persia. On the 
campaign, see 134-89.  
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The years 454-449 are, in retrospect, often seen as the time when the Delian 
League metastasized into the Athenian Empire. Pericles transferred the league treasury to 
Athens in 454 (Plut. Per. 12.1-2), which inaugurated the period of conspicuous building 
projects at Athens and apogee of Athenian power.16 Open conflict between Athens and 
Persia, the ostensible purpose of the Delian League, ground to a halt after Cimon’s death 
in 450 (Plut. Cimon 19.1-2),17 which freed Athenian forces to focus on exerting control 
over the league.18 The traditional interpretation of Ionia during this period is that the 
transition set up the final marginalization because it put the poleis in a Catch 22: resist 
and be crushed or acquiesce and accept subordination. Thus, this interpretation would 
have the Ionian poleis be “prizes” in the imperial competitions of Athens, Persia, and 
other imperial aspirants.19 Closer examination of Ionia, however, reveals that this 
characterization is deeply flawed. The Ionian poleis continued to be active players in the 
Aegean and eastern Mediterranean worlds during the Classical period and were partners 
in the imperial enterprise, not simply prizes to be won. 
 
                                                 
16 Kagan, Outbreak, 101; M.F. McGregor, The Athenians and their Empire (Vancouver: 
The University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 75-83, 105; P.A. Stadter, A 
Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1989), 145-8. 
17 J.M. Balcer, The Persian Conquest of Greece (Konstanz: Universitatsverlag Konstanz, 
1995), 313-14; Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 557-8, 579; Kagan, Outbreak, 103-6. 
Plutarch says μετ δ τν κείνου τελευτν πρς μν τος βαρβάρους οδν τι 
λαμπρν π᾽  οδενς πράχθη στρατηγο τν λλήνων, λλ τραπέντες π 
δημαγωγν κα πολεμοποιν π᾽ἀλλήλους... “After [Cimon’s] death, no other general 
of the Greeks carried out any famous exploits against the barbarians, but they [the 
Greeks] were turned on one another by demagogues and warmongers…” 
18 G. Cawkwell, “The Peace between Athens and Persia,” Phoenix 51 (1997), 115-30. Cf. 
Kagan, Outbreak, 108-10; McGregor, Athenians and their Empire, 65-9. H.B. Mattingly, 
“Peace of Kallias,” Historia 14 (1965), 273-81, dates the treaty to 426/5.  
19 E.g. K. Brodersen, “Aegean Greece,” in A Companion to the Classical Greek World, 
ed. K.H. Kinzl (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 102. 
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2. Ionia under Athenian Hegemony: 454-412 
 
 
I. Ionian Stasis Before the Peloponnesian War 
In his Sparda by the Bitter Sea, Balcer offered a paradigm for ancient imperialism 
as three stages through which the relationship between Ionia and its erstwhile conquerors 
may be understood. First, he posits a defensive stage during which “a fear of foreign 
military intervention and fear of foreign domination of the institutions of art” drove 
increased militarism and alliances.1 This stage gave way to an offensive period of seeking 
cultural and military domination.2 Every state, he says, that took the step from stage one 
to stage two must then break down in stage three, where the failures of institutions and 
leadership meant that the regime succumbed to the stage one of a new imperial regime.3 
According to Balcer, Ionia sat precisely at the overlap of these competing imperialisms 
such that stage-one, which offered an attractive combination of protection and autonomy, 
was preferable to the later stages and therefore the rise and fall of empires dictated Ionian 
behavior. Balcer’s model treats Ionia first and foremost as a frontier, and he posits that 
the competing imperialisms resulted in Ionian stasis because the landed aristocracies 
preferred Persian hegemony, while the nucleated settlements gravitated toward Athenian. 
Balcer is, however, too reliant on a clash of civilizations narrative. In contrast, 
Vlassopoulos has recently offered an interpretation where Persia was politically 
imperialistic while Greek culture was imperialistic in its own right, becoming the 
common vocabulary and iconography beyond what is considered the Greek world.4  
                                                 
1 Balcer, Sparda, 19-20. 
2 Balcer, Sparda, 21-2. 
3 Balcer, Sparda, 23-5. 
4 Vlassopoulos, Greeks and Barbarians, particularly 226-76. 
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Ionian poleis were riven by stasis, but it is simplistic to suppose that the lines were 
delineated simply by the choice of which overlord Ionians preferred. More probably, the 
appeals to Athens and Persia were the product of local power struggles. 
Naval vulnerability after the disaster in Egypt in 454 and rumors that Artaxerxes 
would raid Delos prompted a move of the league treasury from Delos to Athens (Diod. 
12.38.2; Plut. Arist. 25.2).5 The transfer was unpopular, as Aristides forewarned when he 
said that the move was unjust, but profitable (ὡς οὑ δίκαιον μέν, συμφέρον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστί, 
Plut. Arist. 25.2).6 According to ancient tradition, the Samians suggested the treasury be 
moved, but it ought to be noted that they also paid no phoros and thus may not have 
considered the change oppressive. Plutarch preserves the tradition that Pericles’ enemies 
tried to slander (διαβάλλειν) him on account of how the money was handled (Plut. Per. 
12.1-2).7 Plutarch’s episode culminates with a critique of the Periclean building program 
                                                 
5 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 44; Kagan, Outbreak, 101; Shipley, Samos, 111; R. Legon, 
“Samos in the Delian League,” Historia 21 (1972), 146, points out that there were no 
Samian contributions to the treasury, which may have meant that they were less 
concerned about the change’s implications for the league, while W.K Pritchett, “The 
Transfer of the Delian Treasury,” Historia 18 (1969), 17-21, argues that Thucydides 
means to highlight that the allies might have considered it a reasonable move at the time 
only to see the change as disastrous in hindsight. On dating the regulations for Miletus 
and Erythrae, see below. 
6 The popularity of the Athenian hegemony is long disputed. For the thesis that it was 
unpopular, see: T.J. Quinn, “Thucydides and the Unpopularity of the Athenian Empire,” 
Historia 13 (1964), 257-66; D.W. Bradeen, “The Popularity of the Athenian Empire,” 
Historia 9 (1960), 257-69; that it was popular: G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, “The Character of 
the Athenian Empire,” Historia 3 (1954), 241; and “The Character of the Athenian 
Empire,” Historia 3 (1954), 1-16; H.K. Pleket, “Thasos and the Popularity of the 
Athenian Empire,” Historia 12 (1963), 70-7. C.W. Fornara, “IG I2, 39.52-57 and the 
‘Popularity’ of the Athenian Empire,” CSCA 10 (1977), 39-55, argues that before 431, 
when the alternative to Athens was autonomy, Athenian hegemony was unpopular, but 
that changed once it was a choice between masters. For the Ionian poleis other than 
perhaps Chios, autonomy was never an alternative. 
7 The accusation that Pericles used tribute to fund domestic monumental architecture is 
probably distorted and exaggerated. L. Kallet, “Did Tribute Fund the Parthenon?,” CA 8 
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that describes Athens as “like a shameless woman” (ὥσπερ ἀλαζόνα γυναῖκα), but it 
begins with the supposed outrage of the allies at Pericles for moving the treasury. It is 
implausibly argued that the transfer of the treasury was linked to revolts in Ionia,8 but, 
after the disaster in Egypt, chronic instability in the region increased the urgency for 
securing the treasury. Plutarch’s sources are unknown, but that he preserves these 
accusations as slander may indicate that the decision to move the treasury was neither 
made nor proposed by Pericles.9 Nevertheless, antipathy toward Athens for consolidating 
power had grown among the allies even before the building program began.  
The traditional opinion that Ionians chafed at the Delian League in 450s comes in 
part from the Athenian Tribute Lists, marble stelae on the Acropolis that recorded 
aparche (first-fruit offering) from the annual phoros payments.10 These lists are lacunate, 
but offer a partial chronicle of an interaction between Athens and the phoros-paying 
allies. At face value, the ATL supports the notion that there was a series of Ionian poleis 
that revolted from Athens starting in 454. Miletus is possibly absent from the list for 
454/3 (see below), while Milesians in Leros and Teichoussa both appear, and Boutheia 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1989), 252-66, argues that the passage should not be dismissed, as suggested by A. 
Andrewes, “The Opposition to Perikles,” JHS 98 (1978), 1-8, and W. Ameling, 
“Plutarch, Perikles 12-14,” Historia 34 (1985), 47-63, but also that the tribute did not 
fund the Parthenon. A. Giovannini, “Le Parthenon, le Tresor d'Athena et le Tribut des 
Allies,” Historia 39 (1990), 129-48, emphasizes the Parthenon as a Hellenic monument 
to victory over the barbarians, while L.J. Samons II, “Athenian Finance and the Treasury 
of Athena,” Historia 42 (1993), 129-38, argues that the treasury of Athena, which once 
collected revenue from league treasurers, became the war-chest of the League. See 
Kallet, n. 1, for a list of works that accept as fact that the Parthenon was funded with this 
money. Cf. Stadter, Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles, 147-8. 
8 J.P. Barron, “Milesian Politics and Athenian Propaganda, c.460-440 B.C.,” JHS 82 
(1962), 5. 
9 McGregor, Athenians and their Allies, 83. 
10 B. Paarmann, “Aparchai and Phoroi: A New Commented Edition of the Athenian 
Tribute Lists and Assessment Decrees” (PhD Diss. University of Fribourg, 2007), 40-52. 
See Part III, Chapter 14. 
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on the Erythraean peninsula appears on the list for 453/2 where it had previously paid 
with the other settlements in the Erythraean syntely.11 Balcer argues that a pro-Persian or 
anti-Athenian faction, which he identifies with the landed aristocracy, seized the astu 
(town center) of Erythrae and pro-Athenian groups fled to Boutheia from whence 
Athenian forces restored them.12 Similarly, he says, poleis such as Miletus had enclaves 
in the hinterland that favored close ties with Athens while the citizen population of the 
nucleated settlement favored Persia, or vice versa (see below).13 It is also suggested that 
there was Athenian military activity nearby since a large number of Carian communities 
appear for the first time in 450.14 Miletus and Erythrae both have inscriptions recording 
Athenian regulations (ML 43 and 40, respectively), but these probably belong in the third 
quarter of the fifth century (see below).15  
Evidence from the Athenian Tribute Lists is suspect because, as a collection, they 
are extremely fragmentary, meaning that the missing entries may simply be lacunae in the 
                                                 
11 Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 93; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 112; P.J. Rhodes “The Delian 
League to 449 B.C.,” in CAH2 5, 54-9. In an examination of local settlements on the 
Erythraean Peninsula, I. Gezgin, “The Localization Problems of Erythrae’s Hinterland,” 
trans. A. Aykurt, Arkeoloji Dergisi 14 (2009), 7, argues that there is no archeological 
evidence for a settlement named Boutheia. On the entries for the Ionian poleis on the 
Athenian Tribute Lists, see Part III, Chapter 14.  
12 Balcer, Sparda, 380-1; cf. D.M. Lewis, “The Athenian Tribute-Quota Lists, 453-450,” 
ABSA 89 (1994), 294. 
13 Balcer, Sparda, 377-8. 
14 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 117-18.  
15 The provenance of this decree at Erythrae is particularly problematic. It was found on 
the Athenian Acropolis by Fauvel in the early nineteenth century, but both the stone and 
the original copy are lost. See Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 91, with bibliography; cf. G.E. 
Malachou, “A Second Facsimile of the Erythrai Decree (IG I3 14),” in ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ 
ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΣ: Studies in Honour of Harold B. Mattingly, edd. A.P. Matthaiou and R.K. 
Pitt (Athens: Greek Epigraphic Society, 2014), 73-96 and A. Moroo, “The Erythrai 
Decrees Reconsidered: IG I3 14, 15 & 16,” in ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΣ: Studies in 
Honour of Harold B. Mattingly, edd. A.P. Matthaiou and R.K. Pitt (Athens: Greek 
Epigraphic Society, 2014), 97-120. 
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stones. Recent work on the Athenian Tribute Lists has revealed that Miletus did in fact 
make phoros payments in the late 450s and early 440s.16 That modern scholars see 
double with reference to the revolts does not mean that Ionia was stable. The changes to 
the communities on the Tribute Lists have been seen as an Athenian scheme either to 
tighten the grip on the Ionian poleis by decentralizing the region or to increase the 
amount of tribute. For instance, Gomme argues that Athens encouraged Marathesium to 
reject Samian control, which would have produced additional revenue since Samos did 
not pay a phoros.17 The proposition that this top-down change cascaded into the conflict 
between Samos and Miletus (see below) is unlikely, however, because Samos had already 
probably given Marathesium to Ephesus in return for Anaea.18 Thus the Ephesian phoros 
already included Marathesium. The changes to the payment structure at Miletus and 
Erythrae in the 450s and to Ephesus when Pygela, Marathesium, and Isinda first appear 
on the tribute lists in the 440s do not indicate a revolt or top-down restrictions imposed 
by Athens, but are better understood as local civil strife and separation with the poleis. 
Thus, satellite communities agitated for autonomy, one sign of which was to make their 
own phoros payments.  
Then there is the specter of Persian intervention. Briant argues that that the 
Persian King expected to reclaim the tribute from Ionia even after hostilities with Athens 
                                                 
16 B. Paarman, “The Revolt of Miletus in 454/3 and the Milesians in IG I3 259.III.29,” in 
ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΣ: Studies in Honour of Harold B. Mattingly, edd. A.P. 
Matthaiou and R.K. Pitt (Athens: Greek Epigraphic Society, 2014), 125-37. On Miletus 
and the ATL, see Part III, Chapter 14. 
17 Gomme, HCT 1, 349-50; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 428; Podleki, Pericles, 119.  
18 Rubinstein, “Ionia,” 1082. 
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ended,19 and thus that Artaxerxes encouraged the satraps to test Athenian weakness, 
particularly appealing to the medisers that existed in every polis. Much of the evidence 
for this dynamic is problematic. First, the Persian satrap at Sardis likely remained in a 
position to exert influence in Ionia in the 450s, and Themistocles is said to have received 
Myus, an Ionian polis on the Gulf of Latmus, from the Persian king (Plut. Them. 29.7). It 
is possible that the anecdote indicates that Myus was a Persian possession until 450 when 
its payments appear on the Athenian Tribute List,20 but the story is suspect. Plutarch 
specifically says Myus was to provide Themistocles with ὄψον (cooked fish), but this is 
likely metaphorical since the other gifts of wine and bread completed the tripartite 
structure of the ideal Greek diet.21 Second, Meiggs speculates that an Athenian decree in 
praise of Sigeum (IG I3 17), which promised support if the polis was attacked, should be 
read as a response to the Satrap of Dascylium subverting the polis parallel to the 
machinations in Ionia.22 This decree, however, like the regulations in Ionia, has been 
aggressively down-dated to 418/17.23 Finally, Thucydides records that the Persian king 
Artaxerxes I sent Megabyzus to Sparta with money in order to encourage the Spartan 
                                                 
19 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 580-1; McGregor, Athenians and their Empire, 65-9; 
cf. M. Waters, Ancient Persia: A Concise History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 163-4. 
20 Balcer, Sparda, 373. ATL 1, list 3.  
21 J.N. Davidson, Courtesans and Fishcakes: The Consuming Passions of Classical 
Athens (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 21-4. 
22 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 117; R. Meiggs, “The Crisis of Athenian Imperialism,” 
HSPh 67 (1963), 6; Kagan, Outbreak, 102. 
23 P.J. Rhodes, “After the Three-Bar “Sigma” Controversy: The History of Athenian 
Imperialism Reassessed,” CQ2 58 (2008), 503-4; Mattingly, “The Growth of Athenian 
Imperialism,” Historia 12 (1963), 270-1. N. Papazarkadas, “Epigraphy and the Athenian 
Empire: Reshuffling the Chronological Cards,” in Interpreting the Athenian Empire, edd. 
J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas, and R. Parker (London: Duckworth, 2009), 77, pushes the date 
even further to 407. 
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invasion of Attica in 457/6 (1.109.2-3).24 The Persian King certainly never relinquished 
his claim to the Ionian poleis and therefore instructed the satraps, when possible, to 
recover the tribute payments so it is impossible to rule out that Ionian unrest was a pro-
Persian fifth-column.25 Some Ionian families surely profited from Persian occupation and 
appealed again in order to recover their position, but this does not indicate a significant 
medising element in Ionia. 
The problem with treating the discontent in Ionia categorically as anti-Athenian, 
pro-Persian, Persian-sponsored, or some combination thereof, is that domestic friction 
was already smoldering before the 450s.26 The “revolts” were located in particularly 
decentralized poleis. Miletus had been destroyed at the conclusion of the Ionian revolt in 
494 (Hdt. 6.18-21) and was only refounded in 479 after the battle of Mycale when the 
Persian forces withdrew from the region.27 The government in 479 had festivals and 
political bodies that mirrored those of Archaic Miletus, albeit without the Branchidae, the 
hereditary priests of Apollo at Didyma,28 and without control over the entire chora.29 
                                                 
24 R. Meiggs, “The Growth of Athenian Imperialism,” JHS 63 (1943), 22; Kagan, 
Outbreak, 96-7; McGregor, Athenians and their Empire, 58; Hornblower, CT 1, 175; 
D.M. Lewis, “Persian Gold in Greek International Relations,” REA 91 (1989), 227-35. 
25 J. Balcer, “Separatism and Anti-Separatism in the Athenian Empire (478-433 B.C.),” 
Historia 23 (1974), 27; Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 580-1; M. Waters, “Applied 
Royal Directive: Pissouthnes and Samos,” in The Achaemenid Court, edd. B. Jacobs and 
R. Rollinger (Weisbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 817-28. 
26 Kagan, Outbreak, 100-1. 
27 The territory of Miletus was not completely uninhabited in 479, and a contingent of 
Milesians served in and betrayed the Persian army at the battle (Hdt. 9.104), but a large 
enough population to warrant refoundation on the site, evidenced by later archeological 
finds, only appeared after the battle. Gorman, Miletos, 147-51, postulates that the new 
population consisted of citizens from Milesian colonies. 
28 N.G.L. Hammond, “The Branchidae at Didyma and in Sogdiana,” CQ2 48 (1998), 339-
41. On the re-establishment of Didyma, see Part II, Chapter 6 and Part III, Chapter 17. 
29 N. Robertson, “Government and Society at Miletus, 525-442 B.C.,” Phoenix 41 (1987), 
378; Gorman, Miletos, 273. A.J. Earp, “Athens and Miletos ca. 450 B.C.,” Phoenix 8 
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Miletus was not in revolt from the Delian League in 450, but was on the brink of a civil 
war. 
The Milesian astu was situated on the south shore of the Gulf of Latmos, but its 
territory was extensive and included towns such as Teichoussa and islands such as Lade, 
Patmos, and Leros, and a sizeable Carian population. It is of little surprise therefore that 
Miletus was beset by stasis in the Archaic and Classical periods. Two accounts describe 
this strife along economic lines. [Plutarch] says that Miletus was divided between the 
aeinautai (“forever sailors”) and the cheiromachei (“manual workers,” likely farmers), 
which may indicate conflict between landed interests and burgeoning maritime commerce 
(Mor. 298c-d; cf. Hdt. 5.28-30).30 Similarly, Athenaeus preserves a fragment from 
Heraclides of Pontus about conflict between the wealthy in Miletus and the gergithae 
(slaves, or poorer stratum of society), during which the Gergithae expelled the citizens 
and had young children trampled by oxen on the threshing floors (Athen. 12.26).31 
Neither story is strictly historical, but both indicate an unstable community.  
                                                                                                                                                 
(1954), 144, argues that the restored community had a democratic constitution until the 
Athenian intervention in the late 450s.  
30 Greaves, Miletos, 95; Robertson, “Government and Society at Miletus,” 381-2; How 
and Wells, CH 2, 10-11; T.A. Goldman, “Imperializing Hegemony: the Polis and 
Achaemenid Persia,” (PhD Diss. University of Washington, 2011), 117-132, following 
H.T. Wallinga, “The Ancient Persian Navy and its Predecessors,” in Achaemenid History 
I: Sources, Structures, and Synthesis, ed. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (Leiden: Nederlands 
Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten: 1987) 47-77, adds that service in the Persian navy 
empowered non-political classes in the Ionian communities. The aeinautai may have 
been a merchant association throughout the Aegean, as indicated by an inscription 
declaring that they erected a herm at Eretria, see R.K. Sherk, “Eponymous Officials of 
Greek Cities: Mainland Greece and the Adjacent Islands,” ZPE 84 (1990), 238; B. Chr. 
Petrakos, “Dédidace des AEINAYTAI d’Érétrie,” BCH 87 (1963), 545-7.  
31 The Gergithae may have been Anatolian since the name resembles Gergithos of 
Herodotus 7.43.2, see How and Wells, CH 2, 147. On Heraclides of Pontus, see E. 
Schütrumpf, Heraclides of Pontus: Texts and Translations (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2008), 80-3. 
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The principal site of mediation and reconciliation at Miletus during the Archaic 
period was the Carian-founded sanctuary at Didyma (Paus. 7.2.6).32 Although the oracle 
ceased to speak after 494, the sanctuary probably served a similar unifying function 
during the Classical period, as indicated by the Molpoi Decree, which detailed the 
religious procedures for the annual procession along the Sacred Way that ran 16.4 
kilometers from Miletus to Didyma. The decree probably inscribed in 450/49 names the 
officials for the six Milesian tribes and the stephanophoroi of the Molpoi (singers) as 
leading the public festival to inaugurate the transition between aesymnetes.33 The 
importance of the Sacred Way also indicates that the route itself continued to be a locus 
for dedications.34 Despite these provisions for civic unity at Miletus, another decree, 
dated between 470 and 440 (ML 43), records the banishment of Alcimus and Cresphontes 
on the accusation of trying to seize power. The two men were the sons of Nympharetus 
and probably from the powerful Neleid family.35 The decree promises reward of one 
hundred staters to anyone who killed the exiles. While Alcimus and Cresphonetes are 
charged with having negotiated with Persia, there is no indication that the two men 
considered Athens anything other than an impediment to their own local political 
ambition. 
Colophon, the lone Ionian polis situated inland from the sea, had continued to 
trade up the Cayster River to the Persian territories even after joining the Delian League 
                                                 
32 Gorman, Miletos, 186-8; Greaves, Miletos, 109-11; H.W. Parke, The Oracles of Apollo 
in Asia Minor (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 2; contra J. Fontenrose, Didyma (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 6, see Part II, Chapter 17. 
33 Gorman, Miletos, 170-86; Robertson, “Government and Society at Miletus,” 378-84; 
Barron, “Milesian Politics and Athenian Propaganda,” 1-2. 
34 On the sacred ways in Ionia, see Greaves, Land of Ionia, 180-93. 
35 Gorman, Miletos, 229-34; Robertson, “Government and Society at Miletus,” 358-9; 
Barron, “Milesian Politics and Athenian Propaganda,” 1-2. 
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and minted small denomination coins on the Persian standard.36 Colophon’s location 
made it harder for Athens and easier for Persia to exert influence,37 and, in 450, it 
disappeared from the Athenian Tribute lists.38 However, I believe that the decrees 
recording Athenian regulations for Colophon and the establishment of a colony nearby 
more likely belong in the suppression of the revolt in 430 rather than 450 (see below).  
No Ionian polis tried to buck Athenian hegemony in the 450s, but the situations at 
Colophon, Erythrae and Miletus indicate widespread political unrest that was not limited 
to a small number of medisers. This stasis, extant in the 450s, continued throughout the 
440s and was the product of local tensions exacerbated by Athenian actions, rather than a 
response to the evolution of Athenian imperialism.39  
 
II. The War Between Samos and Miletus and Athenian Intervention 
 Samos had been the Ionian polis most staunchly in support of Athens in 454 
when its delegate had suggested that the Delian League move the treasury to Athens; in 
the early 440s the relationship was friendly enough that Socrates travelled to Samos 
where he probably met the Samian philosopher Melissus and other Samian intellectuals 
who routinely studied in Athens (Diog. Laert. 2.23).40 There is trace evidence, however, 
that Athens installed a cleruchy on the island c.450.41 Horoi (boundary stones) on the 
                                                 
36 T. Figueira, The Power of Money (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1998), 78, 478, see Part III, Chapter 15. 
37 Kagan, Outbreak, 118-19; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 161-2. Thucydides 3.34.  
38 Balcer, Sparda, 405. 
39 Balcer, Sparda, 380. The timing could indicate a response to an Athenian settlement 
with Persia such as is traditionally referred to as the Peace of Callias. However, the treaty 
is probably an invention of the fourth century. 
40 D.W. Graham, “Socrates on Samos,” CQ2 58 (2008), 308-13. See Part III, Chapter 20. 
41 Shipley, Samos, 114-16.  
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island belonging to sanctuaries for “Athena, Protectress of Athens,” “Ion from Athens,” 
and “The Eponymous Heroes from Athens” have been found inscribed in Attic rather 
than Ionic,42 and similar horoi have been found on Cos, Aegina, and Chalcis, other places 
on which Athenians imposed cleruchies in the early 440s. Thus, Shipley argues that 
Athens had installed a cleruchy on the island during this period, not displacing the 
Samians, but bringing in a small number of Athenians to help secure the polis against a 
Samian faction that gathered at Anaea in the Samian peraea.43 He also connects an 
anecdote attributed to Craterus that an “Attikos paroikos” meant a bad neighbor to this 
period.44 This episode on Samos escapes mention in the extant histories. While it is 
possible that an inscription detailing the end of an open conflict is lost, the cleruchy was 
probably not a punishment for revolt, but rather a preemptive measure against stasis, 
where the Athenians only seized the estates of a few prominent disaffected Samians.45 
Nevertheless, the Attikoi paroikoi were unpopular and likely caused more problems than 
they solved. 
Samos entered into a conflict with Miletus in 441 over control of territory on the 
Mycale peninsula (Thuc. 1.115.2; Diod. 12.27.1).46 The accounts of the Athenian entry 
                                                 
42 Some of the stones used the “three-barred sigma,” a letter type that was more common 
in Athenian public inscriptions before 446. R. Meiggs, “The Dating of Fifth-Century 
Attic Inscriptions,” JHS 86 (1966), 86-98; Shipley, Samos, 115. For recent debates about 
the dating of fifth-century decrees by letterform, see A. Henry, “The Sigma Enigma,” 
ZPE 120 (1998), 45-8; Rhodes, “After the Three-Bar “Sigma” Controversy,” 500-6. See 
below for discussion of the problem. 
43 Shipley, Samos, 114-16.  
44 Shipley, Samos, 115. 
45 Shipley, Samos, 115, notes that the horoi were found on some of the most fertile land 
on Samos. 
46 I published the argument that follows as “The war between Miletus and Samos περ 
Πριήνης (Thuc. 1.115.2; Diod. 12.27.2; and Plut. Per., 25.1),” CQ2 66 (2017), 772-4.  
Kagan, Outbreak, 170; Shipley, Samos, 113, following Gomme, notes that it is possible 
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into the war are vague; Thucydides says that Athens intervened in the war because the 
Milesians, being beaten, appealed for intervention and because a faction of Samians 
desired constitutional change (1.115.2-3), while Diodorus says that Samos went to war 
with Athens on account of Athenian favoritism toward Miletus (12.27.1) and Plutarch 
says that Samians rejected an arbitration ordered by Athens, thus prompting Athenian 
intervention (Per. 25.1).47 As hegemon of the league, Athens had grounds upon which to 
intervene and the Samian rejection of this arbitration was a direct challenge to Athenian 
authority.48 In June or July 441, an Athenian fleet sailed to Samos, toppled the 
government, collected hostages that they deposited on Lemnos, and installed a garrison 
(Thuc. 1.115.3-4; Diod. 12.27.1-3).49 The leaders of the unrest fled to Persia where they 
plotted a return with Pissouthnes, the satrap at Sardis (Thuc. 1.115.4-5; Diod. 12.27.3).50 
The imposition of a garrison at Samos was an extreme measure, and the Athenians went 
further by taking hostages, probably from the remaining aristocrats.  
                                                                                                                                                 
that the conflict was between Miletus, Samos, and Priene over another plot of land on the 
Mycale peninsula. Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 428, n. 14, argues that Samos might have 
tried to take Priene in compensation for the loss of Marathesium. The wars between 
Miletus and Samos over Priene might have prompted change in venue for the Panionion 
festival from Priene to Ephesus, Diod. 15.48. Cf. Hornblower, CT 1, 189. On the Samian 
Peraea, see C. Carusi, Isole e Peree in Asia Minore (Pisa: Scuole Normale Superiore, 
2003), 127-97. On the Panionion, see Part III, Chapter 8. 
47 As Quinn, Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios, 11, notes that the explanations in 
Thucydides and Plutarch are not mutually exclusive. Athens may have received the 
request for aid and ordered arbitration. It is also plausible that the Samians suspected an 
arbitrator would have sided against them, justifying Diodorus’ statement. Plutarch also 
says that Pericles decided to intervene at Samos to placate Aspasia, who was from 
Miletus, see Part III, Chapter 20. On the arbitration, see Part III, Chapter 12. 
48 Kagan, Outbreak, 171-2; Shipley, Samos, 113 and n.8, contra Quinn, Athens and 
Samos, Lesbos and Chios, 11, who argues that the Samians were surprised by the 
Athenian intervention. 
49 Diodorus also records an indemnity of eighty talents, but unless he is referring to 
property seized this fine is probably too insignificant. Hornblower, CT 1, 189, points out 
that Lemnos had been an Athenian possession since the Persian Wars. 
50 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 580-1. 
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In 440, some eight months after the Athenian intervention, the Samian exiles 
returned by night with seven hundred mercenaries provided by Pissouthnes and 
overthrew the Athenian-backed regime (Thuc. 1.115.5; Diod. 12.27.3).51 Pissouthnes also 
helped them rescue their hostages from Lemnos.52 The conspirators expelled the 
Athenian cleruchs and their Samian opponents and likely had broad popular support.53 
When Pericles led a second Athenian expedition to the island, the polis held out for more 
than eight months.54 It is reasonable to assume that the Athenian meddling in local 
government, designed to quell nascent dissent, had actually exacerbated hostilities and 
gave the citizens of Samos an enemy to unite against. Thucydides records that the 
Samians turned the Athenian garrison and its commanders over to Pissouthnes and 
prepared a campaign against Miletus (1.115.5).55 They probably did not expect to capture 
Miletus with a mere seven hundred mercenaries, but invaded as part of their agreement 
with Pissouthnes in return for the disputed territory. 
When news of the coup, transmitted by the expelled garrison and exiled Samians, 
reached Athens, the Athenians immediately dispatched a fleet of sixty ships to the eastern 
Aegean. Most sailed directly to Samos, but some set to guard against the possible 
appearance of the Phoenician fleet and others went to allied states to summon aid (Thuc. 
                                                 
51 Kagan, Outbreak, 172; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 59; Podlecki, Pericles, 119; Meiggs, 
Athenian Empire, 189; McGregor, Athenians and their Empire, 99. 
52 Diodorus 12.27.3 and Thucydides 1.115.3, say that they rescued the hostages right after 
the coup, while Plutarch, Pericles 25.3, says that Pissouthnes liberated them. 
53 Despite McGregor, Athenians and their Empire, 99, characterizing their opponents as 
“the commons.” 
54 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 191; McGregor, Athenians and their Empire, 99-100. 
55 Hornblower, CT 1, 189. 
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1.116.1).56 The Athenian fleet defeated the Samian ships returning from Miletus off the 
island of Tragia. After disembarking on Samos, the Athenian army defeated the Samians 
and lay siege to the settlement. Before the rest of the allied fleet arrived, Pericles took 
most of the ships toward Caria, supposedly because of a rumor that the Phoenician fleet 
was nearby (Thuc. 1.116.3). However, Pericles likely sailed to Miletus in order to counter 
Pissouthnes as much as the threat of the Persian fleet. Melissus, the Samian commander, 
took the opportunity to surprise the Athenian camp. His forces destroyed the Athenian 
guard ships and for two weeks controlled the sea around the island before Pericles 
returned and other reinforcements arrived, cutting off Samos (Diod. 12.28).57 
Although the Athenian campaign to Samos was meant to confront multiple threats 
in the northern and eastern Aegean, the length and cost of the expedition are out of 
proportion with the intensity of the conflict in Thucydides’ narrative.58 Plutarch and 
Diodorus preserve a more vicious account, including that Pericles was supposed to have 
brought to bear more siege engines than had been employed previously (Diod. 12.28.3; 
Plut. Per. 27.3).59 The Samians allegedly branded the prisoners they took with an owl, 
while the Athenians branded prisoners with the Samaena, which caused Aristophanes to 
joke in Babylonians that they were a “lettered” people (Plut. Per. 26.3-4).60 After a siege 
                                                 
56 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 581, points out that the Athenians had “no illusions” 
about the Persian fleet actually staying out of the Aegean. Cf. Kagan, Outbreak, 175; 
McGregor, Athenians and their Empire, 100; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 190-1; Shipley, 
Samos, 116-17. 
57 Kagan, Outbreak, 172, argues that the war was fundamentally about a Samian 
challenge to Athenian naval power. Cf. Podlecki, Pericles, 120; Meiggs, Athenian 
Empire, 191. 
58 Kagan, Outbreak, 173, 176; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 191. 
59 Plutarch derives his information from Ephorus, BNJ 70 F 194, 195. 
60 P. Karavites, “Enduring Problems of the Samian Revolt,” RhM 128 (1985), 54-6; 
Shipley, Samos, 116-17. 
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of eight months that cost the Athenians at least 908 and probably more than 1400 talents 
(IG I2 293),61 the Samians surrendered.  As punishment, they were saddled with an 
enormous fine to be paid in annual installments, had the ruling faction replaced,62 
surrendered new hostages, and had to tear down their walls and give up their ships (Thuc. 
1.117.3; Diod. 12.28.3 Plut. Per. 28). 63 Yet, Samos retained its independence, free of 
both phoros assessment and garrison. The formula for surrender was the same at Samos 
as it appeared elsewhere later, with the boule taking an oath of loyalty to Athens.64 It has 
also been assumed, based on a reconstructed inscription (IG I2 50, l. 22), that the 
Athenians took a reciprocal oath to defend the Samian people, but it is more likely that 
the Samian boule had to swear an oath both to Athens and to defend its own demos.65  
In the aftermath of the war, there was likely retributive violence. Plutarch 
preserves, but rejects, a story from Duris of Samos that Pericles ordered the Samian 
trierarchs and epibatoi (marines) chained to planks in the Milesian agora after the war 
                                                 
61 Kagan, Outbreak, 176; C.W. Fornara, “The Chronology of the Samian War,” JHS 99 
(1979), 9-12; B.D. Meritt, “The Samian Revolt from Athens in 440-439 B.C.,” PAPhS 
128 (1984), 128. The inscription contains three sums, Fornara argues that they 
correspond to the three consecutive boards of treasurers responsible for paying for the 
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and the expedition to Byzantium. For the ancient tradition about cost, see: Isoc. 15.111 
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the island. 
62 Shipley, Samos, 121-2, cautions that the new government may not have been a 
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is unlikely. A. Blamire, “Athenian Finance, 454-404 B.C.,” Hesperia 70 (2001), 101-3, 
argues that the Samians were to pay back the cost of the war at a rate of fifty talents per 
year. Cf. Kagan, Outbreak, 176; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 192-4. 
64 Kagan, Outbreak, 176; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 193-4. 
65 Fornara, “Chronology of the Samian War,” 17-18. Contra ML 153. 
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and, after they had suffered for ten days, had their heads destroyed with clubs and their 
bodies cast out without burial rites (BNJ 76 F 67=Plut. Per. 28.1-2).66 The basis for 
Plutarch’s rejection of the story is that only Duris, who he accuses of embellishing 
horrors suffered by the Samians, attests to it. Plutarch is probably being overly 
exculpatory to Pericles and, as Shipley notes, such punishment was not unique in ancient 
warfare.67 However, the punishment should probably be tied not to the brutality of the 
siege, but to the Samian expedition to Miletus before the Athenian fleet arrived. A public 
location in Miletus is also an odd choice if the display was meant as a warning to the 
citizens of Samos and punishment for atrocities during the siege. The campaign against 
Miletus was probably a condition of the alliance between the renegade Samians and 
Pissouthnes, who coveted the polis. The executed trierarchs were likely the same men 
who had gone into exile in 441 and the epibatoi were likely the mercenaries employed in 
the counter-revolution. Nothing is known about the raid on Miletus, but it is reasonable to 
assume that, after the fall of Samos, Pericles then ordered the crucifixion, execution, and 
disposal of the bodies of individuals who attacked Miletus for crimes committed there. 
 
III. Horses not in need of the whip: Chians in the 430s 
                                                 
66 ς ρα τος τριηράρχους κα πιβάτας τν Σαμίων ες τν Μιλησίων γοραν γαγν 
κα σανίσι προσδήσας φ᾽  μέρας δέκα κακς δη διακειμένους προσέταξεν νελεν, 
ετα προβαλεν κήδευτα τ σώματα. 
67 Samos, 117. On the branding of prisoners, see Rawlings, The Ancient Greeks at War, 
particularly 114-15. Karavites, “Enduring Problems of the Samian Revolt,” 47-51, says 
that the punishment dates to 412, instead of 440, and also notes that the usual 
“crucifixion” is misleading. Cf. Stadter, Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles, 258-9; 
Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 192; Pownall BNJ 76 F 67 commentary; contra Karavites, 
“Enduring Problems of the Samian Revolt,” 45-53, who suggests that Duris conflated this 
conflict with another revolution in 412. He is right to acknowledge the depth of the civil 
strife in 412, see Part II, Chapter 3, but the location of the punishments in Miletus makes 
440/39 the more likely date. On Duris, see Part III, Chapter 20. 
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Eupolis likened Chios to a horse that did not require a whip in his comedy The 
Poleis of 422 because it obediently provided ships and men when needed.68 Chios not 
only accepted Athenian hegemony, but also supported the campaign against Samos.69 
Even more, when Thucydides recorded Chios’ departure from the league in 412/11, he 
paused to extoll its virtues, saying that Chios was the only polis that became more well-
governed and stable the larger it grew (8.24.4).70  
There was a strong connection between Athens and Chios in the fifth century. For 
instance, the Athenian proxenos at Chios, Hermisilaus, hosted a dinner-party for 
Sophocles while the latter was sailing from Samos to Lesbos during the siege (Ion, BNJ 
392 T 5b, F 6)71 and Ion of Chios attended a party at Athens thrown by Cimon (Ion, BNJ 
392 T 5a, F 12).72 Ion spent multiple extended periods of his life in Athens, competed and 
placed in Athenian dramatic competitions and was well-enough known to merit mention 
in Aristophanes’ Peace in 421 (834-7).73 A passage in Aristophanes’ Birds of 414, where 
Pisthetairus quips that he likes the custom of always adding Chios to things (Χίοισιν 
σθην πανταχο προσκειμένοις, 879-80), also indicates a wide perception that Athens 
                                                 
68 ατη Χίος, καλν καλν πόλις<μα>|πέμπει γρ μν νας μακρς νδρας θ᾽  ταν 
δεήσμ | κα τ᾽  άλλα πειθαρχε καλς, πληκτος σπερ ππος. J.M. Edmonds, 
Fragments of Attic Comedy I (Leiden: Brill, 1957), Eupolis F 232; cf. Hornblower, CT 2, 
403; Quinn, Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios, 42. On the dating of Eupolis, see I.C. 
Storey, “Dating and Re-Dating Eupolis,” Phoenix 44 (1990), 18-20.  
69 Quinn, Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios, 40. 
70 Χῖοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους ὧν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ηὐδαιμόνησάν τε ἅμα καὶ 
ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἐπεδίδου ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, τόσῳ δὲ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο 
ἐχυρώτερον. 
71 Quinn, Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios, 40; A. Geddes, “Ion of Chios and 
Politics,” in The World of Ion of Chios, edd. V. Jennings and A. Katsaros (Leiden: Brill, 
2007), 117-18. See Part III, Chapter 20. 
72 Ion was Plutarch’s source for Cimon’s physical appearance. 
73 Cf. Katsaros’ BNJ bibliographical essay. For a more detailed account of Ion’s 
curriculum vitae, see Part III, Chapter 20. 
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and Chios were close. 74 It is possible that the joke is merely a polite echo of Eupolis’ 
comment about Chios and Athens being inextricably linked, this time poking fun at the 
Athenians. However, I prefer Barron’s suggestion of a darker reading, namely that it 
refers to the scarcity of the remaining Athenian allies and therefore to Chios’ 
uniqueness.75 In this interpretation, Aristophanes implies that the Athenians were not 
adding Chios to things because of their special relationship, but out of desperation, being 
afraid that the Chians were not so well trained. 
There are reasons that discontent with Athenian hegemony took longer to 
manifest on Chios than elsewhere in Ionia. Chios was in a position where it was able to 
receive the benefits of the Delian League longer than most other Ionian communities. 
Archeological finds attest to a flourishing trade of Chian wine since shards of pottery for 
the transport of this wine appear in the Athenian Agora, Southern Russia, and Corinth.76 
So extensive was the wine trade that Barron argues that, “Chian wine was an essential 
part of victualing that great force…[Athens] committed to the six years’ fight for 
Egyptian independence.”77 Closer to home, Chios almost certainly supplied a similar fare 
during the siege of Samos in 440 (see above). In the mid-fifth century it relied on its 
extensive trade network for continued prosperity, but also to feed a burgeoning 
population. Thus Hippocrates of Chios, a Pythagorean mathematician, came to Athens 
                                                 
74 Quinn, Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios, 43. 
75 J.P. Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” in Chios, edd. J. Boardman and C.E. 
Vaphopoulou-Richardson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 102; followed by A. 
Blanshard, “Trapped Between Athens and Chios: A relationship in fragments,” in The 
World of Ion of Chios, edd. V. Jennings and A. Katsaros (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 154. 
76 Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” 95; Sarikakis, “Commertial Relations 
between Chios and other Greek cities in Antiquity,” 123; Davidson, Courtesans and 
Fishcakes, 42. On the high price of Chian wine, see Part III, Chapter 16. 
77 Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” 95. 
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primarily to bring a court case after being swindled out of his cargo (Arist. Eudemian 
Ethics 8.2.5).78 The importance of this commercial relationship meant that Chios likely 
made concessions to the Athenian weight regulations based on this economic incentive.79 
It would be a mistake, however, to downplay the ties between Athenian and Chian elites 
in facilitating the change since, as sketched above, there were particularly close ties 
between the two poleis.80 
Chian activity is particularly well documented, but maritime commerce was 
common throughout Ionia. In addition to the region’s connection with Anatolian trade 
networks, one of the routes from the Hellespont came into Ionia before crossing from 
Samos through the Cyclades to Athens. The existence and longevity of this route is 
supported by the recent underwater archeology find of more than forty-five shipwrecks 
between Samos and Fourni (a Samian possession, Strabo 10.5.13, 14.1.19) that range 
from the Archaic period through Late Antiquity.81 Though detailed analysis of these 
excavations are not yet published, the finds themselves indicate the ubiquity of trade 
conducted by and passing through Ionian poleis. Samian jars probably circulated in larger 
quantities than the famous Chian product, and Ionian merchants carried mastic, wool, 
scented woods, oil, and, likely, grain to Athens and other Aegean markets.82  
 
                                                 
78 See Part III, Chapter 20. 
79 Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” 98-100; Figueira, Power of, weights: 157, 
mint: 165. See Part III, Chapter 15. 
80 See Part III, Chapter 11. 
81 The preliminary findings from this project are forthcoming in G. Koutsouflakis and P. 
Campbell, “Ancient Trade and Navigation in the Aegean: The Initial 45 Shipwrecks of 
the Fourni Underwater Survey,” IJNA (2017). 
82 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 73; Sarikakis, “Commercial Relations between Chios and other 
Greek cities in Antiquity,” 123. See Part III, Chapter 16. 
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IV. Signs of Stasis 
A decree at Erythrae (ML 40) was the first Athenian regulation enacted in Ionia to 
address factional conflicts.83 The regulations forced Erythrae to adopt an Athenian-style 
democracy and council that was to be approved by a phrourarchos (garrison commander, 
l. 14) and required the polis to seek Athenian approval before new expulsions or 
restorations (l. 27). The decree specifies some unnamed exiles who took refuge with 
Persia, which leads scholars to infer that Athens had to intervene “militarily to expel a 
small medizing faction, and set up a democracy. She has installed a garrison which will 
remain to safeguard the settlement and protect Erythrai from medizers.”84 Yet, that the 
exiles took refuge with Persia does not require that they were inherently pro-Persian. 
Factions within the Ionian poleis reached out to Persia for help only because they decided 
to resist Athens, rather than the other way around. Once expelled, the exiles would have 
been banned from the poleis in the league and the Persian satrapy of Sparda, the domain 
of which was just a few kilometers away, was a common destination for Greek political 
refugees.85  
 This decree conjures specters of Persia and, several lines later, may warn about 
citizens who could betray Erythrae to tyrants in order to justify the constitutional reform 
                                                 
83 For 434, see Moroo, “Erythrae Decrees Reconsidered,” 97-120; Mattingly, “Periclean 
Imperialism,” 329 n. 80; on the earlier date c. 450, see Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 453/2; 
Jensen, “Rethinking Athenian Imperialism,” 52-4. Jensen’s claim that the Erythraeans 
saw an opportunity to revolt after the Athenian disaster in Egypt is plausible, but I believe 
that the stelae recording Athenian regulations became common only after the revolt of 
Samos. 
84 Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 92; cf. Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 579, 581; Rhodes, 
“The Delian League to 449 BCE,” 56-7. Note the assurance that the medizing faction was 
small. 
85 For instance, Themistocles received land at Magnesia from the Persian king and was 
there in the 450s, Plut. Them. 31.4. 
 43
and the garrison,86 but it also mandated that the officials coming into power had to take 
an oath of loyalty to Erythrae on the one hand and Athens and the allies on the other (ll. 
8-29).87 Additionally, the Athenian phrourarchos received broad civic powers to vet the 
incoming Erythraean council.88  The regulations at Erythrae paint a picture that shows 
Ionian stasis continuing and becoming more pronounced, forcing Athens to intervene. 
Whatever benevolent veneer the Athenians put on the decree, the changes, including the 
garrison, were directed at controlling a citizen body with sympathies toward Persia—or, 
at least, not Athens—that extended beyond a group of potentially malignant medizers. 
 
V. Reliable Allies? Ionia during the Peloponnesian War 
Athens increased the phoros payments from league members in 425, but without a 
consistent pattern across all tribute districts.89 The total payment for the Ionian district 
increased because Athens merged the Ionian and Carian districts after many rural dynasts 
and towns rejoined Persia, but while some Ionian poleis may have paid much larger 
amounts, there is no evidence for a dramatic increase in tribute.90 The assessment 
changed again in 420, usually, but not always, shrinking the rates from the Assessment of 
                                                 
86 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 113; Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 92, 107, they suggest that the 
tyrants to whom the community could be betrayed were the same individuals as those 
who fled to the Persians.  
87 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 113. 
88 A.S. Nease, “Garrisons in the Athenian Empire,” Phoenix 3 (1949), 106. Cf. Meiggs, 
Athenian Empire, 205-9.  
89 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 327. On the districts and Assessment of 425, see Part III, 
Chapter 14. 
90 Balcer, Sparda, 417-18; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 327-8. Meiggs also notes that there 
was inflation, but not enough to account for the total increase in tribute, 331.  
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425.91 While the smaller states in Ionia continued to provide their phoros uninterrupted, 
the larger states contributed military forces to most Athenian ventures through the early 
years of the Peloponnesian War. Even though the phoros assessments did not increase in 
425, allied military contributions nevertheless increased in the 420s because war and the 
plague had drained Athenian manpower (see below).92 Ionian frustration with Athenian 
imperialism increased in step with the higher demands, yet there are also indications that 
the stasis endemic in Ionia before 440 continued to fester irrespective to Athenian action.  
Ionia was un-walled in 427, according to Thucydides, and most probably was in 
431 (3.33.2).93 Chios possessed walls until 425 (see below), but Samos had lost its walls 
as part of the treaty with Athens in 439 and there are several possibilities for how the rest 
of Ionia came to be without walls: Persia forced the poleis to dismantle fortifications in 
494 and they were never rebuilt, the poleis never had walls, or, sometime after the war 
with Samos, Athens placed this sanction on potentially rebellious states.94 Plutarch 
preserves a fragment from the lost comic poet Telecleides who chided the Athenians for 
giving Pericles power over the walls of their subjects (Per. 16.2).95 It is notable that 
Thucydides mentions Ionia being unfortified at a point when there was a threat from a 
Peloponnesian fleet and not earlier, and it is plausible that he highlighted that the 
                                                 
91 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 344-5. Clazomenae, which had paid one and a half talents 
annually between 454 and 431 had a new quota of six talents in 425 and in 420 that 
increased again to fifteen, Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 342.  
92 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 332. 
93 Hornblower, CT 1, 414-15 
94 Hornblower, CT 1, 415, following E. Badian, “The Peace of Callias,” JHS 107 (1987), 
35, argues that the destruction of walls was a stipulation of the Peace of Callias that both 
Athens and Persia desired. Cf. Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 153 and n. 118; H.T. Wade-
Gery, Essays in Greek History (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 219; Meiggs, Athenian 
Empire, 149; Gomme HCT 1 295. 
95 Gorman, Miletus, 237; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 150. J.M. Cook, “The Problem of 
Classical Ionia,” PCPhS 187 (1961), 9-11.  
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Athenian demands put Ionia in a dangerous situation. Walls were expensive,96 and some 
Ionian poleis had not rebuilt their walls in 494, others, such as Myus, never had walls, 
while a third group that included Chios and Samos was ordered to destroy their walls by 
Athens. 
In 430, one of the factions at Colophon called for and received aid from Persia, 
forcing the rival faction to the Colophonian port of Notium (Thuc. 3.34.1).97 Thucydides 
records that the refugees at Notium again split into factions, with the one supported by 
the mercenaries in the pay of Pissouthnes. The other, exiled a second time, called for aid 
from the Athenian admiral Paches, who invited the mercenary commander to a parley, 
detained him, and immediately attacked, killing all the mercenaries (Thuc. 3.34.2-3). 
Paches then gave control of the polis to the, presumably anti-Persian, Colophonians, and 
Athens sent a colony to help maintain order by gathering refugees from Colophon and 
around the Aegean (ML 47; Thuc. 3.34.4).98 It is unknown how many resources Athens 
expended subduing Colophon, but the Athenians seized its mint and installed a colony 
nearby.99 A fragmentary decree records the treaty between Athens and Colophon and, 
while formerly dated to 447/6, probably refers to the resolution of this conflict in 427.100 
It is notable that Paches decided to settle the citizens of Colophon at Notium where it was 
easier for Athens to help, and control, them, rather than retake the astu, and that he 
                                                 
96 Hornblower, CT 1, 414-15, argues that Thucydides was not commenting on Ionian 
poverty. See Part III, Chapter 18. 
97 Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 61. Hornblower, CT 1, 416. Aristotle attributes the conflict 
to a geographical schism that made the territory unsuitable to a single community, Arist. 
Pol. 1303B 10. 
98 Hornblower, CT 1, 417, states that Thucydides may have been referring to temporary 
“organizers” rather than permanent colonists. Cf. Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 163. 
99 Balcer, Sparda, 405; Figueira, Power of Money, 78, on the interruption of Colophonian 
coinage. 
100 Mattingly, “Periclean Imperialism,” 176-7. 
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refrained from installing a garrison, perhaps because the proximity to Persia risked re-
ignition of hostilities. 
The instructions for the Chians to tear down their walls in 427 fits with the 
context of increased discontent with Athenian hegemony (Thuc. 4.51).101 A fragmentary 
inscription from Athens dated to 425/4 honors two Chians for their role in preserving the 
pisteis between the two communities.102 One of the names is an unknown Philippos and 
the other is fragmentary, but begins ΑΧ and may be reconstructed as Achilles. Barron 
plausibly suggests that Ion’s family, with their Atticism and penchant for heroic names, 
could have named a son Achilles and thus that Athens honored him for preventing the 
Chian defection from Athens.103 
Another source of unrest in Ionia was the settlement of Samian exiles at Anaea in 
the Cayster valley.104 These exiles ambushed an Athenian force under the command of 
Lysicles in 328 that was marching inland from Myus in order to collect money for the 
siege of Mytilene (Thuc. 3.19), provided pilots to the Peloponnesian fleet, and provoked 
unrest at Samos.105  
In 427, the Spartan Alcidas sailed to Ionia (Thuc. 3.31-3).106 Thucydides 3.33 
says that Alcidas received advice from Ionian exiles and was approached by the Samians 
at Anaia, but gives no indication that any polis genuinely considered going over to the 
                                                 
101 Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” 101; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 314. 
102 B.D. Meritt, “Attic Inscriptions of the Fifth Century,” Hesperia 14 (1945), 115-17. 
103 Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” 101-2. On Ion and his family, see Part III, 
Chapter 20. 
104 Carusi, Isole e Peree, 158-60; Shipley, Samos, 122. 
105 Shipley, Samos, 122. The exiles at Anaea also outfitted a ship to fight with the 
Peloponnesians during the outbreak of the Ionian war in 411, see Part II, Chapter 3. 
106 Hornblower, CT 1, 413-15. 
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Spartans, perhaps, though, because Paches was in the vicinity with an Athenian fleet.107 
The Samian exiles approached Alcidas at Ephesus and convinced him that he should not 
kill any more of the prisoners he captured on Chios because they were not his enemies, 
but allies under coercion (θηναίων δ π νάγκης ξυμμάχους, Thuc. 3.32.2). 
However, Alcidas had executed most of the prisoners when he put in at the Teian town of 
Myonnesus (Thuc. 3.32.1). Alcidas released his remaining prisoners at Ephesus, after 
which the Chians approached him with money. Alcidas’ voyage was a piratical raid 
against Athenian allies so the payments were ransoms and do not indicate direct support 
for the Spartan war effort.108 The exiles in Anaea likely also told Alcidas that they would 
be able to bring Pissouthnes into the war on their side. They were overly optimistic, 
however, about Pissouthnes’ ability to intervene since, soon after Artaxerxes’ death in 
424, the satrap revolted with the aid of Athenian mercenaries (Ctesias, F. 52).109 
Tissaphernes became satrap upon Pissouthnes’ defeat and the Athenians renewed their 
treaty with the new king Darius (Andoc. 3.29).110 
Signs of stasis also appear at Miletus. It has long been assumed that Miletus 
rebelled from Athens twice in the fifth century based on evidence from the early 
Athenian tribute lists and a fragmentary inscription that gives provisions for an Athenian 
                                                 
107 This episode is often connected to ML 67, but I date the inscription to c. 396, see Part 
II, Chapter 3. On the revolt of Mytilene, see Lewis, “The Archidamian War,” in CAH2 5, 
402-5. 
108 Gomme, HCT 2, 294-5, argues that Alcidas put into Ephesus just long enough to take 
on drinking water for the voyage home. 
109 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 591; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 80-1; Meiggs, 
Athenian Empire, 349; Llewellyn-Jones and Robson, Ctesias’ History of Persia, 194-5. 
110 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 591-2.  
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garrison (IG I3 21).111 The first Athenian Tribute List in 454/3 did not include Miletus, 
but recorded payments from Milesians at Teichoussa and Milesians at Leros (see 
above).112 Thus it has been often supposed that when Miletus revolted against Athens, 
groups sympathetic to Athens fled to Leros or Teichoussa and there paid their dues until 
Athens restored them in 452. In the 1970s, however, a new fragment of the same list was 
found that could include Miletus, but the editors preferred to preserve the original reading 
in the face of new evidence, explaining that the new fragment refers to another pro-
Athenian enclave on the Leucos peninsula, rather than to Miletus proper.113 But this 
reconstruction is attractive primarily because it preserves the narrative of Miletus in 
revolt, which is itself borne in part from Miletus’ absence from the tribute list.114 It is 
more reasonable that the more recent fragment refers to tribute from the astu of Miletus, 
particularly because there are other examples from later tribute lists where Miletus, 
Leros, and Teichoussa are again listed separately.115 As we have seen, there is strong 
evidence for Milesian stasis in the years around 450, but there is good reason to believe 
that the decree recording Athenian regulations restricting political and legal rights and 
installing a board of archons dates instead to the 420s.116 In particular, the archon on the 
                                                 
111 There is also a banishment decree (ML 43) that is sometimes invoked as further 
evidence for the first revolt, but could be dated anywhere between 470 and 440, see 
above; Kagan, Outbreak, 100-1. 
112 Barron, “Milesian Politics and Athenian Propaganda,” 1. 
113 Balcer, Sparda, 420.  
114 Gorman, Miletus, 224-5. Cf: Robertson, “Government and Society at Miletus,” 394-5, 
397; Paarman, “The Revolt of Miletos in 454/3 B.C.,” 121-40. 
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decree is Euthynus, who is only attested as archon at Athens in 426/5 and the formula 
bears striking resemblance to other decrees reliably dated to the 420s.117 
Athens installed a garrison and a board of five archons in Miletus, probably in 
426/5 (IG I3 22, ll. 4-6, 35, 39, 45, 62, 71, 82), and put restrictions on the Milesian 
political and legal system (ll. 28-51).118 The provisions in the inscription are similar to 
others Athens made after subduing challenges to its hegemony, including at Erythrae, but 
regulations imposed on other Ionian states at about the same time differ in critical ways 
from those at Miletus.119 Most notable among the differences is that the Milesian officials 
swore to uphold the treaty, where the Athenians extracted an oath of loyalty from 
Erythrae. Robertson also ascribes great importance to the five Athenian archons at 
Miletus instead of a singular garrison commander at Erythrae.120 The Milesian territory 
naturally divides into five regions and more so than the six old Ionian tribes, and it was 
these regional distinctions that played a determining role in Milesian civic life.121 Thus, it 
is reasonable to assume that Miletus was as fraught with stasis in 426/5 as in 450/49 and 
the Athenian regulations placed one archon in each territorial division and were meant to 
reconcile the conflicting parties rather than quell a revolt. The measures seem to have 
worked and the territory was reconciled, including Arnassus (a variation of Arnasa), the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Athenian Coinage Decree,” Historia 10 (1961), 174-81 and “The Athenian Decree for 
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deme in which Didyma was located.122 The main piece of evidence left outstanding from 
the later date is from the Old Oligarch, who says that the Athenians threw their lot in with 
oligarchies on three occasions and was each time things turned out poorly for Athens 
([Xen.] Ath.Pol. 3.11). One of these instances is generally thought to refer to the revolt of 
Miletus in c.450, before the war with Samos.123 If the Old Oligarch was familiar with 
Thucydides’ text, then the support for the Milesian oligarchs may refer instead to the war 
between Miletus and Samos in 440 and the consequences coming in the 420s.124 How 
long the archons and the garrison remained in Miletus is unknown, but Milesians served 
with Athenian expeditions until the disaster at Sicily (see below).  
It is also all too easy to trace anti-Athenian sentiment to contemporary Athenian 
legislation (ML 45) and increases in the assessed tribute.125 The Standards Decrees, likely 
enacted c. 428/7, mandated that all league members use Athenian coins, weights, and 
measures and may have prohibited allied poleis from minting silver coinage.126 Certainly 
not every member state produced silver coins, but many Ionian communities did, 
including the large island poleis of Chios and Samos, which minted continuously 
throughout the fifth century.127 Though it is sometimes assumed that the latter 
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“The Old Oligarch (Pseudo-Xenophon’s Athenaion Politeia) and Thucydides,” 363-84. 
125 See Part III, Chapter 14. 
126 Figueira, Power of Money, 174-9, concludes that minting silver coins was never 
totally banned, see Part III, Chapter 15. 
127 Figueira, Power of Money, 150-74. 
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communities were exempt, the decree indicates that all member states were, at least 
initially, subject to it, though it is notable that the decree specifies silver coins, which 
suggests that poleis continued to circulate electrum and small denomination coins.128 
Another possibility is that the Standards Decrees were enacted in 413 when Athens 
abolished the phoros in favor of a five percent harbor tax on all members (RO 18; Thuc. 
7.28.4).129 The change, which mandated direct taxation on merchants, was a move from 
collecting symbolic capital in which the subject allies acknowledged Athenian hegemony 
with tribute to collecting economic capital in order to pay for the war.130 
Miletus contributed forces to the Athenian expeditions to Corinth and Cythera in 
425 (Thuc. 4.42, 4.54), while Chios sent troops to the invasion of the Argolid in 429 
(Thuc. 2.56.2), helped Nicias subdue Mende and Scione in 423 (Thuc. 4.129.2), aided in 
the capture of Melos in 416 (Thuc. 5.84),131 and Chios, Samos, and Miletus contributed 
to the invasion of Sicily in 415 (Thuc. 7.57.3). Hornblower questions whether Milesian 
soldiers were trusted by the Athenian commanders since the two thousand hoplites played 
no part in battle at Cythera,132 but the substantial size of the force, combined with their 
repeated appearance, indicates the they supported the Athenian war effort. There is no 
indication that any other Ionian polis sent forces to the Athenian campaigns such as the 
                                                 
128 Balcer, Sparda, 404-5, argues that Athens closed the Clazomenaean electrum mint, 
too. Figueira, Power of Money, 52-62, downplays the role of Athenian legislation on 
local monetary policy and the assumed autonomy of minting coins. On Ionian coinage, 
see Part III, Chapter 15. 
129 Gorman, Miletos, 236-7, argues that the tax was in addition to the phoros. Cf. 
Hornblower, CT 3, 594-5. 
130 L. Kallet, Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides: The Sicilian Expedition 
and its Aftermath (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 195-
226. 
131 Hornblower, CT 3, 226-8, argues that the Ionians happily participated in the 
expedition to coerce Dorians. 
132 Hornblower, CT 2, 217. 
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one to Sicily in 415, but it is plausible that they did so in numbers too small for 
Thucydides to mention. If that is the case, then their casualties likely contributed to the 
sudden rise in prominence of anti-Athenian factions after the disaster in Sicily.  
Ionia was largely spared the effects of the Archidamian and Decelean Wars. 
Alcidas’ raid in 427 is suggestive of increased risks to Ionian commerce, but Ionian 
merchants probably continued to ply the sea lanes, supplying both military and civilian 
demands for goods, and the major campaigns took place elsewhere. Thucydides’ 
narrative of the Sicilian Expedition focuses on the Athenian catastrophe, set up by his 
description of the procession to the Piraeus to launch the fleet (7.29-32). The expedition 
did have many Athenian soldiers and sailors, was led by Athenian commanders, and, 
ultimately, was an Athenian disaster. However, many Ionians died alongside their 
Athenian allies. The Sicilian Expedition marked the end of Athenian hegemony over 
Ionia, but these were also the last years of the fifth century where Ionia itself was largely 
untouched by war. Signs of stasis abound in fifth-century Ionia, and the situation only 
deteriorated as the Athenian grip weakened.
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3. Battlefield Ionia: 412-386 
 
I. The Ionian War, 412/11-404 
Close on the heels of the Athenian disaster in Sicily in 412, Athenian hegemony 
in Ionia crumbled. The first section of this chapter will examine how Ionia (outside of 
Samos) became disentangled, at least temporarily, from Athenian hegemony and was 
subsequently bound under other leadership.1 The Ionian War also marks a change in how 
Ionia interacted with imperial powers and thus Debord marks the period 413 to 404 as a 
hinge that allows for the understanding of fourth century Anatolia.2 Throughout the next 
quarter-century, the Ionian poleis oscillated between allegiances as the strength of the 
competing powers waxed and waned, frequently for reasons entirely separate from the 
machinations in Ionia. In this period, Ionian poleis were targeted by ambitious 
commanders and the region was frequently the setting for military campaigns designed to 
reclaim the Ionians as subjects or to use the region as a bridge to reach another enemy.  
There are two schools of thought about how the Ionians viewed the Athenians, on 
the one hand, and the Spartans and the Persians, on the other. On the one, Westlake 
maintains that the Ionians revolted to regain their liberty, but turned again to Athens 
when the war dragged out and it became apparent that Persia was waiting in the wings to 
scoop them up.3 On the other, Balcer’s model suggests that anti-Athenian factions 
instigated the revolts while the majority of the population was at worst indifferent to 
                                                 
1 As P. Debord, L’Asie Mineure au IVe Siècle (412-323 a.C.) (Bordeaux: de Boccard, 
1999), 214, notes, Spartan involvement gave the appearance of concessions from Persia, 
but really just replaced Athenian hegemony. 
2 Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 203. 
3 H.D. Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” CQ2 29 (1979), 9-44.  
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Athenian rule.4 Nakamura-Moroo, however, rightly objects to these views as containing 
only partial truths because they are founded upon the premise of a “Greek-Persian 
antithesis.”5  
The scholarship about the relationship between the Ionians, Spartans, and Persians 
from 411-407 largely focuses on the treaties between Sparta and Persia. The inquiries 
generally focus on whether Sparta, in its haste to defeat Athens, sold out Ionia, and who 
had authority over Ionian tribute. The Spartan treaty with Persia in 411 declared that the 
King’s land in Asia belonged to the King to deal with as he pleased (χώραν τν 
βασιλέως, ση τς σίας στ, βασιλέυς εναι, κα περ τς χώρας τς αυτο 
βουλευέτω βασιλες πως βούλεται, Thuc. 8.58), a broad declaration that probably 
indicates that in 411 the Spartans did not have designs on an overseas empire.6 In return, 
they received a guarantee of Persian support against Athens, but circumstances rapidly 
changed. After 408/7 the Spartans concluded a new treaty that likely guaranteed 
autonomy for the Ionians provided that they continue to pay a phoros (Xen. Hell. 1.4.2), 
which the newly appointed Cyrus redirected to Lysander’s war fund (Xen. Hell. 2.1.14; 
see below).7 However, the Spartans were initially drawn into conflict in Ionia not by the 
                                                 
4 Balcer, Sparda, 425. 
5 A. Nakamura-Moroo, “The Attitude of Greeks in Asia Minor to Athens and Persia: The 
Deceleian War,” in Forms of Control and Subordination in Antiquity, edd. T. Yuge and 
M. Doi (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 568. 
6 The first appearance of a treaty in Thucydides 8.18; Hornblower, CT 3, 800-2; Lewis, 
Sparta and Persia, 91, was less specific than the second (8.37; CT 3, 854) and final 
version (8.58, CT 3 924-40), but were probably all part of the same treaty and represent 
three phases of negotiations. 
7 Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 124-6. Gomme, HCT 5, 41; N. Robertson, “The Sequence of 
Events in the Aegean in 408 and 407 B.C.,” Historia 29 (1980), 282-301, provides a 
reconstruction in which the treaty between Sparta and Persia “more deliberate” and less 
reliant on “personalities.” C. Tuplin, “The Treaty of Boiotios,” in Achaemenid History II, 
edd. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg and A. Kuhrt (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije 
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Persians who saw an opening to reclaim possession of the Asiatic Greeks, but by the 
Ionians themselves. 
Chian and Erythraean ambassadors approached Sparta and Persia for help against 
Athens in 412 (Thuc. 8.5.4).8 These men were probably not representatives of their entire 
communities, but saw an opportunity to seize power against their domestic opponents 
who preferred an alliance with Athens.9 Most citizens were likely more interested in 
safety and thus showed a propensity to side with whichever group threatened their 
immediate wellbeing. First, the Spartans sent Phrynis, a perioikos, to determine whether 
the Chians were being truthful about the strength of their polis without exposing to either 
the Athenians or the other Chians what was happening (Thuc. 8.6.3-4).10 Only in the 
summer of 411 did the Spartans finally decide to send a fleet under the command of 
Chalcideus and Alcibiades. In the interim, the Athenian Aristocrates tested Chian loyalty 
and requested ships (Thuc. 8.9.2).11 The Chians supplied seven ships because, 
Thucydides says, most of the Chians were unaware that they were prepared to revolt.12 
                                                                                                                                                 
Oosten, 1984), 138-42, argues that Darius temporarily agreed to suspend his claim to the 
Greeks of Asia because of revolts elsewhere in the empire. Cf. Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 
214. 
8 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 351, 353; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 88-91; D. Kagan, The 
Fall of the Athenian Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 32-8; A. Andrewes, 
“The Spartan Resurgence,” in CAH2 5, 464-5. Contemporary to these revolts against 
Athens, Athens supported Amorges against Tissaphernes. Cf. H.D. Westlake, “Athens 
and Amorges,” Phoenix 31 (1977), 319-29. For Ionia’s relationship with Sparta, see Part 
III, Chapter 10. 
9 As Hornblower, CT 3, 763-4, notes, Thucydides leaves out the article when identifying 
the ambassadors, suggesting that they did not represent a unified group. M. Pierart, 
“Chios entre Athènes et Sparte: La contribution de Chios à l’effort de guerre 
lacédémonien pendant la guerre du Péloponèse IG V 1, 1+SEG 39, 370,” BCH 119 
(1995), 253-82, argues that Chios aimed at first to remain neutral. 
10 Hornblower, CT 3, 775-7; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 88, with n. 31. 
11 Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 38; Hornblower, CT 3, 783-4. 
12 Hornblower, CT 3, 783-4. 
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However, seven ships was not an insignificant force,13 and it is likely that the 
conspirators had not yet successfully taken control of Chios.14 When the Spartan fleet 
finally sailed, it went directly to Chios to incite revolt, both because a local faction had 
requested the support and because losing Chios would be the biggest blow to the 
Athenian war effort (Thuc. 8.14.1-2).15 The Athenians responded by recalling the Chian 
ships on station, arresting the free crews and freeing the slaves, and then sent 
Strombichides to Ionia with eight ships (Thuc. 8.15).16 Thucydides makes a point of 
showing how the decision to abandon Athens was costly for the Chians (8.24),17 but from 
the outset the Spartans were also wary of Chian loyalty and forced their sailors to man 
Peloponnesian ships while the Peloponnesians remained behind on the island (8.17.2). 18 
From Chios, the Spartans sent three ships to Clazomenae, which also abandoned 
Athens and began to rebuild its walls (Thuc. 8.14.4).19 Strombichides tried to secure 
Teos, but was prevented by Chalcideus leading Chian ships, and Erythraean and 
Clazomenaean forces supported by Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.16), so the Athenians 
abandoned the polis.20 The Teians promptly surrendered. After taking Teos, Chalcideus 
and Alcibiades chased Strombichides into Samos and sailed to Miletus, which prompted 
                                                 
13 The Chian and Lesbian contribution to the Sicilian expedition, which was notable for 
its enormous outlay of resources, was fifty ships in sum, Thucydides 6.31. See Part II, 
Chapter 2. 
14 In fact, Athens and its supporters maintained control of the Delphinion on Chios until 
407, see Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 226. 
15 Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 43; Hornblower, CT 3, 780-1. 
16 Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 51. 
17 Hornblower, CT 3, 814-21. 
18 Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 47. Cf. T.J. Quinn, “Political Groups at Chios: 
412,” Historia 18 (1969), 22-30. 
19 Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 46-7. 
20 Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 53; Hornblower, CT 3, 797-8. 
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the polis to revolt and became the Spartan base of operations (Thuc. 8.17).21 Additional 
Chian ships fomenting rebellion in Ionia were thwarted by Athenian reinforcements and 
took refuge at Ephesus and Teos (Thuc. 8.19). It is reasonable to assume, though, that 
Teos was aligned with Sparta out of necessity and the citizens reportedly told Diomedon, 
an Athenian commander, that they would rejoin Athens if he could protect them (Thuc. 
8.20.2).22 
Ephesus, where Tissaphernes sacrificed to Artemis in 408/7 (Thuc. 8.109.1),23 
had probably slipped from Athenian hegemony before the start of the Ionian War,24 but 
Miletus is illustrative as to how the other Ionian communities received their renewed 
relationship with Persia. Lewis argues that the Ionians believed, erroneously, that the 
Spartans would stop the Persians from annexing the Ionian poleis once the Athenians 
were defeated and thus fought enthusiastically on behalf of the Spartans.25 However, the 
Ionians also fought on their own behalf in an instance when Athenians were seen as their 
oppressors. When Tissaphernes built and garrisoned a fort in their territory, the Milesians 
attacked it and drove his forces out (Thuc. 8.84.4).26 Their Greek allies applauded the 
initiative, but the Spartan Lichas said that since the Ionians lived in the Persian domain, 
they ought to submit to the satrap (τε χρναι Τισσαφέρνει κα δουλεύειν Μιλησίους 
                                                 
21 Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 46-7; Andrewes, “Spartan Resurgence,” 468-9. 
22 Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 13; Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 46. 
The next reference to Teos is in 406 when it was raided by the Spartan navarch 
Callicratidas (Diod. 13.76.4). 
23 Hornblower, CT 3, 1052. On Ephesus, see Part III, Chapter 9; on the Sanctuary of 
Artemis, see Part III, Chapter 17. 
24 Hornblower, CT 3, 800; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 90. 
25 Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 114-6, notes that the victory dedication for the Battle of 
Aegospotami at Delphi included statues of a Milesian, an Ephesian, and likely an 
Erythraean commander, ML 95, Paus. 10.9.9. 
26 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 355-6, 367; Gorman, Miletos, 239-40; Hornblower, CT 3, 
994-5. 
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κα τος λλους τος ν τ βασιλέως τ μέτρια κα πιθεραπεειν, Thuc. 8.84.5).27 
Despite Tissaphernes’ claim to Miletus, the polis remained the principal Spartan naval 
base in Ionia until 404 (Xen. Hell. 1.5.1, 1.6.2, 1.6.7).28 Throughout this period, the 
Milesians fought alongside the Spartans, and Lysander sent a Milesian pirate (λστής) by 
the name of Theopompus back to Sparta with news of Aegospotamoi (Xen. Hell. 
2.1.30).29  
 The Milesians also mobilized infantry to fight against Athens, but a contingent of 
two hundred hoplites was almost entirely wiped out while trying to relieve the Athenian 
siege of Pygela (Xen. Hell. 1.2.2-3).30 Lazenby wonders why “help” against Athens came 
from so far away, since Miletus was about sixty kilometers from Pygela, while Ephesus 
was about twenty.31 The discrepancy, I believe, is an example of local politics that were 
taking place concurrently with the war against Athens, since Pygela had belonged to 
Ephesus throughout most of the fifth century.32 Debord rightly cautions, however, that 
this enthusiasm was common in the early years of the Ionian War, but, by the middle 
years, Miletus’ operation beyond its own borders was an exception.33 
In 408/7, two Athenian forces sailed to Clazomenae, where they captured the fort 
constructed by the citizens and restored the polis to the Delian League, though the main 
                                                 
27 C.D. Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 35; 
Hornblower, CT 3, 994-5; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 105, notes that in the final version 
of the treaty, the Spartans only promise the Persians power over the chorae, where the 
earlier ones had spoken of chorae and poleis.  He concludes that Lichas accepted both the 
settlements and their hinterland as part of the king’s domain. 
28 Gorman, Miletus, 238-9, see Part III, Chapter 10. 
29 Most likely the “pirate” was an individual wealthy enough to have a private ship 
equipped for raiding. de Souza, Piracy, 31; Omerod, Piracy, 113. 
30 See Part III, Chapter 10. 
31 Lazenby, Peloponnesian War, 208-9; Cf. Rubinstein, “Ionia,” 1094. 
32 See Part II, Chapters 4 and 6. 
33 Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 232. 
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dissenters escaped to Daphnus (Thuc. 8.23.6).34 In the same campaign season, the 
Athenians defeated and killed Chalcideus in Milesian territory and erected a trophy, 
which the Milesians proceeded to tear down (Thuc. 8.24.1). Athenian forces also defeated 
the Chians in three engagements on the island before ravaging their fields. Thucydides 
highlights the destruction of farmland (8.24.3), but it is probable that the rape of the 
perceived inviolability of the Chian territory was more devastating than were the 
economic consequences.35 During the siege some citizens wanted to capitulate to Athens, 
but the Chian leaders and, more importantly, Pedaritus, the Spartan harmost, discovered 
and suppressed the dissent by taking hostages (Thuc 8.31), and also executed Ion’s son 
Tydeus around this time on the charge of Atticism (Thuc. 8.38.3).36 However, this was 
not the only instance where Spartan commanders had to coerce loyalty from Chios, since 
Diodorus, likely following Theopompus, mentions that Cratesippidas took money from 
Chian exiles in return for restoring them to power and exiled six hundred other men who 
took control of Atarneus (Diod. 13.65.3-4). 
After taking command of the Spartan war effort in 408, Lysander moved the 
Spartan base of operations in Ionia to Ephesus, which, according to Plutarch, he found 
favorable to Sparta, but in miserable economic shape and, allegedly, in danger of losing 
its Greek identity because its poverty made it susceptible to Lydian and Persian influence 
                                                 
34 Hornblower, CT 3, 812. 
35 V.D. Hanson, The Western Way of War, 2e (California: University of California Press, 
2000), 27-39, in an examination of the Spartan invasions of Attica. 
36 Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” 103; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 362; Quinn, 
“Political Groups at Chios,” 29. Hornblower, CT 3, 858, is skeptical about the 
biographical connections. 
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(Lys. 3.2-3).37 Miller has shown, however, that Ephesus and other Ionian poleis possessed 
significant Anatolian cultural elements as far back as the late sixth century.38 Plutarch 
continues that Lysander rescued Ephesus from its state by ordering merchant ships to the 
polis and dispensing government contracts for trireme construction (Lys. 3.3). It is also 
possible, as Westlake argues, that Lysander was able to secure remission of tribute to 
Persia that allowed economic recovery.39 There is an assumption implicit in Plutarch’s 
anecdote that the merchants brought an infusion of Hellenism to Ephesus, but Lysander 
probably did nothing of the sort. Persian culture had become inextricably intertwined 
with local identity, including that the Priest of Artemis had the Persian title “Megabyxus” 
(Xen. Anab. 5.3.4; Pliny, HN 35.36, 40).40 The Ephesians did honor Lysander with a 
statue (Paus. 6.3.15), but probably for his military, not economic, activities.41 
Samos did not join the rest of Ionia in rejecting Athenian hegemony, no doubt 
influenced by Athens’ use of the island as its principal naval base.42 Yet the polis of 
Samos was unstable and experienced a brutal coup in 412 during which two hundred 
                                                 
37 Westlake, “Ionians,” 40-1; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 115, argues that there was no 
immediately notable Persian presence in Ionia when Lysander arrived, while J.M. Balcer, 
“Processes of Acculturation,” Historia 32 (1983), 257-67, believes that there was 
acculturation, but that it took place only in the last quarter of the fifth century. 
38 Miller, “Clothes and Identity,” 18-38; Cf. R.M. Cook, Klazomenian Sarcophagi 
(Mainz: van Zabern, 1981), 60. See Part III, Chapter 9. 
39 Westlake, “Ionians,” 41; Nakamura-Moroo, “Attitude of the Greeks in Asia Minor to 
Persia,” 570; Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 302-3. It was from Ephesus that 
Lysander established his decarchies, Plut. Lys. 5.3; Diod. 13.70.4. Cf. Hamilton, Sparta’s 
Bitter Victories, 37. 
40 Miller, “Clothes and Identity,” 25-33, see Part III, Chapter 9. 
41 D.M. Lewis, “Sparta as Victor,” CAH2 6, 29-30. 
42 Diod. 13.34, lists Samos among the rebel states, but is surely mistaken, see Shipley, 
Samos, 123. 
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citizens were executed and another four hundred went into exile (8.21).43 The next year 
there was another purge, which, following Thucydides, is generally thought to have 
foiled a plot by the Four Hundred at Athens (8.73.2),44 where the Athenian oligarchs 
wanted their own partisans to have power at Samos, while the Athenian fleet was happy 
with their supporters in the polis.45 The Samian stasis was likely not a constitutional or 
class conflict, but about the continued affiliation with Athens.46 The governing aristocrats 
were in step with Athens in 412 because they needed support against the exiles at Anaea. 
As they saw Athenian power in Ionia wane they contemplated getting Spartan support 
toward the same end; another faction preferred to maintain the alliance with Athens and, 
with the help of the Athenian fleet, deposed the ruling faction and gained support from 
the demos under the guise of creating a democracy.  
In 405, the Athenian Assembly decreed that all loyal Samians were Athenian 
citizens, whether they remained on the island or moved to Attica, and confirmed the 
autonomy of the polis (ML 94, ll. 12-16).47 The decree excluded men like Cleomedes 
                                                 
43 Shipley, Samos, 123; Hornblower, CT 3, 808-9; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 358-9. 
Karavites, “Enduring Problems of the Samian Revolt,” 45-53, believes that this is the 
context for the Duris, BNJ 76 F 67, story about the Samian soldiers who were brutally 
executed and left unburied, but see Part II, Chapter 2. 
44 Legon, “Samos in the Delian League,” 156; Hornblower, CT 3, 938-40. On the Four 
Hundred, see Arist. Ath. Pol. 30-3; Hornblower, CT 3, 944-64; Kagan, Fall of the 
Athenian Empire, 131-86; Andrewes, “Spartan Resurgence,” 474-9; Rhodes, Ath. Pol., 
393-4. 
45 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 371-2; Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 168. 
46 Shipley, Samos, 126-9; Class conflict: Andrewes HCT 5, 44-9; constitutional conflict: 
Legon, “Samos in the Delian League,” 156; M. Ostwald, “Stasis and autonomia in 
Samos: A Comment on an ideological fallacy,” SCI 12 (1993), 51-66. Quinn, Athens and 
Samos, Lesbos and Chios, 21, argues that the coups were contained to the ruling 
oligarchy in Samos. Cf. Hornblower, CT 3, 808-9. 
47 J. Cargill, “IG II2 1 and the Athenian Kleruchy on Samos,” GRBS 23 (1983), 233; 
Shipley, Samos, 130-1; contra Gomme, HCT I, 240 n.2. The inscription is a copy of the 
original, which was destroyed by the Thirty Tyrants in Athens, along with two additional 
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who fought against the Athenians at Arginousae in 406, and it is unknown how many 
people actually accepted the offer (Xen. Hell. 1.6.29).48 Samos rewarded Athens by being 
the last polis to oppose Lysander after the battle of Aegospotami in 405 (Xen. Hell. 2.2.6, 
3.6),49 surrendering in 403 only after a lengthy siege. Lysander reintroduced the exiles, 
and installed a harmost, garrison, and narrow oligarchy to control the reduced, but not 
eliminated population (Xen. Hell. 2.3.6-7).50 Many of the new Athenian-Samian citizens 
went to Athens, though two decrees found on a re-inscribed stele praise the citizens of 
Ephesus and Notium, both of which were probably under Cyrus’ control (see below), for 
giving aid to other exiled Samians (RO 2 ll. 49-50).51 The new Samian government 
erected a statue of Lysander at Olympia (Paus. 6.3.14-15) and renamed the Samian 
festival for Hera the “Lysandreia,” which attracted, among others, the epic poet 
Antimachus of Colophon (Duris, BNJ 76 F 26).52 Duris of Samos says that it was this 
faction that instituted the cult worship to Lysander (BNJ 76 F 22), and Lysander added 
Choerilus of Samos to his retinue in the hope that he would compose a poem in his honor 
(Plut. Lys. 18.4-7).53 The Spartans overturned most of Lysander’s decarchies in 403/2,54 
but the one on Samos remained in power until at least 401 since there were four known 
                                                                                                                                                 
decrees that honored specific Samians (RO 2). Cf. M.J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens 
II (Brussels, 1982), 25-6. 
48 Shipley, Samos, 130. 
49 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 374. 
50 Shipley, Samos, 131-3; G.E. Underhill, Xenophon: Hellenica (New York: Arno Press, 
1979), 53. 
51 Shipley, Samos, 130, 132; Cargill, “IG II2 1 and the Athenian Kleruchy on Samos,” 
331. 
52 On Antimachus, see V.J. Matthews, Antimachus of Colophon: Text and Commentary 
(Leiden: Brill, 1996), 18-19, and Part III, Chapter 20. A Samian also composed an 
epigram for Lysander’s monument at Delphi (ML 95), but it is unknown when the 
epigram was added. See Shipley, Samos, 133-4.  
53 See Part III, Chapter 20. 
54 C.D. Hamilton, “Spartan Politics and Policy, 405-401 B.C.,” AJPh 91 (1970), 294-314. 
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Lysandreias, and was likely only abolished in 394 when Conon made a bid to restore 
Athenian hegemony (see below).55 
 
II. Ionia in Persian Dynastic Politics, 404-401 
The Spartan treaties with Persia had conceded the revenues from Ionia, probably 
excluding Chios and Samos, in return for military and financial support. Then at the 
conclusion of the Peloponnesian War in 404, Persian satraps took advantage of Athenian 
weakness and Spartan domestic troubles to reassert their authority over Ionia.56 Although 
I believe that Lysander enrolled the Ionians into the Spartan alliance system,57 the 
Spartans were unable, if they were even willing, to intervene on behalf of the Ionians. 
Further, the Spartan motivations during the Ionian war meant that they supported the 
Ionians against Athens and, to a much more limited extent, against Persia. As a result, the 
Ionian poleis became embroiled in Persian dynastic competition between Cyrus, 
Tissaphernes, and, ultimately, Artaxerxes II. 
From the Persian point of view, the situation was relatively simple and had 
remained constant throughout the fifth century: the satrap was expected to exploit 
political divisions in the Aegean and thereby recover the tribute from Ionia.58 Despite the 
protestations of Greek authors, there is little evidence that the Persians were any keener 
to interfere in the internal workings of the Greek communities than were the other 
Greeks, including Sparta (see above). Cyrus’ arrival in Western Anatolia in 407 changed 
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57 See Part III, Chapter 10. 
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the Persian hierarchy by giving him authority over multiple existing satrapies (Xen. Hell. 
1.4.3; Anab. 1.9.7), but did not fundamentally change the Ionian relationship to the 
Persians.59 In 405/4, however, the situation was not so clear-cut because Darius II died 
and the subsequent succession crisis split Ionian loyalties between Cyrus and 
Tissaphernes.60 
The intrigues of Parysatis, Cyrus, Tissaphernes, and Artaxerxes II and the 
campaign that culminated the in battle of Cunaxa in 401 are largely beyond the scope of 
this study, but the conflict had consequences for Ionia. Cyrus left Anatolia for a time in 
405 before his father died, likely to answer charges that he had executed a member of the 
Persian nobility (Xen. Hell. 2.1.8).61 Artaxerxes II initially reconfirmed his brother’s 
position on the advice of Parysatis, but he then had him arrested after Tissaphernes 
denounced Cyrus as plotting a coup (Xen. Anab. 1.1.3; Plut. Artax. 3.5; Ctesias, F 
19.59).62 Parysatis’ influence saved Cyrus from execution, but it is likely that he had to 
flee back to Sardis and force Orontes, his replacement, to surrender (Xen. Anab. 1.1.6). 
Following Ruzicka’s reconstruction, Artaxerxes acknowledged Cyrus’ domain, but 
carved out a new satrapy in Caria for Tissaphernes, to which he appended the Ionian 
poleis (Xen. Anab. 1.1.6).63 Thus in 404 the revenues from the Ionian poleis in Anatolia 
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formally belonged to Tissaphernes, but the situation in western Anatolia was an uneasy 
post-hoc arrangement. 
Most of the Ionian poleis, however, rejected Artaxerxes’ order to pay their tribute 
to Tissaphernes and instead submitted to Cyrus. This was not necessarily a product of the 
Ionian ruling factions being indebted to Lysander and therefore appealing to his old 
friend, but rather because Cyrus entertained them lavishly and promised to remit their 
tribute, even though he was careful to continue paying the allotted sum to Artaxerxes II 
(Xen. Anab. 1.1.8).64 Miletus was the lone Ionian polis that did not side with Cyrus. 
Milesians formed part of Tissaphernes’ retinue until his death in 395 (Polyaenus 8.16), 
and in 404/3 the satrap coerced loyalty by seizing the polis and exiling the faction that 
supported Cyrus (Xen. Anab. 1.1.6). As a result, Cyrus first gathered his forces with the 
stated intent of restoring the exiles to Miletus.65 Cyrus briefly besieged Miletus, which 
had constructed a wall sometime after 412, but withdrew for the campaign against 
Artaxerxes (Xen. Anab. 1.2.2).66 For much of the next year the Ionians were free from the 
competition for the Persian throne, but it is likely that Tissaphernes, at least, had left 
behind overseers. 
 
III. Crusades “for Ionian Liberty,” 401-394 
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After the battle of Cunaxa in 401, Artaxerxes put Tissaphernes in charge of Ionia 
and demanded the poleis surrender (Xen. Hell. 3.1.3).67 The Ionians responded with an 
appeal to Sparta, into whose alliance they had likely entered during the Ionian War (Xen. 
Hell. 3.1.3; Diod. 14.35.2).68 The Spartans dispatched Dercylidas to Ephesus, where he 
made a truce with Tissaphernes and attacked Hellespontine Phrygia (Xen. Hell. 3.1.8-
9).69 In 396, the conflict escalated when the Spartans sent King Agesilaus to Ionia with 
another eight thousand troops (Xen. Hell. 3.4.5; Diod. 14.79.1).70 Agesilaus, like other 
commanders, employed the Ephesians to equip his army: “the market was full of all sorts 
of horses and equipment, offered for sale, and the copper-workers, carpenters, smiths, 
leatherworkers, and painters were all producing martial gear, so that one might have 
thought that the polis was really a workshop of war” (Xen. Hell. 3.4.17).71 An inscription 
also records contributions for the Spartan campaign (ML 67), including from groups in 
Chios (l. 9) and Ephesus (l. 22).72 In money, manpower, and industry, the Ionians 
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72 There is controversy about dating the decree. Melos appears on the list, which rules out 
the years 416-404, while the reference to triremes could indicate that it belonged before 
the Spartan defeat at Pylos in 425. Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 183-4, tentatively date the 
decree to 427 when Alcidas visited Ephesus, Thuc. 3.32.2, but also suggest that it could 
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supported the Spartan campaigns against Persia, likely because they hoped that such an 
alliance would be less onerous than the one with Persia or Athens and not demand the 
same level of tribute.73 
Agesilaus reaffirmed his support for the freedom of the Greeks of Asia while in 
Ephesus, thus implying that the campaigns were on behalf of the Ionian liberty (Xen. 
Hell. 3.4.5), but the prospect of war booty is impossible to overlook.74 One year earlier, 
in 397, the Spartan ephors had passed a decree that proclaimed the restoration of the 
ancestral constitutions in the Greek poleis, which probably retracted support from the 
remaining decarchies (Xen. Hell. 3.4.7). Lysander’s allies still governed the Ionian 
poleis, but they faced opposition on account of their misgovernment and, without the 
Spartan support, the specter of stasis reemerged (Xen. Hell. 3.4.7; Plut. Ages. 6.1).75 
Instead of describing how Agesilaus resolved the Ionian stasis, ancient sources take pains 
to narrate the king’s falling-out with Lysander while at Ephesus (Xen. Hell. 3.4.8-10; 
Plut. Ages. 7-8; Lys. 23.5-9), saying that some Ionians appealed to Lysander, others to 
Agesilaus (Xen. Hell. 3.4.8).76 Xenophon says that the king summarily dismissed the 
petitions that were brought to him by Lysander and eventually reined in the schism by 
sending Lysander to the Hellespont (Hell. 3.4.8-9). Most likely, Agesilaus resolved the 
latest round of Ionian stasis by changing the Spartan harmosts and supporting more 
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inclusive governments than Lysander had.77 Agesilaus also recruited and trained an army 
from Ionia with which to carry on his Hellenic crusade (Xen. Hell. 3.4.11-19; Nepos, 
Ages. 3).78 However, when Spartans summoned Agesilaus and his army back when 
Thebes, Athens, and Corinth formed an alliance in the autumn of 395 (Diod. 14.83.1), he 
left the Ionian poleis to fend for themselves. In the wake of Agesilaus’ departure, the ties 
between Ionian and Sparta dissipated. When Thibron led another expedition to Ephesus 
in 392, no Ionians joined the campaign (Xen. Hell. 4.8.17-19). 
 
IV. Ionia and Athens Redivivus, 394-386 
The Athenian exile Conon led the Persian fleet into the Aegean and defeated the 
Spartan fleet at the battle of Cnidus in 394.79 After the battle, Conon and Pharnabazus led 
their fleet against the poleis that had allied with the Spartans, and accepted the surrender 
of Teos, Erythrae, Ephesus, and Chios, the last of which expelled its Spartan garrison 
(Diod. 4.84.4; cf. Xen. Hell. 4.8.1-3).80 There is also numismatic evidence for a short-
lived coinage alliance in the wake of the battle that included Rhodes, Iasus, Cnidus, 
Ephesus, Samos, Byzantium, and Cyzicus. The coinage league probably indicates a brief 
moment of common economic and political interest so that the members created a 
common weight standard that that would not alienate Sparta, Athens, or Persia and 
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thereby, in effect, declare neutrality.81 Ephesus appears on both lists, but is not 
necessarily a contradiction. As the Spartan base in Anatolia, it would have been a target 
for Conon and Pharnabazus and without Spartan aid would have surrendered, but still had 
no desire to be a Persian subject, so it joined the coinage alliance between the departure 
of the fleet and Conon’s return to Athens in 393. 
Conon’s reputation as the victor of Cnidus helped him to re-establish the Athenian 
position in Ionia, in 393 or early 392.82 In addition to honors at Ephesus and Samos 
(Paus. 6.3.16), Conon sent his associate Isocrates to Chios in order to rewrite its 
constitution ([Plut.] Mor. 837b).83 Isocrates took students while in Chios and made 
lasting connections that helped drive the foundation of the Second Naval Alliance in 384 
and shaped the trajectory of Chian political history in the fourth century.84 An inscription 
from Erythrae honoring Conon praises him for his benefaction (RO 8, l. 3), made him 
proxenos (l. 4), gave him front seats at the theater at Erythrae (ll. 4-6), immunity to 
import dues (ll. 6-9) and, if he desired it, citizenship (ll. 10-11). None of these honors is 
exceptional, but Erythrae also awarded Conon the choice of where to erect the statue, 
which became common only in the late Hellenistic period, and the dedication is an early 
example of honorific statues erected during the lifetime of the honorand (Dem. 20.68-71; 
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cf. Paus. 1.3.2).85 Erythrae probably granted these honors to Conon for liberation of the 
polis after Cnidus, but the decree cannot be securely dated to 394 when Conon was still 
in Persian service. The honors likely came the next year after he returned to Athens as 
part of strengthening economic relationships between the two poleis because the stele 
does not mention Pharnabazus, with whom Conon had visited Erythrae in 394.86 
Conon’s campaign with Pharnabazus also restored Persian hegemony in Ionia. 
Between 391 and 388 Miletus and Myus submitted a dispute over land in the Maeander 
Valley to the satrap Struses, who instructed the other members of the Ionian dodecapolis, 
including those that were not Persian subjects, to submit five jurors to arbitrate the 
dispute (Picirilli 36 = RO 16, ll. 15-31).87 Struses delegated the preliminary judgment to 
these jurors, but reserved the final decision for himself. Before they heard the case the 
Myesians dropped the suit, a fact the Milesians submitted to the jurors (ll. 37-40). It is 
hardly unusual for poleis to submit dispute to an external arbitrator,88 but the choice of 
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Persia is notable. Further, the use of the Ionian dodecapolis for arbitration was unique 
among arbitrated land disputes in Ionia and was probably the result of Persian precedent 
rather than the renewal of the Ionian League (cf. Hdt. 6.42).89 
In 390, Thrasybulus followed up Conon’s enterprise to Ionia, collecting tribute 
and imposing Athenian “autonomy” (Xen. Hell. 4.8.25; Diod. 14.97).90 While the new 
Athenian imperialism was meant to protect the grain trade from the Black Sea, 
Thrasybulus also placed a five-percent harbor tax on Ionian poleis (RO 18, ll. 5-6).91 The 
smaller Ionian poleis probably welcomed Athenian intervention and accepted the tax 
because Athens had leverage with the Persian satraps (ll. 21-2) and because there was a 
guarantee against garrisons (ll. 22-4), both of which were provisions against the worst 
excesses of the Delian League. Moreover, the decrees for Clazomenae in 387/6 and 
Erythrae before 386 indicate that both poleis were still suffering from stasis in the 380s 
(RO 17 = SEG 26.1282, ll. 11-15). The decree at Erythrae indicates that there were at 
least three factions, one supported by Athens, one holed up on the Acropolis that the 
generals had to seek approval from Athens before settling with (ll. 4-7), and one in exile, 
which the Erythraeans reserved the right to readmit (ll. 7-11).  
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The situation at Clazomenae was similar. A decree found on the Athenian 
Acropolis indicates that Clazomenae was divided between two factions, one on the island 
and the other at Chytum on the mainland, with an uneasy peace gained by the islanders 
collecting hostages from those on the mainland (RO 18, ll. 8-10). The main settlement of 
Clazomenae was situated on an island in the Gulf of Smyrna, about seven hundred meters 
off the coast, and possessed other islands in the gulf and the territory of Chytum on the 
mainland.92 Clazomenae had fallen into stasis in 387 and appealed to Athens for 
arbitration (RO 18). The decree reveals that Clazomenae owed to Athens a five percent 
tax established by Thrasybulus in 387 (ll. 6-7), but with an exception granted for 
conducting commerce with neighboring poleis where they purchased grain (ll. 17-18).93 
At the same time, the decree seems to help Clazomenae because the Athenians promised 
to ensure that the treaty with Persia granted its citizens the same terms as the Athenians 
(ll. 20-1). The final section of the inscription is particularly fragmentary and cannot be 
continuously restored, but seems to recognize the suzerainty of the Persian King over 
some of the Clazomenaean chora.94  
Much as was the case at Erythrae, the decree to Clazomenae reveals stasis 
between the demos that negotiated with Athens, and a dissident faction in the mainland 
territory of Chytum. The decree for Clazomenae shows again that the Ionians maintained 
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that the right to exile or reinstate citizens belonged to the polis. It is likely that the 
Clazomenaeans were particularly concerned that the Athenians could decide to support 
the claim of the citizens at Chytum, since they had remained in the original settlement 
after the polis moved.95 Thus, in addition to adding provisions about the grain supply and 
treaties with Persia, they placed in stone the provision that only they had the authority to 
negotiate with Chytum.96   
It has been suggested that there was a great deal of goodwill in Athens toward 
Clazomenae at the time of the decree, particularly since it offers surety of autonomy to 
the polis in contrast to the treaty with Erythrae.97 Sato, however, argues that the Athenian 
decision stemmed from two distinct factors. First, in Clazomenae itself the pro-Athenian 
faction was firmly entrenched, having received hostages from the dissidents in Chytum 
and thus the Athenians did not fear that reconciliation would undermine the poleis’ 
alignment the way that the same policy in Erythrae might have.98 Second, Athenian 
propaganda could play up the magnanimous support Clazomenaean freedom, particularly 
to Athenians who wanted to continue an aggressive anti-Persian policy, while also 
allowing them to avoid getting entangled in an unwinnable war with Sparta and Persia.99  
Despite the apparent Athenian weakness by 387, groups within both Erythrae and 
Clazomenae believed that they could use Athenian support to consolidate control of the 
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poleis against factions supported by Persia and were willing to offer concessions to 
Athens in exchange. Certainly not everyone in Erythrae and Clazomenae favored an 
alliance with Athens, and it may be that the opposition parties in both poleis believed that 
Persia would support them, a conjecture that led to the suggestion that such an appeal to 
the Persian king caused him to include Clazomenae within his domain in the King’s 
Peace (see below).100 
A group of Spartans led by Antalcidas had been trying to bargain with Persia for 
the end of the hostilities in the Aegean since 392 and had been willing to give up claim to 
the freedom of the Ionians in order to achieve that end (Xen. Hell. 4.8.12-15, Andoc. 3; 
Plut. Ages. 23.1-2).101 At the same time, Athens continued its imperial pretensions in the 
region, which the Ionian poleis were willing to indulge so long as it meant that they kept 
their autonomy.102 In 387/6 the warring parties agreed to the King’s Peace, which 
formally recognized a distinction between the Ionian islands, which were to be 
autonomous, and the Anatolian littoral (including Clazomenae), which belonged to the 
Persian king (Xen. Hell. 5.1.25-31; Diod. 14.110.3).103 The peace created a new dynamic 
in Ionia, splitting the region in two distinct parts and created the impression that the 
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Greek poleis along the Anatolian littoral slipped from the Greek world.104 For the 
Ionians, the treaty limited their ability to play the competing powers against each other, 
but it also offered a temporary respite from military conflict.
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4. Persian and the Hecatomnid Domination of Ionia, 387-336 
 
I. The “Betrayal” of the Greeks of Asia: The King’s Peace  
Between 392 and 386 a Spartan faction led by Antalcidas sought to end the 
hostilities between Persia and Sparta. The Corinthian War continued to rage across the 
Aegean and, while Antalcidas defeated an Athenian fleet in the Hellespont in 387 (Xen. 
Hell. 5.1.25-9),1 the most notable outcome was a collective strain on the resources of the 
Greek poleis (Xen. Hell. 5.1.29-30; Polyaenus 2.24).2 Spartan imperialists such as 
Agesilaus thwarted the initial overture to Persia in 392, but the earlier negotiation 
between Sparta and Persia is an important place to begin in order to understand the 
King’s Peace of 386.3 Antalcidas proposed that Persia receive control over the Greek 
communities in Anatolia in return for a cessation of hostilities (Xen. Hell. 4.8.14).4 This 
bilateral treaty was Antalcidas’ purpose in his embassy to Persia, not creating a koine 
eirene (so-called “Common Peace,” see below). Thus, the autonomy clause was to 
provide security for both Persia and Sparta, rather than a core principle for either party.5 
Antalcidas’ proposal nominally granted Sparta victory in the Corinthian War, but it was 
also a tacit admission that Sparta sought Persian aid from a position of weakness and 
                                                 
1 Buckler, Aegean Greece, 167-8. 
2 Buckler, Aegean Greece, 169. 
3 Ryder, Koine Eirene, 32-4; R. Seager, “The King’s Peace and the Balance of Power in 
Greece,” Athenaeum 52 (1974), 36-7; see Part II, Chapter 3. 
4 Seager, “The Corinthian War,” 117-19. On the negotiations, see M. Zahrnt, “Xenophon, 
Isokrates und die KOINH EIRHNH,” Rhm 143 (2000), 298-303. On the treaties that 
bound the Spartans and the Ionians, see Part III, Chapter 10. 
5 Buckler, Aegean Greece, 179; P.J. Rhodes, “Sparta, Thebes and Autonomia,” Eirene 35 
(1999), 34, 38; Ryder, Koine Eirene, 13-14; J. Wilker, “War and Peace at the Beginning 
of the Fourth Century: The Emergence of the Koine Eirene,” in Maintaining Peace and 
Interstate Stability in Archaic and Classical Greece, ed. J. Wilker (Mainz: Verlag Antike, 
2012), 97-101, 106; Zahrnt, “Xenophon, Isokrates und die KOINH EIRHNH,” 300. 
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could not command hegemony over Greece as it had in 404. The Persian King had an 
interest in ending the endemic wars in the Aegean since territory he deemed among his 
possessions, namely the Greek poleis in Anatolia, had frequently been a theater for 
conflict between Athens and Sparta since the onset of the Peloponnesian War in 431.6  
Tiribazus took to the peace conference in 386 a final version of the agreement 
made with Antalcidas approved by Artaxerxes. According to Xenophon the treaty read 
(Hell. 5.1.31):7 
Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ 
εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομενὰς καί Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας 
πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήμνου καὶ 
Ἴμρου καὶ Σκύρου, ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. 
ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, τούτοις ἐγὼ πολεμήσω μετὰ 
τῶν ταῦτα βουλομένων καὶ πεζῇ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ 
χρήμασιν.  
 
King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the poleis in Asia should belong to him, 
as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other 
Greek poleis, both small and great, should be left independent, except 
Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the 
Athenians. But whoever does not accept this peace, upon them I will make 
war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and 
by sea, with ships and with money. 
 
Thus, Artaxerxes declared his authority over the Aegean. It is likely, though, that there 
were additional clauses, now lost, that clarified specific situations, such as the status of 
peraea (see below).8 While Antalcidas negotiated the treaty in spite of the imperial 
                                                 
6 The King also faced a rebellion in Egypt (Justin 6.6.2). Briant, From Cyrus to 
Alexander, 649-51, argues that the universal attestation of rebellions in the Persian 
Empire suggests that there was unrest, but their manipulation by Evagoras as presented 
by Justin is probably just a conspiracy theory.  
7 On this passage, see J. Dillery, Xenophon and the History of his Times (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), 201. Diod. 14.110.2-4, preserves a truncated account of the treaty. 
Xenophon translation adapted from C.L. Brownson in the Loeb edition.  
8 Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 278-9; Dillery, Xenophon, 201; Seager, “Corinthian War,” 
117-19. G.L. Cawkwell, “The Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy,” CQ 23 
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ambitions of Agesilaus, the terms, particularly the acknowledgment that Clazomenae 
belonged to Persia, also undercut the Athenian position in the Gulf of Smyrna.9 The 
King’s Peace was concluded between the imperial aspirants in the Aegean basin and only 
the principal powers such Athens, which retained its rights to Lemnos, Imbros, and 
Scyros, could hope for concessions as part of the terms.10  
In the case of Ionia, the King’s Peace drew a line between Clazomenae, and the 
mainland poleis, such as Ephesus or Miletus, on the one side, and the poleis on the large 
islands Samos and Chios on the other. Those in the first category were unambiguously 
placed within the Persian sphere. Samos and Chios, in contrast, received autonomy, 
which eliminated their preexisting relationships with the competing imperial powers. 
However, Samos and Chios both must have ceded control of their peraea, which fell 
within the Persian zone.11 Ruzicka has argued that Artaxerxes’ inclusion of Clazomenae 
among his domains was inextricably linked to his claim to Cyprus.12 Athens was 
intimately and actively engaged with the communities in the Gulf of Smyrna in 387/6 and 
an inscription reveals that in addition to the tribute flowing from Clazomenae to Athens, 
the Assembly mulled sending a garrison to occupy the polis despite likely not being in a 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1973), 52, argues that there was a clause requiring the gates of the Piraeus to be 
removed. 
9 See Part II, Chapter 3. 
10 Xen. Hell. 4.8.15, says that the Athenians did not want to give up imperial claims to the 
islands because they lay astride the commercial route for importing grains. R. Seager, 
“Lysias against the Corndealers,” Historia 15 (1966), 172, takes Xenophon’s statement a 
step further to suggest that Lemnos and Imbros were also sources of grain rather than 
mere waypoints. Cf. Cargill, The Second Athenian League, 9. Ryder, Koine Eirene, 39, 
suggests that these three sites were exempt from the autonomy clause in the treaty 
because they were already inhabited by Athenian citizens. 
11 Hornblower, “Persia,” 80, argues that Chios tried to get its peraea back in in the 340s, 
see below. 
12 Ruzicka, “Clazomenae,” 104-8. 
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position to do so (RO 18, ll. 13-14).13 Moreover, Athens had supported Evagoras on 
Cyprus in the 380s, and Ruzicka plausibly argues that Artaxerxes grouped Clazomenae 
and Cyprus together because the Persians needed to use the Gulf of Smyrna as a staging 
ground for operations against Evagoras while also undercutting any possibility that 
Athens could interfere with their plans.14 One might also question why other islands 
immediately off the Ionian coast, such as Chios, were exempt from these demands.15 The 
key difference lay in the respective sizes of Clazomenae and Chios, which meant that the 
latter was able to resist Athenian advances in a way the former was not (see below). At 
the same time, an autonomous Chios stood as a testament to the Persian resolve to uphold 
the peace.16 Artaxerxes needed to draw Clazomenae and Chios away from Athens, so he 
stipulated the former was within his domain, while the declaration of autonomy for the 
latter was temporarily sufficient to prevent Athenian interference.  
Thus, the Spartans, erstwhile allies of the Ionians, allegedly abandoned the Greeks 
of Asia. However, the abandonment of the Ionian poleis is a rhetorical trope more than a 
reality and the peace did not divide the Aegean the way that Athenian authors, including 
Xenophon and Isocrates, imply.17 With the King’s Peace still in effect three decades later, 
an inscription testifies to an Erythraean dedication of a gold crown on the Athenian 
Acropolis in 354/3 (IG II2 1437, l. 12).18 It is possible Persian control waned in the 
                                                 
13 Rhodes and Osborne, GHI, 79-80, note that this treaty was careful to acknowledge the 
rights of the king on the mainland. 
14 Ruzicka, “Clazomenae,” 108. 
15 As Sato, “Athens, Persia, Clazomenae, Erythrae,” 29 n. 30, does. 
16 Dušanić, “The Attic-Chian Alliance,” 23, makes a comparable point in denying the 
idea that Persia threatened Chios in 384, see below. 
17 Hornblower, “Persia,” 82. See Part III, Chapter 11. 
18 Hornblower, Mausolus, 110.  
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intervening years, but it is far more likely that the King’s Peace never caused an 
unbridgeable chasm between Europe and Asia.19 
 
II. Koine Eirene in Ionia 
On a philosophical level, the King’s Peace was important because it introduced 
“peace” as a positive condition rather than something defined by the absence of war.20  At 
the same time, there existed what Moritani describes as a “logical dualism,” namely that 
the treaty (through the power of the King) granted autonomy, but autonomy was 
something to be granted by the powerful, not a basic right.21 Yet it has long been 
recognized that for all its innovations, the King’s Peace caused more problems than it 
solved.22 Thus Seager begins his article on the balance of power in Greece between 380 
and 362: “from the moment of its conception…the King’s Peace was a weapon, to be 
wielded by a single state in the struggle for power.”23 In his view, the King’s Peace was 
proposed by Antalcidas as a weapon against Athens, but since the Persian King rather 
than Sparta was to be the guarantor of the peace, this imminent threat did not remain a 
Spartan weapon, but one Athens and Thebes, in particular, could also use. Nevertheless, 
this international framework of koine eirene guided the developments in the fourth-
                                                 
19 See Part III, Chapter 11. 
20 Wilker, “War and Peace at the Beginning of the Fourth Century,” 93; M. Jehne, Koine 
Eirene (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1994), 31, 99-100. 
21 K. Moritani, “KOINE EIRENE: Control, Peace, and Autonomia in Fourth-Century 
Greece,” in Forms of Control and Subordination in Antiquity, edd. T. Yuge and M. Doi 
(Leiden: Brill, 1988), 574; Wilker, “War and Peace at the Beginning of the Fourth 
Century,” 106. Wilker also notes the inherent conservatism of the autonomy principle, 
while Jehne, Koine Eirene, 32, notes that it was one of the core points of the treaty. 
22 Cawkwell, “Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy,” 53, argues that there 
were limits to who was included in the new arrangement.  
23 Seager, “The King’s Peace and the Balance of Power in Greece,” 38. Cf. Moritani, 
“KOINE EIRENE,” 573. 
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century Aegean and was intermittently renewed.24 This is not the place to examine the 
many wrangles concerning koine eirene, most of which pertain to events in European 
Greece, but rather to turn to the unique effects that this new international framework had 
on Chios and Samos. 
 
III. Chios and the Second Naval Confederacy 
 
While the Anatolian poleis and Clazomenae were politically severed from the 
broader Aegean system after the King’s Peace, Samos and Chios were left autonomous, 
extricated from their earlier alliances. Chios, which had been one of the few Delian 
League states to continue to provide ships to the Athenian war effort until it defected to 
Sparta in 413/12,25 had been an Athenian ally again in the Corinthian War in the 390s. 
While the King’s Peace ended the alliance in 386, the two states forged a new partnership 
in 384.26 The terms of the alliance, preserved in an inscription (RO 20), reaffirmed Chian 
autonomy (ll. 19-20) and bound Athens and Chios together with a mutual defense pact (ll. 
25-9) to last in perpetuity (l. 35).27  
This treaty was the Athenian response to a Chian embassy, though what regional 
pressures prompted the Chians to seek it are unknown. The most obvious possibility is 
that Chios was threatened by the proximity of Persia, which had already absorbed 
                                                 
24 It was first renewed under the guise of the King’s Peace, and then in a new form after 
the Battle of Mantineia in 362, Jehne, Koine Eirene, 48-115; P. Low, “Peace, Common 
Peace, and War in Mid-Fourth-Century Greece,” in Maintaining Peace and Interstate 
Stability in Archaic and Classical Greece, ed. J. Wilker (Mainz: Verlag Antike, 2012), 
118-34. 
25 See Part II, Chapter 2. On Chios as Athens' most loyal ally, see Part III, Chapter 11. 
26 Rhodes and Osborne, GHI, 86. 
27 A similar alliance, but without the Athenian partner, appears in the fragmentary IG II2, 
35, which, if it indeed refers to a treaty with Chios, may be a copy (e.g. Tod 118) or a 
revision of the treaty after the creation of the new confederacy, see below.  
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Clazomenae and was waging war in Cyprus against Evagoras. Bruce therefore suggests 
that although Persia had not infringed on the autonomy of the Aegean islands in the two 
years since the Peace was concluded, Chios remained wary.28 The testimony provided by 
Diodorus suggests that the Athenians reached out to the Chians and other peoples subject 
to Sparta in order to further the cause of Greek autonomy (15.28.3). Diodorus refers to 
the Second Naval Confederacy in 379, and Stylianou is probably correct in saying that 
“we have no reason to query the statement that the initiative for the foundation came 
from the Confederacy came from Athens.”29 Nevertheless, Diodorus is silent on the issue 
of alliance of 384, at which time Chians were not Spartan subjects and thus were not 
initiating a rebellion.30  More likely, Spartan machinations under the guidance of 
Agesilaus had induced civic conflict (Diod. 15.5.2),31 which the Chians were trying to 
abort by reaching out to the Athenians.32 Chios likely saw Athens as a counterweight to 
Spartan influence. More than simply seeking a potentially powerful ally, the negotiations 
                                                 
28 I.A.F. Bruce, “The Alliance between Athens and Chios in 384 B.C.,” Phoenix 19 
(1965), 284. 
29 Stylianou, Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 252. Cf. Cawkwell, 
“Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy,” 60. 
30 As noted by C.D. Hamilton, Agesilaus and the Failure of the Spartan Hegemony 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 179. 
31 Stylianou, Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 168-74, gives 
concrete examples of this Spartan policy and while none are in the Aegean, it is 
reasonable to assume that there was a similar process at work on Chios. Cf. Cartledge, 
Agesilaos, 371-2. 
32 For instance, Theopompus’ father was exiled from the polis on the charge of 
lakanismos (π λακωνισμι, BNJ 115 T 2), which could have been related to the 
political conflicts of the previous decade. W. Connor, Theopompus and Fifth-Century 
Athens (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 2; Hornblower, Mausolus, 131; 
Morison, BNJ 115 T 2 commentary; M. Flower, Theopompus of Chios: History and 
Rhetoric in the Fourth Century BC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 13-17, argues that 
the exile dates to 394 rather than 384 or 378, while G.S. Shrimpton, Theopompus the 
Historian (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1991), 4, less plausibly defends a date 
c.340, see Part III, Chapter 20. 
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with Athens also relied on pre-existing relationships; the embassy that went to Athens 
included Theocritus (RO 20, l. 43), members of whose family had studied with Isocrates 
in the 390s.33 
Yet, there was a second motivation for seeking a defensive alliance in 384. 
Dušanić argues that the Chians feared a war in the eastern Aegean, but that Persia itself 
had abided by the terms of the King’s Peace while the Chians faced more immediate 
threats. 34 Most notably, he suggests that, while Isocrates warned of the Persian threat to 
Chios (4.163), it was a rebel Persian admiral, Glos, likely with aid from Sparta and Chian 
exiles, who threatened the island (Diod. 15.9.5).35 If Isocrates was correct about a Persian 
military build-up in mainland Ionia, Dušanić continues, it was part of the campaign 
against Glos and his successor Tachus, rather than to threaten Chios.36 Thus, in 384, there 
likely was a substantial military presence in Ionia. Dušanić’s interpretation is attractive 
because he supplies a clear and present danger that the Chians reacted to and explains the 
lengthy duration of the Persian military presence in Ionia. Further, he reconciles the 
                                                 
33 S. Dušanić, “The Attic-Chian Alliance (“IG” II2 34) and the ‘Troubles in Greece’ of 
the Late 380’s BC,” ZPE 133 (2000), 24, see Part III, Chapter 20. 
34 Dušanić, “The Attic-Chian Alliance,” 22-8. 
35 Glos was probably an Egyptian who had inherited from his father estates in Ionia and 
married the daughter of the Persian satrap Tiribazus, whose patronage had helped secure 
his position in the campaign against Evagoras. After Tiribazus was arrested, Glos took 
the soldiers under his command at tried to set himself up as an independent dynast in 
western Anatolia. The implications of Glos’ rebellion on mainland Ionia are discussed 
below. Cf. Hornblower, “Persia,” 81-2; S. Ruzicka, “Glos, Son of Tamos, and the End of 
the Cypriot War,” Historia 48 (1999), 23-43. Stylianou, Historical Commentary on 
Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 161, suggests that he was Carian. Dušanić argues that that 
sudden reversal of Spartan policy was the result of internal divisions and a party in Sparta 
led by Agesilaus that had not be in favor of the peace to begin with, which also 
corresponds with Diod. 15.5.2, who says that the Spartans began encouraging stasis in 
poleis throughout Greece in the latter half of the 380s, see Stylianou, Historical 
Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 168-74. 
36 Dušanić, “The Attic-Chian Alliance,” 27. 
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statement in Isocrates that Chios would join Persia with Diodorus’ claim that the Chians 
wished to rebel from Sparta, and clears the Persians of any violation of the peace. There 
is just one significant difficulty: the dates.  
Dušanić argues that the fighting in Cyprus, which began in 386/5, lasted no more 
than two years, and that it was during that time that Tiribazus was arrested and Glos led 
his rebellion. This argument essentially accepts the Diodoran chronology and places 
Glos’ revolt early in 384,37 but it runs counter to the consensus of modern scholarship, 
which pushes the end of the Cyprian War and Glos’ revolt into the last years of the 380s, 
sometimes as late as 380/79 and thus after the treaty between Athens and Chios.38 It is 
true that Diodorus places two years of fighting in Cyprus in between the battle of Citium, 
in which Glos played a critical role, and when Evagoras was bottled up in Salamis, years 
that he narrates with other events that took place between 386 and 384. But Evagoras had 
begun his revolt in c.390 and did not finally surrender until 380, so some scholars have 
moved the date of Citium to 383 in order to align the two years of fighting attested by 
Diodorus (by way of Ephorus) to the two years immediately preceding Evagoras’ 
surrender.39 Shrimpton, like Dušanić, supports the Diodoran chronology, and argues that 
the war in Cyprus had effectively ended in 384. However, he holds that Evagoras 
negotiated a conditional surrender with Orontes and the two men conspired to have Glos’ 
                                                 
37 Dušanić, “The Attic-Chian Alliance,” 28-9. 
38 See, for instance, Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 652-3; Ruzicka, “Glos,” 40; T.T.B. 
Ryder, Spartan Relations with Persia after the King’s Peace: A Strange Story in Diodorus 
15.9,” CQ2 13 (1963), 105-9, argues that a volte-face in the Spartan relationship with 
Persia so soon after 386 is unlikely, while the evidence is stronger for that change by 380. 
M.J. Osborne, “Orontes,” Historia 22 (1973), 522-3, argues that Diodorus collapses 
events that took place over the course of ten years into his narrative for two of those 
years. 
39 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 653; Ruzicka, “Glos,” 23-43. 
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father-in-law Tiribazus arrested that year, which both prompted Glos’ rebellion and 
bought Evagoras several years of a cold war in which to negotiate for a lenient surrender 
with Artaxerxes.40 Thus Shrimpton dates Glos’ rebellion late in 384 or 383, still post-
dating the new Chian-Attic alliance. 
Glos did threaten Chios in the late 380s before he was assassinated in 383/2 
(Diod. 15.18.1),41 but, even if his revolt was underway in 384, the Chian-Attic alliance 
need not be seen as a response to that specific threat. The eastern Aegean in the 380s was 
particularly unstable. There had been a Persian civil war within recent memory, there 
were multiple ambitious satraps with various levels of independence from Persia 
conniving against each other, and Evagoras schemed against Persia on Cyprus. The threat 
of a war emerged as soon as the peace was established. Likewise, the Spartan imperialist 
party centered on Agesilaus probably began to encourage stasis as early as 386/5 (Diod. 
15.5.2), before Glos’ revolt, and could equally have caused the Chians to seek an alliance 
with Athens.  Once Glos went into revolt, the Chians would not have sought an alliance 
because they saw a war brewing, but because a war was upon them. Thus, the 
circumstances were ripe for Chios to look for an alliance in 384, without needing to tie 
the cause to the appearance of Glos. 
                                                 
40 G.S. Shrimpton, “Persian Strategy against Egypt and the Date for the Battle of Citium,” 
Phoenix 45 (1991), 1-20. His suggestion also reconciles one of the contradictions in the 
sources highlighted by Osborne, “Orontes,” 522-37, in that Theopompus says that 
Evagoras implicated Tiribazus, while Diodurus, probably following Ephorus, says it was 
Orobantes acting alone. Stylianou, Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 
185, likewise dates Glos’ rebellion to 383/2. 
41 Diodorus’ account of the end of Glos’ rebellion ends abruptly with an aside about the 
dispute between Clazomenae and Cyme, probably because his source, Ephorus, related 
the story about his native community losing to the tricky Ionians, see Stylianou, 
Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 208-9; on the land dispute, see 
Part III, Chapter 12. 
 86
The wording of the treaty between Chios and Athens makes it clear that its 
composers intended to abide by the terms of the King’s Peace and the Chians themselves 
likely stated in 384 that this sort of defensive alliance did not violate the peace (RO 20, ll. 
7-22).42 There are parallels between this treaty and the alliance between Athens and 
Corcyra in 433 (Thuc. 1.44) that incited conflict even though it did not by the letter 
violate the Thirty Years Peace, and it is tempting to see an instance of Athenian imperial 
policy repeating itself. However, the Chians declare in the treaty that κα κοσιν γαθ 
[παγγελλόμενοι τ]|ι δήμωι τι θηνα[ίων κα πάσηι τι λ]|λλάδι κα βασιλε, 
[ψηφίσθαι τι δ]ήμ|ωι (“they have come offering good things to the people of Athens 
and to all of Greece and to the king; be it decreed by the people,” RO 20, ll. 13-16).43 It is 
clear that the Chians, at least, had a particular interest in making sure that the treaty did 
not antagonize Persia. Further, both parties treated 386 as a watershed, so while the Chian 
and Athenian relationship in the years before helped lead to the treaty in 384, that 
justification for the alliance is meticulously avoided in the treaty’s language.44 Reverting 
to an earlier alliance would have violated the peace by rekindling the knot of animosities 
that had drawn Greece into the Corinthian War and risked Persian retaliation. Isocrates 
may have claimed, in an Orwellian moment, that Chios and Athens had never not been 
allies (14.27-8), but the sentiment was, predictably, mere rhetoric. 
                                                 
42 Rhodes and Osborne, GHI, 86, cf. Bruce, “The Alliance Between Athens and Chios,” 
283; Dušanić, “The Attic-Chian Alliance,” 22; Ryder, Koine Eirene, 49, for how the 
treaty was designed specifically to abide by the terms of the peace. 
43 Trans. RO 20. 
44 Dušanić, “The Attic-Chian Alliance,” 25-6, argues that the Athenian leaders were 
under immense pressure from the “hoi polloi” to help Chios, in part stemming from “the 
tradition about the Chian-Attic kinship,” such as appears in Plato’s Euthydemus (302 B-
D). 
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The treaty between Chios and Athens set a precedent for an Athenian treaty with 
Byzantium, and was a precursor to and the model for the second Athenian naval 
confederacy.45 In 378 Chios and Byzantium, along with Rhodes and the Lesbian poleis 
Methymna and Mytilene, renewed their treaties with Athens under the framework of the 
new confederacy (Diod. 15.30.2).46 A stele from the Athenian agora (RO 22) states that 
the terms of the naval confederacy, in a callback to the alliance in 384, would be the same 
for new allies as it was for Chios (μήτε φρορν εσδεχομένωι μήτε ρχοντα 
ποδεχομένωι μήτε φόρον φέροντι, π δ τος ατος φ᾽  οσπερ Χοι, ll. 21-4). 
Appropriately, Chios appears at the head of the list of member states (l. 79).47 Moreover, 
in the same way that the Attic-Chian alliance in 384 had explicitly described how it did 
not violate the King’s Peace, the new confederacy professed to be defensive in nature and 
in accordance with the peace (ll. 9-15):48 
πως ν Λακεδ[αιμό]νιοι σσι τς λλη‐ 
νας λευθέ[ρ]ος [κα] ατονόμος συχίαν 
γειν, τ[ν χώραν] χοντας μ βεβαίωι τ‐ 
[ν αυτν πσαν, [[κα] [π]ω[ς κ]υ[ρ]ία ι κ[α] δι‐ 
[αμένηι  τε ερήνη κα  φιλία ν μοσ]α‐ 
[ν ο λληνες] κα [βα]σιλες κατ τ[ς σ]υν‐ 
[θήκας]], ψηφί]σθαι τι δήμωι 
 
So that the Spartans shall allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous, and 
to live in their own territory in security, [[and so that the peace and 
                                                 
45 The inscription recording this alliance says that the terms would be the same as the 
terms in the alliance with Chios (Tod 2 121). 
46 Cawkwell, “Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy,” 50-1; Stylianou, 
Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 272-8; Cargill, Second Athenian 
League, 51-2. 
47 Diodorus 15.28.3, supports the idea that the Chians were the first polis to join the new 
Athenian alliance, but his chronology puts the change in 378/7, which is demonstrably 
false, see above. 
48 Rhodes and Osborne, GHI, 100-1. Trans. RO 22. Hornblower, “Persia,” 83, notes the 
decree threatens anyone who attacked a league member, implying that the Persian king 
could violate the treaty. 
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friendship sworn by the Greeks and the king in accordance with the 
agreements may be in force and endure,]] be it decreed by the people: 
 
The decree is especially laconose, but there is general agreement about the thrust of the 
text. Subjects of the Persian King are explicitly forbidden from joining the alliance (ll.16-
17), autonomous poleis are encouraged to seek out this alliance (l. 20), and, in a symbolic 
gesture, the stele was to be erected alongside a statue of Zeus Eleutherios (l. 64).49 
Despite these high-minded appeals, the new confederacy was an Athenian project. 
In addition to the original members, the confederacy included a new series of 
alliances formed in the first three months of 378, and another set in 377.50 In the early 
years of its existence, the activity of the confederacy was guided by the synedrion chaired 
by one of the delegates.51 The synedrion met in Athens, but the Athenians stood apart 
from it, holding no vote. This council had legal protections and the Athenians likely 
swore to abide by the decisions of the koinon.52 However, a long Athenian shadow lay 
over the league since not only did the synedrion meet in Athens, but also it was created 
by a decree of the Athenian Assembly.53 In principle, though, the confederacy was a 
voluntary association to protest high-handed Spartan actions such as garrisons in Boeotia 
                                                 
49 Rhodes and Osborne, GHI, 103-4. 
50 Stylianou, Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 249-53. Cf. C.A. 
Baron, “The Aristoteles Decree and the Expansion of the Second Athenian League,” 
Hesperia 75 (2006), 379-95; G.L. Cawkwell, “Notes on the Failure of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy,” JHS 101 (1981), 41-6; Cargill, Second Athenian League, 51-67; 
Sealey, Demosthenes, 52-8. 
51 S. Accame, La lega Ateniese del secolo IV a.C. (Rome: Angelo Signorelli, 1941), 111-
14; Cawkwell, “Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy,” 46-7; 
Cargill, Second Athenian League, 115-28. 
52 Stylianou, Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 254. Accame, La lega 
Ateniese, 34-5, believes that IG II2 35, which is usually thought to be a copy of RO 20, 
should be read as an updated treaty to accommodate the new confederacy. Cf. Cargill, 
Second Athenian League, 52. 
53 Stylianou, Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 256-7. 
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(e.g. Xen. Hell. 5.4.10) and Sphodrias’ raid on the Pireaeus in 378 (Xen. Hell. 5.4.20; 
Diod. 15.29.5-6).54 This confederacy continued to exist until Philip II abolished it after 
the battle of Chaeronea in 338, but it “failed” (to use Cawkwell’s term) in the lead up to 
the Social War in 357 when Chios, Cos, Rhodes, and Byzantium went to war with Athens 
(see below). It is generally accepted that, in the years after the battle of Leuctra (371), the 
Athenians began to assert imperial authority, extorting more resources from their allies, 
increasing syntaxeis, ignoring the synedrion of the allies, and imposing cleruchies on 
poleis such as Samos that remained outside their protection racket.55 
 
IV. Samos and Athens 
Samos never joined the new Athenian alliance, and, as early as Isocrates’ 
Panegyricus in 380, the ruling Samians preferred to cut ties with Athens. There is no 
testimony from Samos in this period, but Shipley argues that the rejection of the alliance 
was motivated by the loss of the peraea to Persia in the King’s Peace.56 In this 
                                                 
54 On the Spartan garrisons in Boeotia, see J.M. Wickersham, “Spartan Garrisons in 
Boeotia 382-379.8 B.C.,” Historia 56 (2007), 243-6, with bibliography. There is a debate 
whether the foundation of the confederacy belongs before the raid as recorded by 
Diodorus and argued by Cawkwell, “Foundation of the Second Athenian Naval 
Confederacy,” 56-60; Stylianou, Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 
261-5, or after the raid as argued by R.M. Kallet-Marx, “Athens, Thebes, and the 
Foundation of the Second Athenian League,” CA 4 (1985), 127-51; D.G. Rice, 
“Xenophon, Diodorus and the Year 379/8 B.c.” YCS 24 (1975), 112. I prefer V. Parker, 
“Sphodrias’ Raid and the Liberation of Thebes: A Study of Ephorus and Xenophon,” 
Hermes 135 (2007), 13 n. 1, in seeing the foundation of the league as a process rather 
than an event, though I believe the main framework of the confederacy predates the raid. 
55 Cargill, Second Athenian League, 128, argues that the organization of the league 
remained fair to both the weak members of the league and to Athens without becoming 
an empire, but it is worth noting both that Athenian imperialism extended beyond the 
league members and that the discontented members were those that had originally entered 
into bilateral treaties with Athens. 
56 Shipley, Samos, 135-6.  Cf. Hornblower, Mausolus, 127-9. 
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reconstruction, some Samian landowner relocated to the island, while others had to pay 
tribute to the Persians and longstanding relationships on the mainland such as guest-
friendships made them “susceptible to Persian propaganda.”57 Further, while Samos had 
oscillated between pro-Athenian and pro-Spartan alignments in the 390s,58 it is probable 
that Lysander's capture of the island in 404 had caused the expulsion of the most 
passionately pro-Athenian citizens and thus, unlike at Chios, the citizen body did not 
have a strong affiliation with Athens to support joining the Second Naval Confederacy. 
The orientation of the polis toward Persia could have also been influenced by the close 
proximity to Persian satraps, most notably Mausolus.59 Coins minted by the Carian 
dynast and his successor have been discovered on the island, which indicates a close 
commercial relationship before the appearance of a Persian garrison.60  
Isocrates’ generalization that the King’s Peace had allowed the Persian king to 
install supervisors (πιστάτης) in the Greek poleis (4.120) likewise held more truth for 
Samos than it did for Chios. By the early 360s, Tigranes, a Persian hyparch, violated the 
King’s Peace by establishing a garrison on the island (Dem. 15.9).61 In 366, Timotheus 
led an Athenian fleet to the eastern Aegean under the auspices of supporting 
Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Hellespontine Phyrgia, and undertook a ten-month siege of 
Samos in the name of liberating the island from Persia (Isoc. 14.111).62 There is also 
                                                 
57 Shipley, Samos, 136. 
58 See Part II, Chapter 3. 
59 Cf. Shipley, Samos, 137. 
60 Hornblower, Mausolus, 109 n. 19, 135, 198. 
61 Hornblower, Mausolus, 187, 198. 
62 L. Kallet, “Iphikrates, Timotheos, and Athens, 371-360 B.C.,” GRBS 24 (1983), 246.  
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evidence of a skirmish near Chios sometime during that siege (Isaeus 6.27), which may 
have come about because Timotheus dispatched ships to Erythrae.63  
In 366 Timotheus “liberated” Samos from Persia, but, in doing so, violated the 
King’s Peace himself (Dem. 15.9).64 The treaty that bound Athens and the member states 
of the Second Naval Confederacy was meant to adhere to the terms of the King’s Peace, 
but Athens had renewed and revised the treaty several times, most recently in Athens in 
371. There was an important shift when delegates ratified a new treaty (Xen. Hell. 6.5.2): 
where the King’s Peace had guaranteed protection for every polis, the Athenian treaty 
only offered protection to those states that were members of the naval confederacy.65 
Within a year of Timotheus’ capturing Samos, the Athenians expelled the Samians and 
established a cleruchy on the island.66 It has been posited that the Athenian takeover of 
Samos as a response to the Theban naval construction at about the same time,67 but it is 
more likely that such an explanation reverses the causation.68 Nor was there an apologia 
for the conquest of Samos like the one Thucydides included for the capture of Melos 
                                                 
63 On the date of the skirmish near Chios, see E. Schweigert, “The Athenian Cleruchy on 
Samos,” AJPh 61 (1940), 198. On Timotheus’ ambitions, see Ruzicka, Politics of a 
Persian Dyansty, 73-4. See below. 
64 Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 293; Hornblower, “Persia,” 89. 
65 Cargill, Second Athenian League, 12. 
66 Hornblower, Mausolus, 198-9; Shipley, Samos, 141-3; R. Sealey, “IG II2 1609 and the 
Transformation of the Athenian Sea-League,” Phoenix 11 (1957), 95-7, 108; Sealey, 
Demosthenes, 106. Cargill, “IG II2 and the Athenian Kleruchy on Samos,” 321-32, 
argues, contra Shipley, that most of the cleruchs were “ancestral Samians” who received 
Athenian citizenship in 404. The cleruchy also attested by a partial list of settlers, IG II2 
1952. Cf. IG II2 108; Isoc. 15.111-112; Dem 15.9; Nepos, Timotheus 1.2. At least some 
of the grants of land probably went to Samians who had been forced into exile in the 5th 
century, see Part II, Chapter 3.  
67 For example, J.M. Cook, “Cnidian Peraea and Spartan Coins,” JHS 81 (1961), 70 n. 
81. 
68 Hornblower, Mausolus, 198. 
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(5.84-111). The Athenians simply maintained that they liberated the island and used it as 
an outlet to relieve population pressures in Attica.69  
But what of the exiles, those “Samians who had been put on the streets of Greece 
by Athens, [who] were walking mementoes to the power of Fortune, τύχη, no less than of 
the πλεονεξία, the Greed, of the Athenians”?70 Shipley notes that the Samians did not 
form a community in exile in their mainland peraea, likely because most of the land no 
longer belonged to them.71 Instead, the exiles were dispersed, possibly settling as far 
away as Sicily.72 Most of them, however, took refuge in nearby poleis, including Erythrae 
and Priene, which were within the Carian sphere of interest. The action cost the Carian 
dynast Mausolus nothing and Timotheus supported his opponent Ariobarzanes, so, most 
likely, he offered refuge to the dislocated Samians. 
 
V. The Social War 
Predictably, the Athenian expulsion of the Samians (who were only able to return 
after 323)73 and establishment of a cleruchy on Samos created ripple effects in the 
Aegean, even though the Athenians maintained that they violated no treaty. As alluded to 
                                                 
69 Hornblower, Mausolus, 200. G.L. Cawkwell, “Notes on the Failure of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy,” JHS 101 (1981), 55, argues that there was an economic 
depression in the Aegean in the late 360s, in part the product of severe drought and corn 
shortages that might have lasted into the 350s. 
70 Hornblower, Mausolus, 199. 
71 Shipley, Samos, 155-6. 
72 R.B. Kebric, In the Shadow of Macedon (Weisbaden: Historia, 1977), 4-5; R.B. Kebric, 
“Duris of Samos: Early Ties with Sicily,” AJA 79 (1975), 286-7; Shipley, Samos, 163-4; 
C. Habicht, “Samische Volksbeschlüsse der hellenistischen Zeit,” Athenische 
Mitteilungen 72 (1957), n. 23, is a decree from Heracleia for Duris’ brother. There are 
multiple communities named “Heracleia,” the one in Sicily is the most probable. Debord, 
L’Asie Mineure, implausibly suggests that some of the Samians were able to become 
Athenian citizens. 
73 See Part II, Chapter 6. 
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above, it is likely that the renewed specter of imperial ambition afforded Epaminondas 
the opportunity to begin construction of a Theban navy and to appeal to Chios and 
Rhodes to flip their alliances from Athens to Thebes (Diod. 15.79.1).74 Epaminondas 
himself sailed to Ionia and chased away the Athenian general Laches, but the Theban 
general’s death at the battle of Mantineia in 362 stemmed Theban efforts to gain control 
of the sea. Ruzicka also suggests that, despite the testimony of Diodorus, Chios and 
Rhodes formed an alliance with the Thebans in hope of avoiding war with Persia. They 
probably had not actually yet withdrawn from the Athenian confederacy, but the 
appearance of Laches must have given another indication that Athens was willing to 
compel compliance.75 At the same time, the incident at Samos seems to have prompted 
Mausolus to put garrisons on the mainland opposite the island.76 
Throughout the 360s the Athenians took an increasingly presumptive attitude 
toward the allies in the new confederacy;77 Isocrates even records that some Athenians 
advocated denying allies that had fallen behind on payments access to the sea (8.36). 
There is also other evidence that, unsurprisingly, the other poleis believed the Athenians 
to be plotting against them in the early 350s, which, in turn, became the pretext for the 
Social War (Dem. 15.3).78 Chios and Rhodes broke with the confederacy in 357, having 
                                                 
74 Hornblower, Mausolus, 200; Ruzicka, “Eastern Greek World,” 120-1.  
75 Ruzicka, “Eastern Greek World,” 121. Hornblower, Mausolus, 131; Sealey, 
Demosthenes, 103; and Stylianou, Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 
494-7, argue that Byzantium withdrew from the confederacy in 364, while Chios and 
Rhodes did not do so until 357. 
76 Ruzicka, “Eastern Greek World,” 120. 
77 Cawkell, “Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy,” 51-2, see above. 
78 E. Badian, “The Ghost of Empire: Reflections on Athenian Foreign Policy in the 
Fourth Century,” in Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr., edd. W. Eder 
and Chr. Auffarth (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1995), 94-5; Cawkwell, “Notes on the Failure 
of the Second Athenian Confederacy,” 51-3; Worthington, Demosthenes, 65.  
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concluded an alliance with Byzantium, Cos, and the Hecatomnid dynast Mausolus the 
year before.79 Mausolus likely manipulated the concerns over Athenian actions in the 
Aegean islands in order to start the war and shatter Athenian influence in the region,80 
while the poleis that left the confederacy were merely waiting for Athens to be occupied 
somewhere besides Samos.81  
Athens attacked Chios twice in 356 and each time Mausolus came its defense. In 
the lull between attacks he raided Samos and other Athenian territories (Diod. 16.7.2-4), 
and won a battle over the Athenian fleet at Embata near Erythrae (Diod.16.21).82 By 354, 
Athens was forced to again recognize the autonomy of Chios and Rhodes who rebelled in 
357, but those poleis maintained their defensive alliances with each other and, more 
importantly, found themselves within the Carian sphere of influence until the entrée of 
Macedonian power into the eastern Aegean.83 Carian garrisons, while not common, did 
exist, and, perhaps more telling of the new status quo is that substantial hordes of Carian 
                                                 
79 While it is possible that the root cause of the Social War lies in the alliance between the 
eastern Greek poleis and Thebes under Epaminondas, as is implied by Diodorus, Ruzicka 
“Epaminondas and the Genesis of the Social War,” 68, persuasively argues that they 
yielded to Athenian pressure to return to the league in 357 had it not been for new 
alliances with Mausolus.  
80 Hornblower, Mausolus, 183, 208-9; Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 93-4, both 
follow Demosthenes’ claim (15.3) that Mausolus started the conflict. Buckler, Aegean 
Greece, 379, says that though Mausolus benefitted from the war, he was not the 
instigator. 
81 Cawkwell, “Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy,” 55. The two 
explanations are not mutually exclusive; see Sealey, Demosthenes, 106-7. 
82 Hornblower, Mausolus, 212; Ruzicka, “The Eastern Greek World,” 121; Sealey, 
Demosthenes, 104-5; Worthington, Demosthenes, 65-7. The raids on Athenian territory 
were probably, but not impossibly, without the aid of Chian forces since the Athenians 
returned in force later that year. On the fallout from Embata at Athens, see R. Sealey, 
“Athens After the Social War,” JHS 75 (1955), 74-81. 
83 Ruzicka, “The Eastern Greek World,” 122-3, see Part II, Chapter 6. 
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coins depicting Mausolus and Pixodarus have been discovered on Chios.84 Among these 
is a Mausolan drachm minted on the Chian standard,85 which Hornblower reasonably 
posits as a sign of political interference, declaring “the coin is not likely to be a mere 
stray.”86  
 
VI. Anatolian Ionia and Mausolus of Caria 
 According to Diodorus, the Persian Empire was facing imminent doom in the late 
360s and early 350s (15.90.3).87 He claims that the entire Mediterranean coast from 
Anatolia to Egypt went into revolt, cutting off a full half of the annual tribute, and that 
the problems that beset the empire were compounded by the death of Artaxerxes II and 
the accession of Artaxerxes III in 358 (15.90.3-4, 93.1).88 The Persian Empire remained 
structurally sound, but there was a fracturing of royal control in Anatolia, troubles that 
Briant argues “had always been there in latent form.”89 Far from an organized coalition of 
rebel satraps led by Orontes, Artaxerxes II confronted a series of local uprisings. 
Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia, may have quietly renounced his loyalty to Persia as 
early as the 370s, but he openly declared his revolt sometime before 366 and Datames, 
the satrap of Cappadocia, joined him.90 Artaxerxes ordered the satrap of Lydia, 
                                                 
84 Hornblower, Mausolus, 132. 
85 For a discussion of weight standards, see Part III, Chapter 15. 
86 Hornblower, Mausolus, 109 with n. 19; cf. Lane Fox, “Theopompus,” 109. 
87 On the contradictions in this passage, see Stylianou, Historical Commentary on 
Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 527-36. 
88 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 680-1; Waters, Ancient Persia, 192-3. 
89 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 656-75, 680-1; M. Weiskopf, The So-called ‘Great 
Satraps’ Revolt’, 366-360 BC: Concerning Local Instability in the Achaemenid Far West 
(Stuttgart: Historia, 1989), 94-9. Cf. Waters, Ancient Persia, 192-3. Talking points of 
Athenian orators nevertheless included Persian weaknesses, see Part III, chapter 11. 
90 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 661-2. 
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Autophradates, and the Hecatomnid Mausolus to defeat the rebels and, at this juncture, 
Orontes, a Persian possibly in disgrace for slandering Tiribazus in Cyprus in the 380s 
(assuming it is the same man), expanded his position in Mysia.91 Diodorus presents a 
spontaneous rebellion, but it is likely that Satraps’ “revolt” was endemic in Anatolia 
where semi-autonomous satraps and dynasts contended with Greek poleis.92 Indeed 
Brosius describes Persian diplomacy within and beyond Persian territory as guided by 
“pragmatism and political expediency.”93 Among the exaggerated number of regions in 
revolt listed by Diodorus is Ionia (15.90.3-4), but, if the region revolted, the King did not 
punish them. When the Ionian poleis were ordered to pay tribute to a loyal satrap they 
readily did so and, since the satrap was the representative of the King, the communities 
were insulated from punishment.94 
The local nature of the revolts also helps to explain Mausolus’ ambiguous role: he 
first appears helping the loyal Persian forces, but later withdraws from the campaign, and 
then aids the Spartans, and he is explicitly listed among the rebels. Similarly, it is 
possible that Mausolus withdrew from the campaign against the rebel satraps because he 
needed to safeguard his own territory from Athenian attacks while Timotheus besieged 
                                                 
91 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 662; Hornblower, “Asia Minor,” 220. Orontes first 
appears in historical sources as the Satrap of Armenia in 401. He participated in the 
campaign in 384 against Evagoras in Cyprus, but then disappears from the sources until 
the late 360s. A career that spanned more than forty years is certainly possible, but is far 
from certain. Diodorus includes Autophradates in his list of rebels, but Xen. Ages. 2.26 
indicates otherwise. 
92 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 663; Debord, L’Asie Mineuere, 302-66. 
93 M. Brosius, “Persian Diplomacy Between ‘Pax Persica,’ and ‘Zero Tolerance’,” in 
Maintaining Peace and Interstate Stability in Archaic and Classical Greece, ed. J. Wilker 
(Mainz: Verlag Antike, 2012), 153-4. 
94 Brosius, “Persian Diplomacy,” 163, notes that the only revolts punished by Persia were 
those that threatened the Persian Peace. 
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Samos.95 The most probable explanation is that the Carian dynast hedged his bets by 
supporting both sides of the conflict, joining the revolt but not so deeply that he could not 
return to being loyal, while also trying to enhance his local position.96 Control of Ionia in 
the 360s was divided between the satrap at Sardis and Mausolus, and the region was 
probably a staging area for Mausolus’ fleet and recruiting grounds for the mercenary 
armies of both rebel and loyalist forces (e.g. Diod. 15.91.2-3). Though there is no 
evidence for Mausolus’ enterprises between the conclusion of the Satraps’ Revolt in the 
late 360s and the start of the Social War in 357, Mausolus had likely used the pretext of 
the revolt to plant his seeds in northern Ionia, the fruits of which appear in the 350s (see 
below). There is a frustrating lack of chronological detail for Ionia during these years, but 
it is possible to show the broad strokes of Carian involvement in the region. 
The location of Erythrae moved sometime in the mid-fourth century, abandoning 
the first site and moving some nineteen kilometers around the bay.97 Hornblower 
suggests that that the relocation was prompted, or at least had been enabled, by Mausolus, 
whose relationship with the polis blossomed shortly thereafter.98 Mausolus’ relationship 
with Erythrae provides a plausible explanation for the honorary decree that granted him, 
among other things, citizenship (see below). But the relationship went further; a rhetor 
from Erythrae, Naucrates, was one of the Greek intellectuals who gave an encomium at 
                                                 
95 Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 69.  
96 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 668-70; Hornblower, Mausolus, 172-82. 
97 J.M. Cook, “Old Smyrna,” ABSA 53/54 (1958/1959), 21-2; Hornblower, “Asia Minor,” 
224-5. 
98 Hornblower, Mausolus, 100, 108. Mausolus is, notably, granted the honors by the 
Erythraean boule, not the demos, which indicates a rather narrow faction in Erythrae 
dominated the political decision making, as was often true in Ionia. 
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Mausolus’ funeral (Theopompus, BNJ 115 T 6a and b).99 In either c.365 c.357, Erythrae 
granted honors to Mausolus and his sister-wife Artemisia because he was an aner 
agathos (RO 56, l. 3).100 The decree declared that Mausolus was an euergetes to the polis, 
and gave standard honors in making him proxenos and citizen and giving the right to sail 
into and out of the harbor without needing permission through a treaty (ll. 5-8). The 
Erythraeans also erected a bronze statue of Mausolus in the agora and a stone one of 
Artemisia beside the temple of Athena, both with crowns, albeit hers at a lesser expense 
(ll. 10-13). Whether the decree ought to date to Mausolus’ first spate of activity in the 
Gulf of Smyrna in the 360s or the second in 357, which I prefer, it points to his direct 
involvement in the local Ionian politics.101 
Despite the close relationship between Erythrae and Mausolus, there is some 
evidence that there was a non-negligible portion of the population that favored a 
relationship with Athens instead. As early as the mid-360s Timotheus probably sent aid 
to Erythrae, which resulted in a naval battle against Carian ships off Chios (Isaeus 
                                                 
99 Hornblower, Mausolus, 109-10, 334, with n. 9. Also in attendance was the exiled 
Chian historian Theopompus, see Part III, Chapter 20. 
100 Rhodes and Osborne, GHI, 267 and Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 392, date the inscription 
vaguely to the mid-350s at the same time that Mausolus send aid to Chios, though 
Hornblower, Mausolus, 110, and Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 73, plausibly 
suggest that it may date to the mid-360s after the Athenian conquest of Samos when the 
Erythraeans offered aid to Samian refugees. The terminus ante quem for the honors must 
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follow E. Badian, “A document of Artaxerxes IV?,” in Greece and the Eastern 
Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory, ed. K.H. Kinzl, (New York: de 
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101 Hornblower, Mausolus, 109.  
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6.27).102 Timotheus likely chose to aid Erythrae in particular because of a family 
connection: the polis had honored his father Conon after the battle of Cnidus in 394 (RO 
8), including by making him proxenos, a position Timotheus plausibly inherited.103  
Nevertheless, Erythrae ceased minting coins in 356,104 which is another indicator that 
about this time Mausolus bound the polis closer to himself. Even after the polis honored 
him, however, some citizens remained in touch with Athens and in 354/3 dedicated a 
crown on the Athenian Acropolis (IG II2 1437).105   
Though less well documented, Mausolus’ relationship with other Ionian poleis 
appears to have been similar to that of Erythrae. Miletus, the Ionian polis closest to Caria, 
must have been within the Hecatomnid sphere of influence from an early date. The polis 
was not under Mausolus’ direct rule, but had a favorable government propped up by the 
Hecatomnid dynast.106 Polyaenus records that Mausolus sent one Aegyptus to Miletus, 
who then tried to capture the polis, but the scheme failed (6.8). Hornblower surmises that 
Mausolus wanted to annex the Milesian hinterland,107 but that he acted through a 
subordinate so that he was not directly implicated. It is impossible to know when, if at all, 
the plot took place, but the story fits plausibly before 365 when Mausolus first 
established his position in Ionia. Another strategem records how Mausolus captured 
Latmus, one of the districts of Miletus. Polyaenus says that Mausolus first returned 
                                                 
102 Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 73; Schweigert, “Athenian Cleruchy on 
Samos,” 197-8; G.L. Cawkwell, “Notes on the Social War,” Classica et Medievalia 23 
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103 Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 73; Brosius, “Persian Diplomacy,” 160. For 
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104 Rubinstein, “Ionia,” 1076. 
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Latmian hostages and appointed others to his bodyguard and obliged the community in 
all ways (7.23.2).108 Mausolus then pretended to lead his forces to Pygela (see below), 
which took him past Latmus and he had his forces capture the community when the 
citizens came out to greet him. Many details about this strategem are vague, but several 
facts stand out. First, the citizens of Latmus are treated as distinct from Miletus, which 
indicates that decentralization in Miletus continued from the fifth century. Second, it 
reveals that Mausolus already had a relationship with Ionia but that he sought to bind 
them closer to him through flattery and force.  
And yet, Miletus must have been on friendly terms with Caria shortly after 
Mausolus’ death since the citizens honored his successors Idreius and Ada with statues at 
Delphi (Tod 2 161B).109 Moreover, silver coins of a Milesian type that date to the fourth 
century and bear the letters EKA and MA, probably abbreviations of MA[αύσσολλος] and 
EKA[τόμνος], have been discovered between Halicarnassus and Miletus.110 Miletus, like 
Erythrae, aided Samian refugees, perhaps at the behest of Mausolus, and Hornblower 
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109 Cf. Heckel, Who’s Who, 3. Ada and Idreius were Mausolus’ younger siblings and 
inherited his position. Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 112, suggests that erecting 
at Delphi signaled to Athens that their loyalty belonged to Caria; but Hornblower, “Asia 
Minor,” 229-30, notes that, by 300, the dedication at such a sanctuary would likely have 
been erected at Didyma. See Part III, Chapter 17. 
110 Hornblower, Mausolus, 111, believes that these coins, rather than mimicking the 
Milesian type are on the Milesian type, indicating that Miletus fell to Mausolus and 
minted Hecatomnid coinage. Cf. Mausolus’ involvement on Cos, where he manipulated 
their coinage, Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 70-1. 
 101
posits that Miletus may have introduced the worship of Zeus Labraundeus, a Carian 
deity, during this same period.111 
Mausolus also exerted his influence over Priene. Throughout much of the fourth 
century, Priene seems to have ceased to exist, and likely merged its political identity with 
the harbor settlement Naulochon, which, while the site is unknown, begins to be attested 
at about the same time.112 At some point, though, Priene was refounded and likely 
changed location. The site of Hellenistic Priene contains no evidence of a settlement 
earlier than the fourth century, and Patronos thus argues that the post Naulochon was the 
original location, but acknowledges that all arguments are ex silentio until that site is 
located.113 Attempts have been made to credit Alexander the Great with the new 
settlement since a dedication to the Macedonian king appears on the temple of Athena 
Polias, and the action fits within the context of a genuine Panhellenic crusade.114 
However, it is more likely that the refoundation took place with the support of the Carian 
dynasts.115 Vitruvius says that Pytheus was an architect for both the temple of Athena 
                                                 
111 Hornblower, Mausolus, 111-12. Miletus contained a large Carian population so the 
appearance of a Carian deity need not have been introduced by Mausolus, even though he 
may have encouraged the practice and underwritten the costs (Hdt. 1.146). 
112 Hornblower, Mausolus, 327. On the geographical setting and resources of Priene, see 
Patronos, “Public Architecture and Civic Identity,” 108-9, with bibliography. 
113 Patronos, “Public Architecture and Civic Identity,” 111-15. Cf. Hornblower, 
Mausolus, 325-6. 
114 It has also been suggested that Alexander re-founded the polis during his campaign in 
334, but the argument is largely based on a lack of evidence from the earlier period. See 
G. Cohen, The Hellenistic Settlements in Europe, The Islands, and Asia Minor (Los 
Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 187; Hornblower, 
Mausolus, 325-30. Hornblower also suggests that the refoundation could have been the 
work of Ada. On Alexander and Ionia, see Part II, Chapter 5. 
115 Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, 178, implausibly 
suggests Athenian activity behind the refoundation. 
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Polias and the Mausoleum, two buildings in the same architectural tradition.116 
Construction on the latter structure probably began in the 360s, with work continuing 
until at least Artemisia’s death in 351. Thus the upper limit of the refoundation is 
Mausolus’ reign, while the lower limit is probably the reign of Idreius (351/0-344/3), 
since the temple was likely nearing completion in 334 when Alexander campaigned in 
Ionia.117 Mausolus' patronage at Priene also corresponds with a wider program of 
refoundations undertaken by Mausolus in Caria.118 Indeed, Pederson argues that there 
was a broad cultural exchange between Ionia and Caria during Mausolus’ reign, with the 
“fourth century Ionian Renaissance” in construction owing its origins to Caria and 
spreading through Carian patronage, while the styles were contemporary interpretations 
of Archaic Ionian forms.119 
Not every Ionian polis fell under the sway of Mausolus. At Ephesus there is trace 
evidence of factional conflict, as well as resistance to Mausolus, probably aided by the 
close relationship with Sardis.120 As noted above, Polyaenus records a stratagem 
undertaken by Mausolus during an expedition to Pygela, near Ephesus, to thwart the 
actions of Heropythes of Ephesus (7.23.2).121 The passage speaks most directly to the 
relationship between Mausolus and Miletus, but it also says that the pretext of the 
                                                 
116 Patronos, “Public Architecture and Civic Identity,” 118. 
117 Patronos, “Public Architecture and Civic Identity,” 115-21, 124-7. See Part II, Chapter 
5. 
118 G.E. Bean and J.M. Cook, “The Carian Coast III,” ABSA 52 (1957), 141; cf. 
Hornblower, Mausolus, 78-105. 
119 P. Pedersen, “The 4th Century BC ‘Ionian Renaissance’ and Karian Identity,” in 4th 
Century Karia: Defining a Karian Identity under the Hekatomnids, ed. O. Henry (Paris: 
de Boccard, 2013), 33-46. 
120 On the ties between Ephesus and Sardis, see Part III, Chapter 9. 
121 Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 71-2. Polyaenus records the name as 
“Herophytus,” but is probably mistaken, see P.M. Fraser and E. Matthews, A Lexicon of 
Greek Personal Names 5A (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 261. 
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campaign was to support Pygela against renewed aggression from Ephesus under the 
leadership of Heropythes.122  Little is known about Heropythes, but he must have been a 
prominent citizen since he received a tomb in the Agora, which was desecrated during 
riots in 335/4 (Arr. 1.17.11).123  
 
VII. After Mausolus: Ionia to 353-336 
 
Mausolus died in 353 and was succeeded by his sister-wife Artemisia until 351, 
Idrieus (351/0-344/3) and his sister-wife Ada (until 341/0), and finally another brother, 
Pixodarus (340-336).124 Hornblower argues that it is wrong to conclude that Carian 
power declined in this period, but the appearance of new figures such as Hermias of 
Atarneus and the attestation of Rhosaces as satrap of Ionia (Diod. 16.47) indicates 
increased imperial competition for influence in the region.125 In the 340s several Ionian 
poleis negotiated with Hermias and the Macedonian King Philip II (see below), but 
Hecatomnid influence, particularly in the poleis close to Caria such as Miletus, did not 
end until the Macedonian campaigns in 336 and 334.  
 Idrieus, like Mausolus before him, patronized building projects in Ionian poleis 
and the Milesians dedicated massive statues of him and his sister-wife Ada at Delphi in 
the 340s, which also indicates that rebuilding for the sanctuary at Didyma was not yet 
                                                 
122 On Ephesus and Pygela, see Part II, Chapters 3 and 6. 
123 See Part II, Chapter 5. 
124 The Athenians may have used his passing as an opportunity to reinforce their position 
on Samos and thus sent new cleruchs in 352/1. See Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian 
Dynasty, 106. 
125 Hornblower, “Asia Minor,” 216; Hornblower, “Persia,” 94. 
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planned (Tod 2 161 A and B).126 At Erythrae there was an inscription that granted honors 
to Idrieus, perhaps displayed next to the one for Mausolus (see above). Like Mausolus, 
Idreius became euergetes, proxenos, and citizen, and received freedom from commercial 
taxation and rights in the courts.127 Shortly after 351, however, Artemisia installed a 
garrison on Chios, which indicates that the Carian ability to coerce Ionians by means 
other than force was on the wane.128 Chios was exceptional and the Carians may have 
installed the garrison because it was the Ionian polis most able to assert its independence.  
The weakening of Hecatomnid power was also on display beyond Ionia. In c.351, 
Rhodes asserted its independence by sailing to and attacking Halicarnassus and was paid 
back in kind by Artemisia (Vitruvius 2.8.14-15).129 This demonstration of force may have 
also prompted the outpouring of honors and dedications for the dynasts, lest other poleis 
have a similar fate befall them.130 Carian coercion, along with continued patronage, 
worked in the short-term, but resentment at the treatment and fear of heavy-handed 
Carian policies may have encouraged the Ionian poleis to look for new friends. At this 
juncture, though, the only one forthcoming was another local dynast, Hermias of 
Atarneus. 
At around the same time that they honored Idrieus, the Erythraeans concluded a 
treaty with Hermias (Tod 2 165). Hermias was an independent dynast in Aeolis who had 
                                                 
126 Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 104, 112. On the restoration of Didyma, see 
Part III, Chapter 17. 
127 E. Varınlıoğlu, “Inscriptions from Erythrae,” ZPE 44 (1981), 45-7, no. 1; cf. Ruzicka, 
Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 111-12. 
128 Hornblower, Mausolus, 39-40. The garrison is evidenced by Dem. 5.25. 
129 Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 110-12. R.M. Berthold, Rhodes in the 
Hellenistic Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 32 n. 44, and R.M. Berthold, “A 
Historical Fiction in Vitruvius,” CPh 73 (1978), 129-34, believes the episode to be 
fictional. 
130 Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 113-14.  
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concluded a treaty with Philip II of Macedonia, as early as 348 (Dem. 10.32; Diod. 
16.52.5-8).131 The treaty between Erythrae and Hermias assured both parties of economic 
rights and protections in the case of war. It has also been suggested that Chios negotiated 
a treaty with Hermeias perhaps to recover its lost peraea, largely based on a passage from 
Theopompus (BNJ 115 F 291).132 This passage is particularly fragmentary such that the 
relationship between Chios, Mytilene, and Hermias is obscured, but it preserves 
Theopompus’ scorn for how the dynast treated the Ionians (κ(α) προεπηλάκισε 
πλείστους ώνων).133 However, there is reason to be skeptical of a close relationship 
between Chios and Hermias since Atarneus had been part of the Chian peraea until 387. 
In 342, Artaxerxes III assigned Mentor to Anatolia with the instructions to defeat 
Hermias. After luring the tyrant out under false pretenses and arresting him, Mentor 
reestablished royal control over the entirety of western Anatolia (Diod. 16.52.2-7).  
According to Diodorus, Mentor managed this peacefully, writing to the communities 
using Hermias’ seal, professing that he and the King were reconciled. Convinced that the 
hostilities were at an end, the communities surrendered.134  
The account of these events preserved by Diodorus is compressed, but it does 
explain how the Persian territorial boundaries in Anatolia were the same in 336 as they 
were at the conclusion of the King’s Peace in 386. Yet it also indicates that Carian 
                                                 
131 Buckler, Aegean Greece, 473, argues that Hermias did not possess sufficient resources 
to provide a bridgehead to Asia, as Philip’s opponents claimed was the motivation behind 
the alliance.  Cf. Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 122-3; Worthington, Philip II, 
127; Worthington, Demosthenes, 224-6; Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 688-9; P. 
Green, “Politics, Philosophy, and Propaganda: Hermias of Atarneus and His Friendship 
with Aristotle,” in Crossroads of History: The Age of Alexander the Great, edd. W. 
Heckel and L.A. Tritle (Claremont: Regina Press, 2003), 29-46. 
132 Hornblower, “Persia,” 81. 
133 Theopompus was likely not welcome in Chios, see Part III, Chapter 20. 
134 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 688. 
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hegemony over Ionia weakened in the 340s to the point where it was virtually non-
existent except, perhaps, in Miletus. The decline made it possible for factions within an 
increasing number of Ionian polities to break free and consider themselves independent. 
Hermias was a useful ally to help the Ionian poleis resist Caria, but this was a practical, 
rather than ideological, decision. This process probably included expelling the faction 
that had benefitted from Persian or Carian rule in some instances, but it seems was 
frequently just a shift in policy, as happened at Chios. The Chians sent ships to aid their 
old ally Byzantium in 340, after the Athenians had dispatched Hyperides to persuade the 
Chians join a coalition against Philip.135 The expedition was a fiasco and resulted in the 
Chian ships, including a grain fleet, being captured. When Philip released their ships, the 
Chians withdrew from the conflict.136  
The period from 386 to 336 in Ionia began with the poleis off the coast 
technically autonomous and those on Anatolia both de jure and de facto part of the 
Persian Empire. The intervening years were tumultuous, with periods when powerful 
dynasts, not all of which were Persian vassals, were able to exert a great deal of control 
over poleis on the both the mainland and the islands. In addition, there were periods when 
anti-Persian factions in the mainland poleis were able to draw on their contacts from the 
wider Greek world to exert their own independence. Multiple competing imperial powers 
vied for control of Ionia, which, in turn led to extended periods of stasis.  In 336, though, 
the Macedonian kingdom was poised to radically change the balance of power.
                                                 
135 See Part III, Chapter 11. 
136 A.B. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 192; Buckler, Aegean Greece, 485; Rubenstein, “Ionia,” 1064-5; Worthington, 
Philip II, 134-5. In contrast, Philip simply sold the cargo in the Athenian ships (Dem. 
18.139; Justin 9.1.5).  
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5. The Liberation of Ionia?: 336-323 
 
 
I. Ionia in 336 
By spring 336, Ionia had been subject to the King’s Peace for more than fifty 
years.1 In the intervening period, the Hecatomnid dynasts of Caria had drawn most of 
Ionia into their sphere of influence, but their influence had waned by 336/5. Pixodarus 
had likely preserved the Hecatomnid influence at Miletus through personal benefactions, 
but his ability to influence the rest of the region was greatly diminished. The relationship 
with Miletus may have helped pique Philip’s interest in an alliance with Pixodarus in 
337/6.2 After his accession in 336, Darius III sent Orontobantes as Satrap of Caria even 
while Pixodarus remained dynast (Strabo 14.2.17; Arr. 1.23.8).3 After Pixodarus died in 
336/5 control of Ionia reverted to Persian satraps.4 But it was that same spring when 
Philip II launched his invasion of Persia by sending a vanguard under the command of 
Parmenion, Attalus, and Amyntas to Anatolia (Diod. 16.81, 17.7.8; Justin 9.5.8).5 
                                                 
1 Xen. Hell. 5.1.30-1; Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 649-50; Buckler, Aegean Greece, 
167-72. See Part II, Chapter 4. 
2 Worthington, By the Spear, 110. Polyaenus 6.8, records that one of Mausolus’ agents 
tried to capture Miletus through a trick; Hornblower, Mausolus, 111. See Buckler, 
Aegean Greece, 519-20, for speculation about the proposed wedding giving Philip entrée 
into Miletus. 
3 P. Briant, “The Empire of Darius III in Perspective,” in Alexander the Great a New 
History, edd. W. Heckel and L.A. Tritle (Malden: Blackwell, 2009), 156-60; Hornblower, 
Mausolus, 49-50; Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 135; Bosworth, HCA I, 153. 
Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 783, notes that the appointment allowed Darius, who 
had recently come to the throne, to exert some of his own influence while still preserving 
continuity. 
4 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 782; Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 136. 
5 Worthington, By the Spear, 111. On the generals see W. Heckel, Who’s Who in the Age 
of Alexander the Great (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 24 (Amyntas), 62 (Attalus), 190-2 
(Parmenion). I refer to the army as “Macedonian” in the sense that it operated under 
Philip’s direction and was led by Macedonian officers. The army itself was comprised of 
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II. Ionian Stasis, 336-334 
The Macedonian troops crossed into Anatolia in 336 with instructions to secure 
the freedom of the Greek poleis (προστάξας λευθερον τς λληνίδας πόλεις, Diod. 
16.91.2) before Philip would lead the main expedition later that summer.6 Moreover, 
Philip had already been negotiating with the Greek communities along the Anatolian 
littoral, and therefore many of the Greeks in Anatolia already had factions sympathetic to 
the Macedonians. This campaign must have begun in northern Anatolia, near Abydus, 
where Alexander’s army would cross the Hellespont in 334, and the primary theater of 
operations was in Aeolis, to the north of Ionia.7 Diodorus records that Parmenion 
undertook two sieges in Aeolis, a successful one against Grynium where he sold the 
inhabitants into slavery, and one against Pitane that Memnon, the Rhodian mercenary 
commander, relieved (Diod. 17.7.9).8  Memnon then defeated the Macedonian army in a 
pitched battle near Magnesia on the Sipylus (Polyaenus 5.44.4) and then retook Grynium, 
                                                                                                                                                 
some combination of Macedonians and mercenaries, with the latter likely constituting the 
majority, see Worthington, Philip II, 180. 
6 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 817-18. On Philip’s Panhellenic agenda, see Polybius 
3.6.12-13; M. Faraguna, “Alexander and the Greeks,” in Brill’s Companion to Alexander 
the Great, ed. J. Roisman (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 107; Worthington, Philip II, 166-9; 
Worthington, By the Spear, 104-5. 
7 Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 34-5. 
8 E. Badian, “Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia,” in Collected Papers on 
Alexander the Great, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 126-7 = [“Alexander the Great and 
the Greeks of Asia,” in Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies Presented to Victor 
Ehrenberg, ed. E. Badian (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966), 37-69]; Bosworth, Conquest and 
Empire, 250; Worthington, Philip II, 180. The Greek sources tend to over-emphasize 
Memnon’s role in leading the Persian resistance, glossing over the actions of Persian 
commands such as Arsites the Satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, see Briant, From Cyrus 
to Alexander, 817-18. 
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which forced the Macedonian army northward toward the Troad.9  In late July 335, 
Memnon also attacked Cyzicus, which probably sided with the Macedonians, but failed 
to capture it and settled for ravaging its territory (Diod. 17.7.8; Polyaenus 5.44.5).10 
This is not the place to review in detail the Macedonian activities in Anatolia in 
the last months of Philip’s and the opening year of Alexander’s reigns, but several 
features of the campaign are worth noting before turning to Ionia. First, while the 
campaigns were not limited to a single site that would become the bridgehead across the 
Hellespont, the Macedonian operations did not reach Ionia.11 Second, Philip’s 
instructions for the advance force to liberate the Greek communities in Anatolia may be 
more properly described as orders to encourage factions to enact coups and join the 
Panhellenic crusade against Persia and, if they did not, to take them by force. 
“Liberation” from Persia was not optional.12 Third, and perhaps most importantly, the 
Persian response to this invasion was to meet it head on with counter attacks in Aeolis 
                                                 
9 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 817; Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 
127, n. 20, is indubitably correct that the site of this battle was the Magnesia on the 
Sipylus river in Aeolia, rather than Magnesia on the Maeander to the east of Ionia. 
10 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 126. Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 
818, suggests that the Cyzican resistance to Memnon may have had more to do with that 
Memnon coerced resources from the local communities to pay and feed his soldiers than 
with any Macedonian sympathies in 336. 
11 Buckler, Aegean Greece, 519-20, n.31, also speculates that the brunt of the campaign 
took place in the Troad and casts doubt on the veracity of Polyaenus’ claim that there was 
a battle at Magnesia. Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 127, argues that 
Ephesus, which he supposes was close to where the campaign started, opened the gates to 
the Macedonian army; so, too, N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, A History of 
Macedonia, II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 691, but Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 
astutely notes that Parmenion did not have a fleet capable of operating in Ionia. 
12 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 126, highlights the grim irony of a 
mission of liberation selling the population of a Greek community into slavery and is 
certainly correct in the implication that Philip’s declaration was a matter of propaganda 
rather than policy. 
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and the Troad rather than to shore-up the loyalty of communities not directly threatened 
by the Macedonians.13   
The Macedonian expedition of 336 nonetheless led to upheaval in the region.14 
Macedonian diplomacy was aided by the initial successes, loose Persian oversight, and 
Philip’s preliminary work forging friendly relationships with the Ionians. Furthermore, 
the Ionian communities were probably beset by stasis throughout the fourth century as 
factions favored one external power over another.15 The terms of the King’s Peace had 
placed Chios beyond the borders of the Persian Empire, but the polis had nevertheless 
suffered through a Carian occupation between 346 and 340 so it was clearly within easy 
reach of the mainland powers. Chios probably aligned itself with Philip starting in c.340 
(Frontinus, Strat. 1.4.13a),16 and was probably still pro-Macedonian, if not out of reach of 
Persia, in 336.  
On mainland Anatolia, the evidence is more fragmentary. Erythrae may have 
expelled a Persian-backed tyrant in 336, perhaps hoping for Macedonian support and 
exploiting the perceived fragility of the Persian position in Anatolia (SIG3 284). 
However, the dating of this decree is circumstantial and I believe that a later date c. 300 
is more likely.17 Somewhat more is known about the situation in Ephesus where one 
faction used the Macedonian invasion as an opportunity to expel the faction supported by 
                                                 
13 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 818. 
14 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 127 with n. 19; J.R. Ellis, Philip II and 
Macedonian Imperialism (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), 221-2.  
15 See above Part II, Chapter 4. 
16 See Part II, Chapter 4. 
17 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 127 n.19. On dating the decree, see D.A. 
Teegarden, Death to Tyrants! (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 157-62, who 
errs on the side of an early date. I prefer the later date proposed by A.J. Heisserer, “The 
Philites Stele (SIG3 284 = IEK 503) Hesperia 48 (1979), 281-93, see Part II, Chapter 6. 
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Persia (Arr. 1.17.9-11).18 The Macedonian army never reached Ephesus, but this faction, 
which Arrian refers to as “democratic,” clearly attributed their restoration to Philip’s 
intervention since they erected an honorary statue to the king in the sanctuary of Artemis 
(Arr. 1.17.11). The coup must have taken place early in 336 and, in all likelihood, the 
Ephesians decided upon the honors before Philip’s assassination in July of that year. 
Badian tentatively connects the Macedonian successes at Ephesus and elsewhere in 
Anatolia to Philip’s “having his likeness carried in procession as synthronos of the 
Olympian gods.”19 Worthington, however, shows that the Ephesian honors granted to 
Philip were not connected to any aspirations to divinity.20 He points out that the statue 
that the Ephesians were said to have erected to Philip was an eikon (likeness), rather than 
an agalma (cult statue), which indicates that there was no cultic practice associated with 
the statue. Moreover, Arrian is non-specific in locating the statue, with a mere ν τ ερ 
(1.17.11). It is possible that Arrian meant to indicate that the statue of Philip was inside 
the temple (as the phrase is often taken) and therefore that Philip could have been, as 
Badian suggests, in some sense synnaos with Artemis.21 It is more likely, however, that 
the phrase indicates that Ephesians erected the statue beside the temple, rather than inside 
                                                 
18 Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, 221-2; K. Nawotka, “Freedom of Greek 
Cities in Asia Minor in the Age of Alexander the Great,” Klio 85 (2003), 23. 
19 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 127. P. Green, Alexander of Macedon 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 81, 98, similarly 
connects the episode at Ephesus to Philip’s divine pretensions; cf. Briant, From Cyrus to 
Alexander, 817. 
20 Worthington, By the Spear, 151; Worthington, Philip II, 180, 201, and examined at 
greater length in Appendix 5, 228-33, particularly 231, for the statue at Ephesus. 
Bosworth, HCA I, 133, also notes the distinction between the types and, further, points 
out that the Ephesians had had similarly honored Lysander, his fellow navarchs, and 
Timotheus, on whom see Part II, Chapter 4.  
21 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 127; E. Badian, “The Death of Philip II,” 
in Collected Papers on Alexander the Great, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 108 [= “The 
Death of Philip II,” Phoenix 17 (1963), 106-112]. 
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it. Most importantly, the likeness was an honor for the anticipated victory over Persia 
rather than as the basis for a cult.22  
The defeated faction appealed to Memnon in 335, who helped restore them to 
power (Arr. 1.17.11).23 During the subsequent conflict, the statue of Philip was torn 
down, the Temple of Artemis was robbed, and Heropythes’ tomb desecrated.24 By the 
spring of 334, Ephesus was garrisoned by mercenaries in Persian pay, securely enough 
under Persian control that a Macedonian political refugee, Amyntas son of Antiochus, 
fled there (Arr. 1.17.9).25 
Evidence from other Ionian poleis is scant, but it is probable that a similar series 
of events took place throughout the region. Ionia probably remained without garrisons 
until after the onset of Alexander’s invasion (e.g. Miletus, Arr. 1.18-19 and Ephesus, Arr. 
1.17.19). Nevertheless, after Memnon subdued the poleis that had gone over to the 
Macedonians in the preliminary invasion of 336, Ionia was firmly under Persian control 
in 334. 
 
III. Alexander the Great in Ionia, 334 
Alexander III succeeded Philip as king of Macedonia in 336. In 334, he led an 
Hellenic army across the Bosporus and into the Troad. After defeating Persian satrapal 
                                                 
22 M. Bieber, “The Portraits of Alexander the Great,” TAPhA 93 (1949), 378; M. Bieber, 
Alexander the Great in Greek and Roman Art (Chicago: Argonaut, 1964), 20-1, argues 
implausibly that Alexander commissioned the statue as a posthumous honor for Philip. 
23 Bosworth, HCA I, 132-3. 
24 On Heropythes, see Part II, Chapter 4. 
25 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 128, supposes that the Amyntas in charge 
of the mercenary garrison and had been associated with Amyntas Perdicca, who 
Alexander had executed (Diod. 17.48.2; Curt. 3.11.18). Bosworth, HCA I, 132, points out 
that any identification of this individual is uncertain. Cf. Heckel, Who’s Who, 23-4. 
 113
armies at the Granicus River, he led his army to Sardis and from there to Ephesus (Arr. 
1.17.9-12).26 Unlike Miletus (see below), Ephesus did not impede Alexander’s advance 
and the garrison of mercenaries fled on two Ephesian ships at the approach of his army 
(Arr. 1.17.9).27 Alexander reinstated the democratic faction that had seized power in 
Ephesus two years earlier and tarried long enough to sacrifice to Artemis and conduct a 
procession with his army in full battle array (Arr. 1.18.2).28 However, despite Arrian’s 
triumphal narrative about Alexander’s time in Ephesus, the situation in the community 
was tense.  
Arrian portrays the Ephesians as decidedly anti-Persian. According to this 
account, the citizens surrendered to Alexander as soon as the garrison fled and the newly 
liberated population rushed to kill the people responsible for calling in Memnon and 
desecrating monuments (Arr. 1.17.9).29 The Ephesians lynched the family of Syrphax, 
dragging them from the sanctuary where they had sought asylum and stoning them to 
death, until Alexander ordered an end to the violence.30 Arrian attributes Alexander’s 
declaration to a desire to prevent the persecution of innocent people by unscrupulous 
individuals exploiting the situation (1.17.10).31  
                                                 
26 Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 44-5; D. Engels, Alexander the Great and the 
Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1980), 30-3, reminds us that Alexander followed a meandering coastal route to 
avoid uninhabited and particularly parts of Anatolia. 
27 Bosworth, HCA I, 131-3; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 45. 
28 G.M. Rogers, The Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesus (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2012), 48. 
29 Bosworth, “Alexander the Great Part 1: The Events of his Reign” in CAH2 6, 84; 
Bosworth, HCA I, 131-2; Nawotka, “Freedom of Greek Cities,” 24. 
30 Bosworth, HCA I, 132; Heckel, Who’s Who, 259. 
31 Bosworth, HCA I, 132. 
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Alexander offered to contribute funds toward refurbishing the temple of Artemis, 
the same temple said to have been destroyed on the day of his birth, and which had been 
looted in the rioting (Plut. Alex. 3.6), in exchange for an honorary inscription (Strabo 
14.1.22).32 The Ephesians refused, so Alexander ordered that they pay their tribute to the 
sanctuary (see below). The offer to contribute funds to the temple in exchange for honors 
is hardly unusual,33 but the rejection of the dedication is more striking. According to 
Strabo, Artemidorus, a second-century Ephesian geographer, praised the Ephesians 
because it was inappropriate to accept gifts from one god as a dedication to another (ς ο 
πρέποι θε θεος ναθήματα κατασκευάζειν, 14.1.22).34 While this rationale would be 
a good way of flattering Alexander, it reads like a later invention. Modern scholars are 
skeptical about the motivations of the Ephesians, with the action often explained by a 
combination of their pride and wealth, or the story dismissed outright.35 
Badian supposes that when the Ephesians refused Alexander’s offer to fund the 
temple of Artemis the king responded vindictively by making Ephesus the only polis 
from which he did not remit the phoros payments owed the Persian king.36 How one 
interprets Alexander’s relationship with Ephesus hinges on two episodes. First, that 
                                                 
32 Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesus, 48; Worthington, By the Spear, 151. See Part 
III, Chapter 17. 
33 In fact, this was a common source of revenue for construction projects in Ionia, see 
Part III, chapter 17. 
34 Strabo 14.1.26, records that Artemidorus was awarded a golden eikon in the sanctuary 
after a successful embassy to Rome in 104. Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesus, 93. 
35 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 131 and Heisserer, Alexander and the 
Greek Cities, 157-8, suggest pride and wealth respectively; H. Botermann, “We Baute 
das Neue Priene? Zur Interpretation der Inschriften von Priene Nr. 1 und 156,” Hermes 
122 (1994), 181-2, dismisses the supposed dedication as a fictional creation modeled 
after Alexander’s dedication at Priene. 
36 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 131. 
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Alexander levied a syntaxis (contribution) on Ionia in the place of phoros (tribute),37 but 
did not remove the phoros at Ephesus, may indicate that he charged the community 
twice. Second, near the end of his life, one of his deputies punished the Ephesians for 
killing the tyrant Hegesias (Polyaenus 6.49), which could be interpreted as a sign of the 
king’s hostility. Badian follows Arrian saying that Alexander imposed the phoros on 
Ephesus and then, belatedly, decided to lift the same payment elsewhere in Ionia.38 He is 
probably correct that Arrian’s mention of the phoros for Ephesus is exceptional and 
therefore was not lifted with the rest of the Ionian phoroi, but that need not mean that 
there were two payments. More likely, Alexander redirected the Ephesian tribute to the 
sanctuary. In contrast, the punishment for the murder probably stemmed from the fact 
that Hegesias was a Macedonian partisan at Ephesus and thus the two episodes are 
unrelated (see below).39 Moreover, the appearance of hostility only emerges when the 
sources are combined, while none of them individually show friction between king and 
community. 
 The decision not to remit the phoros may, on the one hand, show that the edict 
was a strike against the Ephesians since he forced them to continue paying tribute with 
the same terminology that was associated with the exploitation of poleis. On the other 
hand, though, he forced them to pay it to a local institution. It is better to consider the 
redirection of the phoros as a privilege, marking out Alexander as an indirect benefactor 
                                                 
37 M.M. Kholod, “On the Financial Relations of Alexander the Great and the Greek Cities 
in Asia Minor,” in Ruthenia Classica Aetatis Novae, edd. A. Mehr, A.V. Makhlayuk, O. 
Gabelko (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2013), 83-92; Worthington, By the Spear, 151. Against 
the idea that the sytaxis was equivalent to the phoros in all but name, see Nawotka, 
“Freedom of Greek Cities,” 26-8. On the taxation of Ionia in the 320s, see below. 
38 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 136-7; cf. Nawotka, “Freedom of Greek 
Cities,” 29. 
39 Bosworth, HCA I, 132. 
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of Artemis and a direct benefactor of Ephesus.40 Bosworth points to the testimony that 
Alexander paid Apelles twenty talents to paint an image of the king wielding lightning 
bolts in the temple of Artemis (Pliny, NH 35.36).41 Bosworth also argues that 
Alexander’s promise to pay all the expenses of the temple in both the present and the 
future came from a few years later because it is at odds with the reports of Alexander’s 
insolvency in the first year of the campaign.42 As Kholod has shown, though, Alexander 
was in a secure financial position because he captured the tribute owed Persia from the 
communities of Anatolia.43 However, it is a mistake to focus too much on Alexander; the 
Ephesians likely refused the offer because it also allowed them plausible deniability in 
case the Persians won.44 
Alexander’s relationship with Ephesus ought to be divided into two phases. The 
first, in 334, included the proposed benefaction and extending the range at which the 
sanctuary of Artemis could offer asylum (Strabo, 14.1.23).45 It was at this juncture that 
Alexander commissioned the portrait by Apelles, who likely had a workshop in Ephesus 
(Strabo 14.1.25).46 While there are fanciful stories about the meeting with Apelles and 
Bucephalus being more appreciative of his work than Alexander (Pliny, NH 35.36), the 
two probably knew each other since Apelles also painted portraits of Philip II as well 
                                                 
40 Bosworth, HCA I, 133; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 45; Nawotka, “Freedom of 
Greek Cities,” 29-30;  
41 Heckel, Who’s Who, 39-40; cf. Beiber, Alexander the Great in Greek and Roman Art, 
47-9. 
42 Bosworth, HCA I, 132-3. 
43 Kholod, On the Financial Relations of Alexander,” 83-92; Worthington, By the Spear, 
150-1. 
44 Cartledge, Alexander, 119-20; Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesus, 48. 
45 Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesus, 48. 
46 Apelles was probably born in Colophon and moved to Ephesus (Suda A 3008); Heckel, 
Who’s Who, 39-40; S. Lydakis, Ancient Greek Painting and Its Echoes in Later Art 
(Athens: Melissa Publishing House, 2002), 157. 
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(Pliny, NH 35.93). The second phase saw a return of stasis in the polis and the imposition 
of a Macedonian garrison (see below). However, Apelles also probably visited 
Alexander’s court during the later period when he supposedly composed a nude painting 
of Alexander’s favorite mistress, Pancaste (Pliny, NH 35.86-7),47 and likely then received 
a commission for his famous image of Alexander wielding lightning bolts at the 
Artemisium (Pliny, NH 35.92). Alexander no longer courted Ephesus, but neither did he 
punish it. 
Embassies from other Ionian poleis also approached Alexander while he was at 
Ephesus (1.18.1).48 Those from Magnesia and Tralles may indicate that their 
communities had instigated their own revolutions,49 but, more likely, they indicate 
internal strife, with one faction petitioning Alexander. Badian marks Alexander’s 
decision in Ephesus to facilitate and protect revolutions as a turning point for the king 
who, he says, had been hesitant to endorse the autonomy of the Greeks of Asia.50 Badian 
sees this as part and parcel of Alexander developing a plan as he progressed, taking 
advantage of opportunities as they arose and, to the greatest extent possible, keeping the 
campaign centered on his person.51 Thus it was only from Ephesus that Alexander 
dispatched Parmenion toward Magnesia and Alcimachus with a small army to liberate the 
communities of Ionia and Aeolis back to the north.52 It is possible, however, that Arrian 
                                                 
47 Heckel, Who’s Who, 189. Pliny maintains that Apelles fell in love with her, so 
Alexander gave her to him as a gift. 
48 Bosworth, HCA I, 133-4. 
49 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 131. 
50 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 131. 
51 Alexander was involved directly with communities elsewhere, see below.  
52 Bosworth, HCA I, 133-6; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 45-6, 256; R.A. Billows, 
Antigonus the One-Eyed (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1985), 39, argues that Alexander sent Antigonus to Priene. 
 118
compressed these strategic decisions into a single episode at Ephesus. There are 
dedicatory inscriptions that obliquely refer to Alexander’s liberation of Erythrae (Welles, 
RC 15) and Colophon,53 not far to the north of Ephesus. While Heisserer suggests that 
these communities were along Alexander’s route from Sardis to Ephesus,54 it is more 
likely that he took the royal road and therefore did not visit either polis. Further, neither 
inscription dates to 334 or offers specific information about Alexander’s treatment of the 
polis. There is no reason to doubt that he remitted the phoros from Erythrae, but the 
episode should not be regarded as indicative of Alexander’s magnanimity toward Ionia. 
Bosworth notes the unusually strong detachment and suggests that many of the 
communities in Ionia and Aeolis still had Persian garrisons, while others had suffered 
from Macedonian attacks while Philip was king.55  
Between Ephesus and Miletus, Alexander probably visited Priene, where is an 
inscription testifies to Alexander’s dedication of the temple of Athena Polias (RO 86 A). 
Badian comments that it would have been a great coincidence if both this temple and the 
Artemisium at Ephesus had been completed as Alexander passed through, 56 but there is 
no reason to doubt the construction at either site. The temple at Priene was nearing 
completion as it had likely been begun during the period of Hecatomnid domination.57 
Another inscription from Priene testifies to Alexander’s generosity to the polis (RO 86 
B), but likely refers to developments later in his reign (see below).  
                                                 
53 B.D. Meritt, “Inscriptions of Colophon,” AJPh 56 (1935), 358-72. 
54 Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 166.  
55 Bosworth, HCA I, 133; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 45-6. 
56 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 132. 
57 Patronos, “Public Architecture and Civic Identity,” 117-20, see Part III, Chapter 17. 
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Alexander arrived at Miletus expecting the polis to capitulate without a fight since 
the garrison commander, Hegistratus, had promised to surrender (Arr. 1.18.4).58 He 
changed his mind upon learning that the Persian fleet was nearby and so Alexander found 
the gates closed to him. Before the Persian fleet arrived, however, the Hellenic fleet 
appeared in the Gulf of Latmus and occupied the island of Lade, which controlled the 
harbor and forced the Persian fleet to anchor near Mount Mycale on the opposite side of 
the bay.59 With typical impatience, Alexander tried and failed to storm the walls before 
his siege engines arrived (Diod. 17.22).60 Miletus fell quickly once the siege train arrived, 
in just a day according to Arrian (Arr. 1.19.2; cf. Diod. 17.22.4-5).61 
The day before the final assault, a Milesian named Glaucippus approached 
Alexander on behalf of the citizens and the mercenary garrison, suggesting that Miletus 
would be open to both Persians and Macedonians (τά τε τείχη φη θέλειν τος 
Μιλησίους κα τος λιμένας παρέχειν κοινος λεξάνδρ κα Πέρσαις, Arr. 1.19.1).62 
Bosworth plausibly argues that Glaucippus was one of the senior members of the ruling 
faction and hoped to find a workable solution for the polis,63 but it is hard to imagine that 
he thought that Alexander would agree to the proposal. The king told the Milesians to 
prepare for battle. The ensuing assault was a bloody slaughter, with only a small part of 
                                                 
58 Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 46. 
59 Worthington, By the Spear, 152. 
60 Bosworth, HCA I, 138-9; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 46; Worthington, By the 
Spear, 153. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, 33-
4, suggests that Alexander initially left behind the siege train because the promontory 
where Miletus did not have the resources to support a large force. 
61 Bosworth, HCA I, 138-9. 
62 Bosworth, HCA I, 138; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 46. Glaucippus was probably 
the father of Leucippus and Chrysippus, who were the eponymous magistrates in 340/39 
and 336/5, respectively (I. Milet 122 II, l. 75 and 78).  
63 HCA I, 138. 
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the garrison escaping death (Arr. 1.19.4-6; Diod. 17.22.4-5).64 Diodorus says that the 
citizens surrendered to Alexander as soon as the Macedonians breached the walls and 
both sources record that the king treated them with at least some degree of mercy,65 
although Arrian adds the caveat that not all the Milesians survived the assault (1.19.6), 
and Strabo comments that it was unfortunate for Miletus to fall to Alexander (14.1.7). 
The circumstances of its capture were different from the other Ionian poleis, perhaps 
having a more formidable defensive position, a larger garrison, and the impending 
support of the Persian fleet. The immediate surrender of the population when the walls 
were breached was certainly motivated by survival. 
The citizens of Miletus appointed Alexander aesymnetes (the eponymous official) 
for the year 334/3 as a token of submission (I. Milet 122 II, l. 81).66 According to Arrian, 
Alexander granted Miletus eleutheria, but, as with Ephesus, there are competing 
interpretations about the treatment of the polis. Bosworth argues that here the grant of 
eleutheria was in contrast to the prisoners who Alexander enslaved and the treatment of 
Gryneum, rather than being comparable to the freedom he allowed other Ionian poleis.67 
Supporting this view is an inscription that indicates the Milesians marked their freedom 
not from Alexander but from Antigonus Monophthalmus in 313/12 (I. Milet 123 ll. 2-
4).68 Bosworth therefore suggests that Miletus was not granted remittance of the phoros 
                                                 
64 Bosworth, HCA I, 139, notes that Alexander distinguished between the garrison and the 
demos. 
65 Philanthropia, in Diodorus, Eleutheria in Arrian. 
66 R.K. Sherk, “The Eponymous Officials of Greek Cities IV: The Register: Part III: 
Thrace, Black Sea Area, Asia Minor (Continued),” ZPE 93 (1992), 230. 
67 Bosworth, HCA I, 140; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 250. 
68 See Part II, Chapter 6. 
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and liberties that Alexander granted other Ionian poleis.69 However, this argument is 
faulty. As Sherk shows, the inscription that says that Antigonus established the freedom 
of Miletus heads a second stele listing the eponymous officials; the first stele, with entries 
from c.525-314, includes Alexander and was likely erected in 334 since the names down 
to Alexander are in the same hand, while the ones that follow were inscribed by different 
stonecutters.70 Thus there is no reason to assume that there was an unusual amount of 
hostility from Alexander toward the Milesians. 
There is scant mention of the Hellenic fleet until it arrived off Miletus (Arr. 
1.18.5-6). Up until this point it was conducting a campaign among the Aegean islands, 
parallel to that of the army. The historical sources do not shed much light on this 
campaign so the best evidence may come from inscriptions recording Alexander’s letters 
to the island communities. Most importantly for Ionia are the so-called “First” and 
“Second” Letters to the Chians (RO 84 A and B).71 Both documents, as well as a third 
fragmentary decree dated by Kholod to the same period, primarily concern the 
relationship between the citizens and returning exiles (see below).72 However, these 
documents are controversial, not because of the content, but because of the date. 
 There are two proposed dates for the “First Letter:” 332, at the conclusion of the 
war in the Aegean, or 334, between the capture of Chios and Alexander’s dismissing the 
league fleet at Miletus. The orthodox date for the inscription is 332 after Hegelochus 
                                                 
69 Bosworth, HCA I, 140.  
70 Sherk, “Eponymous Officials IV,” 229-31. 
71 On the text of the first decree, see Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 80-1 and RO 
84 A.  
72 M.M. Kholod, “On the dating of a new Chian inscription concerning the property of 
returned exiles,” in Das imperial Rom und der hellenistische Osten, edd. L.-M. Günther 
and V. Grieb (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2012), 21-34. 
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captured Chios again from the Persian fleet (Arr. 3.2.3, see below).73 This date is reached 
based on the interpretation of two points: the installation of a garrison (ll. 17-20) and the 
return of the exiles (ll. 5-6). The individuals who betrayed the polis are supposed to be 
the same ones as Hegelochus took to Elephantine (Arr. 3.2.3-4; Curt. 4.5.14-17), while 
the triremes are equivalent to those conscripted for the siege of Mytilene (Curt. 4.8.12). 
In contrast, Heisserer argues that the decree belongs in 334, envisioning the situation on 
Chios as parallel to that of Ephesus (Arr. 1.17.11, see above).74 The strongest point in 
favor of this view is that the decree specifies that the people who betrayed the population 
were to be tried by the league synedrion and those who fled were banned from entering 
those communities (ll. 10-15).75 Heisserer rightly, I believe, argues that the constitutional 
reorganization of Chios is more likely to have taken place in 334 since the restoration of 
the constitution in 332 would have been a continuation of this process rather than a new 
revision. 
While I agree in principle with Heisserer’s early dating of the “First Letter,” I 
believe that his reading is flawed. Both dates for the inscription assume that the order to 
supply triremes “so long as the rest of the Greek fleet sails with us” (ταότας δ πλεν 
μέχρι ν κα τ λλο ναοτικν τ τν λλήνων μεθ᾽  μν συμπλ, l. 9-10) indicates that 
the decree came near the end of the campaign.76 Thus, in Heisserer’s interpretation, the 
                                                 
73 Most recently argued by G.A. Lehmann, Alexander der Große und die «Freiheit der 
Hellenen» (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 90-7; Kholod, “On the Dating of a New Chian 
Inscription,” 26-7. 
74 Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 83-95, followed by Rhodes and Osborne, GHI, 
422. 
75 Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 83-95; Rhodes and Osborne, GHI, 422-3. 
76 Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 86-7; Lehmann, Alexander der Große, 97. T. 
Lenschau, “Alexander der Grosse und Chios” Klio 33 (1940), 205-6, argued that the first-
person plural referred to the Chians rather than Alexander and his fleet. 
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decree was issued after Alexander had decided to dismiss the fleet at Miletus (Arr. 
1.20.1),77 with the instructions providing a limit for the term of service. However, the 
inscription does not specify when the ships will be dismissed, and thus likely indicates an 
open-ended mandate. A date for the inscription between 334 and 332 is further not 
considered because it is assumed that Alexander did not order the reconstitution of the 
fleet until he was in Gordium when Arrian first mentions Hegelochus’ command (2.2.3), 
after he narrates Memnon’s capture of Chios (2.1.1).78 Nevertheless, two points indicate 
that Alexander had already ordered the re-assembly of the Macedonian fleet.79 First, 
Arrian uses the pluperfect (προσετέτακτο), which suggests that the order had come 
much earlier, and, second, the passage records that the assembly of the fleet was already 
underway. Further, Curtius records that the new fleet included ships from the Greek 
poleis (Curt. 3.1.19). Thus, the letter to the Chians should be dated to the very end of 334 
or start of 333, at the outset of Hegelochus’ command rather than at the end of it.  
The “First Letter” declares that the Chians are to be autonomous and be governed 
according to their democracy, probably with reference to the constitution created in the 
late 390s,80 but also required the Chians to appoint men to write new laws and stipulated 
that they had to be approved by the king (ll. 3-7). However, its principal provision, being 
                                                 
77 Bosworth, HCA I, 141-3. Arrian says that Alexander did this because he was short of 
money, but offers no evidence. See above on Alexander’s finances. 
78 Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 87-8; Ruzicka, “War in the Aegean,” 132; 
Bosworth, HCA I, 184. Cf. Curt. 3.1.19, who introduces the new fleet by mentioning 
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exclusive. Once Memnon captured Chios, Alexander certainly instructed it be retaken. 
79 Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 87-9, argues implausibly Hegelochus’ fleet was 
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80 See Part II, Chapter 4. 
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both the first (l. 3) and last (ll. 17-19) point addressed, was the return of the exiles.81 The 
installation of a garrison to preempt conflict (ll. 17-19) shows that the problems 
associated with the return were not unforeseen. The Persian capture of Chios in 333 
probably complicated the return of the exiles and two later decrees that similarly address 
the status of returning exiles probably date to after the recapture by Hegelochus in 332 
(see below).82 
During his procession south through Ionia, Alexander offered two competing but 
not contradictory visions for the region.83 First, the official message delivered by the 
campaign was that he was liberating the Greeks of Asia Minor from Persia. Henceforth 
the Ionians were to be autonomous (e.g. RO 84 B ll. 3-4), they would have liberal 
governments under their ancestral, democratic, constitutions, and exiles would return and 
have property restored to them. Underlying this propaganda, however, was a second 
message: that the Ionian poleis, particularly on the mainland, which were not enrolled in 
the League of Corinth (see below), were his subjects. Despite the measures taken at Chios 
and Ephesus to ensure that the returning exiles did not disrupt the Ionian poleis, the 
Macedonian conquest led to considerable turmoil and individuals such as Hegesias 
exploited the situation to seize power (see below). 
 
IV. War in the Aegean, 334-331 
                                                 
81 Lehmann, Alexander der Große, 93. Heisserer, Alexander the Great and the Greeks, 
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83 A.B. Bosworth, “Alexander the Great Part 2: Greece and the Conquered Territories,” in 
CAH2 6, 868-70. Dmitriev, Greek Slogan of Freedom, 102-3, 111. 
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Before addressing Alexander’s social, fiscal, and political effects on Ionia, it is 
necessary to examine the conclusion to the war in the Aegean. Between 333 and 332, the 
Macedonian war effort took place on two theaters. Alexander’s relentless assault east 
drew off Persian resources toward Syria, while, in the Aegean, multiple contingents 
confronted the Persian counterattacks by land and sea.84  The Persians still possessed a 
large fleet in the Aegean with which to threaten coastal and island communities. In 
November 333, Alexander defeated Darius III at Issus in a pass that linked Cilicia and 
Syria85 and remnants of Darius’ army retreated west into the territory governed by 
Antigonus Monophthalmus, while Alexander chased the king into Syria (Curt. 4.1.34-
5).86 As a result, the war in Anatolia intensified in the immediate aftermath of Issus 
before Alexander conquered Phoenicia in early in 332 and defections crippled the Persian 
fleet.87 
Alexander had left garrisons in multiple communities in western Anatolia, 
including Priene,88 and a force outside Halicarnassus (Arr. 1.23.6; Curt. 3.7.4).89 The 
league fleet disbanded after capturing Miletus (Diod. 17.22.5-23.3; Arr. 1.20.1),90 but 
Alexander probably realized the strategic error and ordered the creation of a new fleet 
before the spring of 333 (Arr. 2.2.3; Curt. 3.1.19-20, see above).91 Confronting these 
meager forces were the Persian fleet that had failed to prevent the fall of Miletus and an 
                                                 
84 S. Ruzicka, “War in the Aegean, 333-331 B.C.: A Reconsideration,” Phoenix 42 
(1988), 133-4. 
85 Diod. 17.32.2-35; Arr. 2.8-11; Curt. 3.9-11; Plut. Alex. 20; Bosworth, Conquest and 
Empire, 55-64; Worthington, By the Spear, 165-71. 
86 Billows, Antigonus, 41-5. 
87 Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 64-5; Worthington, By the Spear, 172-8. 
88 Kholod, “Garrisons of Alexander the Great,” 250. 
89 Kholod, “Garrisons of Alexander the Great,” 252; Ruzicka, “War in the Aegean,” 135. 
90 Bosworth, HCA I, 141-3. 
91 Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 47. 
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army led by Memnon that consisted of at least ten thousand mercenaries.92 There was a 
persistent fear that the Persian fleet was preparing to cross the Aegean (Diod. 17.29.3, 
30.1; Arr. 2.2.4-5),93 but Briant and Ruzicka both reach the conclusion that this was not 
the case, albeit from different directions.94 Briant argues that the intention to invade 
Europe comes “from a Greek tradition that was only concerned with [Memnon’s] and his 
family’s memory” and thus presents Memnon’s death as a catastrophe for Darius that 
forced him to abandon his plan.95 Ruzicka argues that Darius’ intention was for the 
Persian fleet to campaign on the Anatolian coast and that the plans for a strategic shift 
away from the Aegean—one that the sources link to Memnon’s death—was actually set 
in motion before the Rhodian died.96 The Persian fleet continued to threaten the Bosporus 
and worked to secure control over the Anatolian coast. The Persian campaign thus 
focused on the Anatolian coast and nearby islands, which placed Ionia front and center. 
Memnon recaptured Chios early in 333, which Arrian says was given over to him 
by treason (προδοσί, 2.1.1; cf. Diod. 17.29.2, 31.2, Curt. 3.1.19).97 He may have 
refrained from installing a garrison at this point since Arrian specifically mentions a later 
time when Persians garrisoned the island (2.13.4-5).98 Instead, Memnon turned Chios 
over to a pro-Persian faction and counting on the proximity of the Persian fleet at 
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Mytilene to ensure there would be no counter-revolution.99 After the Macedonian fleet 
captured Tenedos in the Hellespont the Persian commanders Autophradates and 
Pharnabazus established a garrison of fifteen hundred mercenaries on Chios (Arr. 2.13.5; 
Curt. 4.1.37), and later increased that garrison to three thousand.100 Even less is known 
about the Persian recapture of Miletus in 333. Pharnabazus exacted money (Curt. 4.1.37), 
but probably did not install a garrison.101 
In 332, a Macedonian army defeated a Persian force near Miletus and once more 
conquered the polis (Curt. 4.5.13). At the same time as this and other Macedonian 
campaigns took place, the Macedonian fleet arrived at Chios and besieged the island 
(Curt. 4.5.14). The citizens had been prevented from surrendering initially, but, when the 
gate was breached, they rose up against the Persian garrison (Curt. 4.5.17), slaughtering 
the Persians and turning the commanders, mercenaries, and pirates over to the 
Macedonians (Curt. 4.5.18). Arrian records a similar sequence, saying that the Chians 
opened the gates to the Macedonians despite the Persian garrison and adds that the men 
who betrayed the polis were taken as prisoners to Elephantine in Egypt (3.2.3-7).102 
Curtius is silent about how the Milesians received their latest bout of liberation, but it is 
conspicuous that he shows the great exuberance with which the Chians joined the 
Macedonians. The capture of Chios was a climax of the Macedonian war in the Aegean, 
with only the siege of Mytilene remaining before Persian power in the region was 
completely broken. 
                                                 
99 Diod. 17.29.4, recounts Memnon’s frequent use of bribes. 
100 Ruzicka, “War in the Aegean,” 141, rightly notes that the passages recorded in Curtius 
and Arrian must refer to the same events despite a discrepancy in chronology. 
101 Ruzicka, “War in the Aegean,” 144, n. 40. 
102 Bosworth, HCA I, 266-7. 
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Macedonian operations continued for some time both in Anatolia and the islands 
after the capture of Chios,103 but all Ionia was secure and no further Persian incursions 
reached the region (on the new regime, see below). There is no evidence upon which to 
suggest that Ionian poleis aside from Chios and Miletus were recaptured by the Persians 
during this campaign, but it is likely that they were all extorted or raided by the Persian 
fleet (Arr. 3.2.5; Curt. 4.5.18).104 While the Macedonians installed more garrisons while 
the Persian fleet was active in the Aegean, it is notable that so few are attested.105 Green 
suggests that the Ionians welcomed the Persian fleet as their true liberators, speculating 
that there was a latent hostility toward Alexander’s impositions.106 Adoration for 
Alexander and the Macedonians was not universal and there were a variety of reactions in 
the different poleis, but it is unlikely that there was any more love for the Persians than 
there was for Alexander.107 The enthusiasm at “liberation” by either the Macedonians or 
Persians is more aptly attributed to the local political situation that had developed 
throughout the fourth century. The stasis was not directed at either the Persians or 
Macedonians, but at the ruling factions.108 When one side or the other captured a polis, 
there was at least the threat of political violence and purges, of the sort that Alexander 
                                                 
103 Ruzicka, “War in the Aegean,” 145-51. 
104 J.E. Atkinson, A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus’ Historiae Alexandri Magni, Books 
3 and 4 (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1980), 330, sees the reference to pirates in these 
sources as indicative of increased activity after the Social War. 
105 M.M. Kholod, “The Garrisons of Alexander the Great in the Greek Cities of Asia 
Minor,” Eos 97 (2010), 252. 
106 Green, Alexander of Macedon, 211-12. 
107 Mytilene put up stiff resistance to the Persian siege in 333/2 and negotiated with the 
Persians for the Macedonian garrison to be able to leave unmolested. See M.M. Kholod, 
“Mytilene under Alexander the Great: A Way to a Democracy under the Monarchic 
Aegis,” Bulletin of St. Petersburg State University series 2 (2010), 36-9. Translated from 
Russian by Dr. H. Akselrod, MD, MPH. 
108 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 855. 
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had put a stop to at Ephesus and the threat of which is attested at Chios. This unrest 
persisted in Ionia and reared its head again before the end of Alexander’s reign. 
 
 V. Ionia 331-323 
There are few references to Ionia in the extant sources after the Macedonian 
triumph in the Aegean, but the new regime left an indelible impact on the region. At the 
conclusion of the war in the Aegean in 331 ambassadors from Miletus reached Alexander 
in Egypt (Strabo 17.1.43). The Milesians approached the king with news that in the wake 
of his visit to Didyma the oracular spring began to flow again and supposedly bore 
prophecies concerning his impending victory over Darius. There is no reason to doubt the 
embassy or the attempt at flattery, since it was a conspicuous declaration of loyalty and 
the Milesians were in the process of restoring the cult at Didyma.109 The ambassadors 
must have petitioned Alexander for donations to rebuild the temple, but none were 
forthcoming, so construction did not begin until the end of the fourth century.110 
Most references to garrisons in the Ionian poleis disappear after 332, but, as 
Kholod argues, this does not indicate the removal of all garrisons.111 Chian and Rhodian 
embassies approached Alexander in Egypt concerning the garrisons in their poleis (Curt. 
4.8.12-13).112 Alexander’s “First Letter” to the Chians (see above), reveals that the 
Macedonians garrison was not intended to thwart a Persian attack, but rather that it was to 
                                                 
109 Green, Alexander, 276-7; Patronos, “Public Architecture and Civic Identity,” 65. 
110 See Part II, Chapter 6 and Part III, Chapter 17. 
111 Kholod, “Garrisons of Alexander in Asia Minor,” 254. 
112 Atkinson, Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus, 372; Kholod, “Garrisons of Alexander in 
Asia Minor,” 254. 
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exist until the factions in stasis were reconciled (RO 84 A, l. 15-19).113 Although I date 
this decree to before the war in the Aegean (see above), it is probable that Amphoterus 
and Hegelochus installed a new garrison with the same mandate to ensure civic stability 
in 332. The garrisons were to prevent stasis in the Ionian communities, but there are 
indications that the soldiers also served to prop-up pro-Macedonian governments and 
committed acts that the civilians resented. In the 320s, for instance, Philoxenus installed a 
garrison at Ephesus because the Ephesians refused to arrest the three brothers 
(Anaxagoras, Codrus, and Diodotus) who killed Hegesias (Polyaenus 6.49).114 Badian 
suggests that this individual was one of the men Alexander had saved in 334,115 but 
Bosworth more plausibly argues that he is better identified as a member of a pro-
Macedonian “junta” that existed within the democratic constitution.116     
A second change to the social makeup of Ionia during Alexander’s reign resulted 
from the return of exiles. Alexander’s letters to the Chians foreshadow the Exiles Decree 
of 324 and give an insight into the problems associated with the king’s demanding the 
reinstatement of exiles.117 Both the “First” and “Second Letters” to the Chians show that 
in the 330s only those individuals who were actively supporting the Persians were exiled 
from the community, while all other exiles were allowed to return.118 The “Second 
Letter” likewise makes an exception for Alcimachus, who it refers to as Alexander’s 
                                                 
113 Kholod, “Garrisons of Alexander in Asia Minor,” 254, believes the decree should date 
to 332, but holds the same position that the Macedonian garrison was meant to prevent 
stasis instead of to suppress rebellion per se or to oppose the Persians. 
114 Kholod, “Garrisons of Alexander in Asia Minor,” 255; Nawotka, “Freedom of Greek 
Cities,” 32. 
115 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 142 n. 36. 
116 Bosworth, HCA I, 132. 
117 On the Exiles Decree, see Part III, Chapter 13. 
118 Many exiles probably made it back to the community only after 332. 
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friend, by saying that he was not working for Persia of his own volition and should be 
pardoned (RO 84 B ll. 10-25).119 The return of exiles threatened domestic harmony 
particularly because of the restoration of property. The inscription Kholod recently dated 
to 332 shows that a panel of ten judges adjudicated disagreements (ll. 16-21) and that 
confiscated property, including houses, had to be returned to the exiles or else the state 
was to pay damages (ll. 4-11).120 These disputes certainly exacerbated tensions 
throughout Ionia, leading to the more deep-seated problem that probably stemmed from 
the political conflicts that had caused the original exile. On Chios, this sort of conflict 
emerged between Theocritus and Theopompus, the once and future exile, who wrote 
letters to Alexander about Theocritus’ poverty and wretchedness (BNJ 115 T 8).121 
As seen above, the Ionian poleis other than Ephesus had their phoros payments 
changed into syntaxeis in 334. It is sometimes assumed that the transition was the result 
of being in the League of Corinth, but this is unlikely.122 Alexander’s “First Letter” to the 
Chians refers internal Chian disputes to the league synhedrion (RO 84 ll. 13-15), but 
Chios was in a different position from the Anatolian poleis in that it was declared 
autonomous by the King’s Peace of 386.123 The other Ionian poleis held an anomalous 
position of being recognized as autonomous civic entities that conducted their foreign 
                                                 
119 Alcimachus is probably a Chian rather than the Macedonian officer in charge of 
capturing Aeolis in 334. Rhodes and Osborne, GHI, 425; F. Piejko, “The ‘Second Letter’ 
of Alexander the Great to Chios,” Phoenix 39 (1985), 245-7; contra Heisserer, Alexander 
and the Greek Cities, 108-11. 
120 Kholod, “On the Dating of a New Chian Inscription,” 24. 
121 Morison, BNJ 115 T 8 commentary, see Part III, Chapter 20. 
122 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia Minor,” 137; Green, Alexander of 
Macedon, 187; Heisserer, Alexander and the Greek Cities, 91, 158. 
123 See Part II, Chapter 4. 
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policy much like other Greek poleis,124 but also being considered Alexander’s subjects 
and therefore legally neither allies nor league members.125 Despite the formal recognition 
of the Greek autonomy, the Ionians remained under the protection and authority of 
Alexander’s deputies in Anatolia, including the Satrap of Caria Ada and the chief 
financial officer Philoxenus.126  
It is clear that Alexander declared that the Ionian poleis were not subject to a 
phoros, but a decree at Priene offers more insight into the organization of the region (RO 
86 B).127 The inscription, which specifically remits the syntaxis from Priene (RO 86 B ll. 
11-12), probably dates to 332 and records a reward for loyalty during the war in the 
Aegean.128 First, the inscription records a syntaxis that was the financial levy Alexander 
instituted on the nucleated settlement, while the phoros would continue in the royal 
territory (ll. 8-13).129 Second, there is a reference to a garrison that may read: κα τμ 
φρουρ[]ν φ[ίημι μν ε]σάγει[ν ες τν κραν?] (“I allow you to introduce the 
                                                 
124 Nawotka, “Freedom of Greek Cities,” 31-3. 
125 Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 255-6, Dmitriev, Greek Slogan of Freedom, 99-102. 
N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 
75-6; Poddighe, “Alexander and the Greeks,” 105. 
126 Kholod, “On the Financial Relations of Alexander,” 90; Nawotka, “Freedom of Greek 
Cities,” 26. The collection of the syntaxis Alexander delegated to Philoxenus who, 
Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks of Asia,” 141, argues, may have held a small military 
command independent of the satraps, a combination he parlayed into ever greater 
authority that Alexander retroactively approved. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 242, 
suggests that Philoxenus succeeded Ada as Satrap of Caria. Cf. Heckel, Who’s Who, 220. 
127 Heisserer, Alexander the Great and the Greeks, 145-68; Lehmann, Alexander der 
Große, 109-14. The decree comes from an archive probably inscribed during the reign of 
Lysimachus, see S.M. Sherwin-White, “Ancient Archives: The Edict of Alexander to 
Priene, a Reappraisal,” JHS 105 (1985), 80-9. 
128 Badian, “Alexander and the Greeks,” 133-6; Rhodes and Osborne, GHI, 435. 
129 Kholod, “On the Financial Relations of Alexander,” 84; Sherwin-White, “Ancient 
Archives,” 84-5. 
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garrison to the acropolis,” RO 86 B ll. 15-16).130 While the passage is extremely 
fragmented, I believe that this reconstruction is likely because it fits with the context of a 
privileged grant of autonomy for Priene. However, the need to garrison the acropolis also 
indicates that there were local tensions or dangers that are otherwise unrecorded in our 
sources.131  While much about the Ionian position during Alexander’s reign is impossible 
to know unless new evidence comes to light,132 certain features of their position are 
evident: the campaigns between 334 and 330 took a steep financial toll on Ionia and the 
syntaxis was not likely a one-off payment.133 
There are lingering questions about how the Ionian communities perceived 
Alexander and whether they considered the Macedonian invasion “liberation” from 
Persia, but there is an anecdotal tradition that suggests many did prefer Alexander’s rule. 
For one, Hellenistic inscriptions frequently refer to their autonomy and freedom as 
stemming from Alexander’s reign.134 For another, multiple new cults and festivals in 
honor of Alexander cropped up in Ionia in the years after his death, including an annual 
                                                 
130 T. Heisserer, Alexander the Great and the Greeks, 146. Nawotka, “Freedom of Greek 
Cities,” 27-9. Kholod, “Garrisons of Alexander the Great,” 250-1, argues that the decree 
guaranteed the absence of a garrison. 
131 Nawotka, “Freedom of Greek Cities,” 43. On third century garrisons on the acropolis, 
see L. Robert and J. Robert “Une inscription greque de Téos en Ionie: L’union de Téos et 
de Kyrbissos,” JS (1976), 198-205. 
132 M. Hatzopoulos, “Perception of the Self and the Other: The Case of Macedonia,” AM 
7 (2007), 51-66, tried to draw new conclusions based on the description of Alexander’s 
trierarchs in India (Arr. Ind. 18.3-8), but his argument is refuted by M.M. Kholod, “Arr. 
Ind. 18.3-8 and the Question of the Enrollment of the Greek Cities of Asia Minor in the 
Corinthian League,” in KOINON DORON: Studies and Essays in Honour of Valery P. 
Nikonorov, edd. A.A. Sinitsyn and M.M. Kholod (St. Petersburg: St Petersburg State 
University Faculty of Philology, 2013), 479-82. 
133 Bosworth, HCA I, 166; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 254; Kholod, “On the 
Financial Relations of Alexander,” 85; the hypothesis is critiqued by Sherwin-White, 
“Ancient Archives,” 69-89. 
134 Welles RC 15; Meritt, “Inscriptions of Colophon,” 158-72; Nawotka, “Freedom of 
Greek Cities,” 33. 
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Alexandreia festival by the Panionian assembly and celebrated at the sacred precinct 
above Chalcideis (14.1.31) and the Erythraean cult for Alexander inaugurated by at least 
270 (SIG3 1014, l. 111).135 However, both of these developments were the product of new 
relationships and political pressures in the Hellenistic period, while also reflecting that 
the relative peace during Alexander’s reign likely created a better situation than existed in 
the years immediately after 323.136 The Persians supported regimes that aroused 
enmity,137 but the transition to Macedonian rule similarly gave rise to conflict. 
Alexander’s reign changed the imperial landscape surrounding Ionia, but the fundamental 
position of the region remained the same.
                                                 
135 Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 289; Nawotka, “Freedom of Greek Cities,” 33. On 
the cults sponsored by the successors, see Part II, Chapter 6. 
136 Dmitriev, Greek Slogan of Freedom, 96-8. 
137 Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 252. 
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6. From Alexander to Lysimachus: Ionia 323-294 
 
I. Introduction 
The sources for the early Hellenistic period focus on the breakup of the 
Macedonian Empire and the global power politics of the Diadochoi (Successors), rather 
than on regional polities.1 In European Greece Athens instigated the Lamian War (323-
322),2 in central Asia colonists refused to remain in the new settlements, and Rhodes, to 
the south of Ionia, expelled its Macedonian garrison (Diod. 18.8.1).3 But no revolt against 
Macedonian rule took place in Ionia.4 
Billows has characterized this period as one of rebirth, in which the Hellenistic 
rulers considered Ionia to be of central importance and therefore planted the seeds of 
prosperity with favorable policies.5 On one level it is hard to disagree: Hellenistic rulers 
offered tax exemptions, favorable statuses, and donations to gain influence with the 
Ionians and the Ionian poleis did grow larger and wealthier in the Hellenistic period. 
However, the dissolution of the Macedonian Empire after Alexander’s death made for an 
unstable situation in the early Hellenistic period and the same central geographic location 
that made the Ionians worth courting put them firmly in the middle of the early wars of 
the successors. This environment of competition gave the Ionians a way to manipulate the 
                                                 
1 On sources: E.M. Anson, Alexander’s Heirs (Malden: Blackwell, 2014), 7-10; 
Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, vol. 1, 1-3; Shipley, 
Greek World After Alexander, 7-31; F.W. Walbank, “Sources for the Period,” in CAH2 
7.1, 2-22. 
2 J. Romm, Ghost on the Throne (New York: Knopf, 2011), 57-85, 110-37; R. 
Waterfield, Dividing the Spoils: The War for Alexander the Great’s Empire (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 30-3.  
3 Anson, Alexander’s Heirs, 49, notes that Pisidian communities also went into revolt. 
4 Waterfield, Dividing the Spoils, 30; Anson, Alexander’s Heirs, 33. 
5 Billows, “Rebirth of a Region,” 33-43. 
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imperial contenders, but this was in its own way a continuation of the situation that the 
Ionians had been living under for two centuries. Only after the focus of the wars move 
away from Ionia in the 290s did the Ionian renaissance truly begin. 
 
II. Samians Restored 
The Samians had maintained a coherent identity even after being scattered across 
the Mediterranean after 365 when Timotheus conquered the island.6 Some of them, 
including Caius, the father of the historian Duris, competed in and won events at 
Panhellenic games.7 The Exiles Decree, as the text is preserved, says nothing about 
Samos, but in a separate, near-contemporaneous decision, Alexander demanded Athens 
allow the repatriation of the exiles.8 The Samians in 334 had probably petitioned 
Alexander for the return of their island, but he found in favor of the Athenians (Plut. 
Alex. 28.1).9 The Samian cause was not without advocates, though, and the Samians 
bestowed honors on Gorgos of Iasus for his support at Alexander’s court and for his 
financing of the return trip for the Samian residents of Iasus (SIG3 312).10 Some 
individuals may have received citizenship at other poleis, but most likely lived as metics 
                                                 
6 See Part II, Chapter 4. 
7 Kebric, In the Shadow of Macedon, 7; on Duris of Samos, see below and Part III, 
Chapter 20. 
8 The separate ruling is attested by Ephippus FGrH 126 F 5; Shipley, Samos, 165. 
9 On the date, see Hamilton, Plutarch Alexander, 71; J. Cargill, Athenian Settlements of 
the Fourth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 41-2. 
10 Shipley, Samos, 165; Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 182-94. Heisserer dates the 
decree to 323 right after the restoration of the exiles. Gorgos is also attested as offering 
Alexander ten thousand panoplies and catapults for war against Athens after the Harpalus 
affair (Ephippus FGrH 126 F 5; Justin 13.5.7); Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 225; E. 
Badian, “A Comma in the History of Samos,” ZPE 23 (1976), 289-94, with bibliography. 
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instead.11 The Athenians appealed Alexander’s decision, but the king confirmed that he 
did require their cleruchs to give up Samos.12 Although not yet willing to openly revolt 
from Alexander, the Athenians did not passively accept the decision. 
Samians began to return to the island late in 324 or early 323 and more gathered 
in Anaea, where some of them likely had lived since 365, but the Athenian cleruchs were 
still on the island when Alexander died.13 An Athenian decree, probably from early in 
outbreak of the Lamian War,14 records instructions for the strategos on Samos to arrest 
the returnees and send them to Athens, where they remained as hostages.15 When the war 
turned against Athens, the Samians were condemned to death, only to be saved because 
Antileon of Chalcis paid their ransoms.16 Athens was the dominant naval power in the 
Aegean at the outset of the Lamian War,17 but its fleet was defeated near Abydus in the 
spring of 322 by the fleet Alexander sent to Antipater (IG II2 398; II2 493), and by Cleitus 
the White near Amorgus in 323/2 and off the Lichades islands in 322.18 These battles 
                                                 
11 Shipley, Samos, 165-6. 
12 Cargill, Athenian Settlements, 41; R.M. Errington, “Samos and the Lamian War,” 
Chiron 5 (1975), 53-4, notes that Athenians are not attested among the Greek delegates 
who approached Alexander in 324/3 (Arr. 7.19.1, 723.2; Diod. 17.113.3-4). Cf. Badian, 
“Comma,” 289-94. 
13 Shipley, Samos, 167. 
14 Errington, “Samos and the Lamian War,” 56; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 226; C. 
Habicht, “Samische Volksbeschlüsse der hellenistischen Zeit,” MDAI(A) 72 (1957), 159-
69 no. 2, dates the events to early 321. 
15 C. Habicht, Athens from Alexander to Antony, trans. D.L. Schneider (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1997), 34; Shipley, Samos, 167. 
16 Habicht, “Samische Volksbeschüsse,” no. 2; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 226, see 
below. 
17 The Athenian fleet had access around 410 ships in the 320s, IG II2 1631, ll. 167-74. 
See N.G. Ashton, “The Naumachia near Amorgos in 322 B.C.,” ABSA 72 (1977), 1-11; 
A.B. Bosworth, “Why did Athens lose the Lamian War,” in The Macedonians in Athens, 
322-229 B.C. eds. O. Palagia and S.V. Tracy (Oxford: Oxbow, 2003), 14-15. 
18 Ashton, “Naumachia near Amorgos,” 1-11; Heckel, Who’s Who, 87-8. Bosworth, 
“Why did Athens lose the Lamian War,” 19-22, argues that there were more naval 
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provided the Samians an opportunity to make the maritime crossing, even though the 
Macedonian fleet did not directly help them. The Samians were not without support to 
take back the island, receiving two warships from Nausinicus of Sestus.19  
After the battle of Crannon in 322, which ended the Lamian War, Antipater 
referred the issue of Samos to Philip III Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV. Their regent 
Perdiccas issued a decree on behalf of the kings that confirmed Alexander’s Samian 
decision (Diod.18.18.69), in return for which the Samians established a new festival, the 
basilica, in their honor.20 But the Samians still probably had to physically expel or kill 
the cleruchs.21 The Athenians, impelled by the returning cleruchs, continued to regard the 
Samian return as an illegal action. While the new Samian polis was not secure from the 
caprice of the Macedonian dynasts after the 320s (see below), or from Athenian attacks 
(e.g. IG XII 6 nos. 51-52), 22 Samos did not fall to Athens again. 
Samian relations with other states in the years after the restoration of the polis are 
attested through a bevy of honorific decrees that reveal the extent to which the new 
settlement relied on foreign aid.23 In addition to the decree for Gorgos of Iasus and 
honors for citizens of Erythrae, Magnesia, and Priene, there is an account that the 
Spartans underwent a one day fast, the savings from which supposedly went to support 
                                                                                                                                                 
conflicts in 323 and 322 and the Athenian navy was only overwhelmed by the arrival of 
Cleitus’ fleet in 322. 
19 Shipley, Samos, 168. 
20 Shipley, Samos, 169; Habicht, “Samische Volksbeschüsse,” no 1, ll. 11-12, is the first 
attestation of the festival. 
21 Billows, Antigonus, 58; Shipley, Samos, 168; G. Martin, “Antipater after the Lamian 
War,” CQ2 55 (2005), 303. 
22 L. O’Sullivan, The Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens, 317-307 BCE (Leiden: 
Brill, 2009), 261-3; L. O’Sullivan, “Asander, Athens, and “IG” II2 450: A New 
Interpretation,” ZPE 119 (1997), 107-8.  
23 Shipley, Samos, 161-8. 
 139
the Samians.24 Other inscriptions detail honors for the tyrant of Syracuse and Gela, 
Sicilian Heraclea, and Sosistratus of Miletus for their support of exiled Samians (IG XII 
no. 37).25 Sosistratus had provided a three and a half talent loan to the new community,26 
and Antileon of Chalcis spent his own money to free Samian hostages after the battle of 
Crannon (see above).27 Samos was poor in liquid assets in 321, so Sosistratus and 
Antileon likely considered their support an investment that could pay future dividends. 
Shipley also plausibly suggests that what little money the Samians had was needed to arm 
citizen-soldiers and hire mercenaries to ward off Athenian attacks (see above).28  
The Samians also faced agricultural start-up costs of metal tools and seed corn. 
They needed to purchase grain both because of a general grain shortage in Greece (RO 
96; Dem. 56),29 and because it is improbable that the cleruchs left behind any grain on the 
island. The only fields that likely continued to produce at full capacity were those of the 
                                                 
24 C. Habicht, “Der Beitrag zur Restitution von Samos während des lamischen Krieges 
(Ps. Aristoteles, Ökonomik II, 2.9),” Chiron 5 (1975), 45-50, argues that the Spartan fast 
was connected to their refusal to assist Athens in the Lamian War, but Shipley, Samos, 
168, also points out that Samos and Sparta had a history of close relationships dating 
back to the Archaic period. 
25 Shipley, Samos, 163, 170; Kebric, In the Shadow of Macedon, 3-4; C. Habicht, 
“Hellenistische Inscriften aus dem Heraion von Samos,” MDAI(A) 87 (1972), no.  4. 
26 Shipley, Samos, 170. 
27 Habicht, “Samische Volksbeschüsse,” no. 2. 
28 Shipley, Samos, 168. 
29 The inscription records the purchase of grain from Cyrene for many communities in the 
Aegean and for Olympia and Cleopatra. Rhodes and Osborne also provide a map 
showing the distribution of sale, but Ionia is conspicuously absent from the list. This fact 
could be interpreted that Ionia was self-sufficient in grain, but it is more likely that Ionian 
imports came from the north. D. Rathbone, “The Grain Trade and Grain Shortages in the 
Hellenistic East,” in Trade and Famine in Classical Antiquity, edd. P. Garnsey and C.R. 
Whittaker (Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, 1983), 45-55, posits that though 
war could have disrupted the flow of grain, many of the food crises were the result of 
price gouging rather than limited supply. 
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Peraea.30 A Samian decree from c.322/1 records honors for Gyges of Torone for bringing 
three thousand medimnoi of gain to Samos and offers him citizenship, either in accord 
with a law that honored grain traders or in a bid to get Gyges to sell them even more 
grain.31 By the end of the third century there were instructions for grain distribution to 
Samian citizens to be subsidized by the temple of Hera,32 and, while it is impossible to 
backdate this law, it testifies to an endemic problem for which the Samian polity 
continued to seek solutions.33 
The leaders of the new community were the wealthy individuals who led the 
exiles back to the island. Notable among these was the family of Duris of Samos.34 
Pausanias describes a statue at Olympia dedicated to Caius, Duris’ father, for his victory 
during the period of exile (νικσαι Σκαον νίκα  Σαμίων δμος φευγεν κ τς 
νήσου, 6.13.5).35 The text continues: τν δ καιρν […] π τ οκεα τν δμον, 
revealing that in due time Caius had something to do with the return of the Samians, but 
there is a critical lacuna that includes the verb of the clause. Modern scholars plausibly 
restore the text to read that he both led the exiles back and infer that he became tyrant 
                                                 
30 The Samians did collect grain in the name of Hera, see D.J. Gargola, “Grain 
Distributions and the Revenue of the Temple of Hera on Samos,” Phoenix 46 (1992), 13-
15. 
31 Shipley, Samos, 169-70. 
32 On the growth of the Heraion, see Part III, Chapter 17. 
33 Habicht, “Samische Volksbeschüsse,” no. 63, with the dating. Gargola, “Grain 
Distributions,” 12-28, points out that the law was not a humanitarian venture to improve 
life for the citizens. 
34 On Duris, see Part III, Chapter 20. 
35 The name Caius is remarkable for its parallel to the Latin praenomen, which is taken to 
buttress the case that his family spent the period of their exile in Sicily. Kebric, In the 
Shadow of Macedon, 4; Pownall, BNJ 76 T 4 commentary; see Part III, Chapter 20. 
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soon thereafter.36 Shipley disagrees with this assessment, arguing that, even if the 
restoration itself is correct, Pausanias’ source for Caius’ importance in 322/1 is Duris 
himself, a historian with a reputation for exaggeration (BNJ 76 T 7, F 37; Plut. Per. 28.1-
3).37 The incipient state was heavily dependent upon its wealthy citizens to function, 
regardless of the formal constitution, and thus Kebric argues that the tyranny of Caius 
emerged peacefully from a Samian plutocracy.38 Tyranny is probably an inappropriate 
term since it refers to the unconstitutional maintenance of political power. Duris’ family 
was one of the most important on the island and Duris’ name appears on Samian coins 
c.310-300, which suggests that he held monetary office during that period.39 Caius 
probably held a position not unlike that of Pericles in fifth-century Athens in that he was 
able to dominate the politics of the polis and be characterized as a tyrant without calling 
himself one.40  
 
III. The Wars of the Diadochoi and Ionia, 323-315 
The first Macedonian settlement was at Babylon after Alexander’s death in 323, 
in which Perdiccas became regent for Philip III Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV, confirmed 
Menander as satrap of Lydia, Asander in Caria, and expanded Antigonus’ satrapy to 
include Pamphylia, Lycia, and Greater Phrygia, and gave Thrace to Lysimachus (Diod. 
                                                 
36 J.P. Barron, “The Tyranny of Duris at Samos,” CR 12 (1962), 191; Lund, Lysimachus, 
124; Kebric, In the Shadow of Macedon, 7-8. 
37 Shipley, Samos, 178. On Duris, see Pownall, BNJ 76 F 37, commentary, following 
W.E. Sweet, “Sources of Plutarch’s Demetrius,” CW 44 (1951), 177-81. 
38 In the Shadow of Macedon, 8. 
39 Shipley, Samos, 178; J.P. Barron, The Silver Coins of Samos (London: Athlone, 1966), 
124-40. 
40 cf. Thuc. 2.65 describing Pericles’ power over Athens. 
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18.3.1).41 In 322, Antigonus fled from Perdiccas to Antipater and Craterus in Macedonia 
to urge them to declare war on Perdiccas (Diod. 18.23.3-4), while the Ionian poleis 
remained overtly loyal to the regent. In all probability, though, Ionia neither favored nor 
opposed Perdiccas. When the regent left Anatolia to invade Egypt in 321,42 Antigonus 
crossed the Aegean to Caria with three thousand troops and ten Athenian ships. Ephesus 
and then the other Ionian poleis followed the lead of the two Macedonian satraps by 
joining him (Arr. Succ. F 1.2).43 Billows speculates that Antigonus had brokered a deal 
with Menander and Asander before returning to Asia since he achieved rapid successes 
even before Antipater and Craterus committed to war against Perdiccas.44 The 
chronology of the First Diadoch War is disputed, though, and Briant argues that the 
satraps changed sides only after Antipater and Craterus crossed the Hellespont.45 Despite 
the superficial cooperation between the campaigns of Antipater and Craterus on the one 
                                                 
41 Anson, Alexander’s Heirs, 47-9; R. Billows, Kings and Colonists (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 
90-2; Billows, Antigonus, 402-3; R.M. Errington, “From Babylon to Triparadeisus,” JHS 
90 (1970), 49-59; A. Meeus, “The Power Struggle of the Diadochoi in Babylon, 323 
BC,” Anc.Soc. 38 (2008), 39-83; Waterfield, Dividing the Spoils, 16-29. Menander had 
been satrap of Lydia since 331, see Heckel, Who’s Who, 163. 
42 Errington, “From Babylon to Triparadeisus,” 64-5. 
43 Billows, Antigonus, 63.  
44 Supposedly it was news of Perdiccas’ courtship of Alexander’s sister Cleopatra, which 
Antigonus learned after he crossed into Asia, that swayed the other two Macedonians 
(Diod. 18.25.3). Anson, Alexander’s Heirs, 56; Romm, Ghost on the Throne, 147-8; 
Waterfield, Dividing the Spoils, 57-60. Asander and Antigonus may have been kinsmen, 
see Heckel, Who’s Who, 57; Menander resented Perdiccas because the regent had made 
Cleopatra his superior at Sardis, Arr. Succ. 1.2.6; Heckel, Marshals, 54; Heckel, Who’s 
Who, 57, 163. 
45 Anson, Alexander’s Heirs, 57-8; P. Briant, Antigone le Borgne (Paris: Le Belles 
Lettres, 1973), 208; Waterfield, Dividing the Spoils, 57-60.  
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hand and Antigonus on the other, Hauben is correct that, by crossing into Asia, 
Antigonus was waging his own war independently.46 
It is unknown to what extent Antigonus prepared for his return before fleeing to 
Europe, but he likely remained in contact with the satraps Asander and Menander. Anson 
argues that Antigonus did not maintain contact with the Ionian communities after 
accepting the surrender of Priene on behalf of Alexander in 331. Yet, Antigonus’ satrapal 
court included at least one Ionian, Aristodemus of Miletus, and a Macedonian, 
Theotimides, who the Samians honored for his support of their citizens while in exile.47 
Further, it is possible that Asander and Menander acted as proxies for Antigonus with the 
Ionians. Antigonus thus probably stayed in contact with the Ionian communities between 
322 and 321. 
Among Ionian poleis, only Samos and Ephesus have known grounds for 
sympathy for Perdiccas. The regent had issued the decree confirming Samian possession 
of the island against Athens in 322 (Diod. 18.18.6-9), but that need not indicate a 
reciprocal relationship since Perdiccas merely confirmed Alexander’s original ruling. The 
Samians, surely aware of the origin of the decree, nevertheless honored the kings in 
whose names the grant was made. By 319, they had joined Antigonus. Similarly, 
Polyaenus records that Perdiccas had sent Philoxenus, Alexander’s agent in Ionia, to the 
polis to stand trial for his arrest of Ephesian citizens (6.49).48 The Ephesians also gave 
grants of citizenship to Hagnon of Teos, Cleitus the White, and Perdiccas’ brother 
                                                 
46 H. Hauben, “The First War of the Successors (321 B.C.): Chronological and Historical 
Problems,” Ancient Society 8 (1977), 85-119. 
47 Billows, Antigonus, for Aristodemos: 372, for Theotimides: 437-8; J. Champion, 
Antigonus the One-Eyed (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2014), 23; Shipley, Samos, 166. 
48 See Part II, Chapter 5. 
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Alcetas, the latter of whom are explicitly linked in the decree, which can be plausibly 
dated to 322/1 when Antipater, Craterus, and Perdiccas were on good terms.49 
Nevertheless, when Antigonus return to Asia, Diodorus specifically says that an Ephesian 
faction supported the attack from inside (Diod. 18.52.7, see below) 
In 320, Antipater, Antigonus, and the survivors of Perdiccas’ invasion met at 
Triparadeisus and brokered a new settlement about rule of the Macedonian world (Diod. 
18.39.2-6). 50  Asander remained satrap of Caria, Cleitus the White replaced Menander in 
Lydia (Diod. 18.39.6; Arr. Succ. F. 1.41).51 Antigonus himself became strategos of Asia 
and Antipater became regent, Ptolemy’s position in Egypt was confirmed, and Seleucus 
received Babylon. The new arrangement only lasted about a year and in 319 Antipater 
died, leaving the regency to Polyperchon (18.48.4). In 318, Cleitus crossed the Aegean to 
Greece in order to denounce Antigonus to Polyperchon, and prepared for war by 
installing garrisons at Ephesus and other Anatolian poleis. Antigonus promptly marched 
on and captured Ephesus with an immediate attack because a faction in the polis assisted 
                                                 
49 I.Eph. 1435, 1438, 1437; A.J. Bayliss, “Antigonos the One-Eyed’s Return to Asia in 
322,” ZPE 155 (2006), 108-26; Mastrocinque, La Caria e la Ionia meridionale, 17. 
50 The chronology of this period is disputed between the so-called high chronology and 
the low, which holds that events took place one year later; I follow the low chronology. 
For the low, see: Errington “From Babylon to Triparadeisus,” 75-7; R.M. Errington, 
“Diodorus Siculus and the Chronology of the Early Diadochoi, 320-311 B.C.” Hermes 
105 (1977), 478-504; E.M. Anson, “Diodorus and the Date of Triparadeisus,” AJPh 107 
(1986), 208-17; E.M. Anson, “The Dating of Perdiccas’ Death and the Assembly at 
Triparadeisus,” GRBS 43 (2003), 373-90; E.M. Anson, Alexander’s Heirs, 58-9; Billows, 
Antigonus, 64-80; J. Roisman, Alexander’s Veterans and the Early Wars of the 
Successors (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), 136-44; high: A.B. Bosworth, 
“Philip III Arrhidaeus and the Chronology of the Successors,” Chiron 22 (1992), 55-81; 
A.B. Bosworth, “Perdiccas and the Kings,” CQ2 43 (1993), 420-7. T. Boiy, Between High 
and Low: A Chronology of the Early Hellenistic Period (Bonn: Verlag Antike, 2007), 
offers a chronology that finds a compromise between the two. 
51 Anson, Alexander’s Heirs, 70-4; Errington, “From Babylon to Triparadeisus,” 67-71; 
Heckel, Who’s Who, for Asander 57, for Menander 163, for Cleitus, 87-8 and Heckel, 
Marshals, 58-64; Waterfield, Dividing the Spoils, 66-8.  
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his forces (Diod. 18.52.7).52 On the one hand the Ephesians’ relationship with Perdiccas 
was no longer profitable, but, on the other, the episode should be seen as indicative of 
competing groups in Ephesus exploiting the fluctuations in Macedonian politics for their 
own ends. Antigonus’ forces also captured a Rhodian named Aeschylus at Ephesus when 
he put in at the harbor carrying six hundred silver talents from Cilicia to Macedon (Diod. 
18.52.7).53 Antigonus captured the remaining Lydian and Ionian communities (Diod. 
18.52.5-8) before leading an army in pursuit of Eumenes in the interior of Asia, which 
occupied him until late in 315.54 
 
IV. The Diadochic Wars and Ionia, 315-301 
The Wars of the Successors largely passed Ionia by and, there is no evidence that 
the Second Diadoch War affected the region. The Third Diadochic War broke out in 315, 
which set Antigonus and his son Demetrius Poliorcetes against Ptolemy, Cassander, and 
Lysimachus,55 ranged from the European side of the Aegean to Gaza to Babylon. 
However, one campaign brought the war to Ionia. Seleucus, driven from his satrapy of 
Babylon in 315, led a Ptolemaic fleet to raid the Anatolian coast and laid siege to 
Erythrae in the autumn of 315 (Diod. 19.60.3-4).56 Antigonus responded to the siege by 
                                                 
52 Billows, Antigonus, 83. 
53 Billows, Antigonus, 83, 364-5; Champion, Antigonus, 35, 193. 
54 E.M. Anson, Eumenes of Cardia (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 147-90; Billows, Antigonus, 83-
107; Roisman, Veterans, 212-36; Waterfield, Dividing the Spoils, 94-103. 
55 E.M. Anson, “The Chronology of the Third Diadoch War,” Phoenix 60 (2006), 226-35 
and A. Meeus, “Diodorus and the Chronology of the Third Diadoch War,” Phoenix 66 
(2012), 74-96; Roisman, Veterans, 130-44; P. Wheatley, “The Chronology of the Third 
Diadoch War, 315-311 B.C.,” Phoenix 52 (1998), 257-81. 
56 Billows, Antigonus, 113; Champion, Antigonus, 80; Grainger, Seleukos, 58-9, 
speculates that Seleucus’ siege of Eyrthrae was a distraction meant to occupy his troops 
while he negotiated with Asander.  
 146
sending one of his nephews, Polemaeus, into Ionia in 314 with an army to deter any 
Ionian communities from going over to Seleucus, who abandoned the siege when 
Polemaeus approached (Diod. 19.58.6).57 It was probably during this campaign that 
Seleucus first reached out to the Milesians, who were in the process of restoring the 
oracle at Didyma. It is impossible to know what either party said, but Seleucid 
propaganda later claimed that the oracle predicted kingship of Asia and Seleucus 
showered Didyma with gifts after the battle of Ipsus in 301.58 
Polemaius’ campaign in Ionia put pressure on Asander, the satrap of Caria, who 
negotiated an alliance with Ptolemy in 314/13 and sailed to Athens seeking support from 
Cassander and Demetrius of Phalerum (IG II2 450).59 In league with Cassander, Ptolemy 
sent ten thousand mercenaries under the command of Myrmidon to Caria in 313, but 
Polemaius defeated this expedition and, in the autumn, Cassander sent his own army to 
Caria under the command of Eupolemus (Diod. 19.68.3-7, 68.2).60 Eupolemus’ 
expedition was an unmitigated disaster, which forced Asander to surrender his armies to 
Antigonus (Diod. 19.68.5-7).61 Asander quickly changed his mind, though, and called on 
Seleucus, still leading Ptolemy’s navy, for help (Diod. 19.64.1-2); Antigonus responded 
by recalling his forces from their winter quarters and, splitting his forces into four 
columns, conquered Caria in a matter of weeks. One of these columns, under the 
command of Docimus, marched down the Maeander valley to Miletus while Medius 
                                                 
57 Billows, Antigonus, 112-13. 
58 See below and Part III, Chapter 17. 
59 Billows, Antigonus, 116. 
60 R. Billows, “Anatolian Dynasts: The Case of the Macedonian Eupolemos in Karia,” 
CA 8 (1989), 173-206. 
61 Billows, Antigonus, 120; Waterfield, Dividing the Spoils, 116-17. 
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approached by sea (Diod. 19.75.3-4).62 Antigonus’ forces besieged the citadel, which 
Asander’s troops had not vacated, and encouraged the Milesians to turn against the 
garrison and “assert their freedom” (τούς τε πολίτας κάλουν π τν λευθερίαν, Diod. 
18.75.4). The list of Milesian eponymous officials (stephanephoroi) also testifies to the 
liberation, because a new list of eponyms begins in 313/12 with the declaration that, in 
the term of Hippomachus, Antigonus restored autonomy and democracy to the polis 
(ππόμαχος Θήρωνος, π τούτου  πόλις | λευθέρα κα ατόνομος γένετο π | 
ντιγόνου κα  δημοκρατία πεδόθη, I. Milet 123, ll. 2-4).63 The first entry to follow 
this dedication is to πόλλων Διός, which usually indicates a financial emergency and 
suggests that the reference to Antigonus was not as celebratory as otherwise might be 
assumed.64  
In 314 before the expedition to Caria Antigonus had made his proclamation at 
Tyre that all Greek poleis were to be free, autonomous, and ungarrisoned (Diod. 19.61.3-
4) and Ptolemy probably soon followed suit (Diod. 19.61.5).65 Billows puts the 
proclamation in the context of Antigonus facing four hostile dynasts and thus argues that 
“the primary motive…was clearly to incite mainland Greeks to rebel against Kassandros 
[and] one may conclude that it was purely a politico-military maneuver, devoid of any 
                                                 
62 Docimus: Billows, Antigonus, 382-3; Heckel Who’s Who, 115. Champion, Antigonus, 
88. 
63 Anson, “The Chronology of the Third Diadoch War,” 230; Lund, Lysimachus, 115; 
R.H. Simpson, “Antigonus the One-Eyed and the Greeks,” Historia 8 (1959), 392. R. 
Seager, “The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia: From Alexander to Antiochus,” CQ2 31 
(1981), 107, notes that Diodorus says this campaign is how the Greeks became subject to 
Antigonus. 
64 S.M. Burstein, The Hellenistic Age from the battle of Ipsos to the death of Kleopatra 
VII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 33 n. 3. 
65 C. Wehrli, Antigone et Démétrios (Geneva: Droz, 1968), 110-11; Billows, Antigonus, 
116, 199- 200; Dmitriev, Greek Slogan of Freedom, 117-19; Simpson, “Antigonus the 
One-Eyed and the Greeks,” 390; Worthington, Ptolemy, 118-19. 
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broader policy or idealistic content.”66 Likewise, Dmitriev sees the policy in light of 
Antigonus’ urgent need to “break down a military alliance that had been forged against 
him.”67 He further declares: “all these words and deeds had nothing to do with the actual 
status of individual cities.”68 The autonomy of the Greeks, including the Ionians, was 
certainly a cornerstone of Antigonus’ policy between 315 and 301 and this promise 
declaration was included in the Peace of 311.69 There is an element of propaganda to this 
because to do otherwise would invite his rival dynasts to take advantage of hypocrisy,70 
but the Ionian poleis were useful to him as free and independent allies.  
Billows marks Antigonus’ declaration at Tyre as a watershed moment for his 
relations with the Greek poleis. However, the freedom of the Greeks had been a common 
thread of Macedonian propaganda since 337. Antigonus’ actions toward the Ionian poleis 
between 318-315 were opportunistic, driving Cleitus the White’s garrison from Ephesus 
(Diod. 18.52.5-8), but also supporting Cassander against Polyperchon, the latter of whom 
had promised the Greeks that he would remove Antipater’s garrisons and impositions 
created after the Lamian War (Diod. 18.53.2-57.1; Plut. Phocion 31.1).71  In 318 
Antigonus had a sphere of influence that was nominally limited to Anatolia, where he 
already did support the Greek poleis against Cleitus’ garrisons. Since Polyperchon had 
already declared the freedom of the other Greek poleis, Antigonus gained little by 
following suit. However, this was also a period in which Antigonus had only minimal 
                                                 
66 Billows, Antigonus, 199. 
67 Dmitriev, Greek Slogan of Freedom, 118. 
68 Dmitriev, Greek Slogan of Freedom, 119. 
69 Simpson, “Antigonus the One-Eyed and the Greeks,” 393-4, 399. See below. 
70 Billows, Antigonus, 199-200. 
71 Billows, Antigonus, 199; Heckel, Who’s Who, 227. Cornelius Nepos, Phocion, 3 says 
that Cassander had supporters in Athens, but that that the popular party in Athens had the 
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contact with the Greek communities since he was in the interior of Asia in pursuit of 
Eumenes until 316.72 Antigonus probably saw value in independent allied poleis rather 
than expending his own forces securing their allegiance. Antigonus’ forces “liberated” 
the rest of the poleis of Anatolia and he ensured that a clause guaranteeing Greek 
autonomy appeared in the treaty of 311, albeit for his own reasons (Diod. 20.19.3-4).73 
Antigonus developed a reputation for defending autonomy that Ionian poleis referred 
back to later in the third century when seeking royal benefactions,74 but he nevertheless 
installed garrisons when it was necessary to secure control of a polis (e.g. Diod. 
20.111.3).75  
Between the Peace of 311 and the Ipsus campaign of 302/1, Ionia was not directly 
affected by the diadochic wars. Ptolemy sent a fleet to Caria in 309 and captured 
Phaselis, Xanthus, Caunus, Myndus and Iasus, but Demetrius prevented the fall of 
Halicarnassus (Diod. 20.27.1-2).76  Ptolemy spent the winter of 309/8 at Cos, where he 
proposed marriage to Alexander the Great’s sister Cleopatra, but after her murder he 
sailed to Greece without attacking Ionia (Diod. 20.37).77 The next campaign in Ionia 
came in 302 when Lysimachus and Cassander’s general Prepelaus crossed the Hellespont 
                                                 
72 Billows, Antigonus, 198. 
73 Billows, Antigonus, 200, n. 29; Mastrocinque, La Caria e la Ionia meridionale, 26, 
describes the Peace of 311 as a temporary truce along the lines of the status quo, while 
R.H. Simpson, “The Historical Circumstances of the Peace of 311,” JHS 74 (1954), 25-
31, posits strategic gain for Antigonus through diplomacy in that he conducted 
negotiations with Lysimachus and Cassander that forced Ptolemy to leave Seleucus out of 
the settlement. Cf. Simpson, “Antigonus the One-Eyed and the Greeks,” 393-4. 
74 Welles, RC no. 15. 
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76 Billows, Antigonus, 143-4. 
77 I. Worthington, Ptolemy I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 152-4. 
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for the final campaign against Antigonus. Prepelaus led his forces south through Aetolia 
and into Ionia, where, according to Diodorus, he struck fear into the Ephesians and 
captured the polis without a fight (20.107.4).78 At Ephesus he freed Rhodian hostages 
who Demetrius had deposited there and confirmed the tax exemption for the temple of 
Artemis.79 He also installed a garrison and burned the ships in the harbor, but reputedly 
left Ephesus free (Diod. 10.107.4-5). The conquest probably entailed a turnover of the 
ruling elite since Demetrius is said to have forced Ephesus back to its earlier conditions 
(νάγκασε τν πόλιν ες τν προυπάρχουσαν ποκαταστναι, Diod. 20.111.3).80 
Prepelaus then accepted the surrender of Teos and Colophon, but the Antigonid navy 
reinforced Clazomenae and Erythrae, so he settled for raiding those territories before 
turning inland toward Sardis.  When Demetrius returned from Greece in 302 he landed 
his army at Ephesus and compelled it to rejoin Antigonus’ alliance.81 He also dismissed 
the, presumably mercenary, garrison and installed one of his own before marching north 
toward the Hellespont (Diod. 20.111.3).82 
 
V. Samos and Diadochic Politics, 319-301 
In 319 Polyperchon, who became the regent for Alexander IV and Philip III 
Arrhidaeus after Antipater died, tried to win Athenian support for his war against 
Cassander by offering among other things to recognize Athenian ownership of Samos in 
                                                 
78 Billows, Antigonus, 176; Lund, Lysimachus, 72; Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis, 44-6. 
79 Lund, Lysimachus, 118, see Part III, Chapter 17. 
80 Lund, Lysimachus, 125-6. 
81 Champion, Antigonus, 157; Lund, Lysimachus, 119, picks up on that Demetrius 
compelled Ephesus to return to Antigonid control. 
82 Billows, Antigonus, 179; Champion, Antigonus, 157. 
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the name of the kings (Diod. 18.56.7, see above).83 Demetrius of Phalerum took control 
of Athens in 317 with the support of Cassander,84 but the threat of attacks on Samos 
nevertheless also strengthened the relationship between Samos and Antigonus 
Monophthalmus.85 Antigonus had gained the support from Ionia when he returned from 
Europe in 322/1 and it is possible that Samos was among those states to support him even 
though Perdiccas had, as regent, confirmed the Samian restoration to the island (Diod. 
18.18.6-9). When Antigonus became strategos of Asia through the settlement at 
Triparadeisus in 320, his official sphere of influence was expanded to include Ionia, and 
Polyperchon’s support for the Athenian claim to the island strengthened Antigonus’ hand 
as a protector of Samos.86  
The Athenians made one final bid for control of Samos in 313 at the same time 
that Asander confronted Antigonus. Asander had ties with Athens at least by 314/3 when 
there is an Athenian decree that voted honors for the satrap in return for his provision of 
warships (IG II2 450 ll. 19-20). The purpose of the gifts to Athens are unknown, but 
O’Sullivan argues that Asander intended the ships to be used against Samos, which 
Antigonus’ forces could use to attack Miletus.87 She connects these overtures from 
Asander with two inscriptions from Samos recording a siege (IG XII 6, nos. 51-52) that 
                                                 
83 Shipley, Samos, 171; Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 191; O’Sullivan, 
Demetrius, 37-8. 
84 O’Sullivan, Demetrius of Phalerum, 37-40. 
85 Kebric, In the Shadow of Macedon, 4-5; Shipley, Samos, 171-2. 
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she believes fit snugly into Diodorus’ episodic treatment of the Third Diadoch War.88 In 
contrast, Shipley suggests that the inscriptions refer to an attack that should be identified 
with the campaign waged by Myrmidon of Athens, a mercenary and the commander of 
Cassander’s Carian campaign, a solution that does not need to rule out Athenian 
involvement if Cassander and Demetrius of Phalerum coordinated campaigns.89 
Antigonus’ forces carried the day in Caria, however, and the attack on Samos failed. 
Samos remained within the Antigonid sphere until 294.90  There are archeological 
remains of towers on the western side of the island that were probably built under the 
Antigonid aegis and indicate a military presence.91 Surviving inscriptions further testify 
to a strong relationship. Two inscriptions from 307/6 honor Antigonus’ philoi,92 and 
Themison of Samos, who had brought Antigonus forty ships at Tyre in 314 (Diod. 
19.62.7), was one of Demetrius Poliorcetes’ commanders at the battle of Salamis in 
Cyprus in 306 (Diod. 20.50.4).93 Another inscription from Samos dated 306-301 records 
thanks for Hipparchus of Cyrene, an Antigonid officer, for his goodwill to Samians 
before and after their return to the island and praises him for his treatment of Samian 
military forces in Caria.94 Demetrius managed to preserve the loyalty of some poleis after 
Ipsus by using his fleet and there may have been a garrison on Samos, but there is no 
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reason to suppose that the relationship was borne of coercion.  Instead, the Samians used 
Demetrius and his fleet to protect their new community. 
 
VI. After Ipsus, 301-294 
A coalition army under the command of Seleucus and Lysimachus defeated 
Antigonus and Demetrius at the battle of Ipsus in 301. Plutarch says the victors, including 
Ptolemy and Cassander, carved up Antigonus’ kingdom as though it was a slaughtered 
animal (Plut. Demet. 30.1).95 Lysimachus’ cut consisted of Anatolia north of the Taurus 
Mountains and nominally included Ionia. Opposition to the new regime was limited in 
the Anatolian hinterland, but Demetrius led five thousand infantry and four thousand 
cavalry to Ephesus after the battle, so much of Ionia remained under his control (Plut. 
Demet. 30).96 Demetrius did not stay long in Ephesus, but Plutarch makes a point of 
saying he took pains to prevent the looting of the temple of Artemis, which shows that he 
intended to keep control of the polis (Plut. Demet. 30.1).97 Lysimachus bribed the 
garrison commander Diodorus in 301/0, but Demetrius secured control of Ephesus by 
luring Diodorus onto a boat in the harbor and killing him and his supporters (Polyaenus 
4.7).98 Clazomenae and Erythrae, both of which had remained aligned with Demetrius in 
302, likely continued their allegiance after the battle. There is also evidence that the 
Ionians fought an extended low-intensity war against the incursions of Lysimachus. An 
                                                 
95 Grainger, Seleukos, 121-2; Errington, Hellenistic World, 51-2; Waterfield, Dividing the 
Spoils, 172-4. 
96 Lund, Lysimachus, 81-3.  
97 Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis, 53. 
98 Lund, Lysimachus, 84, n. 14, acknowledges that the dearth of evidence makes it 
equally possible that Lysimachus’ attack could be dated to 298 or 301 in the immediate 
aftermath of Ipsus or 298. Cf. Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis, 53-4. 
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Ephesian decree honors Archestratus, Demetrius’ strategos in Clazomenae, for protecting 
the vessels that supplied food.99 Moreover, the Ephesians gave citizenship to Thras[---] of 
Magnesia because he paid the ransom for their citizens whom Lysimachus had captured 
(I. Eph. 5 1450).100 When Demetrius and Seleucus created a new alliance after 299, they 
reaffirmed their commitment to the freedom of the Greeks against Lysimachus, which is 
attested by a decree from Ephesus honoring their delegate Nicagoras of Rhodes (OGIS 
10).101  
Miletus remained in alignment with Demetrius initially, but Ptolemaic forces 
captured the poleis c. 299/8 and maintained possession of it until 294/5 when Demetrius’ 
appearance on the list of stephanephoroi indicates that he was once more in control (I. 
Milet. 123 l. 22). Burstein argues that Demetrius received Miletus as a condition of his 
peace with Ptolemy in 297/6.102 It was in this same period that Seleucus’ relationship 
with Miletus flourished. He promoted he story that the oracle at Didyma foretold his rise 
to kingship and backed up the propaganda with a set of massive offerings to adorn the 
sanctuary (McCabe, Didyma 7).103 The Milesians also offered honors to his son 
Antiochus (SEG 4 470) and wife Apame (SEG 34 1075) for their donations to sanctuaries 
at Didyma.104 Despite the gifts, the wars and impositions took a toll on Miletus and the 
list of stephanephoroi includes Apollo the son of Zeus (πόλλων Διός) as the eponym for 
                                                 
99 Lund, Lysimachus, 84-5. 
100 Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis, 55-6. 
101 Grainger, Seleukos, 139-40; Lund, Lysimachus, 89. A.B. Bosworth, The Legacy of 
Alexander (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 268, notes that Demetrius was a 
political prisoner of Seleucus at the time, but that the Ephesians gave him pride of place 
in the decree regardless. 
102 Burstein, “Lysimachus and the Greek Cities of Asia,” 78-9. 
103 See Part III, Chapter 17. 
104 Fontenrose, Didyma, 16-17. 
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299/8, which has been argued indicates financial hardship at Miletus (SIG3 322, l. 18).105 
However, the invocation of Apollo also probably indicates periods of civil strife that 
interfered with the usual elections. Antigonus’ allies were formally exempt from taxes 
and tribute, but it is probable that he required his allies to pay for other military expenses, 
so Lund argues that it was Antigonus and Demetrius, not Lysimachus, who beggared 
Ionia (see below).106 
In 296/5 Demetrius sailed to Athens and Lysimachus took the opportunity to seize 
Ionia. Lund posits that Demetrius’ heavy-handed management eased Lysimachus’ 
conquest, citing the appearance of Apollo in the list of Milesian eponyms and an 
Ephesian debt law of c.297 that “implies widespread damage to the citizens’ 
properties.”107 Her supposition that the wars between Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and 
Demetrius in the years 302-294 taxed Ionian resources is well founded, but it is 
unnecessary to lay this blame solely at the feet of Demetrius. While Demetrius installed 
garrisons in Ionian poleis in order to hold together some of Antigonus’ realm after the 
battle of Ipsus, there is little evidence of direct evidence of opposition. Economic 
hardship would have aided Lysimachus in 294, but the new hegemony was no more 
welcome than the old. Some factions in Ionian poleis, probably including Miletus, 
welcomed Demetrius back in 286/5 with the result that Lysimachus imposed a phoros 
                                                 
105 Burstein, Hellenistic Age, 33 n. 3. 
106 Lund, Lysimachus, 116; Burstein, Lysimachus and the Greek Cities of Asia, 79, argues 
persuasively that Lysimachus was no more extortionate than any other Hellenistic dynast. 
See Part III, Chapter 18. 
107 Lysimachus, 92; Burstein, “Lysimachus and the Greek Cities of Asia,” 78-9; cf. 
Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis, 55. 
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when he recaptured it.108 Lysimachus’ and Antigonus’ rule in Ionia was little different, 
but the former refused to hide his authority behind professions of autonomy.109 
 
VII. Ionia and the Kings: Euergetism and Human Geography 
Demetrius temporarily regained control of Ionia in 286/5, but Lysimachus’ 
campaign in 294 was the denouement in Ionia of the war that reached its bloody climax at 
Ipsus. The Ionian poleis had mixed experiences with the Diadochoi, having been the 
target of numerous campaigns from 323 to 294. While they benefitted from royal 
building programs, they were also frequently expected to pick up the tab for civic 
projects and leave alone sacred funds.110 Hellenistic rulers declared the Greeks 
autonomous on several occasions in the fourth and third centuries, but the best that the 
communities could hope to enjoy was a combination of benign neglect and reciprocity 
from a position of subordination, and were often subject to the whims of these rulers. Yet, 
despite the unstable fortunes of the Ionian poleis, they benefitted from an influx of money 
for building projects and grew into flourishing centers once the fighting subsided.111  
Individual communities and the Ionian League both offered honors to rulers in a 
variety of ways, including festivals, grants of ateleia (tax exemption), and other rewards. 
The largest festival, the Alexandreia, held by the Ionian League may indicate that 
Alexander the Great refounded the organization, but it is more likely that that it 
                                                 
108 Lund, Lysimachus, 102-3. Certainly, not all Ionians welcomed Demetrius back in 286. 
Polyaenus (5.19) records a stratagem by Lysimachus’ general Lycus bribing pirates who 
Demetrius’ forces were using to control Ephesus. 
109 Lund, Lysimachus, 110-11, for similarities in economic policy, see 123-5; Burstein, 
“Lysimachus and the Greek Cities of Asia,” 76. 
110 See Part III, Chapter 18. 
111 Billows, “Rebirth of a Region,” 33. 
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inaugurated the festival to honor Antigonus, who, as was common in the early Hellenistic 
period, deferred the honor to Alexander as a way of associating himself with the late 
king.112 Samos also founded a religious festival for Antigonus and Demetrius after 306, 
and renamed an existed tribe Demetrieis as a way of further honoring the kings.113 The 
Samians also voted honors for an associate of Demetrius’ wife Phila, who they petitioned 
about an unknown issue in 306 (SIG3 333 ll. 8-9).114  Ephesus gave cult honors to 
Lysimachus as the second founder of the polis when he moved its location in c.294,115 
and, by 289/8, Seleucus asked for libations from the temple of Apollo at Didyma for his 
continued good health (OGIS 214, ll. 11-12).116  In return for these honors, the Diadochoi 
offered the Ionian poleis economic privileges such as tax exemption and gifts of money 
and materials for building projects.117 Antigonus is known to have given tax exemptions 
to Erythrae (I Ery. 31 and 32) and Ephesus.118 These few cases of Ionian taxes being 
remitted were the exception, however, regardless of the regime.119 It was also a common 
situation to find that a ruler prescribed a civic building project, but left bulk of the 
payment to the citizens such as was the case for the new walls at both Colophon and 
Erythrae under Antigonus and Ephesus under Lysimachus.120 
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The human geography of Ionia also changed in the early Hellenistic period. 
Antigonus and Lysimachus refounded Smyrna, which had been destroyed in the seventh 
century (Strabo 14.1.37), though local tradition gave credit to Alexander (Pausanias 
7.5.1-3; Aelius Aristides 10.7, 20.20).121 The nucleated settlement at Colophon also 
moved between 315 and 306, which is attested by a new set of walls built by Antigonus 
that enclosed both the new and old settlements.122  What makes this particular civic 
project notable beyond that the community soon relocated (see below) is a partial list of 
donors who contributed funds for construction.123 In addition to a large number of 
citizens, the list includes four Macedonians, with one Stephanus offering three hundred 
gold staters, one of the largest single donations.124 Although there is no information about 
these people outside this list, other Ionian poleis offered Macedonians citizenship,125 so it 
is reasonable to assume that listed individuals lived in the community. In c.303, there was 
also a proposed synoicism of Teos and Lebedos that, if it was not the brainchild of 
Antigonus, was pursued under his direction (Ager 13, ll. 5-15, see below).126 An 
earthquake in 304/3 had caused considerable damage in Ionia, and Billows posits that 
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both poleis suffered damage and sought Antigonus’ help, perhaps unaware that the king 
would instruct them to merge and to send joint representatives to the Panionion.127 The 
citizens of Myus voluntarily relocated to Miletus during the Hellenistic period because 
the gnats in the surrounding marshes became unbearable, according to Pausanias (7.2.11; 
Strabo 14.1.10).128 Pausanias’ story that insects defeated the polis is probably hyperbolic, 
but the silting up of the Gulf of Latmus likely caused the farmland at Myus to turn to 
marsh and provides a salient reminder that the Ionian communities faced natural as well 
as human challenges in the early Hellenistic period.129 
Ephesus moved to a new site before 294 because the original location ceased to 
have access to the sea due to the silting of the Cayster River (Paus. 1.9.7).130 According 
to Strabo, the Ephesians found the idea of moving distasteful, but Lysimachus literally 
flushed them from their homes by blocking the sewers in advance of a torrential 
downpour, thereby flooding the original settlement (Strabo 14.1.21). Strabo’s story is far-
fetched, but the flooding was most likely real. The contemporary poet Duris of Elaia 
composed an epigram about a deluge sweeping all into the sea (Stephanus, Greek 
Anthology 9.424)131 and Ephesus had long been combatting the rivers, including a project 
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to dam the Silenous in order to prevent it from flooding the sanctuary.132 Rogers therefore 
convincingly argues that Ephesus moved location before Lysimachus captured the region 
and that blaming him for the deluge was a story started by Demetrius’ allies in the 
polis.133 
In addition to renaming Ephesus “Arsinoeia” after his third wife, Lysimachus 
added to it the populations of Colophon and Lebedus (Paus. 1.9.7, 7.3.4-6). Pausanias 
cryptically adds that the Colophonians alone opposed Lysimachus’ decision to move 
them to Ephesus. Lysimachus’ capture of Colophon prompted the iambic poet Phoenix to 
compose a lament (Paus. 1.9.7, 7.3.4). How the evidence for the sack of Colophon and 
temporary relocation of the citizens to Ephesus correlates with the earlier synoicism of 
the old and new settlements in the reign of Antigonus is unknown.134 The Lebedians 
maintained a coherent identity at Ephesus, though, and re-founded their polis in c.266 
with the blessing of the Ptolemaic king in exchange for naming it “Ptolemais,” once 
again using imperial politics for local ends.135 Arsinoeia (Ephesus) flourished at the site 
even though some of its expanded populations left after the king’s death, but the polis 
reverted to its traditional name and continued to struggle with the silting of the Cayster 
River (Strabo 14.1.21, 25).136  
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Still further, Lysimachus fundamentally changed the relationship between the 
sanctuary of Artemis and the Ephesian civic body. Traditionally the sanctuary had 
dominated civic life, but Lysimachus inaugurated a rival sanctuary for Artemis Ortygia 
and gave the Arsinoeian gerousia the authority to mediate between the two and oversee 
festivals for Artemis.137 The new sanctuary at Ortygia was dedicated to Artemis’ martial 
aspects and was located near the border with Pygela, a small polis which the Ephesians 
had dominated in the fifth century, threatened in the fourth, and formally annexed in the 
third. Although it is possible to see this new sanctuary stoking local imperial ambitions 
on the part of the Ephesians, it is better to regard it as a reflection of a longstanding 
struggle that was reinvigorated in the early Hellenistic period, perhaps as early as 317, 
when there was inscribed a decree establishing isopolity between Pygela and Miletus (I. 
Milet. 3 142). The decree does not mention Ephesus and would be otherwise 
unremarkable except that, in the fifth century, the Pygelans called on the Milesians for 
aid against an Athenian siege despite the Ephesians being closer, most likely because the 
Milesians could provide a counterweight against Ephesian ambitions.138 
The kings also intervened in the Ionian poleis by overseeing arbitrations.139 When 
Antigonus presided over the proposed synoikism between Teos and Lebedos he appointed 
Mytilene as an arbitrator in cases that dealt with the special agreement he instructed the 
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two states to develop, but both the new laws and unforeseen disputes were to be referred 
to Antigonus himself, following the model established by Alexander.140 The king did 
frame his decision in the language of a neutral arbitrator, but the royal suggestions carried 
the force of commands. Antigonus also likely established regulations for the arbitration 
of a border dispute between Clazomenae and Teos c.302 (SEG XXVIII 697). Though the 
inscription is heavily reconstructed and both the name Antigonus and the regulations 
open to debate, Clazomenae and Teos shared a small peninsula and Ager reasonably 
argues that the growing population as the result of the inchoate synoicism between Teos 
and Lebedos prompted the Teians to expand their territory and thus ran into conflict with 
the Clazomenaeans.141 
Finally, the kings supported the Ionian League, which took on a new political 
importance in the early Hellenistic period.142 The league served the kings by providing a 
system of organization. When Lysimachus conquered Ionia he appointed strategoi to 
oversee the league, perhaps in parallel to Philoxenus during the reign of Alexander,143 but 
there is no evidence for a comparable appointee under Antigonus.144 The relationship 
between strategos and league is largely unattested; Lund speculates that he had the 
authority to intervene in the judicial and financial affairs, but she also posits that the 
absence of evidence for strategoi later in Lysimachus’ reign indicates that the position 
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was an extra security measure for an important region that was neither unique nor 
routine.145 
The question remains what can be said about the state of the Ionian poleis 
between 323 and 294. They were clearly subordinate to, and, in many respects, at the 
mercy of, the Diadochoi, even while they frequently maintained some level of autonomy. 
Ma clearly shows that, in addition to circuit walls around the nucleated settlements, the 
chorae of Hellenistic Ionia contained forts garrisoned by citizen-soldiers.146 The Ionians 
were eventually able to capitalize on their location between east and west, and Billows is 
likely correct that the kings relied on Ionia and other Greek poleis along the Anatolian 
coast for manpower.147 Nevertheless, the early Hellenistic period (323-294) taxed 
military and economic resources and perpetuated regional antagonism in Ionia that 
prevented the formation of an Ionian federal state that could counterbalance the kings. 
The prosperity that returned to the region later in the Hellenistic period should be traced 
to new locations for the settlements and privileges first confirmed by the Diadochoi, but 
the benefits were not immediate. The same forces that drove factionalism in earlier 
periods, particularly competition between imperial contenders, were evident still in the 
early Hellenistic period.
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7. A Synopsis of Classical and Early Hellenistic Ionia: Freedom’s Just Another Word 
 
By c.294, the political situation in Ionia had come full circle from 454. Once 
again, the Ionian poleis were formally autonomous and not facing open conflict, while 
also being implicitly subordinate to imperial actors outside the region. Throughout this 
period, Ionia was rife with internal conflicts, both in terms of inter-polis disputes and 
intra-polis stasis. The region’s liminal position in the Aegean world exacerbated these 
conflicts since the external actors sought to control the Ionian poleis, and both the Ionian 
poleis and individual factions sought to use the external actors in order to enhance their 
local position. 
There were differences, of course. In 454, Ionia was dominated by Athenian 
hegemony through the Delian League, while in the early Hellenistic period, Macedonian 
kings held sway and were more overt in their manipulation of the Ionians. More 
importantly, Ionia ceased to be a frontier between the Persian Empire and the Greek 
world. On the one hand, this change is semantic; Ionia continued to play a critical role in 
linking Asia to the Aegean world and longstanding trade routes meant that commercial 
products continued to flow through the region. Similarly, despite the traditional Greek-
Persian scheme, Ionia was never really governed by the demands of a bipolar world, 
except during a brief period in the fifth century. Both the Greek and Persian worlds had 
ever-changing rosters of imperial aspirants, including poleis, dynasts, satraps, and kings, 
so the Ionian relationship with these groups was fluid. 
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In negotiations between the Roman Republic and the Seleucid king Antiochus III 
in the years between 192 and 188, one point of contention was the fate of Ionia and 
Aeolis. Roman propaganda said that their armies in the Aegean were the guarantors of 
Greek liberty and the Romans demanded that all Greek poleis should be free and 
autonomous (Livy 34.57), echoing the declarations made in the early Hellenistic period. 
Nestled within the accounts of the negotiations, Appian says that Antiochus relented with 
respect to his claims on European Greeks, as well as the Rhodians, Byzantine, 
Cyzicaeans, and all the other Greeks who lived in Asia, “but he would not release the 
Aeolians and the Ionians, since they had long been accustomed to obey the barbarian 
kings of Asia.” (Syr. 12.1).1 Antiochus frames himself as the heir to the non-Greek kings 
in this ill-fated gambit to preserve part of his realm, but his justification that the histories 
of Ionia and Aeolis meant that they forfeited their right to autonomy is notable. Ionia was 
revitalized during the Hellenistic period, but it remained subordinate to foreign powers 
and, although it is unwise to read too much into Appian’s passage, it nonetheless provides 
insight into a common opinion about Ionia. 
In some ways, Antiochus’ assessment is astute. Regardless of formal declarations 
of autonomy, Ionia was dominated by other groups in the Classical and early Hellenistic 
periods, which were both after Ionia first became subject to “the barbarian kings of Asia.” 
However, there are two significant problems with the Seleucid king’s argument. First, 
Ionia was subject not only to the barbarian kings, but also to Greek poleis and 
Macedonian kings. Some Ionian poleis such as Miletus, Ephesus, Samos, and Chios were 
large communities, but only Chios retained its autonomy for any length of time and even 
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it frequently relied on alliances with other powers in order to do so. Second, although 
Antiochus referred to the Ionians as accustomed to obedience, they were anything but. 
The Ionians did not have complete political autonomy during the Classical and early 
Hellenistic periods, but this was hardly a new development and the instances of heavy-
handed foreign involvement are notable precisely for their rarity.  
Billows argues that Ionia underwent a renaissance in the early Hellenistic period, 
but this is only superficially true.2 Debord is also certainly correct that Alexander’s reign 
and, by extension, the early Hellenistic period only accelerated the changes already 
taking place in fourth century Ionia rather than heralding in a new era.3 But change is not 
the same as rebirth, for rebirth necessarily requires death. It has long been assumed that 
after the vibrant Archaic period, the Ionian poleis experienced economic and cultural 
stagnation that lasted for nearly two centuries,4 but my discussion of Classical Ionia 
demonstrates, to the contrary, that the Ionians continued to help shape the trajectory of 
their region even as the political situation in the wider Greek world changed around them.
                                                 
2 Billows, “Rebirth of a Region,” 33-44. 
3 Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 497. 
4 e.g. Cook, “Problem with Classical Ionia,” 9-18. 
 167
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Thematic Case Studies: 
New Perspectives on Classical and early Hellenistic Ionia 
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Synopsis 
 
The second part of my dissertation consists of thirteen thematic case studies. Each 
one addresses 1) a longstanding debate about Ionia; 2) a persistent misrepresentation of 
Ionia in the scholarly tradition; or 3) an issue that has been long overlooked about Ionia 
in its Mediterranean context. These studies situate the regional developments of Ionia in 
the larger political, economic, and diplomatic contexts of the Mediterranean world. 
The first six case studies address broadly political issues. The inaugural study is a 
reexamination of the evidence for the Ionian League, in which I argue that it existed as a 
religious network without political function until the Hellenistic period. Second, I use 
Ephesus as a case study to challenge the tendency for looking at Ionia in terms of a 
Greek-Persian binary. In the third, I examine the Ionian relationship with Sparta during 
the 390s, showing that they were the result of firm, if ephemeral, alliances. Next, I turn to 
the corpus of surviving speeches of the Attic orators, concluding that the repeated, 
oblique mention of Ionia reflects the region’s importance in Athenian public discourse. 
The fifth study examines instances of interstate arbitration in Ionia, finding a distinction 
between disputes regarding priesthoods, which were settled by the league, and land 
disputes, which fell under the purview of imperial powers. The final political case study 
is an investigation of how Alexander’s conquest of Ionia affected exiles. I conclude that 
his famous Exiles Decree of 324 had only a limited effect in the region because decisions 
in 334 and 332 had already largely resolved the issue. 
The next five studies offer economic perspectives that situate Ionia in its 
Mediterranean context. The first reexamines the history of tribute payments Ionian poleis 
made to Athens and culminates with a reassessment of the Assessment of 425, which is 
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generally thought to have severely increased the Ionian payments. I argue that many of 
the changes in how Ionia appears on the Athenian Tribute Lists may be attributed to local 
conditions and, ultimately, that the Assessment of 425 did not constitute a severe 
imposition on Ionia. The second chapter dovetails with the first in that it reexamines the 
fifth-century Athenian regulations concerning weights and measures of Delian League 
members by examining the history of minting coins in Ionia, once more concluding that 
the (non-)appearance of coins cannot be attributed to imperial regulations. The third 
chapter takes a broader perspective on (primarily maritime) trade in Ionia, examining the 
Ionian role in the grain trade and asking how the tumults of the fourth century would 
have affected this commerce. The fourth chapter addresses the construction of 
monumental Ionian temples, arguing that, rather than a measure of commercial 
prosperity, their construction is intimately linked with the broader relationships between 
Ionian poleis and imperial actors. The fifth chapter reexamines how the wars of the 
Diadochoi affected the Ionian economy, arguing that the short-term costs imposed on 
Ionia temporarily stunted economic growth while also laying the foundation for future 
prosperity. 
The penultimate chaper, “Accustomed to Obedience: “Decadent” Ionia and the 
reputation for martial weakness,” is a reassessment of the tropes of corruption and 
decadence that appear in Hellenistic and Roman historiography about Classical Ionia in 
which I argue that contemporary descriptions blame Ionian weakness on inadequate 
training and experience in warfare. In the final chapter, “Between Local and Global: 
Ionian Intellectuals and the Aegean World, 454-294,” I situate Ionian writers and 
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intellectuals in their Aegean context to show that the Ionians did not squander their 
inheritance from the Archaic period but greatly contributed to Classical Greek culture.
8. The Ionian League in the Classical Period 
 
The early history of the Ionian League is almost entirely speculative and inferred 
from later sources.1 Meetings of the koinon took place at Panionion on the Mycale 
peninsula, which housed the sanctuary of Poseidon Heliconius (Hdt. 1.148). The 
sanctuary was established at the site of Melie, but Vitruvius presents the foundation as 
the creation of a cult by a preexisting koinon of the Ionians (4.1.3-5).2 By the Hellenistic 
period, membership included participation in both cult activity and the Panionian 
festivals.3 The Panionion was also a common meeting place where political issues could 
be addressed. For instance, Herodotus says that representatives assembled at the 
sanctuary after the Persians conquered Ionia in 540, and at the meeting Thales of Miletus 
proposed that the Ionians should have a single political seat (βουλευτήριον) at Teos 
because it was in the middle of Ionia (1.170).4 However, it is important to note that even 
in Herodotus’ account the unified political institutions were not going to be located at the 
Panionion.5 Mac Sweeney is correct that there was the precedent to discuss major 
                                                 
1 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 220; MacSweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 173-7, with 
references. Cf. M. Horster, “Priene: Civic Priests and Koinon-Priesthoods in the 
Hellenistic Period,” in Cities and Priests in Asia Minor and the Aegean islands from the 
Hellenistic to the Imperial period, edd. M. Horster and A. Klöckner (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2013), 177 n.2 references. Even the term “Ionian League” is misleading, though, for the 
sake of convenience, I will continue to refer to the network religious network of Ionians 
by that name. 
2 Kowalzig, “Mapping out Communitas,” 52; Greaves, The Land of Ionia, 219-22. On the 
war with Melie, see Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 178-87. 
3 Four new Panionian festivals were created in the Hellenistic period; see Metcalfe, 
“Reaffirming Regional Identity,” 108-11. 
4 How and Wells, Commentary on Herodotus, 130, note that Herodotus believes Thales’ 
suggestion to be a genuine political unification and compare the language to Thucydides’ 
description of the unification of Attica (2.15.2-3).  
5 How and Wells, CH, 130, also point out that the virtue of Teos, in addition to its 
centrality, was its relative unimportance and therefore suitability as a capitol. 
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political events in a common forum, but also that, as far as the evidence takes us, there 
was never collective action as a result of these meetings.6 Thus, Thales proposed a formal 
political organization, but neither his course, nor Bias of Priene’s proposal for all Ionians 
to move west, was followed. 
The two traditional lines of scholarship about the Ionian League represent a 
chicken and egg problem. One considers that the league existed first as a political entity 
that later established the cult. This tradition, which is accepted by Vitruvius, treats the 
early Ionian League anachronistically as a political organization along the same lines as 
Hellenistic federal leagues, designed to resolve debates and orchestrate collective action 
against the Cimmerian invasion, if not also against Lydian encroachment.7 Following this 
line of reasoning the common cult would be a secondary outgrowth of political unity. 
Adherence to this model is latent even in comparatively modern studies about the Ionian 
Revolt, where it is assumed that the revolt was organized under the auspices of the Ionian 
League and that the league ceased to exist after the Persians suppressed the revolt in 492.8 
However, the “Ionian Revolt” is a misnomer in that it was not started by the Ionians, but 
by a series of individual communities in and around Ionia and did not include all of the 
Ionian poleis.9 
                                                 
6 Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 174-6. 
7  M.O.B. Caspari, “The Ionian Confederacy,” JHS 35 (1915), 173-88; C. Roebuck, “The 
Early Ionian League,” CPh 50 (1955), 26-40; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Über der 
ionische Wanderung (Berlin: Verlag der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
1906). Wilamowitz saw the league as a counterweight to Lydia, while Caspari argues that 
the Lydians offered benevolent imperialism and sees the Cimmerian invasion as the 
unifying threat. 
8 For example: D. Lateiner, “The Failure of the Ionian Revolt,” Historia 31 (1982), 131-
5, although he suggests that the league was not originally political. 
9 Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 175; Neville, “Was there an Ionian 
Revolt?,” 268-75. 
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The other line of scholarship holds that the league was principally a religious 
network that had little or no collective political activity.10 Kowalzig takes this argument a 
step further, arguing that the collective cult, created in commemoration of the common 
war, helped create political unity.11  This is the most likely scenario, one in which there 
was a latent sense of community and an ideal of political unity in Ionia but with no actual 
institutions or regulatory power.12 Mac Sweeney goes so far as to say that the Ionian 
League was designed as a “fight club,” to regulate conflict between member states, and 
the archeological remains of the sanctuary have turned up rooms decorated with trophies 
of war.13 Thus, she continues, “inter-Ionian competition became not just a sideshow—it 
was the fundamental principle underlying the Ionian League.”14 Further, as Greaves 
notes, religion played a crucial role in ancient warfare.15 The Panionion was a site that 
played a critical role in linking the Ionian poleis, but it lacked political institutions. 
The myth that united Ionians was not that of the Ionian Migration, but a common 
war waged against Melie, a local community that is alternately described as Ionian or 
                                                 
10 In particular, see: G. Fogazza, “Per una storia della lega ionica,” La Parola del Passato 
28 (1973), 157-69; C.J. Emlyn-Jones, The Ionians and Hellenism: A Study of the Cultural 
Achievement of Early Greek Inhabitants of Asia Minor (London: Routledge, 1980), 17; 
C. Bearzot, “La Guerra lelantina e il koinon degli Ioni d’Asia,” Contributi dell’Instituto 
di storia antica 9 (1983), 57-81; K. Tausend, Amphiktyonie und Symmachie (Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992), 55-7 and 70-95. 
11 B. Kowalzig, “Mapping out Communitas: Performances of Theoria in their Sacred and 
Political Context,” in Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Antiquity, edd. J. 
Elsner and I. Rutherford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 41-72. Cf. Mac 
Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 174. 
12 Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 176. 
13 Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 196. 
14 Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 197. 
15 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 155. 
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Carian.16 The Ionians eliminated their enemy utterly, though Colophon and Miletus sided 
with Melie during the war, and the victors founded the Panionion on the spot.17 The 
sanctuary was dedicated to Poseidon Heliconius, and was supposed to be the location of 
the Panionian festival except for a period during the Peloponnesian War when it was 
relocated to Ephesus.18 
It is widely held that the Ionian League was disbanded at the conclusion of the 
Ionian Revolt, with its sanctuary destroyed and the cult activity repressed first by Persia 
and then by the Athenian-led Delian League.19 Under this consensus, the Ionian League 
returned to existence sometime in the fourth century, as attested by inscriptions recording 
religious laws and disputes about the management of Panionian priesthoods.20 However, 
the proposed date of the refoundation is disputed because there is no direct evidence for 
it. One camp believes that the league only came back into being in the last third of the 
century. For instance, since the earliest dateable reference to the Ionian League was when 
Antigonus instructed Teos and Lebedus to have joint representation after his proposed a 
synoicism c.303,21 Billows argues that either Alexander or Antigonus refounded the 
league.22 Other scholars prefer the reconstitution around 400, based, in part, on the 
                                                 
16 Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 180. The distinction in Ionia is difficult 
to untangle and usual involves the political agendas of the writers who record an ethnic. 
17 Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 180-1. 
18 S. Hornblower, “Thucydides, the Panionian Festival, and the Ephesia (III 104),” 
Historia 31 (1982), 241-5, contra P.J. Stylianou, “Thucydides, the Panionian Festival, 
and the Ephesia (III 104), Again,” Historia 32 (1983), 245-9. 
19 For a brief history of the Ionian League, see Metcalfe, “Reaffirming Regional 
Identity,” 88-9. On the Ionian temples, see Part III, Chapter 17. 
20 Horster, “Priene: Civic Priests and Koine-Priesthoods,” 177-208; Kowalzig, “Mapping 
out Communitas,” 47; see below. 
21 See below and Part III, Chapter 12. 
22 Billows, “Rebirth of a Region,” 40-1; Billows, Antigonus, 217-18. 
 175
account of League activity recorded by Diodorus 15.49.23 The Ionian League existed as a 
body that claimed the right to speak on behalf of the Ionians by the third century since it 
issued a decree honoring the Seleucid king Antiochus I in the mid-260s.24 However, I 
believe that the Panionion continued to exist in the fifth century and was not destroyed by 
the Persians.25 At the same time, the league never had broad powers to resolve political 
disputes. The league provided the Ionians with a regional religious network that allowed 
them to keep an eye on their neighbors and therefore it possessed an incidental political 
function. What is seen as a rebirth in the fourth and third centuries is actually the 
religious organization becoming active as a political network.
                                                 
23 Stylianou, Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 379-80; Metcalf, 
“Reaffirming Regional Identity,” 80-3; Caspari, “The Ionian Confederacy,” 182-3. In 
Caspari’s view, the league was a political organization that was briefly revitalized 
between c.400 and 386 and then suppressed after the creation of the King’s Peace. 
24 F. Piejko, “Decree of the Ionian League in Honor of Antiochus I, CA 267-262 B.C.,” 
Phoenix 45 (1991), 126-47. 
25 Cf. Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 495. 
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9. Ephesus in the Delian League, 478-414 
 
I. (In)visible Ephesus 
In contrast to most other Ionian poleis and, despite its large population and the 
prominence of the Sanctuary of Artemis, there is almost no evidence for the history or 
character of Ephesus in the fifth century.1 The result is that Ephesus remains largely 
absent from the histories of Ionia and the Delian League. In this case study, therefore, I 
will focus on Ephesus and what its relationship with Athens reveals about Ionia in the 
Delian League. After briefly examining the evidence for fifth-century Ephesus, I will 
tease out two potential narratives. Then, I will argue not only that appearance that the 
interpretations are mutually distinct is superficial, but also that Ephesus is a microcosm of 
Ionia. The binary between Athenian and Persian hegemony is a construct and, while 
Persian culture had a deep influence in Ephesus (and likely elsewhere in Ionia) that 
culture is not indicative of political sympathies. 
The scarcity of evidence for Ephesus and its relationship with the Athenian-led 
Delian League in the fifth century allows for two, seemingly mutually exclusive, 
interpretations. On the one hand, the absence of regulatory inscriptions at Ephesus, as 
appeared at Erythrae, Miletus, and Colophon, suggest that it was a quiescent subject of 
Athens. On the other hand, Ephesus was, outside of Colophon and its unique 
geographical situation,2 the polis most susceptible to Persian influence, likely the first 
Ionian community to revolt from Athens, and thus arguably a hotbed of Persian 
sympathies.  
                                                 
1 For narrative, see Part II, Chapter 1. 
2 See Part II, Chapter 1. 
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II. The (Scarcity of) Evidence 
Ephesus sat near the mouth of the Cayster River, the middle of the three large 
valleys that cut Anatolia along its east-west axis.3 The location of the settlement of the 
Archaic and Classical periods that moved in c.294 is unknown,4 but Ephesus was the 
western terminus of the Achaemenid road system, with a branch connecting it and 
Sardis.5 As a result, Ephesus lay along the commercial route from the Aegean to the 
Persian heartland and Herodotus recalls the story of the Chian Panionius who made a 
business of selling castrati to Persians at Ephesus and Sardis (8.104-6).6 It is therefore not 
a surprise for the polis to appear as a point of connection between East and West. 
Ephesus appears in Diodorus’ history for the first time when Lysander arrived 
there in 408 (13.104.3), while Thucydides only mentions it as a location six times in the 
course of his history and does not mention the Ephesians as a people at all.7 Even though 
the location of the Classical settlement is unknown, the physical evidence for Ephesus is 
somewhat more abundant than is the literary record. The polis appears sixteen times on 
the Athenian Tribute Lists,8 and the most likely restoration of an inscription detailing the 
                                                 
3 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 101-2. On Ionian geography, see the introduction. 
4 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 101-2. On the re-foundation of Ephesus, see Part II, Chapter 6. 
5 Hdt. 5.54; Strabo 1.6; D. French, “Pre- and Early-Roman Roads of Asia Minor: The 
Persian Royal Road,” Iran 36 (1998), 20-1; Greaves, Land of Ionia, 102; How and Wells, 
CH, 270-1; Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World 1, 462. 
Herodotus says the road linked to Sardis, which then continued on to Ephesus. On the 
Persian road system, see Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 357-87, who notes, “our 
information on customs and tolls seems to confirm the breadth and density of trade.” 
6 Miller, “Clothes and Identity,” 30. 
7 Themistocles’ flight to Persia: 1.137; Alcidas’ visit to Ephesus: 3.32; celebration of the 
Panionian festival: 3.104; Athenian envoys accompanying Artaphernes: 4.50; Chian ships 
fleeing to Ephesus: 8.19; Tissaphernes sacrificing to Artemis: 8.109. 
8 Rubinstein, Ionia, 1071. See Part III, Chapter 14. 
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treasury of Athena in 415 indicates an Athenian general at Ephesus (ML 77, l. 79). Coin 
hoards also indicate that it continued to mint silver coins intermittently throughout the 
fifth century, which both indicates economic activity and that the polis was not subject to 
restrictive regulations.9 Ephesus’ absence from the written histories is not indicative of an 
inactive community, and the lingering question is what relationship the Ephesians had 
with Persia on the one hand and Athens on the other. 
 
III. Ephesus the Quiescent Subject 
There are three parts to the interpretation that Ephesus was a quiet ally of Athens 
until 412. First, every indication on the Athenian Tribute Lists is that Ephesus made 
regular phoros payments from the first record in 454 until the last in 415/14.10 Ephesus 
either appears with its payment or with a space for the payment on each list where the 
Ionian district survives. The known amounts of tribute are likewise stable. This lack of 
volatility is exceptional in Ionia, even though I reject the traditional interpretation that 
Ionian poleis repeatedly failed to pay the phoros. On the first list, Ephesus is recorded to 
have paid seven and a half talents,11 which also probably included the tribute for the 
nearby settlements of Marathesium, Isinda, and Pygela.12 In addition to their proximity to 
Ephesus, these communities are treated as a group because they appeared on the tribute 
                                                 
9 Figueira, Power of Money, 114. He also argues, 174-9, that silver coinage was never 
explicitly banned by Athenian regulations, see Part III, Chapter 15. 
10 For discussion of the lists as a source and what they say about Ionia, see Part III, 
Chapter 14. 
11 From the recorded 750 dr. aparche, which was one-sixtieth the total tribute, see Part 
III, Chapter 14. 
12 Strabo 14.1.20, says Ephesus traded its dependent Anaea to Samos in return for 
Marathesium; cf. Carusi, Isole e Peree, 135, 141-6; Rubinstein, “Ionia,” 1082, see Part II, 
Chapter 1. 
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lists at the same time by 444. However, the change in tribute payments in 446 was not an 
Athenian scheme to increase the overall amount of tribute from the Ionian district since 
the Ephesian payments decreased in proportion to the sum of the payments for the other 
communities. Nor is the reduced payment necessarily an indication that the Ephesian 
citizens paid less than they previously had because it is likely that they had previously 
collected contributions from the dependent poleis.13 In fact, depending on how the 
Ephesians collected money, it is possible that Marathesium, Isinda, and Pygela actually 
paid less per capita with the new organization than while under the sway of Ephesus. 
Extortion by the Ephesians likely created lingering anger from the dependents, which 
manifested in Pygela appealing to Miletus instead of Ephesus when attacked by Athens 
during the Ionian War (Xen. Hell. 1.2.2-3).14  
Marathesium, Isinda, and Pygela appeared on the tribute lists independent of 
Ephesus for the first time in 444, and thus were likely assessed separately in 446/5.15 The 
appearance of these three communities does not directly correspond to the Athenian war 
with Samos in 440, but does fall into a context of local stasis.16 Balcer suggests that the 
change in the Athenian assessment process, if not an actual amount, was the product of 
the need to increase the Athenian presence along the Anatolian coastline, and thereby 
control the subject communities from Persian schemes.17 It is true that Ephesus was 
particularly influenced by Persia in the fifth century, but it is an unsupported leap to 
                                                 
13 On the payments, see Part III, Chapter 14. 
14 See Part II, Chapter 3. 
15 New assessments occurred every four years, so the appearance in the middle of a 
period likely, though not absolutely, means that the payments may be backdated to the 
most recent assessment. See Part III, Chapter 14. 
16 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
17 Balcer, Sparda, 418. Nor is it likely that the change was intended to increase revenue, 
see Part III, Chapter 12. 
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suggest that the influence of Persian culture need indicate attempts to suborn the polis. It 
is likely instead that the impetus to change the communities assessed came from 
Marathesium, Pygela, and Isinda themselves, the product of local politics rather than the 
regional geo-political standoff between Athens and Persia.18 
The second part emerges when considering Thucydides’ infrequent mentions of 
Ephesus. While it remained a member of the Delian League Thucydides mentions it three 
times when influential figures visited the polis: Themistocles in 471/0 (1.137), Alcidas in 
428/7 (3.32),19 and Artaphernes in 425 (4.50). Artaphernes presents no challenge to the 
narrative of a quiescent Ephesus because his visit came after the Athenians captured him 
and returned him to the King by way of Ephesus. Nor is there a contradiction for 
Themistocles’ flight into exile. Although Themistocles was ostracized from Athens in 
472/1, possibly on account of his medism, he was not necessarily restricted from going to 
Ephesus.20 Thucydides says that Themistocles received aid from an Athenian ship captain 
to reach Anatolia, but not that he received any help from Ephesus, which was merely the 
most efficient route to Sardis. This leaves Alcidas, a Spartan commander, who, 
Thucydides says, received ambassadors from discontented Samians while he was at 
Ephesus. There is no indication how the Ephesians reacted to Alcidas’ visit, but they 
continued to make phoros payments and were not punished. It is therefore reasonable to 
                                                 
18 Cf. Part II, Chapter 2. 
19 Meiggs and Lewis GHI 67; Gomme HCT 2, 294, argue that this is the context of the 
Spartan War fund, but I agree with Hornblower, CT 1, 413; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 72-3, in 
taking a date in the 390s for the inscription, see Part III, Chapter 10. 
20 R.M. McMullen, “Aspects of Medizing: Themistocles, Simonides, and Timocreon of 
Rhodes,” CJ 97 (2001), 62-6. 
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assume that they were in no position to resist Alcidas because the settlement was 
unwalled (Thuc. 3.33.2), but neither did they move to revolt from Athens.21 
The third part is an argument from silence in that, excepting only Chios, Ephesus 
was the largest Ionian polis that was never subject to an Athenian garrison or special 
regulations before 420. The regulations for Erythrae in c.434 and Miletus in the 420s 
were probably Athenian measures to stop factionalism that threatened to interfere with 
the payment of tribute.22 Although there was probably tension between Ephesus and its 
dependent communities, it likely did not threaten the internal function of the polis and 
therefore it did not behoove the Athenians to make the same sort of provisions. More 
instructive comparanda are the cases of Samos and Colophon. In 440 and 430, 
respectively, Pissouthnes sent mercenaries to both poleis in order to stage coups.23 The 
Athenian response to the loss of Samos was a nine-month siege, destruction of the walls, 
the taking of hostages, seizure of the fleet, and an enormous fine.24 The Athenian 
response to the coup at Colophon 430-427, where they sent an expedition that killed the 
mercenaries (Thuc. 3.34.2-3) but did not exact grievous penalties on the citizens, was not 
as extreme as at Samos. 25 Both incidents provoked an immediate, violent response to the 
Persian machinations. Despite the acculturation of Ephesus and its proximity to Sardis, 
there is no evidence for a comparable event. It is improbable that Pissouthnes was 
                                                 
21 Hornblower, CT 1, 414-15, emphasizes that the Athenians likely would have forced the 
destruction of seaward walls. Cf. Gomme HCT 2, 294-5, who says that the Alcidas put in 
at Ephesus just long enough to take on water. See Part II, Chapter 2. 
22 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
23 Samos: Thuc. 1.115; Diod. 12.27.3; Colophon: Thuc. 3.34; see Part II, Chapter 2. 
24 Plut. Per. 28; Thuc. 1.117.3; Diod. 12.28.3. 
25 Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 61; Hornblower, CT 1, 416; See Part II, Chapter 2. 
 182
unaware of the situation at Ephesus and therefore likely that there was not a faction 
advocating for revolt from Athens. 
By 415, the Athenian hold on Ephesus began to slip. A fragmentary inscription 
has been plausibly restored by Meritt to indicate that there was an Athenian general in the 
polis (ML 77, l. 79). Meritt takes this a step further to suggest that an Athenian proxeny 
decree from the same year that used Ionian characters was given to an Ephesian citizen 
for his support for the Athenian garrison.26 These reconstructions are far from certain, 
but, as Meritt points out, an inscription from 415 is the last evidence for Ephesus before it 
fell under the sway of Tissaphernes c.411.27 If Ephesus was a quiescent Athenian ally 
until that point, it is necessary to ask what changed. Rather than the situation in Ephesus 
changing, though, the balance of power in the Aegean had. The Athenians were occupied 
in Sicily and Tissaphernes had replaced Pissouthnes as satrap at Sardis, which began a 
period of more aggressive Persian activity in western Anatolia. When examined with 
reference to Athens alone, Ephesus is unusual only in its absence of resistance. Every 
indication is that the Ephesians passively accepted the Athenian hegemony, but neither 
did they resist Tissaphernes when he demanded the polis submit to Persian suzerainty. 
 
IV. Ephesus the Hotbed of Medism 
The implication that Ephesus as a community was what might be termed “pro-
Persian” predates the foundation of the Delian League. The economic effect of Persian 
                                                 
26 B.D. Meritt, “Greek Inscriptions,” Hesperia 5 (1936), 381-2. Kagan, Fall of the 
Athenian Empire, 30, refutes the idea that the Athenian force was in Ephesus to support 
Amorges, which was suggested by H.T. Wade-Gery, “The Peace of Callias,” in Essays in 
Greek History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 223; A. Andrewes, “Thucydides 
and the Persians,” Historia 10 (1961), 5. 
27 See Part II, Chapter 3. 
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rule is open to debate. However, the orthodox interpretation that the Ionians revolted in 
499 because the Persian conquest of western Anatolia severed preexisting commercial 
ties and introduced extortionate tribute demands, which plunged the region into a deep 
economic depression,28 has recently been under attack.29 Georges plausibly argues that 
the renaissance of Ionian mints and growth of Ionian navies in this period indicates that 
Persian rule brought on a period of economic prosperity in the region.30 Ephesus, for 
instance, was one of the Ionian poleis that began minting silver coins only after Darius’ 
expedition to Thrace in 513.31  
Ephesus remained largely absent from Herodotus’ account of the Ionian revolt. 
The Ionian and Athenian force that captured Sardis in 499 landed at Ephesus before 
marching inland and took Ephesians as guides (Hdt. 5.100). Herodotus says that the 
Persian counterattack caught up with the Ionians in the Ephesian chora and routed them. 
Yet, the account gives no indication that Ephesus suffered any reprisals, which probably 
also indicates that, aside from the guides, no Ephesians participated in the attack on 
Sardis (5.102).32 Ephesus stayed out of the ensuing conflict and is conspicuously absent 
from the Ionian forces at the battle of Lade in 494 (Hdt. 6.11-16), probably because the 
                                                 
28  O. Murray, “The Ionian Revolt,” CAH2 (1988), 475-6; Cf. H.T. Wallinga, “The Ionian 
Revolt,” Mnemosyne 37 (1984), 411-15; Balcer, Sparda, 248, argues that the economic 
depression in Ionia emerged because of punitive tribute assessments after the revolt. 
29 Goldman, “Imperializing Hegemony,” 117-19. 
30 P.B. Georges, “Persian Ionia under Darius: The Revolt Reconsidered,” Historia 49 
(2000), 2-10. Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 149-50, says that there is not enough 
evidence to analyze the effect increased competition in the network of Persian markets on 
the Ionian economies, but errs on the side that Ionia benefited economically from Persian 
rule. Cf. Balcer, Sparda, 431; Wallinga, “Ionian Revolt,” 415; Wallinga, “Ancient 
Persian Navy,” 70. 
31 Kraay, Coins, 34-9, 131; Georges, “Persian Ionia,” 7. 
32 Balcer, Sparda, 236-7. How and Welles, CH 2, 58, say that the attack on Sardis was 
meant to be a surprise and draw the Persian army away from the siege of Miletus, but 
make no mention of Ephesus. 
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polis was particularly exposed to immediate Persian reprisals.33 When some Chian 
survivors of the battle entered Ephesian territory, Herodotus says that they were mistaken 
for thieves trying to kidnap women, so the Ephesians took up arms and killed them 
(6.16). Herodotus implies that, had the Ephesians known that the trespassers were Greek 
survivors, they would have behaved differently but there is reason to believe that he 
exaggerates Greek solidarity. The Ephesian mistake may be ascribed to the endemic 
problem of border warfare in the Greek world, but it is notable that even by accident the 
Ephesians managed to aid the Persians.34  
Herodotus’ account of the battle of Mycale hints at the same distinction between 
Ephesus and the other Ionian poleis in 478 as had existed in the 490s. The Samians and 
Milesians attacked the Persians, but there is no mention of the Ephesians (Hdt. 9.103-4). 
In fact, Herodotus’ last mention of Ephesus was in recounting that Dionysophanes of 
Ephesus was the person who buried Mardonius after the battle of Plataea earlier in 479 
(9.84, cf. Paus. 9.2.2).35 On its own, this anecdote is of little significance, but it fits within 
a larger pattern of Ephesian support for and satisfaction with Persian rule. The Ephesians 
may have realized that resistance was futile, but it is implausible that they were simply 
smarter or more prescient than their peers. It is thus unlikely that the Ephesians resisted 
                                                 
33 J. Neville, “Was there an Ionian Revolt?,” CQ2 29 (1979), 273; Balcer, Sparda, 243-6; 
Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 155-6. 
34 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 494. 
35 Pausanias says that Mardonius’ son Artontes gave gifts to Dionysophanes and other 
Ionians for burying Mardonius, φαίνεται δ ρτόντης  Μαρδονίου πλεστα μν δος 
Διονυσοφάνει δρα νδρ φεσί, δος μέντοι κα λλοις ώνων ς οδ κείνοις 
μελς γενόμενον ταφναι Μαρδόνιον. 
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“liberation” at the hands of the newly victorious Hellenic League after the battle of 
Mycale. Thus, Ephesus became one of the founding members of the Delian League.36 
Ephesus made regular phoros payments throughout the fifth century and there is 
no evidence for overt resistance to the Athenian hegemony, but interaction between 
Ephesus and Sardis, and therefore Ephesus and Persia, continued. When Themistocles 
went into exile in Persia c. 471/0 his route to Sardis took him through Ephesus (Thuc. 
1.137),37 and in 425, when the Athenians returned Artaphernes, an envoy from the 
Persian king to Sparta who they had captured, they sent him to Ephesus with their own 
ambassadors (Thuc. 4.50). Neither instance shows political sympathy, but both indicate 
ongoing interaction. More concretely, Thucydides’ narrative of the Peloponnesian War 
leaves off with the Persian satrap Tissaphernes making sacrifices at the Temple of 
Artemis in 411 (8.109).38 Tissaphernes certainly used the sanctuary to rally support for 
his political designs among the Ephesians (cf. Xen. Anab. 1.6.7; Xen. Hell. 1.2.5-6), but 
the network of devotees of Artemis Ephesia extended to Sardis, where a fourth century 
inscription attests to the presence of sacred envoys.39 
The extent of Persian cultural influence in Ionia is debated. Balcer, for instance, 
argues that the Persians’ administrative setup emphasized that they were alien overlords 
who turned to the local aristocracy to govern.40 The result, he says, was that there was a 
                                                 
36 ATL 3, 203. 
37 Plutarch, Themistocles, 25, says only that he landed in Asia and does not mention 
Ephesus. 
38 Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 108, argues that Artemis at Ephesus is a peculiar deity and 
that there is no extra symbolism to Tissaphernes’ dedication. Cf. Hornblower, CT 3, 
1052-3. See Part III, Chapter 18. 
39 Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesos, 6; Sokolowski, “New Testimony on the Cult 
of Artemis of Ephesus,” 427-31. 
40 Balcer, “The Greeks and the Persians,” 265-7. 
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Hellenization of the Achaemenid Empire rather than a Persianizing of the Greek poleis. 
In Balcer’s reconstruction, it was only in the last quarter of the fifth century that the 
desire for tighter control of the subject populations led to substantive acculturation in 
western Anatolia, including the appearance of Persian fire altars and tombs around 
Sardis.41 Balcer’s thesis is also supported by the widespread perception that the Persians 
lacked interest in imposing their culture on their subjects because they did not impose 
either language or script as a common form of communication and tolerated the local 
religions of the peoples they conquered.42  
The problem with this interpretation, as Miller argues, is that the sudden late turn 
to Persianization does not adequately explain either the trickle of evidence from western 
Anatolia throughout the fifth century or the depth of acculturation found at Ephesus.43 
Xenophon says nothing about the supposed barbarization of Ephesus when Lysander 
arrived in 408 (Hell. 1.5.1), but this should not be taken to indicate that there was an 
absence Anatolian and Persian substrata. Plutarch changed the significance of the same 
events such that he says Lysander found Ephesus in danger of becoming entirely 
barbarous (Lys. 3.2).44 The deep acculturation at Ephesus is epitomized by the 
                                                 
41 Balcer, “The Greeks and the Persians,” 266-7. The construction around Sardis was 
hardly straightforward, with evidence for syncretism between Achaemenid and local 
religious practices, see E. Dusinberre, Aspects of Empire in Achaemenid Sardis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 59-69; cf. M. Brosius, “Artemis Persike 
and Artemis Anaitis,” in Achaemenid History XI, edd. M. Brosius and A. Kuhrt (Leiden: 
Nederlands Instituut voor Het Nabije Oosten, 1998), 227-38. 
42 M. Brosius, “Keeping Up with the Persians: Between Cultural Identity and 
Persianization in the Achaemenid Period,” in Cultural Identity in the Ancient 
Mediterranean, ed. E.S. Gruen (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2011), 136-7. 
43 Miller, “Clothes in Ionia,” 29-30. 
44 γενόμενος δ᾽ἐν φέσ...πράττουσαν δ τότε λυπρς κα κινδυνεύουσαν 
κβαρβαρωθναι τος Περσικος θεσι δι τς πιμιξίας. Miller, “Clothes and 
Identity,” 25-33; see Part III, Chapter 19. 
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Persianization of the cult of Artemis, where the priest took on the Persian title 
“Megabyxus” (Xen. Anab. 5.3.6), friezes show figures in Persian garb participating in 
ritual practice, and Persians items have appeared among the dedicatory offerings.45 
As noted above, Ephesus slipped from the Athenian grasp sometime between 415 
and 411. Unlike Chios, Clazomenae, Erythrae, and Miletus, all of whom bucked 
Athenian imperialism with armed resistance,46 there is no evidence that Ephesus did the 
same. Most likely, when the Athenians were no longer able to control Ephesus, 
Tissaphernes, who had been ordered to collect tribute from the Ionian poleis (Thuc. 
8.4.5), took the opportunity to secure it.47 Persian acculturation was not the cause of 
Ephesus’ revolt from Athens, but it contributed to how and when it happened. 
 
V. Escaping the Greek-Persian binary 
In 1973, Eddy posited that for more than three decades “there was a kind of cold 
war between [Athens and Persia], a situation of vague menace, of raids, of small 
successes, of countermoves, of embassies and threats.”48 He concluded that the 
resumption of war was inevitable, drawing on the contrast between imperialistic Persia 
                                                 
45 Miller, “Clothes and Identity,” 25-33; M. Brosius, “Artemis Persike and Artemis 
Anaitis,” in Studies in Persian History: Essays in Memory of David M. Lewis, edd. M. 
Brosius and A. Kuhrt (Leiden: Nederlands Intituut voor het Nabue Oosten, 1998), 227-
38. Greaves, Land of Ionia, 193-7, argues that the cult of Artemis was originally 
Anatolian. There is no evidence in Thucydides, however, that there were Persian Magi 
living in Ephesus in the late fifth century, as Eddy, “The Cold War Between Athens and 
Persia,” 255, claims. 
46 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 592; Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 10-11, 
13-14. See Part II, Chapter 3. 
47 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 592. See Part II, Chapter 2. 
48 Eddy, “Cold War between Athens and Persia,” 241. 
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and the heroic defenders of liberty in the Athenians.49 Eddy was inextricably influenced 
by the contemporary context of the Cold War between the U.S.S.R. and the United States 
in interpreting the relationship between Persia and Athens, but the use of this motif is 
representative of the orthodox interpretation of the relationship. Moreover, Eddy’s model 
has some validity when considering Athens and Persia, but the parallel between the fifth 
century BCE and the twentieth century CE breaks down when it comes to evaluating the 
communities caught between the two superpowers.50 
There is a tendency to evaluate the Ionian poleis in terms of mutually exclusive 
binaries, with one of those being the preference for an alliance with Persia or with 
Athens.51 It would be easy to assume that Ephesus’ close contact with, and deep cultural 
affinity for, Persia would have caused antipathy toward Athens and factions that 
frequently appealed to Sardis for support. The problem is that there is no evidence for 
this. Ephesians did not oppose Athenian hegemony until absolutely necessary. Thus, 
acculturation cannot be taken to indicate political sympathy. The episodes at Colophon 
and Samos where Pissouthnes supported factions against Athens were in response to 
power struggles in those poleis;52 the apparent preference for either Athens or Persia was 
generated by which side would support the faction in its bid to rule. The corollary to this 
conclusion is that the significance given to the acculturation of the Ionian poleis emerged 
from the later historiographical record that created an East-West cultural schism that 
                                                 
49 Eddy, “Cold War between Athens and Persia,” 257-8. 
50 Similar arguments may be made for groups caught between the US and the USSR, too, 
but that is not the thrust of Eddy’s argument. 
51 Vlassopoulos Greeks and Barbarians 35-52. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic 
History, 81, said of the Ionian poleis “These cities, though subjects of Persia…in fact 
belonged not to the Oriental, but to the Greek world. They were, so to speak, fragments 
of the Western world on the fringe of the Eastern.” 
52 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
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defined Greeks in opposition to the barbarian Persians.53 In Ephesus specifically and 
Ionia generally, no such stark division existed.
                                                 
53 Mitchell, Panhellenism and the Barbarian, 10-19; Vlassopoulos, Unthinking the Greek 
Polis, 46-53. 
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10. A Product of Alliance: Ionian Levies in Spartan Campaigns in Asia, 412-394 
 
I. The Emergence of a Spartan Alliance in Ionia 
Ionia was engulfed by military campaigns with only short-lived and intermittent 
periods of respite between the conclusion of the Sicilian Expedition in 412/11 and the 
battle of Cnidus in 394.1 Thucydides says that the Ionian War began because of the 
machinations of Chians and Erythraeans (8.5-6), but the frustration with Athenian 
hegemony was far from isolated, and Ephesus likely withdrew from the Delian League as 
early as 414 (ML 77).2 After an outpouring of support for the war against Athens between 
411-408, the Ionian activity began to flag. Thus, starting in 408, Lysander and other 
Spartan commanders supported sympathetic governments and extended the Spartan 
alliance to Anatolia.3 The clearest indication of this new relationship was that the Ionian 
states repeatedly supplied soldiers for campaigns outside their immediate territories, 
particularly in the 390s. Persian potentates both sought to recover the Ionian revenues and 
used the Ionian poleis and exiles as pawns in their personal conflicts (e.g. Xen. Anab. 
1.2.1).4 Sparta negotiated away Ionian autonomy for Persian help in 412/11, yet from 
                                                 
1 See Part II, Chapter 3 for the narrative of this period. 
2 The editors of the ATL include the notation “Revolt (?)” for Ephesus in 413/2, 277. Cf. 
Miller, “Clothes and Identity,” 30, with n. 47; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 90; Hornblower, 
CT 3, 805. See Part III, Chapter 9 for Ephesus.  
3 The Ionian War writ large continued until 404 when Athens surrendered after 
Aegospotamoi, but the gravity of the war moved north to the Hellespont and thus away 
from Ionia in 405. Thucydides uses το ωνικο πολέμου (8.11.3) to denote the military 
actions that took place in and around the Greek poleis in Asia and the eastern islands 
rather than to name a new engagement. Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” and I 
follow this precedent, but where he also uses “Ionian” to refer to all Greek communities 
in Anatolia, I continue to distinguish between the Ionian poleis and the other Greeks 
along the Anatolian littoral. 
4 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
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407-394 the Ionian poleis belonged to the Spartan orbit. When Tissaphernes returned to 
western Anatolia after the battle of Cunaxa,5 the Ionians appealed to and received support 
from Sparta, but, in return, they also had to provide troops. 
 
II. Enthusiastic for Liberty: Ionians in the Ionian War, 412-408 
Westlake opens his article “Ionians in the Ionian War” with the observation that 
“the Ionian war was more complex than any previous war in which Greeks had fought 
one another.”6 The war simmered, periodically rising to a boil, over the course of nearly 
nine years (413/12-404), with neither Athens nor Sparta committing the troops and 
resources to the region to win a decisive military confrontation.7 At the same time, Ionia 
was peripheral to both Athens and Sparta, meaning that it was impossible for either to 
triumph in it permanently, and Persian satraps awaited the opportunity to exploit the 
situation.8 Westlake describes the Ionian poleis in this conflict as self-aware pawns, “not 
without some influence,” but quite weak and “frequently in danger of being sacrificed.”9 
However, Westlake is not being inconsistent; in his final analysis, to continue the 
metaphor, the Ionians were pieces on the board, not the players in the game between 
Sparta, Persia, and Athens. 
                                                 
5 See Part II, Chapter 3. 
6 Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 9.  
7 Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 31-2, also highlights the disincentives for either 
Athens or Sparta to over-commit resources to Ionia, which implies an inability to send 
resources. 
8 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 580-1; Waters, “Applied Royal Directive,” 817-28 
9 Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 44. 
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Overall, Westlake suggests that the Ionian enthusiasm for the war rapidly waned 
when it became clear that the Spartans were not committed to Ionian autonomy.10 Thus, 
he argues, the Ionians were more willing to return to the Athenian embrace because the 
Spartans supported Tissaphernes’ claim for control in return for money with which to 
maintain their fleet (Thuc. 9.58).11  The Teians between 412-406 even tried to remain 
neutral, only to be extorted by both sides (e.g. Thuc. 8.20.2; Diod. 13.76.3-5). However, I 
believe it is more likely that the non-Chian Ionians revolted from Athens more out of 
frustration with Athenian hegemony than from a genuine belief that they would receive 
autonomy free of phoros payments and other obligations (see below). It is also naïve to 
insist that the Ionians would be protected even from their “allies.” The Chians discovered 
this in the winter of 409/8 when Peloponnesian sailors who were working on the island 
between campaigns planned a coup that their commander, Eteonicus, foiled after 
extracting payment from the polis (Xen. Hell. 2.1.1-5).12 Westlake also argues that the 
lukewarm relationship that set in after the initial zeal, combined with the Ionian 
ineptitude in war,13 meant that the Spartans could not rely on Ionian contingents to 
conduct a decisive campaign against the pro-Athenian forces.14 Yet, there was no 
consolidated Athenian force in Ionia to confront other than the fleet based on Samos, 
which made the situation in Ionia from 412/11-404 distinctly different from the Spartan 
                                                 
10 Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 43-4; cf. Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 87-91; 
Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 32-8; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 351 
11 Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 13-14; Hornblower, CT 3, 800-2, 854, 924-40; 
Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 91; Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 46-7. See Part II, 
Chapter 3. 
12 Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 36 n. 5, argues that the sailors working as hired 
laborers demonstrates the extent to which the Spartans relied on Persian subsidies. 
13 On the ineptitude, see Part III, Chapter 19. 
14 Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 26. 
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campaigns in Anatolia against Persia between 400 and 394.15 Though the Spartans did 
not conscript Ionian troops during the Ionian War, particularly in this first phase of the 
war before there were designs on drawing the Ionians into the alliance,16 they probably 
had a clear expectation that the Ionians would fight on their own behalf against Athens. 
 The Ionian War ostensibly began in 412 when ambassadors from factions within 
Erythrae and Chios and a representative from Tissaphernes went to Sparta (Thuc. 8.5).17 
Thucydides provides scant detail about formation of this embassy before it reached 
Sparta. What he does say is that the Chians and the Erythraeans were ready to revolt from 
Athens, while the Great King had instructed his satraps to collect tribute from the Greek 
poleis in Asia. The Chians and Tissaphernes therefore shared the common objective of 
ending Athenian rule in Ionia (ο μν ον Χοι κα Τισσαφέρνης κοιν κατ τ ατ 
πρασσον, 8.6.1).18 Although the delegation included representatives from Erythrae, 
their interests immediately vanish from the narrative, and Thucydides does not record 
what their envoys said. Erythrae was less important than were Chios and Tissaphernes in 
                                                 
15 Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 30-1, 43, acknowledges the situation, but 
attributes the Spartan plan to their inability to mobilize Peloponnesian allies and mistrust 
of the Ionian martial prowess. See below. 
16 Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 69, on what he deems “Spartan selfishness.” 
17 Much as been made of this embassy going to Sparta rather than to King Agis who 
received entreaties from other disgruntled Athenian allies at Decelea in Attica and that 
Pharnabazus, Tissaphernes’ rival likewise appealed to Sparta and sent money in the place 
of Tissaphernes’ promises, see: Thuc. 8.6.1, 8.1; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 89; Lazenby, 
Peloponnesian War, 172-3; Hornblower, CT 3, 773-6, Andrewes, “Spartan Resurgence,” 
464-5. Sparta, like the Ionian poleis, was rife with factionalism, which is one of the 
thematic elements in Thucydides’ eighth book. Diod. 13.34.1, also says that Samos 
revolted, but the pro-Athenian faction brutally quashed the separatist movement, see: 
Thuc. 8.63; Shipley, Samos, 129-30; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 357, cf. 193-4; see Part 
II, Chapter 3. 
18 Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 87-91; Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 32-8; Meiggs, 
Athenian Empire, 351. Thucydides supplies an article for the Chians in this instance, but 
probably just referring to “these” Chians, rather than distinguishing them from the rest of 
the citizen body as he does at 8.5.4, see Hornblower, CT 3, 763-4. 
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the Spartan calculus. While it is possible that the Erythraean motivations did not align 
with those of their larger partners, it is more probable that Thucydides links these 
representatives because the factions in both Chios and Erythrae were in negotiations with 
Tissaphernes before coming to Sparta and the three groups made a joint appeal to Sparta. 
The difference in the representation of Chios and Erythrae, it is reasonable to assume, is 
that the faction from Erythrae, which had political groups who appealed to Persia in the 
430s,19 had already agreed to pay tribute to Tissaphernes in return for his help. The 
representatives for both Erythrae and Chios were evidently in a position to conclude 
treaties with Sparta on behalf of their poleis.20 The Spartans responded to the appeal by 
sending Phrynis, a perioecos, to Chios in order to investigate into the strength of Chios 
without being detected (Thuc. 8.6.4).21 Once the Spartans confirmed the strength of the 
Chian fleet, they agreed to support both poleis. 
Ionians served outside their home chora infrequently, so the episodes when they 
did are all the more striking. After a coup in Chios in 412, the Chians and Erythraeans 
induced a revolt in Clazomenae to begin the Ionian War (Thuc. 8.14).22 The Chians then 
manned their fleet and, supported by an army from Clazomenae and Erythrae, sailed to 
Teos. The approach of the Ionian forces caused the Athenian commander 
                                                 
19 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
20 Quinn, “Political Groups in Chios,” 23. 
21 Lazenby, Peloponnesian War, 173, says that Phrynis’ responsibility is indicative of the 
“status that leader perioikoi could enjoy,” but the pro-Spartan faction in Chios was not 
yet in control of the polis, so it is more likely that they sent a perioecos because a Spartan 
would have drawn too much attention, see, Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 88, n. 31. 
Hornblower, CT 3, 776, suggests that Phrynis had Sicilian connections. See Part II, 
Chapter 3. 
22 Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 43; Hornblower, CT 3, 780-1. For the narrative, 
see Part II, Chapter 3. 
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Strombichides,23 who had sailed to the polis with a Samian ship (Thuc. 8.16.1), to flee. 
Without Athenian support, the Teians allowed entry to the approaching Ionian army 
(Thuc. 8.16.2-3).24 The Peloponnesian fleet then sailed to Miletus because Alcibiades 
was close with the leaders of the polis (ὣν ἐπιτήδειος τοῖς προεστῶσι τῶν Μιλησίων), 
although Thucydides also declares that Alcibiades wanted to claim credit for winning the 
war (8.17).25 The narrative for this first campaign concludes with the fleet and army 
forcing revolts in Haerae and Lebedus before retiring to their respective poleis (Thuc. 
8.19.4).26 
The joint Clazomenaean and Erythraean army did not stay on campaign long, but 
the show of force induced revolts in three poleis.27 There is too little information about 
Myus, Priene, and Colophon, but probably they also went into revolt leaving only Samos 
explicitly in league with Athens.28 Thucydides’ narrative implies that the people of 
                                                 
23 Strombichides was probably an archon with the Athenian fleet and not yet a strategos, 
see B. Jordan, “A Note on the Athenian Strategia,” TAPhA 101 (1970), 238-9, which may 
explain both the small size of his command and also speak to the relatively small amount 
of concern Athens had about war breaking out in Ionia. After becoming strategos in 
412/11, Strombichides commanded Athenian forces in the Northern Aegean (Thuc. 8.79), 
but suffered a defeat at the hands of Timolaus of Corinth near Thasos (Xen. Hell. 1.1.32), 
see W.E. Thompson, “Two Athenian Strategoi,” Hesperia 36 (1967), 106-7. 
Strombichides was again general in 405/4, but was executed by the Thirty for his support 
for the democracy, Lys. 13.13, 30; 30.14; Davies, APF, 161. 
24 Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 46-7; Hornblower, CT 3, 797; Andrews HCT 5, 
38-9; Westlake, "Ionians in the Ionian War," 12-14, all note a lack of enthusiasm from 
Teos. 
25 Andrewes, HCT 5, 40; Hornblower, CT 3, 797-800; Andrewes, Sparta and Persia, 90 
n. 39, all emphasize the importance of Miletus and suggest that capturing the polis 
presented an opportunity to perhaps end the war. 
26 Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 12. 
27 Hornblower, CT 3, 797; Westlake, "Ionians in the Ionian War," 143. 
28 Ephesus had probably ceased contributing to League activities by 413, see Part II, 
Chapter 2. Colophon had been under Persian control in 430, but there was an Athenian 
cleruchy there since 428/7 (Thuc. 3.34.1-4). Andrewes, HCT 5, 39, maintains that 
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Erythrae and Clazomenae were so enthusiastic about a revolt from Athens that they took 
up arms for the cause simply of their own volition, but this is improbable. The automatic 
appearance of the Ionian forces validated Alcibiades’ claim that he could incite revolts in 
Ionia (Thuc. 8.12.2), but the Spartan Chalcideus commanded the fleet in actuality.  Nor 
did Clazomenae remain enthusiastically in league with Sparta after 412. When an 
Athenian squadron recaptured the polis the same year, the Athenians or their partisans 
exiled the pro-Spartan faction to Daphnous (Thuc. 8.23.6). Further, despite Astyochus’ 
efforts to recapture Clazomenae (Thuc. 8.31.2), Alcibiades passed through while 
defecting back to Athens in 410 (Xen. Hell. 1.1.10-11), indicating that Clazomenae was 
not solidly Spartan.29 Further, the Spartan navarchs led the Peloponnesian fleet against 
the Athenians later in the Ionian War, and simultaneously directed the activities of the 
Ionian land forces (see below). Thus, it is more likely that Chalcideus, working through 
the pro-Spartan factions in Clazomenae and Erythrae, orchestrated the campaign from 
afar and set a precedent for his successors. 
Milesian hoplites campaigned beyond their borders twice during the Ionian War. 
Thucydides recounts the first during the narrative about The Four Hundred in Athens and 
the subsequent discontent in the Athenian fleet on Samos (8.45-98).30 The Spartan 
navarch Astyochus, whose sailors were showing signs of dissatisfaction, decided to strike 
                                                                                                                                                 
Colophon was still under Persian control when Athenian forces under Thrasyllus attacked 
it in 409 (Xen. Hell. 1.2.5), see Part II, Chapter 3. 
29 Diod. 13.71.1, says that Clazomenae was one of the last Athenian allies and suffered 
raids from its exiles down to 404, even though an Athenian inscription (ML 88, l. 5) 
attests to a formal reconciliation between the factions in 407, Rubinstein, “Ionia,” 1076-
7; Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 14-15; see Part II, Chapter 3. 
30 On the Four Hundred, see Arist., Ath. Pol. 30-3; Hornblower, CT 3, 944-64; Kagan, 
Fall of the Athenian Empire, 131-86. 
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the Athenian fleet at Samos in the hope of winning a decisive victory (Thuc. 8.78).31 
Astyochus sailed his fleet from Miletus north toward Samos while the Milesian infantry 
marched around the mouth of the bay to the Mycale Peninsula where the two forces 
encamped together (Thuc. 8.79). The land route the Milesians took to reach Mycale took 
them past Myus and Priene, and Andrewes laconically says that their ability to traverse 
the route indicates that the local Ionian poleis were lost to Athens.32 Even more telling to 
the political alignment of these communities than the unmolested passage is that the 
Milesian army was joined on Mycale by contingents from the local towns, which can 
reasonably be taken to mean that the Ionian states around the Maeandrian egress sent 
token forces. The campaign came to naught because the Athenian fleet withdrew from its 
anchorages on the Mycale peninsula to Samos and only offered battle after being 
reinforced, so the Peloponnesian fleet, by then withdrawn into Miletus, chose not to 
fight.33 But it is significant that Astyochus intended to use both land and sea forces even 
though his assumed objective was the defeat of the Athenian fleet. First and most 
importantly, he needed the Milesian infantry to seize the anchorages on the Mycale 
peninsula and turn them over to the Peloponnesian fleet.34 Second, should the Spartan 
fleet defeat the Athenians, he could ferry the army to Samos and coerce the polis into 
repudiating Athens. While the Ionian troops never actually saw battle, they were critical 
for the success of Astyochus’ operation. 
                                                 
31 Hornblower, CT 3, 981-3. 
32 Andrewes, HCT 5, 273, echoed by Hornblower, CT 3, 984. 
33 C. Falkner, “Astyochus, Sparta’s Incompetent Navarch?,” Phoenix 53 (1999), 218-19. 
34 Note a comparable situation in 336 when Alexander instructed Philotas to capture the 
same anchorages that the Persians were using to harass the Greek fleet at Miletus, Arr. 
Anab. 1.19.2-11, see Part II, Chapter 5. 
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The second campaign came in 409 when Athenian peltasts under the command of 
Thrasyllus decisively defeated a contingent of hoplites from Miletus near Pygela, a town 
south of Ephesus in the Cayster River valley (Xen. Hell. 1.2.2). Xenophon says the force 
of just over two hundred hoplites that supported Pygela came from Miletus (κ δ τς 
Μιλήτου βοηθησαντές τινες), about sixty kilometers away, but it is unlikely that enough 
time had passed for a plea to reach Miletus and the force to assemble and then march to 
the rescue.35 It is therefore reasonable to assume that this contingent, while its point of 
departure was indeed Miletus, was already in the vicinity of Pygela since there is scant 
evidence of a delay between the Athenian raid and their arrival. When the hoplites 
arrived, Xenophon reports, Thrasyllus’ peltasts won a complete victory, capturing two 
hundred shields. Ionians fighting in their own territory to this point in the Ionian War had 
had mixed fortunes,36 but the skirmish near Pygela, a complete disaster, was the first 
instance where Ionian troops actually fought outside their home territories. Yet one ought 
to not interpret the defeat, as Westlake does, as a sign of incompetence.37 Lightly armed 
troops posed a particular danger to hoplites, including on Sphacteria in 425 where the 
Spartan hoplites surrendered (Thuc. 4.28-38).38 
                                                 
35 By modern roads, Pygela is about 63 km from Miletus, which is on the south side of 
the next River Valley to the south. In comparison, it is only about 18 km from Ephesus. 
Lazenby, Peloponnesian War, 208-9, “wonders why help came from so far away when 
Ephesus was so much nearer.” Rubinstein, “Ionia,” 1094, rightly, says that Pygela’s 
independence was threatened by Ephesus, which absorbed the town in the Hellenistic 
period, see Part II, Chapter 6, so the citizens of Pygela used Miletus as a counterweight. 
36 The Athenians won minor victories in the Milesian chora (Thuc. 8.24-5), at 
Clazomenae (Thuc. 8.23.6), and Chios (Thuc. 8.24.3), but suffered a setback at Herae 
(Thuc. 8.20.2). Despite Thrasyllus’ initial success, he was defeated at Ephesus (Xen. 
Hell. 1.2.7-11). Cf. Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 29-35. 
37 Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 26, 34. See Part II, Chapter 3. 
38 Xen. Hell. 4.5.13; Arist. Pol. 1321a 14-21; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 45-6; Rawlings, 
Ancient Greeks at War, 85-6; van Wees, Greek Warfare, 62-5. 
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Xenophon’s outline of the Ionian War between 409 and 404 gives the impression 
that the Spartans ceased to use Ionian troops against the Athenians, but this conclusion is 
reached from a dearth of evidence. The Spartan fleet continued to use Ephesus as its base 
in the eastern Aegean and Spartan navarchs continued to guide Ionian forces, just in a 
smaller number of campaigns. The Spartans had agreed to recognize the Persian claim to 
Ionia in 411, but the actual relationship between the Ionian poleis and Persia varied 
widely on a case-by-case basis. In most instances, the Ionians followed Spartan, not 
Persian, leadership, probably because the Spartans were still the ones directly confronting 
Athens and the Persian leaders believed that they could reclaim Ionia once the fighting 
stopped. In the second phase of the Ionian war, however, the relationships with Sparta 
were formalized. Many Ionians likely advocated for this change because Sparta could 
provide a counter-weight against Persia, but only when their appeals reached individuals 
with imperial ambitions did the change actually come. 
 
III. Un-betrayed? Ionia, Sparta, and Persia 407-400 
In 412/11 there were three treaties between Spartan commanders and 
Tissaphernes wherein the Spartans “betrayed” the Ionian Greeks to Persia. First there was 
one concluded by Chalcideus (Thuc. 8.18),39 then by Therimines (Thuc. 8.37),40 and 
finally by Lichas (Thuc. 8.43).41 Each treaty traded territorial concessions in Anatolia for 
Persian money and Thucydides juxtaposes them with an invocation of Lade, where the 
                                                 
39 Hornblower, CT 3, 800-2; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 90. 
40 Hornblower, CT 3, 854; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 93-5. 
41 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 188-9; Hornblower, CT 3, 876-7; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 107. 
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final battle of the Ionian Revolt was fought in 494.42 The question then is whether these 
Spartan concessions betrayed the Ionian poleis and made the possibility of a lasting 
alliance impossible. The first two treaties were preliminary, ad-hoc arrangements that 
were never ratified, but they might have rankled the Ionians anyway.43 Darius and 
Tissaphernes, though, were more concerned with the revenue from the Ionian poleis than 
in achieving direct political control.44 For many Ionians, the first treaty gave up too many 
concessions, namely control over the Ionian chorae, poleis, and revenues, but the larger 
issue for the Spartans was that they got back too little from Tissaphernes. 
In 408, Sparta concluded a new treaty with Persia. This treaty, negotiated by 
Boeotius, was presented as a diplomatic coup for the Spartans (Xen. Hell. 1.4.2-3),45 but 
their achievements probably had more to do with reining in Tissaphernes than in securing 
new freedoms for the Ionians.46 The treaty also corresponds with the appointment of 
Cyrus as Caranus (commander-in-chief) in western Anatolia (Xen. Hell. 1.4.3; cf. Anab. 
1.12.).47 According to Xenophon, Cyrus directly answered the Greek concerns about 
Tissaphernes by saying that he was there to oversee the war against Athens (Xen. Hell. 
1.5.3). Cyrus also granted Lysander the revenues from his poleis for the Spartan war 
effort in 406/5 (Xen. Hell. 2.1.14; Diod. 13.104.4). Xenophon is ambiguous as to which 
                                                 
42 Hornblower, CT 3, 800-2. 
43 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 188. 
44 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 188. 
45 Boeotius had probably left for the embassy to Darius as early as 410, so Cyrus’ 
appointment followed the embassy. See N. Robertson, “The Sequence of Events in the 
Aegean in 408 and 407 B.C.,” Historia 29 (1980), 290-1. 
46 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 189-90; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 124-5; Tuplin, “Treaty of 
Boiotius,” 139. 
47 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 600; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 119. See Part II, 
Chapter 3. 
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poleis these were, but the grant likely included Ionia.48 Darius had recently renewed the 
Persian demand for tribute from the poleis and the new treaty continued this 
requirement.49 There is reason to believe, though, that the pro-Spartan factions in the 
Ionian poleis were not wholly opposed to the arrangement. For instance, the factions in 
Chios and Erythrae worked with Tissaphernes in 413/12 and Tissaphernes visited 
Ephesus in 411 (Thuc. 8.109).50 Miletus was the only Ionian polis during the war to have 
openly opposed the satrap when the citizens expelled his garrison from their territory 
(Thuc. 8.84).51 The Milesians welcomed the satrap at other times, so it is probable that 
the presence of a garrison and mischief on the part of the commander resulted in the 
expulsion (e.g. Thuc. 8.25).52 
Between 407 and 404 Lysander and other Spartan commanders installed favorable 
regimes in Ionian poleis that continued to resist Spartan authority such as Clazomenae 
and Samos.53 The most notorious of these governments were Lysander’s decarchies, 
boards of ten men, which he reputedly installed in every community under his control 
(Plut. Lys. 14.1; Nepos, Lys. 2.5). This breadth of Lysander’s program is unlikely, 
however, and the only known decarchy in Ionia was at Samos (Xen. Hell. 2.3.7).54 
Keeping with Spartan policy, Lysander likely left pro-Spartan governments intact, 
                                                 
48 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 600; Ruzicka, “Cyrus and Tissaphernes,” 209; 
Tuplin, “Treaty of Boiotios,” 133-4. 
49 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 80, 189-90; Tuplin, “Treaty of Boiotius,” 139. 
50 Ephesus is said to have been distinctly “barbarian” before Lysander’s intervention in 
407, see Part III, Chapter 19. 
51 Andrewes, HCT 5, 279-80; Hornblower, CT 3 994-5. 
52 According to Thuc. 8.109, Tissaphernes was concerned that the attack on the fort was 
targeting him. The support for the Milesians from the Peloponnesian fleet should not be 
taken too far since they were upset with Tissaphernes about money, see Part II, Chapter 
3. 
53 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 191. 
54 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 90; Shipley, Samos, 131-3, see Part II, Chapter 3. 
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supervised by harmosts. His position was such that Lysander was able to largely choose 
the harmosts, though the overthrow of the decarchies in 403/2 probably entailed turnover 
in the appointments (Xen. Hell. 3.4.2).55 There can be no doubt that the governments 
were violent, so the preconditions for the complaints against Lysander that precipitated 
the change still existed. 
 There are two pertinent features of the Ionian status between 404 and 400. First, 
Ionian poleis did have financial obligations to the Persian satraps and continued to 
periodically appeal to the Persians for political aid. Xenophon says that Artaxerxes did 
not mind competition between Tissaphernes and Cyrus, so long as someone paid the 
requisite tribute, because they would weaken each other (Anab. 1.1.8). Thus, it is likely 
that the relationship between Ionian and the Persians was such that the Persian king 
expected tribute, but the satraps formed personal ties with the poleis to determine which 
one of them collected the payment.56   
Second, the Spartans had agreed to remove their forces and harmosts from the 
Ionian poleis and accept that those states owed tribute to Persia on the condition that they 
remain autonomous.57 Unlike the Athenian empire, the Spartan alliance system did not 
require financial contributions, apart from ad hoc extortion. As a result, tribute to Persia 
did not interfere with the Ionian relationship with Sparta as long as the Persians did not 
                                                 
55 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 94, 191; Parke, “Development of the Second Spartan Empire,” 
52. 
56 Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 122, 137; Hornblower, Mausolus, 33-4; Ruzicka, “Cyrus 
and Tissaphernes,” 205-6, argues that Artaxerxes limited Cyrus’ power in Anatolia after 
404, contra Andrewes, “Two Notes on Lysander,” 208-9, who believes Cyrus was 
stripped of his satrapy entirely.  
57 Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 137. Xen. Anab. 1.1.6, says that Cyrus installed, but since 
the governments were already aligned with Sparta and Cyrus, this was not taken as an 
infringement of autonomy. 
 203
meddle with the pro-Spartan governments. Sparta was itself deeply divided at the end of 
the Peloponnesian War between what may be characterized as conservative factions and 
one of imperialists led by Lysander and, eventually, Agesilaus.58 There is no reason to 
assume, as Hamilton does, that the preeminence of a conservative cadre at Sparta brought 
about a clean break with Ionia at the conclusion of the Ionian War.59 Sparta was not 
actively engaged in Asia between 404 and 400, but the imperialists had orchestrated pro-
Spartan governments in the Ionian poleis and considered them to be part of the Spartan 
alliance. Certainly, the Ionians expected to be able to call on Sparta for help. 
 
IV. Ionians and the Spartan Campaigns Against Persia, 400-394 
In 400, the Ionians asked Sparta for aid because they were concerned that 
Tissaphernes would exact retribution for their support of Cyrus and said that the Persian 
would enslave them (Xen. Hell. 3.1.3-4).60 The Ionian plea for freedom and the 
subsequent Spartan declarations both smack of propaganda. Cyrus had refrained from 
removing the Spartan sponsored governments from power, but Tissaphernes expelled the 
government from Miletus that supported Sparta and Cyrus and replaced it with his own 
partisans (Xen. Anab. 1.1.7; Diod. 13.104.5-6).61 While there were undoubtedly others 
who chafed at such statements, freedom for these delegates from the pro-Spartan 
                                                 
58 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 77-98; Hamilton, “Spartan Politics and Policy,” 294-314; Lewis, 
“Sparta as Victor,” 40-1; Sparta and Persia, 137. See Part II, Chapter 3. 
59 Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories, 107-8. 
60 All of the Ionian poleis except Miletus, which had been controlled by Tissaphernes, 
supported Cyrus at the outbreak of the revolt: Xen. Anab. 1.1.6-7; Buckler, Aegean 
Greece, 40-1; Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories, 104; Hornblower, “Persia,” 64-5; 
Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 635; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 121-2, argues that 
Tissaphernes sent this ultimatum on his own volition to ensure the submission of Cyrus’ 
partisans, see Part II, Chapter 3. 
61 Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories, 108-9, with n. 33. 
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governments meant freedom for the current regime to stay in power. Likewise, 
Agesilaus’ declaration in support of Panhellenic autonomy was propaganda (Xen. Hell. 
3.4.5; Xen. Ages. 1.10); Spartan imperialists intervened in Asia to preserve their 
influence with the Greeks there and those Greeks supplied troops to Sparta as part of the 
alliance system. 
The Spartans agreed to send an expedition to Ionia under the command of 
Thibron, and to that end they collected 1,000 neodamodeis, 4,000 Peloponnesian allies, 
and 300 Athenian cavalry (Xen. Hell. 3.1.4).62 At Thibron’s behest, the Ionian states 
contributed 2,000 soldiers (Diod. 14.36.2; Xen. Hell. 3.1.4).63 Xenophon says that these 
recruits came from the mainland,64 while Diodorus says that Thibron enlisted them from 
his own (Ephesus) and other poleis (κε δ κ τε τν δίων πολέων κα τν λλων, 
14.36.2), but it is further possible to provide boundaries for the recruitment. Miletus and 
Magnesia both belonged to Tissaphernes, so Myus, which was located between the two, 
probably stayed out of the conflict. Tissaphernes first sacked Cyme in Aeolis (Diod. 
14.35.7), which may have pushed the Ionians nearby such as Clazomenae and Erythrae 
toward Sparta. It is therefore likely that most of Thibron’s Asian Greeks came from 
Ephesus, the Ionian communities in the Cayster river valley and to the north, and Priene 
                                                 
62 The Athenians sent cavalrymen who had sided with the Thirty. Xenophon says that 
Thibron held the post of harmost, but nothing is known about Thibron before this 
campaign. Neodamodeis were helots freed in return for military service, Krentz, 
Xenophon, 159. The Peloponnesians probably did not include Corinthians, who also did 
not join Agesilaus’ campaign in 396 (Paus. 3.9.2). Cf. Buckler, Aegean Greece, 44-5. 
63 Thibron also hired some of the mercenaries who had accompanied Cyrus (Diod. 
14.37.4). H.D. Westlake, “Spartan Intervention in Asia, 400-397 B.C.,” Historia 35 
(1986), 410.  
64 πε δ᾽  ες τν σίαν φίκοντο, συνήγαγε μν στρατιώτας κα κ τν ν τ πείρ 
λληνίδων πόλεων, πσαι γρ τότε α πόλεις πείθοντο  τι Λακεδαιμόνιος νρ 
πιτάττοι, Hell. 3.1.4. 
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on the north side of the Bay of Mycale (see below).65 Westlake suggests that their 
“significantly small number” of Ionians provides “evidence of their inability to defend 
themselves,”66 which may be true for the individual poleis, but it is notable that only 
three of the four largest Ionian communities, Samos, Chios, and Miletus, contributed no 
forces to this campaign. 
Based at Ephesus, Thibron and his army of Ionians, Peloponnesians and 
Athenians, campaigned north along the Aegean coast, capturing multiple settlements, 
including Pergamum and Larisa, before the ephors instructed him to invade Caria, which 
probably also meant an attack on Miletus (Xen. Hell. 3.1.6-7).67 Before the invasion 
began, though, Dercylidas replaced Thibron as the commander of the expedition (Xen. 
Hell. 3.1.8).68 Dercylidas led another campaign inland and to the north and captured 
Atarneus, which was occupied by Chian exiles who had repeatedly raided Ionian territory 
since early in the Ionian War (Xen. Hell. 3.2.11).69 Dercylidas finally led his army 
against the Persians in 397, but it blundered into the combined forces of Tissaphernes and 
Pharnabazus drawn up in battle order. Xenophon says that when Dercylidas ordered his 
army into formation, many of the Ionian hoplites dropped their weapons and fled, while 
                                                 
65 See the map at the front. 
66 Westlake, “Spartan Intervention,” 410. 
67 Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories, also points out that Caria was the site of 
Tissaphernes’ residence (Xen. Hell. 3.4.12), so the instructions could have been meant to 
put pressure on him. 
68 Thibron was recalled on the pretense that he had allowed his army to raid the territory 
of his allies, which, while probably true, was hardly exceptional, Xen. Hell. 3.1.5-8. 
Cartledge, Agesilaos, 209; Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories, 113. 
69 During the Ionian War, the Spartan navarch Cratesippidas restored Chian exiles, who, 
in turn, banished six hundred of their political enemies. Those exiles then seized Atarneus 
(Diod. 13.65.3-4). Krentz, Xenophon, 169. For accounts of Dercylidas’ campaigns, see 
Cartledge, Agesilaos, 210-11; Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories, 113-19; Westlake, 
“Spartan Intervention,” 413-26. 
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those who remained looked as though they would also run away (Hell. 3.2.17).70 The 
battle never took place because Dercylidas negotiated a truce with Tissaphernes, but 
Xenophon builds the tension before the anticlimactic conclusion by focusing on the flight 
of the Ionians. Despite the prominence of the Ionian flight, Xenophon uses it not to 
critique the soldiers, but to draw a contrast between Dercylidas’ failures as a leader and 
Agesilaus’ successes. 
The truce between Dercylidas and Tissaphernes required the Spartans to withdraw 
their forces and harmosts from the poleis in return for a promise from both sides Ionian 
autonomy (Xen. Hell. 3.2.13-20).71 For the Ionians, this amounted to a restoration of the 
conditions that had existed immediately after the Peloponnesian War. Before the battle, 
the Ionians sent a second embassy to Sparta in which they claimed that Tissaphernes had 
the power to grant their autonomy and urged negotiation (Xen. Hell. 3.2.12).72 The 
ambassadors were almost certainly mistaken and Xenophon says that the treaty had to be 
referred to the king (Hell. 3.2.20),73 but it is possible that Tissaphernes told the Ionians he 
had that power. While Dercylidas had kept the Persian satrap at bay until that point, it is 
likely that the Ionians were aware of the imminent threat and encouraged the Spartans to 
find a more permanent solution. The imperialists at Sparta refused to ratify Dercylidas’ 
treaty and the Persian preparation of a fleet for a new war in the Aegean indicates that, 
despite appearances, neither side thought the truce would actually end the fighting (Diod. 
                                                 
70 Krentz, Xenophon, 170, suggests that Xenophon specifically mentions Prienians 
because, as inhabitants of the Maeander Valley, they might be expected to fight most 
fiercely since their land was at risk. Cf. Buckler, Aegean Greece, 58-9; Westlake, 
“Spartan Intervention,” 414. On the military “ineptitude” of the Ionians, see Part III, 
Chapter 19. 
71 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 365; Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories, 118-19. 
72 Westlake, “Spartan Intervention,” 420. 
73 Waters, “Applied Royal Directive,” 817-28; Tuplin, “Treaty of Boiotius,” 149-51. 
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14.39.2-4).74 Lysander was particularly keen to begin a new campaign in order to restore 
the decharchies and therefore asked his friends in Ionia to appeal to Sparta for an 
expedition (Plut. Lys. 23.1; cf. Plut. Ages. 6.1).75 Thus Agesilaus prepared a new 
campaign against Persia. Despite the propaganda that the war was to keep the Ionians 
free, Xenophon says, “what was esteemed the most by [the Spartans] was not fighting for 
Greece but to conquer Asia” (κάλλιστον δ πάντων κρίνετο τ μ περ τς λλάδος 
λλ περ τς σίας τν γνα καθισστάναι, Ages. 1.8).76  
The behavior of the Ionians under Dercylidas notwithstanding, Agesilaus 
instructed them, as well as the communities of Aeolis and the Hellespont, to send soldiers 
to him at Ephesus in 396 (Xen. Hell. 3.4.11-12; Xen. Ages. 1.14).77 Proof of the Spartan 
commitment to fighting in Asia probably resulted in more communities actually sending 
troops to join Agesilaus than had supported Thibron in 400. Xenophon goes on to explain 
how, the next spring, the Spartan king put his army through a rigorous training regimen 
before the start of his second campaigning season (Hell. 3.4.16-19; Nepos, Ages. 3).78 
Xenophon marvels: “what a sight it would have been to see: Agesilaus first, and then the 
other soldiers processing, garlanded, from the gymnasium, dedicating the garlands to 
Artemis” (Xen. Ages. 1.27; Hell. 3.4.18).79 Agesilaus also went further to cultivate a 
relationship with the Sanctuary of Artemis, and an inscription bearing his name likely 
                                                 
74 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 635-7; Westlake, “Spartan Intervention,” 422-3. 
75 Buckler, Aegean Greece, 59-60. 
76 Xenophon describes the campaign as revenge for the Persian Wars, see Dillery, 
Xenophon, 116.  
77 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 212-13. 
78 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 214. 
79 περρώσθη δ᾽  ν τις κκενο δών, γησίλαον μν πρτον, πειτα δ κα τος 
λλους στρατιώτας στεφανωμένους τε που π τν γυμνασίων οιεν, κα 
νατιθέντας τος στεφάνους τ ρτέμιδι. 
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indicates an otherwise unattested building phase at the temple during and after the 
campaign.80 
His army newly energized, Agesilaus won a victory over the Persians outside 
Sardis in early 395.81 The conduct of the Ionian levies is unrecorded, but Agesilaus 
supposedly intended to bring the Ionians along as part of his army when he was recalled 
later that year (Xen. Hell. 4.2.4-5). Xenophon says that Agesilaus realized that many of 
the Asian Greeks did not want to fight against Greeks, but most probably did not want to 
cross back to Europe because it meant leaving their homes. Moreover, in his address to 
these soldiers, Xenophon has the king address them as his allies ( νδρες σύμμαχοι, 
Hell. 4.2.3). Yet, in the same scene in his biography of Agesilaus, Xenophon says that the 
Ionians mourned the king’s departure not just as they would their ruler, but their father or 
close friend (οὐχ ὡς ἄρξοντος μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς πατρὸς καὶ ἑταίρου, Ages. 1.38).82 
Even though the allied forces were supposed to follow Spartan leadership, Agesilaus 
gave the units the option of continuing with him, thus tacitly admitting an end to 
ambitions in Asia. Some Ionians continued to serve with Agesilaus after he returned to 
Europe and even fought at the battle of Coronea, where they routed their opponents (Xen. 
Hell. 4.3.17).83  
 
                                                 
80 Chr. Börker, “König Agesilaos von Sparta und der Artemis-Tempel in Ephesus,” ZPE 
37 (1980), 69-70; B. Wesenberg, “Agesilaos im Artemision,” ZPE 41 (1981), 175-80. On 
funding and construction at the temple of Artemis, see Part III, Chapter 17. 
81 J.K. Anderson, “The Battle of Sardis in 395 B.C.,” SCSA 7 (1974), 27-53; Cartledge, 
Agesilaos, 214-17; V. Gray, “Two Different Approaches to the Battle of Sardis in 395 
B.C.,” CSCA 12 (1979), 183-200; Hamilton, Agesilaus, 98-100. 
82 Dillery, Xenophon, 117. 
83 Cartledge, Agesilaus, 219-222; Hamilton, Agesilaus, 106-11. Ancient authors laud 
Agesilaus for his generalship at Coronea (Xen. Ages. 6.2; Frontinus, Strat. 2.6.6; Nepos, 
Ages. 4; Polyaenus, 2.1.19), but Cartledge is skeptical.  
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V. The End of the Ionian-Spartan Alliances 
After the battle of Cnidus in 394, Conon and Pharnabazus visited the poleis in 
Anatolia and helped to expel the pro-Spartan governments, which probably ended the 
Spartan alliances with the Ionian poleis (Xen. Hell. 4.8.1-3; Diod. 14.84.4).84 Sparta sent 
one final expedition to Asia under the command of Thibron in 392/1 (Xen. Hell. 4.8.17-
19). Like earlier Spartan campaigns, this expedition used Ephesus and Priene as bases 
from which to raid Persian territory,85 which probably indicates that Thibron sailed first 
to Ephesus and then crossed into the Maeander valley by way of Priene. Unlike the 
earlier expeditions, however, neither did he summon troops from the Ionians nor did they 
send either money or soldiers. Between 412 and 394, though, Ionian soldiers repeatedly 
campaigned with or at the behest of Spartan commanders. In a period that saw a 
preponderance of mercenaries, even among Spartan forces,86 the seeming ad-hoc nature 
of these Ionian levies makes them stand out. Far from being abnormal, however, they are 
indicative of the reciprocal relationship that developed between factions in the Ionian 
poleis and Spartans with imperial aspirations. The Spartans bound the Ionians to them 
and expected military assistance in return, the same as any other ally. By 392, these 
relationships had vanished.
                                                 
84 Xen. Hell. 4.3.10-12; Diod. 14.83.5-7; Polyaenus 1.48.5; Nepos, Conon 4; Cartledge, 
Agesilaos, 218, 363; Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories, 228-9; Buckler, Aegean Greece, 
128-41; Seager, “The Corinthian War,” in CAH2 6, 103-4; Perlman, “Athenian 
Democracy and the Revival of Imperialistic Expansion,” 261-2; Seager, “Thrasybulus, 
Conon and Athenian Imperialism,” 101, see Part II, Chapter 3. 
85  δ διαβάς τε κα ρμώμενος ξ φέσου τε κα πεδί πόλεων Πριήνης τε κα 
Λευκόφρους κα χιλλείου, φερε κα γε τν βασιλέως. 
86 Rawlings, Ancient Greeks at War, 169-73; H.F. Miller, “The Economic Background to 
the Greek Mercenary Explosion,” G&R 31 (1984), 153-60, though “bands of unemployed 
soldiers plaguing Greece” was likely a rhetorical trope rather than a reality, see Trundle, 
Greek Mercenaries, 10-39. 
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11. “Does anyone care about those Greeks living in Asia?”: Ionia and Attic Orators in the 
Fourth Century 
 
 
I. Introduction 
In 341, Demosthenes delivered On the Chersonese before the Athenian Assembly. 
Demosthenes was responding to a Macedonian embassy that protested the extortionate 
practices of an Athenian fleet commanded by Diopeithes in the northern Aegean and he 
called for an aggressive policy against Philip II. In the speech, he accepts that Diopeithes 
overreached, but lays the blame for the actions on the Athenians for not funding the 
campaign and pivots to the issue of opposing Philip. Demosthenes lists communities 
where Athenian fleets put in to collect resources, ultimately demanding to know “does 
anyone care about the Greeks living in Asia?” (μέλει γάρ τινι τούτων τν τν σίαν 
οκούντων λλήνων;, Dem. 8.27). On the one hand, Demosthenes is framing his 
opponents as unpatriotic in that they seem to champion the causes of other Greeks over 
Athens and as penurious for their refusal to fund the expedition. On the other, though, the 
statement also gives a glimpse into Athenian public discourse and reveals an ongoing 
relationship with Ionia that is seldom mentioned in the surviving speeches. 
It is well established that Athenian orators crafted their speeches to emphasize 
performance and manipulate content.1 In symbouleutic oratory, it was the responsibility 
                                                 
1 For instance: L. Pearson, “Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators,” CPh 36 (1941), 
221; S. Usher, “Symbouleutic Oratory,” in The Blackwell Companion to Greek Rhetoric, 
ed. I. Worthington (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 228-34; I. Worthington, “Rhetoric and 
Politics in Classical Greece: Rise of the Rhêtores,” in The Blackwell Companion to Greek 
Rhetoric, ed. I. Worthington (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 263-7; I. Worthington, 
Demosthenes of Athens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7. Orators also had the 
opportunity to revise their speeches before publication, cf. I. Worthington “Greek 
Oratory, Revision of Speeches and the Problem of Historical Reliability,” Class. & Med.  
42 (1991), 55-74; I. Worthington, “History and Oratorical Exploitation” in Persuasion: 
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of the speaker to choose the exemplum that would best persuade the Assembly to pursue 
the desired course of action (Arist. Rhet. 2.20.9; Isoc. 13.16).2 Rather than receiving 
historical events, anecdotes, and stories as immutable topoi, they manipulated their 
exempla in order to shape opinion and guide Athenian policy (Isoc. 13.16-17).3 Forensic 
oratory required the orator to master the language of the court, but the manipulation of 
evidence to persuade the audience of Athenian citizens remained a critical component.4 
In both types of speeches, the orator had to appeal to popular whims and expectations in 
order to persuade his audience. In this way, the extant speeches represent an admixture of 
Athenian public discourse and the objectives of orators.5 
Athens held hegemony over the Ionian poleis through the Delian League in the 
fifth century and its position at the center of this system that included communities along 
every coast of the Aegean Sea is borne out in the cosmopolitan nature of fifth-century 
Greek literature, including Herodotus’ account of the Ionian revolt from Persia of 499-
494 (5.28-38, 59-55, 97-107; 6.1-33), and Thucydides’ dedication of book eight to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Greek Rhetoric in Action, ed. I. Worthington (London: Routledge, 1994), 109-129; R.D. 
Milns, “The Public Speeches of Demosthenes,” in Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator, 
ed. I. Worthington (London: Routledge, 2000), 207-9. In contrast, historians and 
playwrights frequently addressed topical political concerns, but this was not the primary 
concern for their works. 
2 S. Perlman, “The Historical Example, Its Use and Importance as Political Propaganda in 
the Attic Orators,” SH 7 (1961), 153-4; T. Poulakis, Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates’ 
Rhetorical Education (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 22-3. 
3 J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989), 177-82; T. Papillon, “Isocrates,” in The Blackwell Companion to Greek Rhetoric, 
ed. I. Worthington (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 67; Perlman, “The Historical Example,” 
150-2.  
4 C. Cooper “Forensic Oratory,” in The Blackwell Companion to Greek Rhetoric, ed. I. 
Worthington (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 206, 215. 
5 Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, 315-16; cf. C.J. Classen, Herrscher, Bürger 
und Erzieher: Beobachtungen zu den Reden des Isokrates (Zürich: Georg Olms, 2010), 
105. 
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Ionian War, which Xenophon concludes in the first book of his Hellenica. Athens 
relinquished hegemony over its maritime empire in 404 and, despite renewed imperialism 
between 392 and 386, the Second Naval Confederacy,6 and the conquest of Samos in 
366/5, Athens never successfully drew Ionia back into its orbit in the fourth century. The 
difference may be attributed in part to Persia. Whereas the Persians had been unable to 
approach the Aegean coastline in the fifth century, the King’s Peace of 386 gave the 
mainland Ionian communities and Clazomenae to the Persian king and provided for the 
autonomy for the remaining Greek poleis.7 Athens had periods of renewed imperial 
ambition throughout the fourth century, but the Athenian orators tended to adhere in their 
speeches to the distinction drawn by the King’s Peace between autonomous and subject 
communities.  
The infrequent mention of Ionia, particularly of the poleis on mainland Anatolia, 
in fourth-century oratory leads to one of two conclusions: either the Ionian poleis had 
ceased to be of concern in Athenian public discourse or, as I believe, the orators obscured 
Ionia’s importance. An examination of fourth-century Athenian politics, however, 
demonstrates that Ionia remained a concern in Athens and thus that the way orators 
treated the region ran contrary to the broader current. When mentioned by name, Ionian 
communities were treated as uncomplicated wholes, a tact that offers little information 
about their situation to the audience. This approach is not borne of ignorance. For 
example, Demosthenes in On the Rhodians and Against Aristocrates was well informed 
                                                 
6 The second naval confederacy continued to exist past 356, but without the largest of the 
allies, Chios, Byzantium, and Rhodes. The imperial nature of the Second Naval 
Confederacy is a matter of some debate, see Part II, Chapter 4.  
7 For the Peace of Callias, if it existed, see Part II, Chapter 2; for the King’s Peace Part II, 
Chapter 4. 
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about events in Rhodes and Thrace, respectively, while, in contrast, such nuance is never 
offered for Ionia. At the same time, the extant speeches make only oblique mention of the 
Ionian poleis. The rhetorical decision to downplay Ionia in political speeches not only 
belies continued intercourse across the imaginary boundary established by the King’s 
Peace but also contributes to the illusion that Ionia slipped away from the Greek world in 
the fourth century. 
 
II. Ionia and Athenian Public Discourse 
The corpus of speeches of the Attic orators provides a narrow window into 
Athenian public discourse, but the fragmentary nature of the extant evidence provides a 
serious limitation to this sort of study. For instance, Demosthenes, one of the most 
prolific orators, was credited with either sixty-five or seventy-one political, forensic, and 
epideictic speeches ([Plut.] Mor. 847e), some erroneously.8 And yet, none of the three 
known addresses to the Assembly during Alexander’s reign survives.9 Likewise, he must 
have given more speeches before the Assembly over the course of his three-decade 
political career, including some during the years when Alexander was king of Macedonia 
(336-323), but those works are now lost.10 Interpretation of Attic oratory is necessarily 
                                                 
8 Sealey, Demosthenes, 230-40; I. Worthington, “The Authenticity of Demosthenes’ 
Fourth “Philippic”,” Mnemosyne 44 (1991), 425-8; Worthington, Demosthenes, 27-8, 
with n. 91; Roisman and Worthington, Lives of the Attic Orators, 241. The authenticity of 
the Demosthenic canon was an issue of contention in antiquity, and Caecilius wrote a 
treatise called On Demosthenes: Which of His Speeches are Genuine and Which are 
False. 
9 Worthington, “Rhetoric and Politics,” 265; Roisman and Worthington, Lives of the Attic 
Orators, 241. 
10 Worthington, “Rhetoric and Politics,” 265; Worthington, “Demosthenes’ (In)Activity 
During the Reign of Alexander the Great,” 90-108; Worthington, Demosthenes, 285-93, 
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shaped by which speeches surive and it is certainly possible that the apparent attention to 
Macedonian and Peloponnesian over Asiatic affairs is owed not to the orators, but to the 
preferences of Alexandrian philologists.  However, in addition to the largely complete 
speeches, there are fragments of speeches by other orators, including titles, that offer a 
tantalizing glimpse into the subjects broached before the fourth-century Athenian 
Assembly, but conceal the angle that orator took. Thus, Philiscus of Miletus (BNJ 337B T 
1B) composed (but did not give) a Milesian Speech, which demonstrates that the agenda 
of the assembly that day included something about Miletus but does not provide any 
detail.11 It is therefore plausible that Ionia was discussed more frequently than the 
surviving speeches indicate, but the paucity of even testimony about now-lost speeches 
that addressed Ionia, I believe, indicates otherwise. 
For this discussion of Attic orators and Ionia, one fragment stands out, the title for 
Hyperides’ Χίακος (Chians).12 Almost nothing is known about the speech itself, which 
leaves both the content and the date uncertain. Hyperides was born in 390/89,13 so it is 
possible that he gave the speech in conjunction with the crisis leading up to or 
immediately following the Social War in 358-354/3 when the Athenians were facing a 
financial crisis.14 The Athenian public was concerned with Chios during the Social War 
and this date would put the speech roughly contemporary with Isocrates’ On the Peace, 
                                                                                                                                                 
argues that Demosthenes continued to guide Athenian foreign policy during Alexander’s 
reign. Contra Sealy, Demosthenes, 208. 
11 Engels, Philiscus, BNJ 337 B T 1B, commentary. See Part III, Chapter 20. 
12 C. Cooper, Dinarchus, Hyperides, and Lycurgus (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2001), 63. 
13 Roisman and Worthington, Lives of the Attic Orators, 247; Davies, APF, 518; cf. D.M. 
Lewis, “Notes on Attic Inscriptions (II),” ABSA 50 (1955), 29. 
14 Demosthenes, for instance, gave his first known political speech, On the Symmories in 
354, around his thirtieth year. On the Social War, see Part II, Chapter 4. 
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which urged the Athenians to come to terms with Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium.15 This 
context cannot be ruled out, but Isocrates’ discourse dealt with multiple states, while the 
title of Hyperides’ speech suggests that the principal topic was just Chios. Moreover, 
Hyperides did not come to prominence in Athenian politics until 343 when he prosecuted 
Philoxenus for taking bribes from Philip.16 A more probable date for the Chians, 
therefore, is 341/0 when it again became imperative for the Athenian state to cooperate 
with its former allies to prevent Philip II from capturing Byzantium (Dem. 9.71).17  
Hyperides’ speech reveals that Chios remained a concern in Athens even after the 
conclusion of the Social War, but the island was not exceptional. In 366 an Athenian fleet 
under the command of Timotheus captured Samos and established Athenian cleruchs 
there (Isoc. 15.111; Dem. 15.9-10; Din. 1.14, 3.17).18 Samos was one of the principal 
Athenian outposts after 365 (Polyaenus, 6.2.1),19 but the Athenian demos was also 
concerned with the eastern Aegean beyond Chios and Samos.20 Timotheus’ expedition 
that conquered the island sailed with the purported aim of aiding Ariobarzanes, the Satrap 
of Hellespontine Phrygia, but with instructions not to help the satrap if he was in open 
revolt, which would have violated the King’s Peace (Dem. 15.9).21 Instead of helping 
Ariobarzanes, Timotheus put in at Samos to remove the garrison established there by 
                                                 
15 Along with Xenophon’s Poroi and Demosthenes’ On the Symmories, On the Peace 
reflects the dire state of the Athenian economy in the 350s and these works form a chorus 
that called for peace and trade rather than continued war. See Worthington, Demosthenes, 
67, 184-6, with bibliography n. 9.  
16 Hyperides 4.29-30; Worthington, Demosthenes, 200. Demosthenes accused Philocrates 
of taking bribes from Philip, Dem. 19.145, 309. 
17 Buckler, Aegean Greece, 475-6; Cooper, Dinarchus, Hyperides, and Lycurgus, 63; 
Roisman and Worthington, Lives of the Attic Orators, 260. See below Part II, Chapter 4. 
18 See Part II, Chapter 4. 
19 Cawkwell, “Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth Century,” 335. 
20 Heskel, North Aegean Wars, 95-100, 132. 
21 Heskel, North Aegean Wars, 133. See Part II, Chapter 4. 
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Tigranes, a Persian hyparch, and it is unlikely that the fleet gave direct aid to the rebel 
satrap.22 Mausolan coins found on the island suggest that there had been a Persian 
influence beyond a garrison and Timotheus decided to capture the island, but the 
expedition itself is significant in that its ostensible aim, if not final result, was to have an 
Athenian force intervene in Anatolia on behalf of a Persian subject (Dem. 15.9). Nor was 
the decision to send cleruchs to Samos without opponents at Athens and the actions were 
likely debated vehemently in the Assembly (Arist. Rhet. 1384b 32-5).23 
Athenian generals such as Diopeithes continued to supplement their campaign 
war-chests by putting in at poleis on the Anatolian littoral and commandeering resources 
“in thoroughly pre-King’s peace fashion.”24 Timotheus went beyond normal practice 
when he employed extreme versions of this tactic while besieging Samos and, as a result, 
received praise from Isocrates for not burdening the Athenian allies or requiring new 
taxes (εσφορς, 15.108).25 First, Timotheus allowed his soldiers to forage freely on part 
of the island but required them to pay for goods on the remainder and demanded a portion 
of the profit in return, with which he was able to pay his troops (Polyaenus 3.10.5, 9). 
Second, he severely restricted the produce that could be sold except to his army 
(Polyaenus 3.10.10). These two stratagems guaranteed that the Athenian troops had 
                                                 
22 Hornblower, Mausolus, 198; R.A. Moysey, “Chares and Athenian Foreign Policy,” CJ 
80 (1985), 224; Shipley, Samos, 137; S. Ruzicka, “Epaminondas and the Genesis of the 
Social War,” CPh 93 (1998), 63-4 n. 16, suggests that Cyprothemis may have been a 
mercenary commander or otherwise invited by Samian oligarchs.  
23 Cawkwell, “The Failure of the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy,” 51. 
24 Hornblower, Mausolus, 189 n. 52. On Diopeithes, see below. 
25 During the Corinthian War, Iphicrates had probably similarly raided the island 
(Polyaenus 3.9.36), but whether this was out of financial necessity or opportunism is 
unknown. Isocrates elsewhere critiques Athenian imperialism against other Greek states 
and Timotheus’ virtues are hyperbolic, so it is possible that he is providing a tongue-in-
cheek encomium, but the defense of Timotheus protects Isocrates’ reputation and 
Timotheus becomes a staunch anti-Persian partisan. 
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access to the two necessities to conduct a lengthy campaign: food and money. Elsewhere 
the generals did not have as immediate access to resources like Timotheus did on Samos, 
but the Assembly granted them similarly meager support. As a result, both Demosthenes 
in On the Chersonese (8.24-7), discussed below, and an inscription dated to 366 during 
Timotheus’ siege of Samos (IG II2 108) indicate that Athenian generals extracted 
resources from Erythrae. Further, the honors which Eyrthrae granted Mausolus were 
plausibly in thanks for the dynast putting an end to these Athenian extortionate practices 
(RO 52).26 Concrete evidence for Athenian activity in the eastern Aegean largely drops 
off in the late 360s, but, as Hornblower suggests, what stopped Athens from intervening 
in Ionia further was the paucity of available resources and pressing need to protect the 
grain route from the northern Aegean.27 Thus, it was out of weakness, not disinterest, that 
the Athenians set in stone a policy of non-intervention in the eastern Aegean after 364 
(RO 42), and probably continued to extort communities anyway.28 
Mausolus and his successors in Caria were also a topic in Athenian discourse in 
the mid-fourth century, and Demosthenes blamed the Hecatomnid dynast for instigating 
the Social War (15.3).29 Whether Carian influence spurred the anti-Athenian alliance of 
                                                 
26 The inscription is usually dated to the mid 350s, though Hornblower, Mausolus 108, 
suggests the 360s as an alternate date. The evidence for Athenian extortion at Erythrae is 
more detailed for the 360s, but Hornblower’s rationale for the honors may have still been 
true in the 350s, see Part II, Chapter 4. 
27 Hornblower, Mausolus, 203. 
28 The inscription, found in Argos and dated to 362/1, is believed to be from Athens 
based on its dialect, but it records the intentions of the Greeks to avoid interfering in the 
Persian conflict, if the Persians did not attack Greeks. Cf. Rhodes and Osborne 
commentary. 
29 Hornblower, Mausolus, 183, 206-11. For the origins of the Social War, see Part II, 
Chapter 4. 
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Byzantium, which had seceded probably in 364,30 Chios, Rhodes, and Cos to war or there 
were other factors is a matter of debate, but that some Athenians blamed Mausolus 
indicates that there was an awareness of the situation in the eastern Aegean in Athenian 
public discourse.31 During the Social War, Athenian fleets campaigned in the eastern 
Aegean, including one led by Chares that subsequently entered into the pay of the rebel 
satrap Artabazus (Diod. 16.21-2).  
Diodorus says that Chares made the decision to enter into foreign service 
unilaterally as a scheme to relieve the fiscal burden on the Athenian state (16.22).32 In 
356/5, Chares succeeded in turning the demos against his principal opponents and is 
described as having command of the entire fleet (Diod. 16.21-2),33 and it is possible that 
he had been given official sanction by the Assembly before he sailed or been named 
strategos autocrator with tacit permission to conduct Athenian foreign policy in the 
                                                 
30 Hornblower, Mausolus, 131; Sealey, Demosthenes, 103; Stylianou, Historical 
Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 494-7. Cf. Worthington, Demosthenes, 65; 
Worthington, By the Spear, 10.  
31 Hornblower, Mausolus, 209-11 and Ruzicka, “Eastern Greek World,” 120-1, accept 
that the Mausolan influence prompted the war, but notes Demosthenes had other reasons 
for shifting the blame away from Athenian generals; Buckler, Aegean Greece, 379, 
absolves Mausolus of blame, ascribing the war to long-simmering complaints from both 
sides of the conflict, with Mausolus taking advantage of the situation. Ruzicka, 
“Epaminondas and the Genesis of the Social War,” 60-9, suggests that Epaminondas 
precipitated the initial schism between Athens and its allies, following Diod. 15.79.1, but 
that Mausolus incited the war, Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 91-3. See Part II, 
Chapter 4. 
32 Χάρης δ παραλαβν παντς το στόλου τν γεμονίαν κα σπεύδων τς δαπάνης 
παλλάξαι τος θηναίους. Sealey, Demosthenes, 105. A scholiast on Dem. 4.19, says 
that Chares wrote a letter to the Athenians declaring that his victory over royalist forces 
was comparable to Marathon. 
33 R. Sealey, “Athens After the Social War,” JHS 75 (1955), 74; Sealey, Demosthenes, 
104-5; Worthington, Historical Commentary on Dinarchus, 154. See Part II, Chapter 4. 
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field.34 Theopompus, however, says that Chares left behind supporters to draft and 
propose legislation that retroactively approved the decisions he made in the field (BNJ 
115 F 213).35 One reference in a Demosthenic oration (23.173) says that Chares received 
the extraordinary position of autocrator for his campaign to the Chersonese,36 but it is 
likely that, while he had sole or primary command of the fleet, he relied on the same 
supporters in Athens who had deposed his opponents to guide the Assembly. It therefore 
follows that some individuals in Athens received a steady stream of updates about events 
happening on the other side of the Aegean.  
The King’s Peace of 386 delineated zones of political authority in the eastern 
Aegean, but it did not restrict passage of individuals, so the intellectual and aristocratic 
networks continued unabated. Ionian aristocrats continued to go to Athens for education, 
including Theopompus of Chios and Naucrates of Erythrae, both of whom were students 
of Isocrates.37 These two Isocratean acolytes also performed at the funeral games that 
                                                 
34 Hornblower, Mausolus, 207; P.D. Salmond, “Sympathy for the Devil: Chares and 
Athenian Politics,” 47; Sealey, “Athens after the Social War,” 74. 
35 The rest of Theopompus’ fragment paints an unlikely portrait of Chares as a wanton 
soldier in search of luxury, see Morison, BNJ 115 F 213 commentary. Cf. Moysey, 
“Chares and Athenian Foreign Policy,” 224-7; Salmond, “Sympathy for the Devil,” 44. 
The Assembly ultimately recalled Chares when the Persian king threatened to provide 
ships to Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium (Diod. 16.22). 
36 Isoc. 8.55, critiques the Athenians for dispatching generals with too much authority. 
Cawkwell, “Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy,” 52; Moysey, 
“Chares and Athenian Foreign Policy,” 223; Salmond, “Sympathy for the Devil,” 50. 
37 Theopompus’ family had been exiled from Chios, probably in the 390s when he was 
still a child, and returned to the polis only late in life. Each of Isocrates’ foreign students 
paid up to a thousand drachmae for their education, though he reportedly refused to 
charge Athenian citizens. Dem. 35.15 and 42; [Plut.] Mor. 837d, 838e-f; Davies, APF, 
247; Roisman and Worthington, Lives of the Attic Orators, 153-65. Not everyone agrees 
that Theopompus was Isocrates’ student, see Flower, Theopompus, 42-8. Cf. Part III, 
Chapter 20. 
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Artemisia threw for Mausolus in 353 (Theopompus, BNJ 115 T 6).38 The testimony that 
Isocrates himself attended the funeral is almost certainly false,39 but it is remarkable that 
this cadre of intellectuals could rise above politics to cross freely to Athens and back into 
the Persian zone.40 Mausolus’ funeral, while magnificent in scale, was hardly unusual 
since the Hecatomnid dynasts frequently patronized Greek intellectuals. For instance, if 
Philostratus can be believed, Aeschines visited Mausolus’ court before his death in 353, 
where he delighted the satrap with his skill in extemporaneous speaking (Philostratus, Vit. 
Soph. 1.482).41 Further demonstrating the continuation of trans-Aegean intellectual life, 
Aeschines may have opened a school of rhetoric in Ephesus during his time in exile 
([Plut.] Mor. 840d).42 
There is a dearth of evidence for fourth-century Ionia because no contemporary 
historical account and very little in the way of literary, epigraphic, and numismatic 
material survives. In comparison, the limited corpus of speeches from the Athenian 
orators, which I will argue offers insight into the relationship between Ionia and Athens, 
primarily sheds light on the political and social situations in fourth-century Athens. The 
Ionian poleis had been integral members of the Athenian Empire in the fifth century, and, 
despite appearing infrequently in fourth century oratory, Ionia remained connected with 
and a concern for Athenian public discourse. The most plausible explanation for the 
                                                 
38 Theopompos, BNJ 115 F 345; 115 T 6a with Morison commentary; Hornblower, 
Maulolus, 334. 
39 [Plut.] Mor. 838b; Roisman and Worthington, Lives of the Attic Orators, 160 
40 See Part III, Chapter 20. 
41 Hornblower, Mausolus, 337. 
42 Roisman and Worthington, Lives of the Attic Orators, 185. Cf. Plut. Dem. 24.2. For 
other examples of intellectual networks, see Part III, Chapter 20. 
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absence is that the orators sought to guide the Athenian Assembly towards action in other 
parts of Aegean, which, in turn, belies Athenian activity in Ionia. 
For the rest of this case study, I will examine how the Athenian orators used 
Ionia. The first category consists of references to Ionian mythology, which appear only 
Isocrates’ oevre.  Then there are sections for each Chios and Samos because these two 
island poleis appear most frequently in Attic oratory. Finally, I examine how the Attic 
orators refer to the poleis on the coast of Asia Minor and, more specifically, how only 
one polis, Erythrae, is cited. 
 
III. Ionian Mythology and Attic Oratory 
In the Classical period, there were multiple foundation myths for nearly every 
Ionian polis, which reflects Ionia’s ambiguous status as a region that, to outsiders, 
straddled the line between Asia and Greece. The myth of the Ionian migration (Paus. 
7.2.1-4), in which the sons of the Athenian king Codrus founded Miletus and Ephesus, 
came to dominate the discussion about Ionian ethnicity.43 Yet, a grand narrative for the 
myth and thus, perhaps, the belief in a kernel of historical truth to the Athenian origins of 
Ionia emerges only when a host of fragmentary accounts are stitched together.44 It would 
be a mistake to take a holistic approach to myth since, as Perlman argues, it did not 
                                                 
43 Versions of the myth existed earlier. For instance, Hdt. 1.97, has Aristagoras of Miletus 
refer to Athens as the mother city of Ionia. 
44 N. Mac Sweeney, “Violence and the Ionian Migration: Representation and Reality,” in 
Nostoi: Indigenous Culture, Migration and Integration in the Aegean Islands and 
Western Anatolia during the Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age, eds. Ç. Maner, K. 
Kopanias, and N. Stampolidis (Istanbul: Koç University Press, 2013), 239-61. 
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consist of “rigid topoi.”45 The ascent of this particular myth, which Mac Sweeney 
contends emerged only in the fifth century,46 is probably tied to Athenian imperial 
ideology because the myth gave Athens a privileged position over the Ionians and 
reinforced the legitimacy of both the Delian League and the Athenian role as hegemon.47 
As one might expect, the Ionian authors rejected both the simple binary between Europe 
and Asia, as well as the location of Ionia within the Athenocentric schema. Mac Sweeney 
therefore argues that the Ionians themselves promoted competing foundation myths as a 
way of undermining the orthodox views of their position between Europe and Asia and 
their relationship to Athens.48 
The objective here is not to revisit Mac Sweeney’s thesis, but to examine two 
vague accounts of Ionian origins from the Athenian side of the Aegean. Myth was one of 
the four areas of history employed by orators and Perlman argues it was the one most 
equated with foreign policy.49 It is hardly a surprise then that the two speeches that make 
references to Ionia in the mythical past, Isocrates’ Panegyricus (380) and Panathenaicus 
(338), both put the Athenian record of fighting against barbarians into a mythical past, at 
the expense, no less, of recounting the actual foundation of the Ionian poleis. Closer 
examination of the two passages reveals that in neither was Isocrates actually concerned 
                                                 
45 Perlman, “Historical Example,” 162. Cf. L. Patterson, Kinship Myth in Ancient Greece 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 5-6, who notes that tendency for Greeks to 
employ ideological rather than literal genealogies, and Poulakis, Speaking for the Polis, 
84. 
46 Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 161. Belief in the kinship between 
Athens and the Greeks of Ionia probably predated the fifth century, but the Ionian 
migration myth manufactured concrete ties between the two regions. Cf. J. Alty, “Dorians 
and Ionians,” JHS 102 (1982), 8. 
47 Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 11, 161-4. 
48 Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 202. 
49 Perlman, “Historical Example,” 158-62. 
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with Ionia; both references are props to demonstrate the role of Athens as hegemon of 
Greece in the eternal war against the barbarian. Though Isocrates unmistakably alludes to 
the Ionian Migration in each speech, in neither one does he directly invoke Ionia. 
In 380, Isocrates published his Panegyricus in which he called for his panhellenic 
audience to launch a unified crusade against Persia as a solution for the internecine 
conflict that plagued the Greek poleis (4.3, 6).50 Given his audience, Isocrates had to 
manipulate the topoi that offered up Athens as the natural hegemon of the Greeks and 
reconcile them with the contemporary reality of resentment for Athenian imperialism and 
existence of Spartan hegemony, which, he claims, the Spartans falsely believe to be an 
ancestral right (4.18).51 The means to this end, he says, is not to remind people of the 
benefits which Athens provided that have been overlooked, but to call to mind those good 
deeds that are still in the memory of all Greeks (4.27).52  
In the course of an extended argument about how Athens had the best ancestral 
claim to hegemony on account of its good deeds on behalf of all Greeks (4.22-50), 
Isocrates claims that at the same time as the Athenians had instituted the worship of the 
gods they realized that the Greeks fought against each other for lack of land. Since the 
barbarians possessed most of the land (τν πλείστην τς χώρας, 4.34), he says, the 
Athenians took matters into their own hands, defeating the barbarians and founding new 
                                                 
50 The speech was probably composed about ten years between 390 and 380, a 
tumultuous decade in mainland Greece. S. Usher, Greek Orators III (Aris&Phillips Ltd: 
Warminster, 1990), 19, suggests that, by 380, most Greeks considered Sparta, not Persia, 
the greatest threat to freedom. Cf. Papillon “Isocrates,” 63-4. 
51 Classen, Herrscher, Bürger und Erzieher, 64-5; E.V. Haskins, “Philosophy, Rhetoric, 
and Cultural Memory: Rereading Plato’s ‘Menexenus’ and Isocrates’ ‘Panegyricus’,” 
RSQ 35 (2005), 36. Isocrates calls the Spartan belief in their ancestral right to hegemony 
a ψευδ λόγον. 
52 Classen, Herrscher, Bürger und Erzieher, 66-7; Haskins, “Philosophy, Rhetoric, and 
Cultural Memory,” 37. 
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poleis on both Europe and Asia, a model that the Ionian poleis later emulated (4.35-6).53 
Isocrates crafts this account of the Ionian migration, which was the only event in which 
Athens was supposed to have founded colonies in Asia, to reflect the contemporary 
political landscape of continuous and economically catastrophic warfare. But the 
audience for this dialogue and the groups plagued by internecine warfare in 380 were 
those of European Greece, not Asia, and Isocrates goes so far as to say that while Greece 
suffered, Asia prospered (4.187). By avoiding discussion of the Ionian communities, he is 
coy as to which continent Ionia belongs (see below). Ionia and Ionians return in more 
detail in other contexts later in the speech, but are passed over in this initial passage 
meant to demonstrate Athens’ claim to hegemony.54 After juxtaposing the two periods 
and building a case for Athens’ eternal war against the barbarians on behalf of the other 
Greeks, Isocrates needed to dissociate the Ionian migration from Ionians.55 More than 
simply a calculation about the ethnic ties in the Aegean, Isocrates was probably trying to 
avoid drawing attention to the Delian League or that, just four years earlier, Athens and 
Chios had formed a defensive alliance that was carefully worded so as not to violate the 
King’s Peace (RO 20).56 Thus, Isocrates made mention of the Ionian migration while 
simultaneously directing the attention of his audience away from the region. 
                                                 
53 Classen, Herrscher, Bürger und Erzieher, 67. The traditional topos for war against the 
barbarian was the Trojan War, but tradition held that Athens played only a small role in 
the war, Usher, Greek Orators III, 157. 
54 See below for the other references to Ionia in Isocrates’ Panegyricus. 
55 Usher, Greek Orators III, 157. 
56 See Part II, Chapter 4; for the Ionian connection with the Delian League, see Part II, 
Chapter 2. 
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Shortly before his death in 338, Isocrates published the Panathenaicus. The 
speech, framed as an address to an Athenian audience at the Panathenaea,57 includes what 
had become standard Isocratean (and epideictic) features: praise of Athens, plea for a 
common war against Persia, and defense against his political detractors.58 In the 
Panathenaicus, as in the Panegyricus, albeit in more detail, Isocrates includes the Ionian 
migration among the list of Athenian achievements (12.43-7) and in 338, like he did in 
380, he models the virtues of the Athenian leadership in the Ionian migration on the 
contemporary political situation (12.43-4):59 
κα πρτον μν τς Κυκλάδας νήσους, περ ς γένοντο πολλα 
πραγματεαι κατ τήν Μίνω το Κρητς δυναστείαν ταύτας τ 
τελευταον π Καρν κατεχομένας, κβαλόντες κείνους οκ 
ξιδιώσασθαι τς χρας τόλμησαν, λλ τος μάλιστα βίου τν 
λλήνων δεομένους κατκισαν ες ατάς: κα μετ τατα πολλς 
πόλεις φ᾽  κατέρας τν πείρων κα μεγάλας κτισαν, κα τος μν 
βαρβάρους νέστειλαν π τς θαλάττης. 
 
First there were the Cycladic islands, about which there were many 
disputes during the rule of King Minos of Crete until finally the Carians 
occupied them. Throwing them out, our ancestors did not venture to 
appropriate the land for themselves, but they settled there who were most 
in need of a livelihood. After this, they founded many great poleis on both 
sides of the Aegean, and they drove the barbarians from the sea… 
 
The island poleis close to the Anatolian coast such as Rhodes and Chios had fallen under 
the influence of the Hecatomnid dynasts in Caria at least by 346 (Dem. 5.25), 60 which 
                                                 
57 T.L. Papillon, Isocrates II (University of Texas Press: Austin, 2004), 167. 
58 Papillon, Isocrates II, 168-70.  
59 Trans. Papillon, Isocrates II, 179-80. Isocrates makes a similar statement about the 
Carians in his Encomium of Helen 10.68. Cf. P. Roth, Die Panathenaikos des Isokrates 
(Munich: De Gruyter, 2003), 110-11. 
60 Hornblower, Mausolus, 129-32. 
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made Caria a natural surrogate target for a crusade against non-Greeks.61 Further, 
Isocrates implies that the Ionian migration drove the barbarians away from the sea in a 
manner that recalls the terms thought to have been established by the Peace of Callias.62 
Here, too, Isocrates avoids identifying the Ionian communities by name because he is 
challenging his audience to invade Persia and extolling the virtues of Athens, not 
addressing Ionia. 
Isocrates referred to the Ionian migration in orations published forty-two years 
apart, both times in an encomium for Athens. In each case, he demonstrated how the 
migration to Asia eased the hardships suffered by the Greeks, but modifies those 
hardships to conform to the contemporary political situation. There is little doubt these 
passages allude to the Ionian migration, but Isocrates mentions the region in neither 
account. Ionia is disassociated with the Ionian migration and only the benefits of invading 
Asia remain. 
 
IV. Chios in Attic Oratory 
Chios and Samos were the only Ionian poleis granted autonomy by the King’s 
Peace. Both were large island communities well situated for maritime commerce and 
both had been members of the Delian League.63 In the fourth century, however, their 
relationships with Athens diverged: Chios oscillated between an ally in the Second Naval 
                                                 
61 Thuc. 1.4-8, also includes an account of Greek conflict with the Carians, but credits 
Minos with driving them back to Asia, see Roth, Panathenaikos des Isokrates, 110 n. 
189. 
62 Cf. Isoc. 4.118-120; 12.59. W.E. Thompson, “The Peace of Callias in the Fourth 
Century,” Historia 30 (1981), 164-77. 
63 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
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Confederacy and an enemy,64 while Athens conquered Samos and expelled the 
population in 366/5 and established a cleruchy on the island.65 The references to Chios as 
a polis with an important relationship with Athens in Isocrates’ Panegyricus, Plataicus, 
and On the Peace, Demosthenes’ Against Lacritus, On the Freedom of the Rhodians, On 
the Peace and Third Philippic, and the title of Hyperides’ Chians represents this 
distinction. 
Thucydides eulogized Chios in the fifth century, saying that it grew stronger as it 
grew larger and wise in prosperity (8.24.4-5),66 but the earliest reference to Chios in 
fourth-century Athenian oratory, Isocrates’ Panegyricus of 380, plays down its 
importance (4.139).67 Isocrates claims in the passage that other orators in favor of 
avoiding war with Persia overstated the power of the Persian king. In particular, he 
suggests that Persia had never overcome both Athens and Sparta together. Isocrates 
maintains that Persia had only come to dominate the Greeks by supporting Sparta against 
Athens, which is a strategy he attributes to small powers, and he supports this claim by 
providing a concrete counterargument: that when Athens and Sparta were at war, 
whichever side Chios supported assumed supremacy at sea (4.139).68 Isocrates alludes to 
                                                 
64 On the confederacy, see Part II, Chapter 4. 
65 See below for the portrayal of Samos. For Timotheus’ capture of the island, see Part II, 
Chapter 4. 
66 Χοι γρ…ηδαιμόνησαν τε μα κα σωφρόνησαν, κα σ πεδίδου  πόλις 
ατος π τ μεζον, τοσ δ κα κοσμοντο χυρώτερον. 
67 Occipinti, “Political Conflicts in Chios,” 33, points to this passage as evidence for the 
close relationship between Chios and Athens in the early fourth century, on which see 
Part II, Chapter 3. 
68 πε κα περ Χίων ξοιμ᾽  ν τοτον τν λόγον επεν, ς ποτέροις κενοις 
κενοι προσθέσθαι βουλεθεεν, οτοι κατ θάλατταν κρείττους σαν.  
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two episodes in this passage, the rise of Spartan sea power after 411 and, more 
immediately, the renewed supremacy of Athens in 394 after the battle of Cnidus.69  
As is typical in early fourth-century oratory, Isocrates is being hyperbolic in order 
to minimize the importance of Persia.70 In reality, Chios’ support of whichever side could 
claim thalassocracy is an instance of correlation, not causation. Sparta owed its fleet to 
Persian financial support, and the secession of Chios in 411 weakened the Athenian war 
effort, but did not spell its doom, while, at the battle of Cnidus, a joint Athenian and 
Persian fleet without contribution from Chios wrested control of the sea from Sparta 
(Xen. Hell. 4.3.10-12; Diod. 14.83.4-7; Nep. Conon 4). The passage conflates the relative 
size, strength, and wealth of Chios and Persia, and, simultaneously, obscures that Persia 
played more of a role than Chios in determining whether Athens or Sparta was the 
dominant naval power. Isocrates thus exploits Chios to play up the importance of Greeks 
at the expense of barbarians, but Chios itself is unimportant. 
While arguing for a crusade against Persia later in the Panegyricus, Isocrates 
again mentioned Chios, saying (4.163): 
ν  μν    βάρβαρους  ρρωμενεστέρως  κατάσχ  τς  πόλεις  τς  π 
θαλάττ, φρουρς μείζους ν ατας  νν γκαταστήσας, τάχ᾽ ἄ  ν κα 
τν νήσων α περ τν πειρον, οον όδος κα Σάμος κα Χίος, π τς 
κείνοθ τύχας ποκλιναίεν. 
If the barbarians strengthen their hold over the poleis alongside the sea, 
placing larger garrisons in them than there are now, then the islands 
nearby the mainland, such as Rhodes, Samos, and Chios, may happen to 
join him. 
                                                 
69 Papillon, Isocrates II, 61; Usher, Greek Orators III, 188, suggests that Isocrates refers 
here to the period 394-392 when the Chians joined Thrasybulus’ fleet, but Isocrates 
surely refers to both periods. 
70 Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 107 n. 96. 
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 Isocrates singles out these at-risk poleis, but they are hardly important to his argument. 
He increases the vividness of the conditional threat to Greek liberty by identifying the 
poleis by name, but the references themselves serve no further purpose. In fact, Isocrates 
frames the conditional statement to imply that the threat of force could cause the poleis to 
slip away from the Greek world, but he does not offer a concrete threat to the 
communities or evidence that the favorable inclination of the islanders towards the 
mainland would be aught other than an increase in economic opportunity. Although he 
maintains that the Greeks who live in Asia would revolt against the Persian king if given 
the opportunity, Isocrates declines to name these poleis by name (see below). Isocrates 
needed to magnify the threat from Persia, but could not risk revealing that the island 
poleis might have preferred a Persian alignment. 
In the Plataicus, published between 373 and 371,71 Isocrates praises Chios, 
Mytilene, and Byzantium for their loyalty to Athens (14.28). The reference appears in a 
passage contrasting the record of Athenian allies, including Plataea and Chios, with that 
of Thebes, which the Plataean speaker declares betrayed not just Athens, but all of 
Greece (14.30).72 The speaker of the oration purports to be Plataean,73 so it is of little 
note that the allusion only refers to the reputed harmony between Athens and Chios rather 
than going into detail. At the same time, Plataea held a place particularly dear in the 
Athenian public imagination because of the service at Marathon in 480 and the 
mistreatment by Thebes at the outset of the Peloponnesian War, whereas Chios had gone 
                                                 
71 Papillon, “Isocrates,” 67. 
72 Pearson, “Historical Allusions,” 216, points out that Isocrates treats the Theban 
mistreatment of Plataea as common knowledge. 
73 Isocrates may have written the speech for Plataean ambassadors when the polis was 
threatened by Thebes (Xen. Hell. 5.4.10), but there is no evidence that it was read before 
the Assembly, Papillon, Isocrates II, 228-9. 
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to war with Athens in 412. Yet, whether Isocrates’ allusion is to the alliance between 
Athens and Chios during the Corinthian War, the defensive alliance forged in 384, a 
lingering reputation from the fifth century, or, more likely, a general reference to all of 
the above, the invocation reveals that mentioning Chios could win sympathy with the 
Athenian audience for Plataea. Thus, in the Plataicus Isocrates treats Chios as in a 
category of poleis that are eternal Athenian allies. 
The thesis of Isocrates’ On the Peace, published in 355, is that the peace that 
ended the Social War between Athens and Chios, Cos, Byzantium, and Rhodes, did not 
go far enough either in its provisions or in the number of states that it included (8.16).74 
Specifically, Isocrates calls for the return to an earlier treaty that made more extensive 
provisions for autonomy in Greece.75  The bulk of On the Peace (17-40) is dedicated to 
an exhortation of peace and an explanation of how imperialism undermines Athenian 
economic prosperity.76 Chios was a state with long-standing commercial ties with 
Athens,77 but is also known to have had scholastic ties with Isocrates in particular.78 Not 
                                                 
74 Sealey, Demosthenes, 103-8, nothing is known about the terms of the peace. On the 
Social War, see Part II, Chapter 4. 
75 It is probable that Isocrates was deliberately ambiguous as to which peace he refers in 
8.16-17. He likely had most in mind the King’s Peace of 386, which set the environment 
in which the Second Naval Confederacy flourished while Athenians checked their 
imperial impulses, but also the Peace of 375 in that he also mentions allowing Thebes to 
keep its ill-gotten possessions.  
76 For Isocrates’ argument that imperialism begat corruption, see: J. Davidson, “Isocrates 
against Imperialism, An Analysis of the De Pace,” Historia 39 (1990), 20-36; P. Hunt, 
War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes’ Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 259-64. 
77 Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” 96-103; Sarikakis, “Commercial Relations 
Between Chios and Other Greek Cities in Antiquity,” 122-4. 
78 Isocrates opened his first school on Chios ([Plut.] Mor. 837b-c) and supposedly 
established Athenian-style magistracies there before he was forced to leave, see Roisman 
and Worthington, Lives of the Attic Orators, 148-51. B. Strauss, “Thrasybulus and 
Conon,” AJPh 105 (1984), 40 n. 14, suggests that Isocrates may have gone to Chios to 
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every Isocratean reference to Chios can be attributed to this relationship (see above), but 
it is reasonable to assume that the link helped inform his positive representation of the 
Chians. It is possible that Isocrates is implying that the treaty concluding the Social War 
placed restrictions on commerce between Athens and Chios. It is natural for Chios to 
appear in this oration since it is a commentary on, and critique of, the negotiations that 
brought about peace between Athens and the polis, but Isocrates is concerned with how 
the peace would benefit Athens, not the wider Greek world. Chios is incidental in the 
speech in that it was a community with which Athens had recently come to terms and that 
Athens had a historical commercial relationship. However, Isocrates uses Chios and the 
other hostile states from the Social War as a jumping off point for broader Athenian 
policy. 
Four references in the speeches of Demosthenes in the 350s and 340s further 
reveal a gulf between Chios and Athens following the Social War. In Against Lacritus, a 
prosecution speech in a trial conducted in c.350,79 the speaker says that the two Phaselite 
merchants absconded to Chios with money owed to an Athenian lender (35.52-4). The 
plaintiff accused the merchants, the brothers of Lacritus, probably a metic and former 
student of Isocrates (35.15-16),80 of breaching a contract: he had lent them money for a 
commercial venture to the Bosporan kingdom, but they returned to Athens with neither 
                                                                                                                                                 
draft a new constitution at Conon’s behest. The relationship between Isocrates and Chios 
is likely also represented in Plato’s Euthydemus, see S. Dušanić, “Isocrates, the Chian 
Intellectuals, and the Political Context of the Euthydemus,” JHS 119 (1999), 1-16. On 
Isocrates’ influence on Chian politics and literary culture in the fourth century, see Part 
III, Chapter 20. 
79 On the date of the speech, see S. Isager and M. Herman Hansen, Aspects of Athenian 
Society in the Fourth Century B.C., trans. J. Hsiang Rosenmeier (Odense: Odense 
University Press, 1975), 170; MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, 261-6. The case was 
after 355 and probably before 348. 
80 MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, 262. 
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grain nor money (35.53). The merchants wanted to take out another loan while they were 
in Pontus, but the unnamed Chian lender would not extend them a loan unless he received 
their entire cargo, to which the Phaselites evidently agreed (35.52). The charge, then, was 
that Lacritus was responsible for the debts of his brothers.81  
It possible to read too much into the political relationship between Athens and 
Chios based on a single passage of a court speech where the litigant has a vested financial 
interest in demonstrating that money and goods were irrecoverable once they reached 
Chios. Moreover, the situation was exacerbated because desperation to feed the 
population led to an Athenian law against maritime loans if the ships did not return with 
grain to Athens.82 The actual case, including both loans and the actions of the Phaselites, 
was private matters, but they also reflect a period of estrangement and mercantile 
competition between Chios and Athens, albeit with third-party merchants continuing 
some measure of intercourse. Beyond this, it is notable that, while Lacritus is the one on 
trial, a portion of the blame falls to the unscrupulous Chian lender. Moreno has argued 
that Isocrates’ school helped to develop the elite networks between Athens and the 
Bosporan kingdom.83 There was a similar relationship between Isocrates and Chios, and 
Lacritus was his student, so it is probable that the presentation of the Chian agent 
undermining the supply of food for Athens obscures the fact that the entire affair 
developed out of longstanding personal relationships.84 
                                                 
81 MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, 260. 
82 Isager and Herman Hansen, Aspects of Athenian Society, 76. MacDowell, Demosthenes 
the Orator, emphasizes an easing of laws in Athens in order to encourage trade; cf. C.M. 
Reed, Maritime Traders in the Ancient Greek World (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 42-6, 89-92; Bissa, Governmental Intervention in Foreign Trade, 180-9. 
83 Moreno, Feeding the Democracy, 192-3. 
84 On these relationships see Part III, Chapter 20. 
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 In On the Freedom of the Rhodians of 351/0, Demosthenes calls out the hypocrisy 
of the Chians and Byzantines, who, he says, allied with the Rhodians on the grounds that 
the Athenians were conspiring against them but, when Mausolus infringed on the 
freedom of the Rhodians, the Chians and Byzantines offered no assistance (15.3-4). 
Demosthenes elides that Mausolus supported the oligarchs in Rhodes rather than 
intervening directly,85 explaining instead that Chios did not offer aid because it was 
governed by an oligarchic faction (15.19).86 However, Radicke plausibly argues that in 
351 Chios was already under Mausolus’ sway and may have had a Carian garrison.87 
Demosthenes is disingenuous when accusing the Chians, offering a simplistic account of 
political theory to show why others refused to fight for freedom. This was probably by 
design, since Demosthenes sought in vain to persuade the Athenians to intervene on 
behalf of the Rhodian exiles.88 
Demosthenes’ political speeches in the 340s further testify to the estrangement 
between Athens and Chios, but he also manipulates the idea of Chios to guide the 
Assembly. In 346, while advocating that Athens avoid war, Demosthenes lists the 
Hecatomnid occupation of Chios (in a change from 351/0), Cos, and Rhodes among the 
slights Athens had endured in the name of preserving peace, along with the detention of 
Athenian ships by the Byzantines and allowing Philip to keep Amphipolis (5.25).89 
Denying Philip a role in the Amphictyony risked a sacred war, so Demosthenes argued 
                                                 
85 MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, 220. 
86 Hunt, War, Peace, and Alliance, 90-2; MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, 220; 
Worthington, Demosthenes, 125. 
87 J. Radicke, Die Rede des Demosthenes für die Freiheit der Rhodier (Stuttgart: Teubner, 
1995), 188-91. 
88 Worthington, Demosthenes, 125-6. 
89 Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 113-14, argues that Chios was the price Athens 
paid to keep Samos. 
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for a policy of appeasement.90 The passage suggests that a group in Athens advocated for 
liberating Chios from Mausolus, but the list also recalls the idea that Athens traditionally 
fought for the liberty of all Greeks against barbarian potentates more than any specific 
contemporary consideration. When Demosthenes conducted a volte-face with reference to 
Philip by 341 he had to persuade the Assembly not only to send a fleet to relieve 
Byzantium, but also to send ambassadors to Chios and Rhodes to create an anti-
Macedonian alliance (9.71).91 The crux of Demosthenes’ argument in the Third Philippic 
(of 341) is that Philip had already declared war on Athens and thus that Athens had not 
choice but to fight back.92 Chios only appears in the speech part of his plan for Athens to 
confront Philip as the leader of a broad coalition with Persian financial aid.93 
Demosthenes changes tack about Chios’ agency from On the Peace because Chios’ 
subordination to Caria undermines the notion that Athens would rally the free states of 
Greece against an oppressor.  
The ambassadors to Chios probably included Hyperides, who gave his Chians 
upon his return.94 Hyperides, like Demosthenes, advocated an aggressive policy to curtail 
the growth of Macedonian power (Hyp. 6.12).95 In 340 when Philip besieged Byzantium, 
Hyperides helped underwrite the cost of outfitting an Athenian fleet, and personally led 
one of the triremes to the Hellespont, perhaps using money given to Ephialtes by the 
                                                 
90 Worthington, Demosthenes, 185. 
91 [Plut.] Mor. 847f-850a; Buckler, Aegean Greece, 475-6; Roisman and Worthington, 
Lives of the Attic Orators, 243, 250. 
92 Worthington, Demosthenes, 185. 
93 Sealey, Demosthenes, 181-5; Worthington, Demosthenes, 224. 
94 Buckler, Aegean Greece, 475-6; Cooper, Dinarchus, Hyperides, and Lycurgus, 63. 
95 C. Carey, et. al., “Fragments of Hyperides’ “Against Diondas” from the Archimedes 
Palimpsest,” ZPE 165 (2008), 1-19; Worthington, Demosthenes, 129-30, 224. 
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Persian king to defray the expense.96 Hyperides also achieved distinction as a diplomat 
and is known to have delivered speeches dedicated to other poleis, including Rhodes, 
which likewise contributed to the allied force that sailed to Byzantium in 341/0 ([Plut.] 
Mor. 848e).97  Further, a scholiast on Aristophanes’ Birds (ll. 877-880) wrote that, in the 
Chians, Hyperides showed that the Chians offered sacrifices on behalf of the Athenians 
just as Aristophanes quipped that the Athenians offered sacrifices for the Chians.98 The 
scholiast uses the passage to show the reciprocity between Athens and Chios, but the 
consensus is that the reference to the Chians was taken out of context in that it refers to 
the foundation of the Second Naval Confederacy instead of the fifth century.99 Hyperides 
may have referred to the 380s in his speech, but the Chians itself was probably delivered 
in 341/0, in conjunction with Demosthenes’ On the Chersonese and Third Philippic, to 
persuade the Assembly that the two states had been close in the past and ought to work in 
concert in the struggle against Philip going forward. Hyperides’ diplomacy and speeches 
probably supplemented Demosthenes’ efforts to persuade the demos to forget the 
                                                 
96 [Plutarch] says that he was suspected of accepting money from Ephialtes (Mor. 848e); 
IG II2 1628 ll. 436-7, IG II2 1629 ll. 957-8; Lewis, APF, 519; Roisman and Worthington, 
Lives of the Atttic Orators, 243, 50; Worthington, Demosthenes, 224. 
97 A. Blanshard, “Trapped Between Athens and Chios: A Relationship in Fragments,” in 
The World of Ion of Chios, edd. V. Jennings and A. Katsaros (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 160. It 
is possible that the Rhodian oration dates instead to 323/2 after the death of Alexander 
since [Plutarch] says that he met Antipater’s envoys there (Mor. 850a), but the biographer 
does not mention an oration and it is possible that Hyperides visited Rhodes more than 
once, R.M. Berthold “Fourth Century Rhodes,” Historia 29 (1980), 44-5 n. 51; cf. 
Roisman and Worthington, Lives of the Attic Orators, 260. Philip did not capture 
Byzantium and returned Byzantine, Rhodian, and Chian ships after capturing a corn fleet 
in 340, see Worthington, Philip II, 132-5. 
98 ν τ Χιακ κα τι Χοι ηχοντο θηναίοις δεδήλωκεν. Blanshard, “Trapped 
Between Athens and Chios,” 160-1.  
99 Blanshard, “Trapped Between Athens and Chios,” 160-1. Gratitude in Athens refers to 
the alliance in 384. Shrimpton Theopompus of Chios, 55; Theopompus, BNJ 115 F 104. 
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(perceived) wrongs committed by Byzantium and Chios and to send aid to the Hellespont 
against Philip (Dem. 9.71; Plut. Dem. 17.2).100 
Finally, in his On the Crown of 330, Demosthenes argued that Athenian resources 
had been limited because only the weakest island states were Athenian allies, and he 
singles out Chios, Rhodes, and Corcyra for not supporting Athens (18.234). Demosthenes 
then refered to the amount of syntaxis Athens collected from its allies in 338 in order to 
show the relatively paltry stream of Athenian income, which makes Yunis’ suggestion 
that Demosthenes lamented the loss of Chios because of the loss of revenue possible.101 
More likely, Demosthenes highlighted both the loss of the syntaxis and the loss of Chian 
forces. Yet Demosthenes was trying to excuse the defeat at Chaeroneia and validate his 
own counsel, so the importance of Chios is its absence as a cause of Athenian weakness, 
not to explain why Chios did not support Athens. 
 
V. Samos in Attic Oratory 
While the references to Chios reflect the complex relationship between the two 
states, the Athenian interest in Samos was as a physical, dominated space. The references 
in Isocrates’ Antidosis, Demosthenes’ On the Freedom of the Rhodians, and Dinarchus’ 
Against Demosthenes and Against Philocles may be broadly categorized as commentary 
about Timotheus’ conquest of the island in 366 or the subsequent circumstances of the 
                                                 
100 Buckler, Aegean Greece, 484; Hornblower, Mausolus, 211; Worthington, 
Demosthenes, 224. Political amity eventually evaporated and Hyperides prosecuted 
Demosthenes for having received a bribe of twenty talents in 323, see Worthington, 
Demosthenes, 316-17. 
101 H. Yunis, Demosthenes, On the Crown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 239. 
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Athenian cleruchy after 365/4 (Diod. 18.18.9).102 Two references (Dem. 21.71; Aes. 
1.53) are excluded from the following discussion because they refer to events on the 
island and activities of the Athenian cleruchs, but do not bring up the displaced citizens 
of the peregrine polis and therefore use “Samos” only in the sense of the Athenian 
territory, not the Ionian state. Two further references, Andocides’ discussion of supplying 
spars for the fleet at Samos (2.11) and Lysias’ accusation that Eratosthenes had 
summoned Lysander from Samos to Athens in 404 (12.71), both composed in the waning 
years of the fifth century, reflect the immediate context of the Peloponnesian War, yet, 
already, the orators refer to the island in its capacity as a naval base rather than as an 
independent entity.103 There was a close relationship between Athens and Samos in 411 
when the Athenian fleet was based there, but, if Samos was a concern in Athenian public 
discourse, the Athenians faced more pressing issues. Yet, even taking into account that, 
to the Athenians, the Samian state ceased to exist in 366, Samos featured in Attic oratory 
less than Chios. 
Three orators, Isocrates, Demosthenes, and Dinarchus, refer to Timotheus’ 
conquest of Samos in their orations while manipulating the topos that was the general’s 
exploits.104 Isocrates defends his former student Timotheus in the Antidosis (15.101-139), 
ostensibly because his opponents accused him of corrupting his students by blaming him 
                                                 
102 See Part II, Chapter 4 for the Athenian conquest of Samos. The cleruchs probably 
included the descendants of the “loyal” Samians who had received Athenian citizenship 
after the overthrow of the pro-Athenian government in 405, Cargill, “IG II2 1 and the 
Athenian Kleruchy on Samos,” 321-32; cf. Shipley, Samos, 141-3.  
103 M. Gagarin and D.M. MacDowell, Antiphon and Andocides (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1998), 141. 
104 I. Worthington, A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1992), 21-2.  
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for Timotheus’ actions.105 Isocrates refutes the charge by saying that Timotheus’ actions 
benefitted the Athenian people without bringing them harm, including that he treated the 
conquered communities with mildness (πράως...κα νομίμως, 15.125) and that 
Timotheus was the only general who gave the other Greeks no grounds for dispute with 
Athens (μόνος ν μες μνεμονεύομεν ανέγκλητον τν πόλιν τος λλεσι παρέσχε, 
15.127). In the litany of Timotheus’ successes is that he conquered Samos, an action that 
Isocrates compares favorably with Pericles’ conquest of the same polis (15.111).  
Isocrates plays on Pericles’ virtuous reputation with moral and philosophical 
language ( μεγίστην π σοφί κα δικαιοσύν κα σωφροσύν) and then reminds the 
audience that Pericles required two hundred ships and a thousand talents to capture 
Samos in 440, while in ten months Timotheus achieved comparable results with eight 
thousand peltasts, thirty triremes and, critically, did not require funds from either Athens 
or its allies, instead paying for the campaign with spoils from the war (τούτοις πασιν κ 
τς πολεμίας τν μισθν πέδωκε).106 According to the speech, Timotheus was the only 
general to have achieved this feat. Isocrates thus links his errant pupil with a towering 
figure in Athenian public memory. The passage particularly makes reference to the apex 
of Athenian power, offering that Timotheus could restore those halcyon times, but also 
taps into the other reasons why Pericles was venerated, such as his civic mindedness and 
                                                 
105 Y.L. Too, A Commentary on Isocrates’ Antidosis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), 
137. 
106 Timotheus’ financial successes at Samos worked their way into the canon of ancient 
military strategy (Polyaenus 3.10.9). Demosthenes (49.1-2, 6, 9) argues that Timotheus 
asked for loans to finance his expedition and then did not pay back the debts. See Too, 
Isocrates’ Antidosis, 145. Cf. Arist. Oec. 2.135b; Nepos, Tim. 2.3. For Pericles’ campaign 
against Samos, see Part II, Chapter 2.  
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service to the democracy.107 In so doing, Isocrates glosses over Timotheus’ faults, 
including that he entered into Persian pay in the late 370s and had been fined one hundred 
talents in 356/5,108 and only directly refutes the charge of being un-democratic 
(15.131).109 In fact, the capture of Samos is one of the few events in Timotheus’ career 
that was unequivocally considered in a positive light by Attic orators. 
Dinarchus also considers Timotheus’ conquest of Samos as a benefaction for 
Athens (1.14; 3.17).110 But where Isocrates focuses on the services that Timotheus 
rendered to the city, Dinarchus reverses the example to demonstrate that the jury 
convicted Timotheus when he was accused of having taken money from the Chians and 
Rhodians. In particular, Dinarchus compares Timotheus and the two states that bribed 
him with Demosthenes, who was accused of having taken bribes from the Persians and 
from Alexander’s corrupt imperial treasurer Harpalus.111 Dinarchus has to consider the 
conquest of Samos as an exemplary benefaction for Athens in order to show that it was 
despite these actions that the jury ordered a fine of one hundred talents. Thus he 
compresses Timotheus’ career, simply listing the events, irrespective of chronology. The 
acceptance of bribes from the Chians and Rhodians, which was the supposed reason for 
Timotheus’ failure to help Chares in the battle of Emabata in 356 during the Social War, 
                                                 
107 On the public memory of Pericles and Plato’s critiques thereof, see S.S. Monoson, 
“Remembering Pericles: The Political and Theoretical Import of Plato’s Menexenus,” 
Political Theory 26 (1998), 489-513. L.J. Samons II, Pericles and the Conquest of 
History: A Political Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 215-16, 
states that Pericles had only a limited political afterlife. 
108 Too, Isocrates’ Antidosis, 144-5, 156.  
109 Poulakis, Speaking for the Polis, 102-3, observes that Isocrates does critique 
Timotheus following this praise, presenting him as a tragically flawed character whose 
primary failing was the inability to court favor with his fellow citizens. 
110 Worthington, Historical Commentary on Dinarchus, 148-56. 
111 Worthington, Historical Commentary on Dinarchus, 156. 
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is neither treated as an anti-democratic act, nor, as it might be characterized, treason.112 
Instead, Dinarchus juxtaposes the campaigns Timotheus famously waged with minimal 
financial support, including the capture of Samos, with the conviction for accepting 
bribes. In this passage, the inclusion of Chios as the source of the bribes is just a 
historical fact, not more, while he invokes Samos for emotional effect in the Athenian 
jury since it also called to mind the impending loss of Samos as a result of the Exiles 
Decree.113 
For both Isocrates and Dinarchus, Timotheus’ conquest of Samos is important as 
one of his successful military campaigns waged on behalf of Athens, of inherent value to 
the citizens without regard to its cost to the Samians or the surrounding circumstances. In 
contrast, Demosthenes brings up the campaign as precedent for an Athenian intervention 
on Rhodes (15.9). The passage appears in the course On the Freedom of the Rhodians, a 
speech dedicated to, on the one hand, preventing the Athenians from directly waging war 
against the Persian king and, on the other, supporting intervention against the Carians in 
Rhodes. Demosthenes argues that the Assembly dispatched Timotheus to aid 
Ariobarzanes on the condition that it did not contravene the King’s Peace; when 
Timotheus learned that Cyprothemis had occupied Samos, he liberated the island. Here, 
too, there is no mention of the Samian people, but Demosthenes specifically frames 
Timotheus’ campaign as one of liberation of the Greeks from the Persians rather than one 
of Athenian expansion. 
                                                 
112 Worthington, Historical Commentary on Dinarchus, 154. Chares and Aristophon 
concocted the court case Dinarchus refers to in order to remove Timotheus from the 
Athenian political scene. 
113 Worthington, Historical Commentary on Dinarchus, 152. On the Exiles Decree, see 
Part II, Chapter 5 and Part III, Chapter 13. 
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Only one fourth-century passage that mentioned Samos did not in some way deal 
with the Athenian conquest: Isocrates’ citation of Pythagoras of Samos, a sixth-century 
philosopher. In the Busiris, a work meant to advertise his educational program,114 
Isocrates provides a commentary on Egyptian piety, of which Pythagoras was supposed 
to have been an eyewitness (11.28).115 The passage invokes a famous son of Samos 
without commenting on the polis. After 366, Samos grew in importance in Athenian 
discourse since it was occupied by Athenian citizens, but at no point does the Ionian polis 
Samos appear in Athenian oratory, and in the only reference to the event that identifies 
from whom Timotheus conquered the island, Demosthenes names the Persians rather 
than the Samians. 
Samos and Chios appear with much more frequency in Attic oratory than do other 
Ionian poleis, but each still occupied its own niche. Orators usually cited Chios with 
reference to its tradition of loyalty to Athens or to lament the estrangement between the 
two poleis. Nevertheless, there is an acknowledgement on the part of the Athenians that 
Chios was an independent entity. Even in Isocrates’ Archidamus, where the Spartan King 
Pedaritus says that he preserved the polis for Sparta at the end of the Peloponnesian War 
(6.53), there is a sense that the Spartan harmost was in Chios at the behest of a faction of 
the population.116 Not so Samos. The island was a feature of Athenian public discourse in 
the fourth century, but the community was not. There may have been controversy about 
the decision to send a cleruchy in the 360s, but the conquest of Samos was a point of 
                                                 
114 N. Livingstone, A Commentary on Isocrates’ Busiris (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 1-3. 
115 Livingstone, Commentary on Isocrates’ Busiris, 150, argues that the depiction of 
Egyptian religion is exaggerated and not wholly serious, and, 156-62, notes that a visit to 
Egypt is a biographical topos for wise men in ancient Greece. 
116 Πεδάριτος μν γρ ες Χίον εσπλεύσας τν πόλιν ατν διέσωσε. cf. Thuc. 8.55.3, 
see Part II, Chapter 3. 
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pride in the extant speeches and Athenians relinquished the island back to the nostoi only 
with great reluctance after Alexander’s death, and without ever actually acknowledging 
from whom they conquered it.117 
 
VI. Anatolian Ionia in Attic Oratory 
Most references to the communities on the Anatolian littoral emphasize the 
willingness and ability of the Ionians to fight against Persia. Isocrates praises the Ionians 
for their oath not to rebuild their temples that had been burned during the revolt against 
Persia in 499-494 (4.156). He maintains that the Ionians left the ruined temples as a 
memorial (πόμνεμα) to barbarian impiety, rather than because they could not afford 
new construction.118 The oath is otherwise unattested and probably belongs to a large 
category of artificial traditions about the Persian Wars that developed in the fifth and 
fourth centuries, such as the Oath of Plataea.119 The unspoken implication is that 
Athenian liberation of Ionia in 480/79, which led to Athenian hegemony over the Delian 
League, was economically beneficial for Ionia, so the prohibitive cost could not explain 
why the Ionian temples had not yet been rebuilt. There are no details about which temples 
Isocrates is referring to so there is no way to check the veracity of his statement, but there 
is evidence for new temple construction at the Artemisium at Ephesus in the early fourth-
century, while the temples left in ruins, such as the temple of Apollo at Didyma, usually 
                                                 
117 See Part II, Chapter 5. 
118 See Part III, Chapter 18. 
119 P. Cartledge, After Thermopylae: The oath of Plataea and the end of the Graeco-
Persian Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), particularly 122-61. 
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had other explanations for their state.120 Further, the rebuilding of temples, in terms of 
both planning and construction, began before Alexander’s conquest of Persia. Thus, 
Isocrates attributed a rationale to the Ionians that supported his belief that the Ionian 
Greeks eagerly awaited their opportunity for retribution against the Persians, irrespective 
of actual conditions.  
The abandonment of the Ionian Greeks to Persia became a topos that forms the 
bulk of the references to mainland Ionia in Attic oratory, buttressed in no small part by 
the surviving Isocratean corpus. Formally, the mainland Ionian communities reverted to 
Persian control under the terms of the King’s Peace in 386 and Isocrates suggests that, at 
least in the 380s, the Ionian poleis were lightly garrisoned by the Persians (4.163).121 The 
orator firmly believed that the panacea for Greek woes would be found in war against 
Persia (see above). Thus, in the Panegyricus, Isocrates recalls the two episodes that pit 
European Greeks against Asia, the Trojan War and Xerxes’ invasion of Europe in 480 
(4.82-3). In particular, he emphasizes how the Athenian triumph over the Persians took 
less time and was more beneficial for the Greeks than was the Trojan War since the 
Athenians “also liberated the rest of Hellas” (κα ην σύμπασαν λλάδα λευθέρωσαν, 
4.83). Isocrates conspicuously constructs his proposals around an ongoing conflict 
between Europe and Asia, with Ionia falling into a gray area between the two.122 He 
undoubtedly means that Athens also liberated the Greeks of Asia, but he uses Hellas here 
                                                 
120 The Branchidae, hereditary prophets at Didyma, were forcibly relocated to Bactria in 
493 and that oracle fell silent until Alexander recaptured Miletus in 334. Construction on 
a new temple began with funds from Hellenistic dynasts. It was never finished. See H.W. 
Parke, “The Temple of Apollo at Didyma: The Building and Its Function,” JHS 106 
(1986), 125-6, see Part III, Chapter 18. 
121 Isocrates’ implication is that the King could threaten free Greeks should he choose to 
expand the garrisons along the coast. 
122 J. de Romilly, “Isocrates and Europe,” G&R 39 (1992), 2-13. 
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in order to make the category of people liberated by Athens as broad as possible. Yet, 
Ionians fought for Xerxes in 480 when the Great King drew together an army from Asia 
(Hdt. 7.94).123 Moreover, Isocrates says that Asia was prosperous (εδαιμονίας) and that 
the Greeks should bring that fortune back to Europe (4.187). Ionia occupied a liminal 
position, not fully Asian and not European, while residing geographically in Asia. If 
Isocrates was correct that Asia prospered, then likewise Ionia, but he probably meant to 
suggest that, as Greeks, there would be no change for the Ionians were Asia plundered.124 
There are two sides to Isocrates’ argument that Greeks, usually the Spartans, had 
betrayed the Ionians to Persia: the betrayal itself and his certainty that Ionians would rise 
up against their Persian overlords. Twice Isocrates says that the Spartans betrayed the 
Ionians. First, he claims in the Panegyricus that “on the one hand they caused the Ionians 
to revolt from our polis [Athens], from whence the Ionians emigrated and by whom they 
were many times kept safe, and on the other they surrendered those people to the 
barbarians” (4.122).125 While admiting that both Athenians and Spartans conceded that 
Asia belonged to the Persian king (4.137), he frames this as a betrayal on the part of 
Spartans and an acceptance of the new reality for Athenians. Isocrates repeats this refrain 
in the Panathenaicus (12.103-4):126 
Λακεδαιμόνιοι...λλ κα τν κατ θάλατταν δύναμιν οτως 
πεθύμησαν λαβεν στε κατ τος ατος χρόνους τούς τε συμμάχους 
τος μετέρους φίστασαν λευθερώσειν ατος πισχνούμενοι, κα 
βασιλε περ φιλίας διελέγοντο κα συμμαχίας, παραδώσειν ατ 
                                                 
123 Balcer, Sparda, 255-6. 
124 Isoc. 5.132, also refers to the wealth of Asia. 
125 κα τς μέν μετέρας πόλεως τος ωνας πέστησαν, ξ ς πκησαν κα δι᾽  ν 
πολλάκις σώθησαν, τος δ βαρβάροις ατος ξέδοσαν, ν κόντων τν χώραν 
ξουσι κα πρς ος οδ πώποτ᾽  παύσαντο πολεμοντες. On Isocrates on the Ionian 
Migration, see above. 
126 Trans. Papillon, Isocrates II, 195. 
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φάσκοντες παντας τος π τς σίας κατοικοντας, πίστεις δ δντες 
τούτοις μφοτέροις κα καταπολεμήσαντες μς ος μν 
λευθερώσειν μοσαν, κατεδουλώσαντο μλλον  τος Ελωτας... 
 
 “The Spartans…were so eager to seize control of the sea as well that they 
induced our allies to revolt with the promise to free them, and also 
negotiated with the King for a treaty of friendship and alliance, offering to 
hand over all those who lived in Asia. But after they gave pledges to both 
these parties and then they defeated, those they had pledged to free they 
enslaved more than the helots.” 
 
 
Isocrates also reiterates the basic contrast between the records of Sparta and Athens with 
respect to the affairs of Asia, arguing that when the Athenians held hegemony, the 
Persians could not bring warships further west than Phaselis or armies closer to the sea 
than the river Halys (4.118; 7.80; 12.59); when the Spartans held hegemony, the Persians 
ruled over Greeks. Though Isocrates does not single out the Ionians as the victims of this 
change, they are clearly included in the reference. 
The Greek concession of Asia to the Persian king as a part of a treaty also 
emerges in Isocrates’ oration To Philip of 346 (5.100), where he pairs the surrender of the 
Greeks of Asia with the inability of the Persian king to maintain control over the poleis 
taken through the treaty. Isocrates tells Philip that Mausolus’ brother Idrieus would rally 
to the banner of freedom, and says that it was the promise of freedom that brought the 
Athenian and the Spartan empires to ruin (5.104). Isocrates maintains in this passage that 
the Persian satraps would rebel and thereby tear apart the Persian Empire by its 
constituent elements. While commenting on Ionian forces fighting for Tiribazus in 380, 
Isocrates implied that the Asian Greeks would join a panehellenic crusade (4.135), but by 
346, his perception of the Ionian states had changed, so bringing freedom to the Greeks 
of Asia only receives passing mention. First, he suggests that Persian satraps, including 
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Idreius, who held sway over Ionian poleis, would revolt from the King given the 
opportunity. Second, Isocrates says that if Philip conquered Anatolia, he ought to 
establish new communities from the landless mercenaries in Greece, which would both 
provide a first line of defense in the case of a Persian counter-attack and solve the Greek 
problem with unemployed soldiers of fortune (5.122-3).127 Only then, as an aside, does 
Isocrates say that even if Philip missed the chance to resolve the mercenary problem, he 
will still easily free the Greek poleis in Asia (λλ᾽  κενό γε δίως ποιήσεις, τς πόλεις 
τς τήν σίαν κατοικούσας λευθερώσεις, 5.123). By 346, the Ionian poleis are thus 
incidental rather than instrumental to Isocrates’ vision of a panhellenic crusade against 
Persia.  
The only reference to a specific mainland Ionian polis in the corpus of surviving 
speeches is to Erythrae in Demosthenes’ On the Chersonese of 341 (8.24).128 
Demosthenes delivered the oration in support of the general Diopeithes, who had led a 
mercenary army to the Hellespont. The Athenian Assembly routinely half-funded 
expeditions, so Diopeithes resorted to extorting and sacking communities and detaining 
merchant vessels in order to pay his army (8.9, 26-28).129 However, Diopeithes’ actions 
were distinguished from “regular” practices because his targets were Philip’s allies and 
he had kidnapped Philip’s herald.130 The victims of extortion and captured merchant 
ships complained to Philip, who sent embassies to Athens insisting that charges be 
                                                 
127 Mentioned also at Isoc. 4.168, 8.24 and Ep. 9.9. Papillon, Isocrates II, 102. On the 
fear of itinerant warriors challenging the community status quo, see Μ. Trundle, Greek 
Mercenaries: from the late archaic period to Alexander (London: Routledge, 2004), 31. 
128 For analyses of the speech as a whole, see MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, 346-
9; Worthington, Demosthenes, 217-21. 
129 For other examples of this practice, see Arist. Oec. 2.1350a. 
130 Worthington, Demosthenes, 214-16. 
 247
brought against Diopeithes.131 While Demosthenes agrees that they ought not sanction the 
capture of merchantmen (8.9), he maintains that a trial of Diopeithes would weaken the 
Athenian military position (8.10). In particular, Demosthenes argues that Philip was 
garrisoning Cardia in violation of the peace agreement and that Philip was at war with 
Athens already.132 The correct course of action, Demosthenes says, is for the Assembly to 
increase the size of Diopeithes’ army and better fund it (8.19; cf. 9.15-16, 20).133  
Demosthenes defended Diopeithes in the speech in the course of vilifying Philip, 
but his comments have broad implication for the relationship between Athens and Ionia. 
Demosthenes argues that all Athenian generals ran a protection racket where they funded 
expeditions by collecting payments from Erythrae, Chios, and other Greek communities, 
in exchange for which the Athenians would not capture their merchant vessels (8.25). 
Athens and Chios had been on shaky terms since the latter left the Second Naval 
Confederacy in 356, so Athenian fleets demanding resources is indicative of continuing 
hostilities. Further, Hunt has argued that Demosthenes portrayed other states with a 
general lack of morality, thereby justifying Athenian use of force.134 This is borne out in 
the speech, where there is no mention of the issues of sovereignty or autonomy. What 
makes Erythrae a surprising inclusion here is that, officially, it was a Persian subject so 
this practice that Demosthenes describes as common was in contravention of the King’s 
Peace. With this background, Demosthenes challenges his audience μέλει γάρ τινι 
τούτων τν τν σίαν οκούντων λλήνων; (“does anyone care about those Greeks who 
                                                 
131 Worthington, Philip, 126. 
132 G.L. Cawkwell, “Demosthenes’ Policy after the Peace of Philocrates II,” CQ 13 
(1963), 200. 
133 Hunt, War, Peace, and Alliance, 64-5, notes the optimistic tone of Athenian orators 
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134 Hunt, War, Peace, and Alliance, 160-3. 
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live in Asia?,” 8.27). Demosthenes clearly means the answer to be no, and that any 
concern professed is feigned, yet the question itself reveals that in 341 there were 
Athenians who did profess to care about Asian Greeks.  
Isocrates wrote in favor of a panhellenic crusade against Persia and Demosthenes 
argued for an anti-Macedonian alliance. For both orators, the Ionian poleis on the 
mainland were a cause for sympathy at best, a distraction at worst, but more often 
incidental. Isocrates, in particular, chastises the Spartans for inducing the Ionians to 
revolt and then betraying them to Persia. Yet he does not mention a single betrayed polis 
by name, which indicates that he is much more concerned with haranguing the Spartans 
for their willingness to broker deals with the Persian King than in the fate of the 
Ionians.135 Moreover, the receipt of the Ionian poleis from Sparta is the only appearance 
of the Persian king with reference to Ionia. Demosthenes describes the Athenian extortion 
of Erythrae as commonplace, but the complaints about Athenian naval activity came from 
concerned citizens and Philip, the target of Demosthenes’ diatribe, not from the Persian 
king. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
There are four broad categories that most of the references to Ionia in fourth-
century Attic oratory fall into: myth, Chios, Samos, and the mainland communities. Of 
these, the orators treated only Chios as an independent entity, but even then, quite 
naturally, defined its position with respect to that of Athens. Samos occupied the opposite 
extreme position from Chios, mentioned frequently in speeches, but in light of its 
                                                 
135 For the anti-Spartan bias in Attic oratory, see Perlman, “The Historical Example,” 
157-60. 
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geographical space rather than its political entity. Of the other Ionian poleis, only 
Erythrae received any mention at all. The scarcity of source material for fourth-century 
Ionia creates an illusion that there was little happening that was of note in the region after 
it settled into a political status quo after 386.  While the lack of sources does hamper 
many lines of inquiry into Ionia during the fourth century, that should not be taken to 
indicate that Ionia was quiescent or that Athenians were ignorant of developments in the 
region.  
The Attic orators provide one narrow window into Athenian public and political 
discourse in the fourth century and do so obliquely. Other than a single piece of 
testimony from Hyperides’ Chians, none of the surviving speeches was dedicated to an 
Ionian polis or Ionia as a whole. Through the extant speeches it is possible to trace the 
opinion first of the individual orators and, by extension, the Athenian public. This is 
particularly true in the case of Chios, which Isocrates treats as an eternal ally, while 
Demosthenes’ speeches reveal a period of estrangement followed by rapprochement in 
building a coalition to oppose Philip. Every reference to Ionia in extant Athenian 
speeches appears in support of another course of action during a century when Athens 
was frequently embroiled in conflicts elsewhere, including with Philip II’s nascent (and 
then ascendant) Macedonian kingdom. Nevertheless, the frequency with which Ionia 
appears is itself a testament to its importance in Athenian public consciousness. To 
answer Demosthenes’ rhetorical question, yes, the Athenians did care about the Greeks 
who lived in Asia.
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12. Interstate arbitration in Classical and Early Hellenistic Ionia 
 
I. Interstate Arbitration in Ancient Greece 
Arbitration was a common feature of interstate relations in the Greek world as 
early as the sixth and seventh centuries, its origins probably linked to the appearance of 
hegemonic and imperial powers.1 Greeks distinguished between arbitration and mediation 
as forms of conflict resolution, with arbitration between states not requiring the consent 
of the disputants.2 If both parties did not submit to the arbitration there was a possibility 
of military conflict and therefore the party conducting the arbitration had to be more 
militarily powerful than or have the respect of both communities in the conflict.3 It is no 
surprise that in Ionia most cases took place when the region was under the control of 
imperial powers. As part of the settlement of the Ionian Revolt in 492, the Persian 
Artaphernes required the Ionian poleis to submit their disputes to arbitration, with the 
final decision belonging to the satrap, in lieu of raiding one another (Hdt. 6.42).4  
Arbitration was often the first recourse for the weaker party against a more powerful 
neighbor.5 For instance, Myus appealed for arbitration against Miletus in the 390s but 
withdrew the suit before the verdict (see below).  
                                                 
1 For an overview of Greek arbitration, see Adcock and Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient 
Greece, 210-15; Ager, “Interstate Governance: Arbitration and Peacekeeping,” 497-511; 
Ager, Interstate Arbitrations, 3-33.  
2 Ager, “Interstate Governance: Arbitration and Peacekeeping,” 499. 
3 Perhaps the most famous of these arbitrations is found in the Tegea Decree recording 
the exiles decree and enforced by Alexander the Great, see Heisserer, Alexander the 
Great and the Greeks, 205-29. 
4 Georges, “Persian Ionia under Darius,” 34. 
5 Ager, Interstate Arbitration, 3. 
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Arbitration did not always lead to the final settlement in these disputes, but was 
usually a temporary solution, such as in the case of the territorial conflict between Samos 
and Priene that flared up repeatedly after it was first resolved by Bias of Priene in the 
sixth century (Plut. Mor. 295f-296a).6 There was a wide range of disputes that Greek 
communities submitted to arbitration, including allegations of debt and problems 
concerning treaties, but the most common cause was conflict over land.7 In Ionia, in fact, 
just one arbitration is recorded that dealt with a dispute over something other than 
territorial boundaries. 
Federal leagues, as well as imperial powers, played a role in arbitrating between 
communities.8 Ager rightly notes that the rise of these leagues alongside the Hellenistic 
kingdoms ushered in a period of more arbitrations than had existed in the earlier periods 
of Greek history.9 Yet, the Ionian League, despite the terminology used to refer to it, was 
not a federal league.10 The schism between religion and politics is a modern distinction 
and the Ionians did meet to discuss political issues at the sanctuary, but the league did not 
possess federal political institutions of the sort created by the Delian League and 
subsequent federations.11 
                                                 
6 For the repeated arbitrations see: Ager 26; Ager 160; Piccirilli 4. See A. Magnetto, 
L’arbitrato di Rodi fra Samo e Priene (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2008). 
7 Ager, Interstate Arbitration, 4. 
8 Ager, Interstate Arbitration, 22-6. J.A.O. Larsen, Greek Federal States: Their 
Institutions and History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), xvi, describes the 
league as “probably an incipient federal state.” 
9 Ager, Interstate Arbitration, 19-20; S. Ager, “Keeping the Peace in Ionia: Kings and 
Poleis,” in Regionalism in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor, edd. H. Elton and G. 
Reger (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2007), 46, argues that Hellenistic monarchs drew on the 
precedents of both Persian royal authority and Greek voluntary arbitration.  
10 It is mentioned only once in Larsen, Greek Federal States. See Metcalfe, “Reaffirming 
Regional Identity,” 86-107. On the Ionian League, see Part III, Chapter 8. 
11 MacSweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 174; How and Wells, CH 1, 123. 
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A review of the known arbitrations between the Ionian poleis between 454 and 
294 with respect to their contemporary political contexts and how the disputes were 
resolved reveals that the league possessed the power of arbitration in only very specific 
cases concerning religious governance. The majority of the cases of arbitration, which 
will be addressed first, involved disputes over land and were the prerogative of the 
imperial powers under whose watch the conflict flared up.  
 
II. Land and Territorial Disputes 
The only recorded arbitration in fifth-century Ionia was for the dispute between 
Samos and Miletus in 440 in the vicinity of Priene, which culminated in the Athenian 
siege of Samos.12 Thucydides describes the conflict as taking place περ Πριήνης, which 
may be interpreted either as Priene being the prize Miletus and Samos fought over, or 
merely indicate that they fought in the vicinity of Priene. Metcalfe notes that all three 
communities had land on the Mycale peninsula, and since Priene was the only settlement 
actually located there and is never mentioned in the resolution of the conflict despite 
being an Athenian ally, I prefer the latter reading.13  
                                                 
12 Piccirilli, 22. Shipley, Samos, 113, following Gomme, argues that the conflict was not 
specifically over control of Priene, but between Miletus, Samos, and Priene over territory 
on the Mycale Peninsula. Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 428, n.14, maintains that the conflict 
was over control of Priene, which Samos claimed as recompense for losing Marathesium, 
see Part II, Chapter 2. 
13 Metcalfe, “Reaffirming Regional Identity,” 130. I have made this argument in “The 
War between Miletus and Samos περ Πριήνης (Thuc. 1.115.2; Diod. Sic. 12.27.2; and 
Plut. Per. 25.1),” CQ2 66 (2016), 772-4. 
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The arbitration between Milietus and Samos never took place, and only Plutarch’s 
account of the event mentions that the process was discussed (Per. 25.1).14 In contrast, 
Diodorus explains the Samian revolt as the result of Athenian favoritism toward Miletus 
(12.27.1) and Thucydides says that Athens responded to an appeal from both Miletus and 
a faction within Samos (1.115.2-3). There is a frustrating lack of corroboration between 
these writers as to the causes of the conflict, but there is also no explicit contradiction. It 
is plausible that the Athenians received an appeal, then ordered arbitration, and that the 
Samians rejected the decision because it would be, in their view, unfairly biased in favor 
of the Milesians.15 Had the arbitration taken place, it would have been customary for the 
hegemon, to judge the case, so the suit would have been heard at Athens.16  
Scholars understandably focus on the events that followed the failure of the 
arbitration between Miletus and Samos. The Athenians clearly believed that they had the 
authority to intervene in the conflict with whatever force they deemed fit, while the 
Samians considered the arbitration an option rather than a necessity. There is no reason to 
believe that arbitration was not discussed. For this study, the importance of the arbitration 
is that the Milesians appealed to Athens rather than to the Ionian League when they 
sought to redress the conflict. In particular, Chios had one of the largest fleets in the 
                                                 
14 Stadter, Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles, 243-4, notes that Plutarch incorporated 
the traditional language of arbitration. Diodorus and Plutarch probably drew on 
Thucydides for the basic narrative, but must have had another source for the Milesian 
bias. 
15 Quinn, Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios, 11. 
16 Stadter, Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles, 243-4; Legon, “Samos in the Delian 
League,” 148, posits that the Samian flaunting of the Athenian ultimatum contributed to 
the war, though his additional reasons, including that the Samians violated Athenian 
regulations about the minting of coins are probably over stated, see Part III, Chapter 15. 
Legon mentions that Athenians would arbitrate the dispute, but he is not clear as to 
whether the Athenian ultimatum included just a cessation of hostilities or also an 
arbitration hearing. 
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Greek world and could have intervened on behalf of the Ionian League, of which it was a 
member, if force was necessary. The appeal to Athens is therefore generally thought to 
indicate that the league was defunct or that the Athenians had suppressed its presence. 
Two points follow from this line of reasoning. First, inasmuch as the Athenians received 
a request for help from the Milesians, the ultimatum that the Samians had to submit to 
arbitration was an Athenian decision, not a local suggestion. Thus, it was Athens in the 
role of hegemon mandating an arbitration that neither side necessarily wanted. Further, it 
is likely that disgruntled Samians considered an arbitration that took place in Athens a 
way for Athenians to mask their preferential treatment for Miletus in a cloak of 
legitimacy. Second, the dispute was between two members of the Delian League, which 
gave Athens a vested interest in intervention.  
The next account of arbitration is preserved on an early fourth-century inscription 
that records a land dispute between Miletus and Myus.17 Sometime between 392 and 388, 
the citizens of Myus submitted a dispute over territory around the mouth of the Maeander 
River to Struses the Persian satrap of Ionia.18 The Spartan alliances in Ionia had ended in 
394 and, despite Conon’s triumphant tour of the Anatolian coast after the battle of Cnidus 
during which he recieved honors from the Ionian communities, the dominant power in the 
region was Persia.19 Struses, referred to in the inscription as satrap (l. 10), probably 
received direct control of the region and took the case as the representative of the Great 
                                                 
17 Piccirilli 36; RO 16. 
18 RO 16; Xen. Hell. 4.8.17-19; Diod. 14.99; Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 495, see 
Part II, Chapter 3. 
19 Xen. Hell. 4.3.10-4.8; Diod. 14.83.5-84.4; Polyaenus 1.48.5; Nepos, Conon 4; 
Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories, 228-9, see Part II, Chapter 3. 
 255
King,20 delegating the task to jurors from the other Ionian poleis. This decision has been 
commonly interpreted as his delegating the task to the Ionian League, but this need not be 
so (see below).21 
Two fragments from the inscription survive, both from Miletus. The upper 
fragment contains substantial lacunae along the left side, but the surviving text indicates 
the location of the disputed territory (l. 5), the involvement of the Persian king and 
Struses (ll. 9-10), and that a certain group of people assembled (l. 11). Rhodes and 
Osborne accept the reconstruction of line eleven where about twenty letters are missing 
as π[ως ο τν ώνων δισκαστα συ]νελθό[ν]‐[τες], translating it “so that the Ionians’ 
jurors may assemble.”22 Their reading is strengthened by the lower fragment, which 
includes a list of jurors from Erythrae, Chios, Clazomenae, Lebedus, and Ephesus. After 
the citizens of Myus abandoned the suit, Struses nevertheless heard the decision of the 
judges (ll. 41-2). Rhodes and Osborne plausibly speculate that the names of the jurors 
from Phocaea, Teos, Colophon, Samos, and Priene fall into a lacuna between the two 
fragments. Their list does include the entirety of the dodecapolis listed by Herodotus, 
excepting only the disputants (1.142), but it is equally plausible that the list also included 
Smyrna, or, conversely, that one or more of the poleis did not send jurors and thus 
“Ionian” is used as a general description rather than a specific group.23 In principle, 
                                                 
20 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 495. 
21 For instance, Adcock and Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, 213; Piccirilli, Gli 
arbitrati interstatali Greci, 158. 
22 GHI, 70-1. 
23 Diodorus, for instance, lists nine poleis as members of the Ionian League (15.49). 
Stylianou, Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 49. T. Lenschau, 
“Alexander der Grosse und Chios,” Klio 33 (1940), 220-1, suggests that Diodorus 
excluded the island poleis Samos and Chios (one of whom sent jurors) from his list and 
that Diodorus records the Panionia taking place at Ephesus because Priene was not 
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though, I agree with the interpretation that Struses used the member poleis of the 
Panionion as arbitrators, thus following the precedent set by Artaphernes (Hdt. 6.42).24  
Despite its limitations, this inscription is a remarkable document. It is the only 
positive evidence for the Ionian poleis resolving a secular dispute as a collective group, 
albeit at the direction of the Persian satrap. It is for this reason that it is suggested that the 
Ionian League, supposedly defunct since the Persian Wars, had been revived at least by 
the 390s, perhaps as part of the Spartan intervention in the region.25 Yet the only 
inscription that likely addressed the Spartan campaigns, the so-called Spartan War fund, 
lists each Ionian community individually and there is no indication that the league took 
on a new political substance at this time (ML 67).26 It is more likely that Struses did not 
delegate the arbitration to the Ionian League, but used league membership to choose 
which communities would send arbitrators. His actions also shared the responsibility for 
the decision among the other communities, thereby giving a veneer of local autonomy 
while maintaining imperial control in Ionia—even before the creation of the King’s Peace 
in 387.27 Further, as satrap of Ionia, Struses was limited in terms of which Greek poleis 
he could instruct to arbitrate the dispute, thereby making it more probable that he would 
employ jurors from the local communities. 
Territorial disputes were not limited to intra-Ionian conflicts, and Diodorus 
preserves an account of one between Clazomenae and the Aeolian community Cyme, 
                                                                                                                                                 
properly a polis at this point of the fourth century. Priene was refounded in the latter part 
of the fourth century, see Hornblower, Mausolus, 323-6; Cf. N. Demand, “The Relocation 
of Priene Reconsidered,” Phoenix 40 (1986), 35-44. 
24 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 495, says that Struses’ use of the other Ionian poleis 
confirms the quality of evidence in Herodotus. Cf. 646. 
25 See Part III, Chapter 10. 
26 On this inscription, see Part II, Chapter 3. 
27 On the King’s Peace and Ionia, see Part II, Chapter 4. 
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which he says took place in 383 (15.18). The story is derived from Ephorus of Cyme, 
who preserved a local tradition about how Clazomenae, not Cyme, gained possession of 
Leuce.28 Unlike the dispute between Myus and Miletus, Clazomenae and Cyme 
supposedly appealed to Delphi and were told by the Pythia that they should appoint a day 
on which the two sides would race from their own settlement and the first to make a 
sacrifice would win the land. According to the story, the Clazomenaeans founded a new 
settlement close to the disputed site and were therefore able to claim the land by this 
exceedingly clever trick (φιλοτεχνήματι).29 Piccirilli interprets this arbitration as an 
indication of the moderate Persian policies concerning local liberty in that the episode 
involved the authority of a group other than Persia.30 On the one hand, it is possible that 
disputants had the leeway to choose the arbitrators, but, on the other, this episode 
involved a community claiming land that had recently belonged to a renegade Persian 
admiral and Cyme, the other community claiming the land, was a Persian naval base.31 
Clazomenae did gain control of Leuce, but the story is far-fetched and likely 
apocryphal.32 
The fourth land dispute is attested by fragmentary inscription found in the 
Asclepium on Cos, which likely dates to 302 (Ager 16). It clearly records arbitration 
                                                 
28 Stylianou, Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 208-9. 
29 Stylianou, Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15, 209, remarks 
“Interestingly, Clazomenae won, not Cyme!” I believe “φιλοτεχνήματι” here possesses a 
negative, duplicitous connotation and therefore is used resentfully rather than in 
admiration. 
30 Piccirilli, Gli Aribitrati. 165, gives another race for control of a town in an earlier 
dispute preserved by Plut. Mor. 298a-b.  
31 Ruzicka, “Glos,” 31; on Cyme, see Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 652-3. 
32 Leuce did mint its own coins on a type similar to Clazomenae and was probably a 
dependent polis, see Rubinstein, “Aeolis and South-Western Mysia,” in Inventory of 
Archaic and Classical Poleis, edd. M.H. Hansen and T.H. Nielsen (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 1046. 
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between Clazomenae and another Ionian polis, probably Teos, because although the 
name of the second community is lost from the inscription there is mention of land in the 
vicinity of the border with Colophon (A l. 11) and of an individual Teian whose property 
was involved in the dispute (A 1. 22).33 The circumstances of the arbitration are unclear, 
but the remaining fragments include the letters κατ τ διά—, which have rightly been 
interpreted as the start of the formula κατ τ διάγραμμα, meaning “according to the 
dictate of” and there is enough space to restore the name “Antigonus.” The evidence is 
scant, but plausibly fits with Antigonus Monophthalmus’ attempt to move the Lebedians 
to Teos at the end of his reign in order to form a single community, which then awoke 
long-standing local rivalries about land ownership.34 In the initial decree, Antigonus 
designated the Mytileneans as arbitrators as part of the synoicism, but likely specified an 
initial period of six months during which this arrangement would hold (Ager 13, ll. 29-
30).35 Disputes that arose after this initial period were to be referred to Antigonus who 
would then appoint a new arbitrator.36 The Coans were only charged with resolving the 
specific land dispute. As was the case with the synoicism of Teos and Lebedus, 
Antigonus couched his royal authority in the traditional diplomatic language and reserved 
the final judgment if he did not like the decision.37 
The Ionian League was clearly extant at the end of the fourth century when 
Antigonus ordered arbitrations in and around Teos. Yet, in both the synoicism of Teos 
and Lebedus and in the boundary dispute between Teos and Clazomenae, Antigonus 
                                                 
33 S.L. Ager, “A Royal Arbitration between Klazomenai and Teos,” ZPE 85 (1991), 87-
97; Ager, Interstate Arbitrations, 69. 
34 S.L. Ager, Civic Identity in the Hellenistic World,” GRBS 39 (1998), 19. 
35 Ager Interstate Arbitrations, 63-5; Cf. Welles, RC, 3. 
36 Ager, Interstate Arbitrations, 64. 
37 Ager, Interstate Arbitrations, 69; Billows, Antigonus, 255, 269-60. 
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appointed arbitrators from outside Ionia to resolve the disputes and drew a distinction 
between that arrangement and the Ionian league. In early Hellenistic Ionia, though, this is 
not an unusual scenario. In 287/6, Lysimachus arbitrated between Priene and Magnesia 
(Ager 25) and, in 283, he conducted an arbitration between Priene and Samos himself 
(Ager 26). In fact, Struses’ use the other Ionian poleis to resolve a territorial dispute in 
c.392 was the outlier. Struses’ decision was probably the result both of Achaemenid 
precedent and because he was limited in terms of which Greek poleis he had sway over. 
The fact that the Ionian League provided the members who could arbitrate is merely 
incidental. 
 
IV. A Sacral Dispute 
There is only one recorded sacred dispute between Ionian communities and, in 
contrast to the aforementioned territorial disputes, this is the only arbitration directly 
handled by the Ionian League.38 An inscription found at the Panionion that dates to the 
second half of the fourth century records the settlement of a conflict between Lebedus 
and another polis, usually thought to be Priene, over control of the priesthood of Zeus 
Boulaios and Hera (Ager 4).39 Another fragmentary inscription records a sacred law that 
specified Zeus Boulaios first among the deities for whom sacrifices had to be provided, 
and it was probably this Panionian priesthood that was the focus of the dispute.40  
                                                 
38 On the league, see Part III, Chapter 8. 
39 Priene also administered the priesthood of Poseidon Heliconius (Strabo 8.7.2; 14.1.20). 
See Metcalfe, “Reaffirming Regional Identity,” 51-2. 
40 For the text of and commentary on the inscription, see Kleiner, Hommel and Müller-
Wiener, Panionion und Melie, 45-63. See I.Priene 201 and 202; F. Graf, “Gods in Greek 
Inscriptions: Some Methodological Questions,” in The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities 
and Transformations, edd. J.N. Bremmer and A. Erskine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
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Nothing from the text of the arbitration can be used to date the decree, but three 
independent arguments offer a consensus date between 350 and 335. First, Ager offers 
that the lack of reference to the involvement of a king, combined with the tendency of the 
kings to play a large role in early Hellenistic disputes,41 indicates that the arbitration was 
before Alexander’s conquest of the region. Second, Hiller von Gaertningen dates it to 
before 334 based on his proposed date for Priene changing its eponymous official from 
“prytany” to “stephanophorate,” and the first line of the inscription suits the former and 
not the latter. Finally, Bechtel limits the decree to the second half of the fourth century 
based on its dialect.42  I believe that this date is reasonable, but must add two 
qualifications to Ager’s rationale for it. First, as is noted above, the Persian kings and 
satraps were as keen to intervene in Ionian disputes as the Hellenistic dynasts, so the 
absence of the name of a dynast alone cannot be taken to indicate an early date. Second, 
almost all of the known arbitrations resolved disputes about land, which means that there 
is limited evidence that dynasts routinely intervened in local religious affairs. In contrast, 
the Ionian League both had the authority to arbitrate the religious dispute and was 
considered the proper recourse for such an appeal. 
 
V. Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 2010), 66; Horster, “Priene: Civic Priests and Koine-Priesthoods,” 177-
208; Kowalzig, “Mapping out Communitas,” 47. 
41 Antigonus is known to have intervened in another religious dispute in the last decade 
of the fourth century, see Ager 11. 
42 F. Bechtel 5588 in H. Collitz and F. Bechtel, Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-
Inschriften 4 vols (Göttingen: Verlag von Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1884-1915); H. von 
Gaertringen, I.Priene 139. 
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In conclusion, Ager posits that, while it was common for federal leagues to 
resolve disputes between member states, the weakness of the Ionian League meant that it 
did not have the same authority over its members as other leagues.43 If anything, Ager 
understates this point. The Ionian League was principally a religious organization and, 
while it served as a central meeting place and foundation for local networks, the league 
never had an overt political function in the Classical period. The resolution of land 
disputes in Ionia was therefore never a power that belonged to the Ionian League and was 
instead tied to the relationship between the Ionians and foreign powers.
                                                 
43 Ager, Interstate Arbitration, 46. 
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13. Ionian Exiles and Alexander the Great 
 
I. Introduction 
Exiles were a perpetual problem in ancient Ionia. The existence of exiles was not 
unique to Ionia, of course, but their prominence is a notable feature of the region’s 
history. There were a variety of actions that could result in exile in ancient Greece, 
including crimes that would pollute the community such as sacrilege and murder, but the 
majority of exiles in Ionia came about because of political factionalism. I have already 
made the argument that factionalism in Ionia was exacerbated because the region was set 
between a series of imperial contenders such as Athens and Persia.1 In turn, competing 
groups of Ionians exploited these conflicts toward their own ends. This instability and 
changing power dynamic in and around the Ionian poleis meant that exile was a common 
feature of political life in the region. It is no surprise, therefore, that exiles were a topic in 
negotiations between the Ionian poleis and imperial powers in the fifth and fourth 
centuries. Clazomenae (RO 18), Erythrae (RO 17), and Miletus (ML 43), all have 
inscriptions that testify to settlements with Athens that included clauses concerning the 
fate of exiles. 
The purpose of this case study is not to review the history of Ionian exiles in the 
Classical period, but rather to examine how Alexander the Great’s conquest of Ionia and 
the subsequent involvement of Greek exiles over the course of his reign affected the 
relationship between Ionian poleis and exiles. Alexander’s most notorious decision 
                                                 
1 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
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regarding exiles came in 324 when he issued the Exiles Decree (18.8.4-6),2 but he had 
been making settlements regarding exiles since his campaign began in 334. In Ionia, 
Alexander issued ordinances concerning exiles at least at Ephesus and Chios and likely 
did so elsewhere, and there is no evidence that the Exiles Decree changed the situation in 
these poleis. In contrast, Alexander stripped Athens of its rights to Samos and restored 
the Samian polis in 324/3 at approximately the same time as he issued the Exiles Decree. 
I believe that the discrepancy between the treatment of exiles elsewhere and the treatment 
of Samos indicates that, even though the population considered themselves exiles, the 
restoration of Samos did not come about because of that circumstance and came to be 
associated with the Exiles Decree because of subsequent events. 
 
II. Alexander’s Settlements in Ionia 334 
In 334, Alexander issued decisions regarding Ionian exiles, but the earliest 
interactions often specified a personal relationship between the king and the exiles rather 
than showing broad involvement in the polis. At Ephesus, Alexander restored the faction 
that Memnon of Rhodes had driven into exile because it had sided with the Macedonians 
in 336 and therefore had suffered on his account (φικόμενος τούς τε φυγάδας, σοι δι᾽  
ατν ξέπεσον τς πόλεως, Arr. 1.17.10). The Ephesians dragged Syrphax and his 
family from the sanctuary of Artemis and stoned them in the agora, but Arrian goes on to 
say that Alexander was aware that what began as righteous retribution would devolve 
                                                 
2 On the Exiles Decree, see Badian, “Harpalus,” 25-31; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 
228; Dmitriev, “Alexander’s Exiles Decree,” 348-81; Errington, History of Macedonia, 
96; Hamilton, Alexander the Great, 138; Heckel, Conquests of Alexander the Great, 146-
7; I. Worthington, “From East to West: Alexander and the Exiles Decree,” in: East and 
West in the World Empire of Alexander: Essays in Honour of Brian Bosworth, ed. E. 
Baynham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 93-105. 
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into petty and private exploitation, and so ordered both investigation and punishment to 
end (πιζητεν κα τιμωρεσθαι, 1.17.11-12). Arrian, alone among the historical writers 
in mentioning the Ionian exiles, says that Alexander restored the people who had been 
driven out on his account (δι᾽  ατν, 1.17.10). Ephesus had rejected Persian authority in 
336, and had erected a statue of the Philip II in the sanctuary of Artemis, but Memnon 
drove the pro-Macedonian faction into exile (Arr. 1.17.11). 3 Further, there was an 
Ephesian orator Delius who argued before Alexander, perhaps at Corinth in 336, in favor 
of a campaign against Persia (Plut. Mor. 1126d).4 Thus Alexander at Ephesus claimed 
responsibility for the exiles and their loyalty to him would be repaid as a form of 
reciprocal obligations. This declaration curried good will with the exiles immediately 
being restored, but it also opened the door to anyone who could claim loyalty to 
Alexander qualifying for repatriation. 
Evidence for Alexander’s treatment of exiles at the other Ionian poleis is almost 
nonexistent. While still at Ephesus, Alexander entertained citizens from Magnesia and 
Tralles before dispatching Parmenion and Alcimachus to liberate towns still subject to 
Persia (Arr. 1.18.1).5 Arrian suggests that the Ionians who appealed to Alexander were in 
a position to turn their poleis over to him, but were likely leaders of groups out of power 
in those communities. In the context of reasserted Persian control in the third quarter of 
the fourth century, it is improbable that the Ephesian exiles were unique in appealing to 
Alexander for restoration. If, as Briant has argued, the contemporary observers 
                                                 
3 Worthington, Philip II, 180, see Part II, Chapter 6. 
4 Bosworth, HCA I, 136; Heckel, Who’s Who, 106; see Part III, Chapter 20. 
5 See Part II, Chapter 6. 
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envisioned Alexander’s invasion as a second coming of Agesilaus,6 rather than the dawn 
of a new age, then it may be even more probable that the supplicants to Alexander were 
not just deprived of power, but also in exile. Arrian’s account of the situation at Ephesus 
suggests that Alexander’s primary concern with exiles would have been to restore only 
those people who were exiled because of loyalty to him. However, Alexander’s 
considerations probably quickly expanded to include people who would be loyal after he 
restored them to their community as he set about changing constitutions and to capitalize 
on the propaganda value of the discourse of liberation. 
 
III. Alexander, Chios, and Exiles 
 Three inscriptions from Chios shed more light onto Alexander’s arrangements for 
Ionia, while also offering complications. The first, a copy of Alexander’s First Letter to 
the Chians of 334/3 (RO 84A),7 instructs the Chians to accept the return of all exiles and 
to establish a democracy (ll. 3-4). Chios was an oligarchy by 351 and Carian coins 
minted by both Mausolus and Pixodarus have been found on the island.8 Further, even 
though Chios sided with Athens against Philip in 340 and aligned itself with Philip in the 
early 330s, there is no evidence that there was a change in government that would have 
caused a new wave of exiles. The instructions to the Chians generally parallel what is 
known about Alexander’s decisions regarding exiles in Anatolia, but the inscription goes 
on to create a new category of exiles: those who betrayed the polis to the barbarians (ll. 
                                                 
6 Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 856-7. When Agesilaus came to Ionia in the 390s the 
Ionians joined his army, but not because they had caught a whiff of autonomy, see Part 
III, Chapter 10. 
7 On the dating and other issues with the “First Letter,” see Part II, Chapter 6. 
8 Hornblower, Mausolus, 109, 131-2. 
 266
10-12). These individuals marked the gravest threat to the inchoate democracy. In reality, 
though, this category was largely a way to exploit Alexander’s propaganda concerning 
Persia rather than marking a significant departure in how people went into exile. In 
contrast, the exiles Alexander restored included men who had gone into exile for a 
variety of reasons over the course of the fourth century.  
The second inscription, Alexander’s “Second Letter” to the Chians (RO 84B), is 
reconstructed from four fragments and suffers from even worse dating problems than the 
“First Letter,” but it appears to record the same series of events. Both Heisserer and 
Dmitriev conclude that the letter belongs to the same year as the first, but disagree on 
which year that is.9 Although this inscription records a progression where the exiles 
returned and the Chians restored the democracy, the crux of the letter actually deals with 
the punishment of one Alcimachus.10 While Alcimachus’ father was not among the men 
Hegelochus brought to Egypt in 332 (Arr. 3.2.4-5; Curt. 4.5.14-22),11 he may have been 
convicted by the democracy in c.334, which explains why his son is viewed warily. Yet 
the decree describes Alcimachus as the king’s friend (μός τε φίλος, 1.13) and praises 
him for his loyalty to the democracy (ll. 23-5).12  What these loyalties were is open to 
speculation, but they most likely occurred during the Persian domination of the island and 
plausibly involved helping restore the polis to Macedonian control. Thus, the “Second 
                                                 
9 Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 110-11; Dmitriev, “Alexander’s Exiles Decree,” 
365-6. 
10 Alcimachus probably was not Alexander’s general who liberated the Ionian and 
Aeolian towns in 334, Heckel, Who’s Who, 9-10; Dmetriev, “Alexander’s Exiles 
Decree,” 365; Piejko, “‘Second Letter’ of Alexander the Great to Chios,” 246. Heisserer, 
Alexander and the Greeks, 96, believes the names to refer to the same person. 
11 Heckel, Who’s Who, 41. 
12 Piejko, “‘Second Letter’ of Alexander the Great to Chios,” 245, argues that Alexander 
deliberately overstates the usefulness of Alcimachus to the demos. 
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Letter” addresses the same turbulent context at Chios, but it belongs later, probably to 
332/1 when Alexander adjudicated a second round of cases concerning Chios at the 
conclusion of the war in the Aegean. 
Three features of these first two letters to the Chians are certain. First, Alexander 
dictated a form of government that is consistent with his decisions elsewhere in Ionia. 
Second, the decision ensured that there was a segment of the population who owed 
Alexander for their restoration. Third, he created provisions intended to stop conflict 
between the people in residence and those being repatriated. Civic unity served as the 
justification to install a garrison on the island (RO 84A, ll. 17-20).  
A third Chian inscription does not mention Alexander, but is recently dated by 
Kholod to c.332, and established a board of ten judges to resolve disagreements between 
the citizens and the returning exiles (ll. 9-11).13 The inscription particularly names the 
return of property as a primary concern (ll. 3-7) and makes the state liable for damages if 
the property could not be returned (ll. 4-7). None of the surviving fragments of the decree 
mentions Alexander, but the entire first line where his name would have appeared in such 
decrees is missing. As Kholod notes, it is “difficult to say” who made up this board.14 It is 
tempting on the one hand to see these men as non-Chians, parallel to the setup established 
in the Tegea Decree and that Antigonus used in the synoicism of Teos and Lebedus 
c.306.15 On the other hand, though, Alexander established a local board of arbitrators at 
Mitylene made of equal numbers of men who returned and men who had stayed in the 
                                                 
13 Kholod, “On the Dating of a New Chian Inscription,” 22-32. 
14 Kholod, “On the Dating of a New Chian Inscription,” 24. 
15 See Part II, Chapter 5. 
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polis to resolve property disputes (RO 85B ll. 21-34) and I believe it more likely that this 
inscription indicates a comparable setup for Chios. 
That the repatriation of Chian exiles was not restricted to those exiled by the 
Persians is also revealed Theopompus’ return to the polis. Theopompus’ exile has been 
dated from as early as the 390s to as late as the 340s,16 and while the charge of laconism 
may be doubted, the exile was certainly the product of political divisions in Chios.17 If 
Theopompus’ father did support the Spartans, then the exile should probably date to 394 
after the battle of Cnidus;18 Theopompus was likely a young man at the time and was an 
exile most of his life. It was only after Alexander restored the exiles on Chios that 
Theopompus returned, most likely in 332/1.19 It is possible, however, that Theopompus 
had a unique position. It was not merely the opportunity to return home that prompted his 
repatriation, but the king’s will. Becoming involved in politics upon his return, he wrote a 
series of letters to Alexander that were said to have enhanced his position and flattered 
Alexander (BNJ 115 T 8, T 20a, F 251).20 He accused Theocritus, an orator and his 
political opponent (BNJ 115 T 9, F 252; Strabo 14.1.35),21 of having amassed a great deal 
of wealth to the detriment of the state, perhaps at the expense of the returned exiles.22 
                                                 
16 Flower, Theopompus, 15-17; Morison, Theopompus, BNJ 115 biographical 
commentary, with bibliography. 
17 Flower, Theopompus, 15. 
18 Lane Fox, “Theopompus of Chios and the Greek World,” 108, suggests that a 
conviction for pro-Spartan activities could have occurred anytime between 394 and 375. 
19 Heckel, Who’s Who, 264. 
20 Five fragments of these letters survive, BNJ 115 T 8-9, F 250-4, with commentary. See 
also Lane Fox, “Theopompus of Chios and the Greek World,” 117-20; Flower, 
Theopompus, 23-5; Shrimpton, Theopompus, 7-9, 21-3. 
21 It is unknown when the rivalry developed, see Part III, Chapter 20. 
22 Heckel, Who’s Who, 263; S.-T. Teodorsson, “Theocritus the Sophist, Antigonus the 
One-Eyed, and the Limits of Clemency,” Hermes 118 (1990), 380-2. On his life and 
death, see Part III, Chapter 20. 
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Theopompus again went in exile after Alexander’s death and Ptolemy refused to accept 
him in Egypt because he was considered meddlesome (πολυπράγμων, BNJ 115 T 1).23 
Alexander’s decisions regarding the exiles at Chios did not end the political 
conflicts that had created the exiles in the first place. If anything, he exacerbated them by 
introducing a new set of people who could try to use him as leverage for position in the 
community despite having spent years abroad. However, the decrees indicate that he was 
not naïve about the problems that would arise in the restoration of the polis and took steps 
to resolve them, thereby indicating that this was meant to be a new beginning for Chios. 
Theocritus might have exploited the situation to make money, but Theopompus’ inability 
to have his complaints gain traction indicates that the provisions were largely successful.  
 
IV. Samos and the Exiles Decree 
Alexander’s treatment of Samos in 334 differed from how he treated the other 
Ionian poleis. The Samians had been expelled from their island in the late 360s, dispersed 
around the Mediterranean as far away as Sicily and Southern Italy and their land 
occupied by Athenian cleruchs.24 Although the Samians considered themselves exiles (ἐν 
τῆι φυγῆι, RO 90, l. 6), there was a distinction between exiles and refugees. The 
inhabitants of the island in 334 were Athenian citizens, not Samians, an important 
distinction because there was no polis for the Samians to return to. When Alexander did 
finally restore the Samians to their island in 324/3, it was as a sanction against Athens 
and a favor to court favorites, not the result of his rulings about exiles. 
                                                 
23 Flower, Theopompus, 24; Shrimpton, Theopompus, 8. While in exile Theopompus took 
refuge at the Temple of Artemis in Ephesus (BNJ 115, T 8). 
24 Shipley, Samos, 162-4; see Part II, Chapter 6 for a narrative. 
 270
Alexander first addressed the Athenian claim to Samos in 334, after capturing the 
Ionian poleis where many Samian refugees had settled.25 The Persian fleet had taken on 
supplies on the island of Samos while Alexander was at Miletus (Arr. 1.19.8), but, 
despite this subversive action, he chose to allow the Athenians to remain in possession of 
the island. Hamilton is probably correct that the letter referred to by Plutarch belongs in 
324/3 (Alex. 28.1-2). Plutarch offers the letter as a singular example of an instance when 
Alexander assumed divine status while interacting with the Greeks, since he was 
supposed to have said: “I cannot have given you that free polis because you acquired it 
from the man who was then your master and was called my father [Philip]” (Alex. 28.1).26 
Hamilton believes that Plutarch simply mixed up the order of events and therefore that 
the letter belongs in 323/4 after Alexander restored the Samians to their island.27 
Hammond, in contrast, maintains the order of events offered by Plutarch, but puts the 
terminus ante quem in 327 when Alexander was wounded in India and therefore fixes the 
letter in the late 330s.28 He also argues persuasively that, despite how Plutarch presented 
the anecdote, the letter does not distance him from Philip because “προσαγόρειν” does 
not possess any inherent qualities of skepticism that a translation of “so-called” does.29 
After the battle of Chaeronea in 338, Philip had stripped Athens of all its possessions 
except Samos, Salamis, Scyros, Lemnos, Imbros, and Delos (Diod. 18.56.7), and 
                                                 
25 See Part II, Chapter 5. 
26 γ μν οκ ν...μν λευθέραν πόλιν δωκα κα νδοξον χετε δ ατν λαβόντες 
παρ το τοτε κυρίου κα πατρς μο προσαγορευομένου. 
27 J.R. Hamilton, “Alexander and his ‘So-Called’ Father,” CQ2 3 (1953), 151-7; 
Hamilton, Plutarch: Alexander, 74. 
28 N.G.L. Hammond, “Alexander’s Letter Concerning Samos in Plut. ‘Alex.’ 28.2,” 
Historia 42 (1993), 380. 
29 Hammond, “Alexander’s Letter,” 381. 
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Hammond argues that the letter recorded by Plutarch is a grant from Alexander to the 
Athenians after the capture of Miletus that confirmed the Athenian control of the island.30  
Hamilton’s is an attractive suggestion, but less because of Alexander’s divine 
pretensions and more because of how he is said to have referred to the polis: free 
(λεύθερος).31 Alexander’s statement is clearly in response to claims that he had 
previously given Samos to the Athenians as a grant that he then revoked. I do believe that 
Alexander wrote to the Athenians after 334 about Samos and confirmed their control of 
the polis. Plutarch is therefore correct that there was a letter about Samos to the 
Athenians before 327, but the text he preserves is that of a later letter when the Athenians 
protested that Alexander had given Samos to them already, the credit for which 
Alexander defers to Philip.32 
Alexander ordered the Athenians to give the island back to the Samian refugees in 
324/3 and the evidence for the decision largely comes from inscriptions set up after the 
restoration thanking individuals for their support of the demos.33 The pronouncement 
cannot be adequately dated, with suggestions ranging from early 324 in Susa, before the 
                                                 
30 Hammond, “Alexander’s Letter,” 380-1. On the instructions following Salamis, see 
Worthington, Philip II, 155-7. C. Habicht, “Athens, Samos, and Alexander the Great,” 
PAPS 140 (1996), 397-405, argues that almost a third of the adult male Athenian citizens 
lived on Samos and that there was mobility between the two locations.  
31 The choice of free instead of autonomous likely indicates the Samian status as subject 
to Alexander. On Alexander’s use of the slogan, see Seager, “Freedom of the Greeks of 
Asia,” 106-7; Nawotka, “Freedom of the Greek Cities in Asia Minor,” 15-33. Compare in 
particular with Colophon, which credited Alexander with its freedom, following Merritt, 
“Inscriptions of Colophon,” 359-72, ll. 6-7. 
32 The historicity of the letter is not universally accepted, see in particular, K. Rosen, 
“Der ‘göttliche’ Alexander, Athen und Samos,” Historia 27 (1978), 20-5. 
33 In particular, Gorgus of Iasus (RO 90), see below. Also, Nausinicus of Sestus and 
Antileon of Chalcis: Habicht, “Samische Volksbeschlusse der hellenistischen Zeit,” nos. 
1 and 2; Shipley, Samos, 166-8; Badian, “Comma in the History of Samos,” 289-94; R. 
Garland, Wandering Greeks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 194-6. 
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promulgation of the Exiles Decree,34 to early 323 outside Babylon, some six months after 
the Exiles Decree.35 These reconstructions, as Dmitriev points out, all rely on the 
assumed “historical circumstances” of the decree, which, in turn, are based on four 
criteria: the presence of Samian soldiers and Gorgus’ intervention at Alexander’s court; 
foreknowledge of the Exiles Decree among the Greek poleis; travel time for Nicanor and 
the embassies; and the alliance between Athens and Aetolia in preparation for the Lamian 
War.36 In his own reconstruction, Dmitriev splits the difference between the dates, 
arguing that Alexander announced his decision at Ecbatana in the summer of 324, after 
Nicanor sailed to Greece with the Exiles Decree, but before its formal announcement in 
August, at the time when Harpalus was at Athens.37 I accept this reconstruction with one 
modification: the decision to restore Samos as a political entity was a reaction to the 
Harpalus affair and therefore part of a program to reduce Athenian power, not as a 
consideration under the Exiles Decree. 
Only a single statement from Diodorus links the restoration of the Samians with 
the Exiles Decree. No other account of the Exiles Decree reveals anything about Samos 
(Diod. 17.109.1; Curt. 10.2.4-6; Justin 13.5.2), but, in the course of explaining how the 
Lamian War began, Diodorus says that the Athenians took offense at the Exiles Decree 
                                                 
34 Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 184; Badian, “Harpalus,” 30; C. Blackwell, In 
the Absence of Alexander (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 14, 145; 
35 Shipley, Samos, 297 says that Alexander clarified the position of Samos in response to 
an Athenian embassy that arrived at Babylon in 323. 
36 Dmitriev, “Alexander’s Exiles Decree,” 367. I. Worthington, “IG II2 370 and the Date 
of the Athenian Alliance with Aetolia,” ZPE 57 (1984), 139-44, argues that the alliance 
between Athens and Aetolia was not finalized until after Alexander’s death. 
37 Dmitriev, “Alexander’s Exiles Decree,” 367-70. I. Worthington, “The Harpalus Affair 
and the Greek Response to the Macedonian Hegemony,” in Ventures into Greek History, 
ed. I. Worthington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 307-30, argues that the 
Athenians had not been actively planning a war against Alexander before Harpalus’ 
arrival. 
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and were unwilling to abandon the island because they had divided it into cleruchies 
(18.8.7).38 Diodorus thus links the Exiles Decree and the return of the Samians, but 
Alexander probably treated these as two unconnected issues.39 However, the Athenians 
may have been prepared to accept the Exiles Decree and then had their resolve stiffened 
when they were required to give up Samos and therefore had to reincorporate both the 
exiles and the cleruchs who were not exiles, but would have nonetheless exacerbated 
economic stresses. Even so, Diodorus says that they did not openly resist the orders until 
after Alexander died (18.8.7). 
A decree of thanks from Samos indicates that Gorgus of Iasus had been working 
behind the scenes when Alexander declared that Samos would be returned to the Samians 
(RO. 90, ll. 5-13).40 Gorgus likely knew Samian refugees his entire life, so one need not 
assume that his involvement was supposed to aid their appeal under the newly-minted 
Exiles Decree, as Heisserer and Heckel do,41 nor that it was an Athenian embassy seeking 
clarification about the Exiles Decree that expedited Alexander’s decision as does 
Shipley.42 Gorgus was an implacable enemy of Athens, against which the restoration of 
Samos was a blow, and he is said to have pledged ten thousand suits of armor and an 
equal number of catapults for a siege of Athens (Ephippus, BNJ 126 F 5).43 If Alexander 
had had the Samians in mind when he established the Exiles Decree then he could have 
already given those specific provisions. It is plausible that Gorgus and Alexander cited 
                                                 
38 μοίως δ τούτοις θηναοι τν Σάμον κατακεκληρουχηκότες οδαμς τν νςον 
ταύτην προίεντο. 
39 Worthington, Dinarchus, 60-3. 
40 See Part II, Chapter 6. 
41 Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 189; Heckel, Who’s Who, 127. 
42 Shipley, Samos, 297. 
43 Heckel, Who’s Who, 127 
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the Exiles Decree as the justification for the restoration after the fact, but, if so, this was a 
convenient pretext since the change of course came after Alexander created the decree, 
but before the appeals from Athens and with enough time before his death that Alexander 
had an opportunity to respond (Plut. Alex. 28.1-2). 
 
V. Conclusion 
Alexander’s invasion of Persia was partly justified as a war of liberation for the 
Greeks of Asia Minor and we are told that one substantive change he inaugurated during 
the campaign was to introduce democracies to the Ionian poleis (RO 84A; Arr. 1.18.2). 
As part of the restructuring of the Ionian communities, Alexander also instructed them to 
accept back exiles and put into place systems that would prevent renewed conflict from 
breaking out. Left out of these changes was a decision in favor of the displaced Samian 
community. Most likely this was a calculated decision not to alienate Athens, particularly 
at a time when Alexander still relied on the Greek fleet in the war against Persia. In 324/3 
he reversed course and stripped the Athenians of Samos in a decision distinct from, but 
contemporary to, the Exiles Decree. Only from the point of view of the Athenians were 
the two actions linked, which thereby caused them to be associated in later 
historiography. The necessary conclusion is that the Exiles Decree itself had very limited 
impact on Ionia since Alexander had already settled the issue of exiles. His creation of a 
world with a single dominant power limited the opportunities for one faction to gain 
power over another in the Ionian poleis, but this was a temporary lull, with a new wave of 
exiles appearing as the result of political rivalries shortly after his death.
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14. The Burden of Empire on Ionia: a study of phoros payments  
 
 
I.  Introduction to the Assessment of 425 
It has long been assumed that in 425/4, when the financial burden of the 
Peloponnesian War had drained most of the Athenian war fund, Cleon convinced the 
Athenians to dramatically increase the tribute (phoros) levels of their allies in the Delian 
League in order to double or even treble the total revenue (ML 69).1 According to the 
traditional line of reasoning, the rates at which the allies paid tribute subsided again with 
the assessment of 422/1. Further, it has been supposed that this new assessment 
disproportionately fell on the Ionian poleis (see below), but the evidence for this is 
lacunate, at best. The assessed phoros did rise in 425/4 across the Delian League, but the 
increases show no consistent pattern. I will argue that there is no evidence to assume that 
Ionian poleis were particularly burdened. As will become apparent, I believe that there 
was no single model according to which the Athenian treasurers (hellenotamiai) made 
their assessments, and therefore will not dedicate much space to the overall trends in 
assessments and payments on the Athenian Tribute Lists except where they intersect with 
the payments made by the Ionian communities. Instead, I will use the earlier Ionian 
payments as the basis for this comparison. Before turning to the specific phoros 
payments, though, it is necessary to examine in brief the Athenian Tribute Lists in order 
to understand both the strengths and the weaknesses of this evidence. 
 
II. A Brief Introduction to the Athenian Tribute Lists 
                                                 
1 ATL 3, 79-86; D. Kagan, The Archidamian War (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 
1990), 250-1; Blamire, A., “Athenian Finance, 454-404 B.C.,” Hesperia 70 (2001), 110-
12; M.B Wallace and T.J. Figuiera, “Notes on the Island Phoros,” ZPE 172 (2010), 69. 
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Compiled from fragments found on the Athenian Acropolis and in the Agora, the 
so-called Athenian Tribute Lists (IG I3 259-91)2 were originally inscribed on marble 
stelae on the Acropolis between the Propylaea and the Parthenon.3 Each list recorded the 
collection of a different year of payments, starting with 454/3 the Delian League treasury 
was transferred from the island of Delos to Athens (Diod. 12.38.3; Plut. Arist. 25.2).4 The 
inscriptions do not record the full amount of the tribute, but an aparche, the first-fruits 
dedication to the goddess Athena, where one presented “a preliminary share to the gods 
from a greater whole.”5 The aparchae dedications were normally a part of the total 
divisible by six,6 and the amounts on the inscriptions follow this pattern by recording 
aparche at a rate of one-sixtieth of the total amount collected.7 While it is likely that the 
dedication of an aparche was a regular part of league ceremony, with the original 
offering going to Apollo on Delos, no lists from the island have been found and the stelae 
at Athens stand as a monument to Athenian hegemony (see below).8  
                                                 
2 Paarmann, “Aparchai and Phoroi,” 16-37; Kagan, Outbreak, 380-1; McGregor, 
Athenians and their Empire, 79-82; L. Kallet, “Democracy, Empire and Epigraphy in the 
Twentieth Century,” in Interpreting the Athenian Empire, edd. J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas, 
and R. Parker (London: Duckworth, 2009), 49-50. The “Tribute Lists” include both the 
aparche lists and assessment decrees. The Athenian Tribute Lists in three volumes (ATL 
1-3), edd. B.D. Meritt, H.T. Wade-Gery, and M.F. McGregor. 
3 ATL 3, 12-16; cf. commentary in ML 84; on the location of the stelae, see Paarmann, 
“Aparchai and Phoroi,” 7, 43-5. 
4 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 44; Kagan, Outbreak, 101. On the circumstances of the 
transfer, see Part II, Chapter 2. 
5 K. Keesling, The Votive Statues on the Athenian Acropolis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 7; T. Suk Fong Jim, Sharing with the Gods (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 36. 
6 Keesling, Votive Statues on the Athenian Acropolis, 7. 
7 Paarmann, “Aparchai and Phoroi,” 7; A.B. West, “The Tribute Lists and the Non-
Tributary Members of the Delian League,” AHR 35 (1930), 267. 
8 Wallace and Figuiera, “Notes on the Island Phoros,” 65; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 232; 
McGregor, Athenians and their Empire, 79-82, 106-7. R. Sealey, A History of the Greek 
City-States 700-388 B.C. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
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From the consecration of the Delian League in 478, every member state owed 
either triremes and crews for the league fleet or phoros payments to the league treasury to 
underwrite the cost of keeping the ships in action.9 Athens contributed the largest number 
of ships, but other poleis such as Chios, Samos, and Mytilene, also supported the league 
through the provision of ships, with Chios doing so until the start of the Ionian War in 
412/11 ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 24.2).10 The rest of the member states paid monetary 
contributions to the league treasury at rates that were initially assessed by Aristides 
([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 23.3-5; Plut. Arist. 24).11 In 493, the Persian satrap Artaphernes had 
calculated the tribute owed by the Ionians based on arable land, measured in parsangs, 
which Herodotus says was the equivalent of thirty stadia (6.42).12 The payments were 
thus based on agricultural production rather than commercial or industrial output. 
Herodotus also says that the amount of tribute assessed by Artaphernes remained fixed 
thereafter, implying that the Delian League kept these levels of tribute. However, the 
amounts that appear on the Athenian Tribute Lists have no consistent pattern based on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
1976), 275, suggests that an aparche was dedicated to Athena before the treasury moved 
to Athens. Wooden lists may have recorded the dedications on Delos, see Paarman, 
Aparchai and Phoroi, 9-11. 
9 Thuc. 1.96; Arist. Ath. Pol. 24; Diod. 11.47; Plut. Aris. 24. Thucydides said that the 
initial Athenian collection was for 460 talents, likely including the value of the ships, see 
M. Chambers, “Four Hundred Sixty Talents,” CPh 53 (1958), 26-32; S.K. Eddy, “460 
Talents Once More,” CP 63 (1968), 187-8; R.K. Unz, “The Surplus of the Athenian 
Phoros,” GRBS 26 (1985), 21-3; West, “Tribute Lists and the Non-Tributary Members of 
the Delian League,” 267-75; Paarman, “Aparchai and Phoroi,” 65; A. French, “Tribute of 
the Allies,” Historia (21 (1972), 17. Hornblower, CT 1, 143-7, rejects the idea that 
phoros payments included the value of ships and military supplies. I think it is probable 
that military supplies were part of the dues to the Delian League, but it is also quixotic to 
believe the ledgers should match up between Thucydides and the ATL 
10 Rhodes, Commentary on the Ath. Pol., 297-8. On Samos’ position of providing neither 
phoros nor ships, see Part II, Chapter 2; on the Ionian War, see Part II, Chpater 3. 
11 Rhodes, Commentary on the Ath. Pol., 292-8. 
12 One stade was 157.7 meters, so one parsang was 4731 meters, or about 4.75 
kilometers, according to Herodotus’s conversions. 
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size of the poleis, and Aristides supposedly assessed the allies based on what it could 
afford to pay, which must have included all sources of revenue, not just agriculture (Plut. 
Arist. 24.1; cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 23.4-5).13 It is nevertheless inevitable that the agricultural 
production was the single largest factor in assessment.14  
A second set of inscriptions records the assessment decrees, including both the 
amount of tribute owed to the treasury and the establishment of processes of 
administration. The assessments and collections were carried out by the hellenotamiai, 
Athenian officials elected for a Panathenaic year (Thuc. 1.96.2).15 There was a new 
assessment every four years after 454,16 but it was also possible for a premature 
assessment, such as the ones in 428 (likely scheduled for 426) and in 425/4 (422/1). The 
new assessments in 430/29, 428/7, and 425/4 also correlate to Thucydides’ account of 
expeditions to collect tribute (3.19), which the ATL editors suggest were “unusually 
strong” collection forces.17 However, Thucydides does not mention either the transfer of 
                                                 
13 Paarmann, “Aparchai and Phoroi,” 69-74; L. Nixon and S. Price, “The Size and 
Resources of the Greek Cities,” in The Greek City from Homer to Alexander, edd. O. 
Murray and S. Price (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 140-61; Rhodes, 
Commentary on the Ath. Pol., 295. B. Tenger, “Phoroshöhe und Bevölkerungszahl. Die 
Athener Tributlisten als Indikator für die grösse der Einwhonerschaft einer Polis?” Asia 
Minor Studien 16 (1995), 139-58, argues that population was the largest factor in the 
assessed tribute. 
14 Kallet, Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides, 201-2. 
15 Hornblower, CT 1, 145; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 44; A.G. Woodhead, “The 
Institution of the Hellenotamiae,” JHS 79 (1959), 149-52; W.K. Pritchett, “Hellenotamiai 
and Athenian Finance,” Historia 26 (1977), 295; J.M. Balcer, “Imperial Magistrates in 
the Athenian Empire,” Historia 25 (1976), 257-87. The Panathenaic year ran from one 
festival to the next, and the assessments where scheduled for the year of the Great 
Panathenaia every fourth year, see W. Burkert “Athenian Cults and Festivals,” in CAH2 
V, 249-56. 
16 Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 68. 
17 ATL 3, 69. 430: Thuc. 3.19, Hornblower, CT 1, 403-5, cf. 354-6; 428/7: Thuc. 450.1, 
Hornblower, CT 2, 66; 425/4: Thuc. 4.75, Hornblower, CT 2, 245. The only one of these 
three that is certainly tied to an assessment is 428/7. Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 254, 
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454 or any assessments. It is impossible to know how the poleis were assessed every four 
years and whether the hellenotamiai were under political pressure to increase levels of 
payment, preserve the status quo, or even received bribes to set a particular level. Yet, 
despite the regular review of the assessments, the overall level of tribute stayed relatively 
static between 454 and 425. 
There is some debate about the purpose of the ATL stelae, namely whether they 
were meant as an archival record of payments, a symbol of Athenian imperialism or, as 
Paarmann argues in his recent dissertation, a set of enormous votive offerings to 
Athena.18 The process of assessment, collection, and aparchae dedications of the phoros 
payments required the creation of three distinct records that must have existed from the 
outset of the league, but it was only in 454 with the transfer to Athens that the aparche 
payments began to be recorded in stone on the Acropolis. In contrast, no list of the tribute 
was ever inscribed with the total payments, and the assessment decrees probably only 
began to be inscribed alongside the aparche stelae in 425 with the decree for the ninth 
assessment decree (IG I3 71, called A9).19 The inauguration of assessment stelae gives 
additional credence to the assessment of 425 being a substantial revision, though not 
necessarily an increase, of phoros payments across the league. It is possible, however, 
that the aparche dedications did not bear a direct correlation with the assessments. In a 
provocative article, Unz argues that most of the phoros payments were used locally and 
                                                                                                                                                 
argues that these expeditions were incidents of rogue piracy to fund expeditions, while 
Rhodes, Commentary on the Ath. Pol., 307, dismisses the link between the date and the 
collection of tribute as coincidental. 
18 Paarmann, “Aparchai and Phoroi,” 43-52. 
19 Paarmann, “Aparchai and Phoroi,” 40. 
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that the dedications represent a dedication from the tribute that actually reached Athens, 
namely from surplus tribute instead of the entire amount.20  
Starting with the aparche list of 443/2, the members of the Delian League were 
grouped into five geographical districts—Ionia, Caria, Islands, Hellespont, and Thrace—
each with its own header.21 In the assessment period 438/7-434/3, however, the Ionian 
and Carian districts merged into a single district, likely because administrating the two 
small, adjacent districts separately was no longer worthwhile.22 With the exception of 
syntelic payments, as at Erythrae and Miletus, where one polis paid on behalf of several 
communities grouped with it, there was no regular order or geographical pattern to the 
lists within the districts.23 The merger of the Ionian and Carian districts affected the 
duties of the hellenotamiai, but did not change the political boundaries or affect the rate 
of payments. On account of this, I will focus on the poleis of the Ionian dodecapolis and 
their satellite communities and seldom refer to the other settlements in the district. I 
prefer to use, where possible, Paarmann’s “clean” lists, which have retained many of the 
lacunae, in favor of the lists compiled and reconstructed lists of the ATL, both because 
the ATL editors were at times overly optimist about their readings and because the gravity 
of the project was central in establishing a seemingly-unimpeachable orthodoxy that 
                                                 
20 Unz, “Surplus of the Athenian Phoros,” 21-42. He calculates the Ionian assessment as 
between 550 and 580 talents, with 110 surplus. His calculations were based on what he 
believed Ionians could afford to pay, calculated by the ships each supplied for the Battle 
of Lade. 
21 H.B. Mattingly, “The Tribute Districts of the Athenian Empire,” Historia 33 (1984), 
498; Kagan, Outbreak, 149. The loose grouping of districts appears three years earlier, 
see B.D. Meritt, “The Second Athenian Tribute Assessment Period,” GRBS 8 (1967), 
121-5.  
22 Balcer, Sparda, 417. Later lists also include a separate, smaller, Euxine District made 
up of the communities along the coast of the Black Sea. 
23 Paarmann, “Aparchai and Phoroi,” 60-3. Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 85, argue that the 
order on the lists was based on the order of payment.  
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provided its own set of limitations.24 I believe that taking a cautious approach to the  
lacunae accepts the widest possible range of explanation because it removes some of the 
significance that they were once afforded. This approach allows an absence to mean that 
the polity did not pay tribute, whether out of inability to do so, revolt from Athens, or an 
unknown exception, that the payment came in non-monetary form, or that the lacunae are 
merely lost records. While the Tribute Lists are a monumental resource, there is much 
about them that remains unknowable. 
 
III. A Summary of Ionian Payments 454-43125 
There are only three Ionian poleis on the inaugural lists in 454/3: Clazomenae, 
Colophon, and Miletus, though the Colophonian port Notium and the satellites of 
Miletus, Leros and Teichousa also appear. Clazomenae, the smallest of the three poleis in 
terms of population, paid a phoros of one and a half talents (an aparche of 150 
drachmae), while Colophon paid three talents (300 dr.) and Notium one third of a talent 
(2,000 drachmae, with a 33 dr., 2 obol aparche). The amounts for Miletus and 
Teichoussa are missing, but another suburb, Leros, paid three talents (300 dr. aparche), 
which is rightfully considered to be a partial payment for Miletus. On list five in 450/49, 
the Milesian phoros was ten talents, one of the highest amounts in Ionia and probably 
included most of the other communities nearby.26 The reunification of phoros payments 
have been used to date the Athenian regulations for the polis to the middle of the fifth 
                                                 
24 Paarmann, “Aparchai and Phoroi,” 87-90. 
25 There are tables of the Ionian payments at the end of this section. 
26 Notably, however, Latmus is recorded with a payment of one talent. 
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century, in the belief that Miletus was in revolt at the end of the 450s.27 More recently, 
however, scholars have down-dated the Athenian regulations for Miletus from 450-447, 
to the 420s.28 The absence of other Ionian poleis on the earliest lists should not be read 
into too deeply, either. The inscription is fragmentary and is missing almost entirely 
twenty-three entries from the first column, twenty in the second, and so on.29 Since the 
lists were not yet organized by district and lacked an underlying geographical logic, it is 
likely that other Ionian poleis are lost in those lacunae. Further, the transition to 
monetized tribute was in its inchoate stages and it is equally possible that other poleis had 
not yet begun paying phoros that would be recorded on a list of aparche offerings.30  
On the second list (453/2), Ephesus (seven and a half talents, 750 dr.) and Priene 
(1 talent, 100 dr.) entered the register, Phocaea (three talents, 300 dr.) and Myus (one and 
a half talents, 150 dr.) entered on the third, Teos (six talents, 600 dr.) and Lebedus (three 
talents, 300 dr.) on the fourth, and members of the Erythraean syntely (amount lost) on 
the fifth.31 By 450/49 every phoros-paying member of the Ionian dodecapolis is attested 
on at least one list. On list eight (447/8) the payment for the Eyrthraean syntely is 
preserved at eight and a half talents (850 dr.) and, given the stability of the other Ionian 
payments in the first two assessment periods, the Eythraean syntely’s sum payment was 
likely that same amount on the earlier lists. 
                                                 
27 See ATL 3, 253; R. Meiggs, “The Crisis of Athenian Imperialism,” HSCPh 67 (1963), 
5-6, 16. 
28 Papazarkadas, “Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire,” 67-77; Rhodes, “After the Three-
Bar Sigma Controversy,” 116, following H.B. Mattingly, “The Athenian Coinage 
Decree,” 35-44, and “The Athenian Decree for Miletos,” 113-17; Paarman, “The Revolt 
of Miletos in 454/3 B.C.,” 121-40. See Part II, Chapter 2. 
29 Four of the entries in the second column have only the first letter extant. 
30 ATL 3, 250. 
31 Individual members of the Erythraean syntely appear earlier, but they appear together 
for the first time on the fifth list in 450/49. 
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The first changes to the Ionian phoros payments came in the third assessment 
period, 446-443. The payments made by Clazomenae, probably Myus, Notium (the port 
of Colophon), and Teos remained stable, while amounts paid by Colophon, Erythrae, 
Lebedus, and Miletus fell dramatically. The phoros from Ephesus also fell from seven 
and a half talents to six, but it was likely at the same time that Pygela, Isinda, and 
Marathesium first entered the register (see below). Earlier Ephesian payments probably 
included these nearby communities and their combined payments amounted to just over 
one and a half talents, so the overall payment for the area around Ephesus did not change 
or even rose slightly.  Unlike the entries for the Milesian and Erythraean syntelies, 
Pygela, Isinda, and Marathesium were never explicitly grouped with Ephesus on the 
Tribute Lists, even though Ephesians controlled them. The distinction is probably that 
where syntelies consisted of citizens from the polis, Pygela, Marathesium, and Isinda 
were directly dominated by Ephesus without having a stake in the government of the 
polis.  
Starting in 446, the list of communities that made phoros payments changed. The 
two common explanations are that it was in order for Athens to increase the overall 
income from the league or as a means to control the Ionian coastline, but both have 
flaws.32 First, while creating a larger number of payers increased in revenue in the long 
term,33 the short-term effect in 440 was a minimal change because the amount raised 
from the new settlements is accounted for in a reduction of approximately the same 
amount elsewhere. Likewise, by the time that the payments at Ephesus rose in the late 
                                                 
32 For control: Balcer, Sparda, 418; for revenue: e.g. Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 135-6, 193. 
33 In 431 (list 23) Pygela’s payment increased to one and a half talents (150 dr.) and 
Ephesus’ payment returned to the original seven and a half talents.  
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430s, there were also larger phoros payments for the Erythraean syntely, which paid just 
over ten talents in 432/1 (1018 dr. 2 obol). There is therefore no reason to attribute an 
increase in revenue to the increased number of communities making payments.34 More 
likely, the later increases were the result of new assessments. Second, while more 
communities making phoros payments meant there were probably more episkopoi 
(overseers) in the poleis, there were probably fewer than 700 total magistrates ([Arist.] 
Ath. Pol. 24.3b-25.1a).35 Moreover, much of the other evidence for Athenian regulations, 
officials, and garrisons in Ionian poleis more properly belong in the 420s, so it is 
impossible to ascribe this change to part of a broader plan of imperial control.36  
A more likely explanation is that the local communities such as Pygela began to 
assert their own autonomy and so made phoros payments on their own behalf instead of 
collectively doing so. At Erythrae and Miletus, one of the cornerstones for dating the 
Athenian regulatory decrees to the 440s was that the lists recorded payments made by the 
polis and syntelic communities separately in those years, only to make the payments 
together after the conflicts were resolved. There is a similar trajectory at Colophon, 
except that Notium appears continuously on the lists, and the crisis of civic identity only 
reached a breaking point in the fourth century.37 The Athenian regulatory decrees may 
have been down-dated to the 420s, but one need not discard the idea of civil strife since 
                                                 
34 In 432/1 Marathesium paid less than in 446, while Isinda paid the same amount. 
35 Rhodes, Commentary on the Ath. Pol., 304-5, casts doubt on the total number of 
Athenian officials and suggests that there could have been as few as seven hundred 
officials total, cf. Balcer, “Imperial Magistrates in the Athenian Empire,” 255-79. 
Aristoph. Birds 1031, mocks the magistrates. Isocrates briefly alludes to Athenian 
garrisons in allied poleis (7.65), but it is likely that he was referring to outlier examples 
rather than a standard policy. 
36 For the regulatory inscriptions, see Part II, Chapter 2. 
37 See Part II, Chapter 3. 
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all of the political and geographical pressures that were supposed to have caused the 
stasis remained in place.38 
In 434 the assessed phoros from Ionia rose, probably the result of a new, regularly 
scheduled assessment rather than a specific agenda to punish the Ionians. In most of these 
cases, such as at Ephesus and Colophon, the payments rose back to their earlier levels. 
Other Ionian communities, including Miletus (l. 60), appear on the list, but the amount of 
payment is lost. Most of the space on the stone dedicated to the Milesian aparche is left 
blank, with a single digit that was at one point inscribed. If the payments from Ephesus 
and Colophon represent a pattern of returning to the earlier level, then the missing digit 
could be inscribed as Χ for the thousand drachmae aparche made from a ten-talent 
phoros payment that Miletus had paid in 449/8.39 Unfortunately, while this amount is 
most likely, it cannot be confirmed because the symbol that records an aparche of five 
hundred drachmae (5 talent phoros, as on list 12, l. 33 and 15, l. 11) also takes a single 
digit. The payments for Myus and Pygela rose from one to one and a half talents each, 
and Erythrae rose from seven talents to over ten (1015 dr.) on lists 22 and 23 (432/1, 
431/0), while Notium and Teos paid the same amount as on previous lists. In general, the 
Ionian phoros payments in this period climbed, but not with any particular pattern. I will 
return to the consequences of these ambiguities below. 
 
Phoros Payment Tables 
                                                 
38 P.J. Rhodes, “Milesian Stephanephoroi: applying Cavaignac correctly,” ZPE 147 
(2006), 116; P. Hermann, “Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Athen und Milet im 5. 
Jahrhundert,” Klio 52 (1970), 163-73. See Part II, Chapter 2. 
39 On the symbols used for numerals on the ATL, see A.G. Woodhead, The Study of 
Greek Inscriptions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 107-11. 
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Key: Places named in italics frequently paid as a group with the community named above without italics, 
either as part of a syntely or more direct imperialism, see text. Amounts are for the aparche given in 
(drachmae, obol), retaining the format of the ATL. The total phoros payment is sixty-times the aparche, 
with six obols equal to one drachma and six thousand drachmae in one talent. Brackets indicate a restored 
figure, “none” indicates that the community appears, but no payment survives, “NA” means the community 
did not make independent payments, “SYN” indicates that the ATL records a syntelic payment. Blank 
entries indicate that no information survives, usually because of lacunae 
 
Year 454/3 453/2 452/1 451/0 450/49 449/8 448/7 447/6 446/5 445/4 
List number 1 2 3 4 5 6 No 
List 
8 9 10 
Ephesus  750      750  none 
Pygela  NA      NA   
Marathesium  NA      NA   
Isinda  NA      NA   
Colophon 300 300 300 none     150  
Notium 33, 2 33, 2 33, 2 33, 2 33, 2 34, 2     
Erythrae  none   none none  [600]   
Polichnia  none    [SYN]  100   
Sidousi      [SYN]     
Elaios      [SYN]  [15]   
Boutheia      [SYN]  10   
Peteosi      [SYN]  1, 4   
Miletus None None None  1000      
Teichoussa None          
Latmus     100      
Leros 300 None         
Clazomenae None [150] 150   150   None  
Priene  100   100      
Myus   150        
Phocaea  100 300 300     187, 
4 
 
Teos    600 [600] 600  None 600  
Lebedus    300 None    100  
 
Year 444/3 443/2 442/1 441/0 440/39 439/8 438/7 437/6 436/5 435/4 
List number 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Ephesus 600 600 none 600 600      
Pygela  none none none 100      
Marathesium  none 50        
Isinda  16, 4 none        
Colophon  none 150        
Notium  none  33, 2   33, 2     
Erythrae  none none  700      
Polichnia 66, 4 none none  66, 5      
Sidousi     8, 2      
Elaios 1, 4 none none  1, 4      
Boutheia  none none  16, 4      
 287
Peteosi     1, 4      
Miletus  500 none  500      
Teichoussa           
Latmus           
Leros           
Clazomenae  150 none  none      
Priene  none none   100     
Myus  none none   100     
Phocaea  none 200   200     
Teos 600 none 600        
Lebedus  none 100   100     
 
Year 434/3 433/2 432/1 431/0 430/29 429/8 428/7 427/6 426/5 425/4 
List number 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Ephesus  750 750        
Pygela   150  none      
Marathesium  33, 2 33, 2        
Isinda  16, 4 15, 4        
Colophon  none 300    8, 2    
Notium   33, 2    1, 4    
Erythrae  1015 1018, 
2 
 none  1200 none   
Polichnia  SYN SYN  none  150    
Sidousi  SYN SYN  none      
Elaios  SYN SYN     none   
Boutheia  SYN SYN  none  16, 4 none   
Peteosi  SYN SYN        
Miletus  none none     none   
Teichoussa        ***40   
Latmus  100 100        
Leros        none   
Clazomenae   none  none  600 [533, 
2] 
  
Priene           
Myus   150        
Phocaea     none      
Teos     none      
Lebedus           
 
 
IV. Ionian phoros payments, 430-426 
                                                 
40 The entry for Teichoussa has an aparche of at least eleven drachmae, two obols, but is 
missing at least three digits. See Paarman, Aparchai and Phoroi, Part II A, 69. 
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The stelae for the years 430/29 to 426/5 are particularly fragmentary. The editors 
of the ATL associated fragments with particular years and while the recreation of those 
stelae have been largely accepted the dates have not. For instance, Meritt has 
demonstrated that the second numeral in the header for “list 26” must contain six letters, 
which he argued meant hέκτες;41 Mattingly rightly points out, though, that γδόες and 
νάτες are equally valid restorations, which therefore places the inscription between 429 
and 427.42 Mattingly also debunked Meritt’s proposed dating based on the order of the 
districts on the inscription and argues that what the editors of the ATL called lists 26 and 
27 belonged to a single list. This interpretation is impossible to prove, but has gained 
increasing acceptance, so Paarmann and Kallet now refer to these fragments by their 
Epigraphical Museum (EM) numbers, with a cross reference to the former ATL number.43 
The problems with these inscriptions with regard to Ionia only begin there. Long sections 
of the Ionian district are missing from EM 6856 (former list 26), including what were 
probably thirty-five consecutive entries of both the name and aparche amount (ll. 22-57). 
Fragments of other lists such as EM 6654 (former 28 or 29) preserve the list of Ionian 
communities that made their phoros payments, but are missing most of the amounts. 
There are just four instances in this period where the surviving inscriptions 
include both the community and the phoros amount, one each for Colophon, Notium, 
Clazomenae, and Erythrae. Colophon and Notium continued to make phoros payments 
separately and it would be reasonable to suppose that the proximity and relationship 
                                                 
41 ATL 3, 68. The Attic alphabet employed an Ionic “eta” to denote the aspirate, see 
Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, xiv. 
42 Mattingly, “Athenian Coinage Decree,” 27. 
43 e.g. Paarmann, “Aparchai and Phoroi,” 63-7; L. Kallet, “Epigraphic Geography: The 
Tribute Quota Fragments Assigned to 421/0-415/4 B.C.,” Hesperia 73 (2004), 465-96. 
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between the two would result in parallel development of phoros payments. However, this 
was historically not the case: Colophon’s payment shrank from three talents to one and a 
half in 426, while Notium’s much smaller payment remained stable at two thousand 
drachmae. In the early 420s, though, both communities made significantly reduced 
payments. One list, former list 27 in 428/7, records an aparche of one drachma and four 
obols, for a total payment of just over one hundred drachmae for Notium, while 
Colophon’s aparche was eight drachmae and two obols, for a total payment of five 
hundred drachmae. The reduction was probably the result of a Persian-backed faction 
staging a coup in Colophon, which affected both poleis (3.34).44  Colophon and Notium 
continued pay an aparche, but at reduced rates. 
In contrast to Notium and Colophon, the same inscription records that 
Clazomenae and Erythrae made higher payments. Clazomenae, which had paid one and a 
half talents before 430 (150 dr.), made a payment of six talents (600 dr.) in 428/7. 
Erythrae’s phoros payment, which probably included the obligation for the rest of the 
syntely, rose from an earlier maximum of just over ten talents to twelve (1200 dr.). The 
decreases in payments from Notium and Colophon are easily explained, but it is harder to 
account for increases, particularly for the four-fold increase at Clazomenae. The fact that 
the earlier payment level divides evenly into the more recent payment may indicate that 
the polis had to make up for the failure to make payments and, certainly, there is no 
positive evidence of Clazomenaean payments after 430/29 (list 25). In addition to the 
neat math, what makes the interpretation that the payment was for multiple years 
attractive is that this is by far the largest percent increase of any Ionian payment and the 
                                                 
44 Hornblower, CT 1, 415. See Part II, Chapter 2.  
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largest in total amount until in 415/14 on EM 6653 (former list 39) when Clazomenae’s 
payment climbed to an astounding fifteen talents (1500 dr.). Nevertheless, Clazomenae 
had a phoros payment of five and a third talents the very next year (533 dr., 2 obols), 
which has no good explanation, but puts to lie the idea that the six-talent payment had 
been for multiple years. Likewise, Erythrae made a larger payment, but not one so large 
that it could be for more than a single year, making it likely that the assessment rose. 
There are no other recorded payments for Ionia during this period, but it is probable that 
some poleis had increased assessments, while others continued to make payments at the 
same levels in earlier periods. The most probable explanation is that the increased 
heightened phoros levels were part of an ongoing procedure to reassess the tribute, even 
before 425. The key here is that the payment levels did not remain static. 
 
V. Phoros payments from the Ninth Assessment to the Assessment of 421/0 
Prompted by Cleon and the strains of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians 
ordered an extraordinary assessment in 425 outside of the regular sequence. The total 
tribute burden on the allies rose, but by how much is debated, as is the significance of the 
changes. Further, the Ionian assessment is missing the amounts, which leads some 
scholars to attribute a massive increase in the region (see below).45 This assessment 
decree in 425/4, the Ninth Assessment overall, was probably the first of the decrees 
inscribed on the Acropolis and is commonly assumed to represent a particularly severe 
                                                 
45 B.D. Meritt and A.B. West, The Athenian Assessment of 425 B.C. (Ann Arbor: 
Michigan University Press, 1934), 89-90; Kagan, Archidamian War, 250-1. 
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imposition on the league members (ML 69).46 The assessment decree, reconstructed by 
Meritt and West, added more than one hundred new communities to the roll and says 
both that the reason for the new assessment was that the phoros payments had grown too 
small (ll. 17-18). The decree thus mandated that new assessments could only be smaller 
than the current rate in cases of demonstrable poverty (ll. 21-2).47 The decree also 
authorized the creation of a new court with one thousand jurors to hear cases concerning 
the assessments and ordered that the members pay their proper allotment (πρς μέρος, ll. 
16-18). 
The ATL editors suggest that the creation of a court indicates that the Athenians 
expected a particularly large amount of litigation on account of the assessment. They are 
undoubtedly correct that the court was designed to handle grievances from member states 
and that many of the members would have made appeals, but the new court in 425/4 was 
not exceptional. First, the decree for the assessment in 430/29 also created a court to 
accommodate complaints, so this was not an innovation for the Athenian imperial 
apparatus.48 The decree in 430/29 also suggests that the Athenians created a temporary 
institution every four years to deal with the assessment and that the amount paid need not 
be the same as the amount listed on the assessment decree. Second, the notion that the 
court looked forward to a larger than usual number of appeals hinges on the assumption 
                                                 
46 Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 193, note that the decree instructs the assessors to raise the 
amounts unless poverty made it impossible (ll. 21-2). The increased severity is seen by 
both the ATL editors and Mattingly, “Periclean Imperialism,” 147-79, who was convinced 
there was a marked change in the severity of the empire between Pericles and Cleon. Cf. 
Kallet, “Democracy, Empire and Epigraphy,” 55-6; Papazarkadas, “Epigraphy and the 
Athenian Empire,” 78. 
47 Meritt and West, Athenian Assessment of 425, 59; Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 193; S. 
Dow, “Studies in the Athenian Tribute Lists, III,” TAPhA 72 (1941), 82. 
48 ATL 3, 79; Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 197. F.A. Lepper, “Some Rubrics in the Athenian 
Quota-Lists,” JHS 82 (1962), 33-4, dates the change to 434. 
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that this particular assessment markedly increased the payments across the empire, which 
I will argue was not necessarily true. 
This standard reading of the assessment of 425 in part rests on how Meritt and 
West interpreted the description of the phoros payments as too small.  Indeed, the 
inscription makes this pronouncement (ll. 17-22), but one is led to ask with reference to 
what? The assessment took place five years after the start of the Archidamian War, 
which, combined with the revolt of Mytilene, the campaigns at Pylos and Sphacteria, and 
the catastrophe of the plague, taxed Athenian finances to the breaking point,49 so the 
decree probably indicates that the payments were insufficient for the war effort. 
Likewise, it is possible there was widespread inflation in the fifth century Aegean, which 
meant the buying power of the payments had significantly shrunk since the 470s.50 The 
ATL editors thus suggested that, despite the new assessments every four years, the 
assessment of 425 constituted a long-overdue update. At the same time, Kagan suggests 
that the Delian League as a whole was significantly more prosperous in the immediate 
aftermath of the Persian Wars than in the 420s.51 However, payments were not the same 
as assessments. The war strained the Athenian budget, but it also put a strain on other 
Greek communities and interfered with their ability to make uninterrupted payments. If 
this combination undercut the income used for the phoroi, then increasing the assessment 
would have had little substantive effect on the payments. In fact, Meritt and West 
themselves interpret πρς μέρος πάσας as each community being assessed according to 
its ability to make payments, which was the same condition attributed to Aristides’ 
                                                 
49 Blamire, “Athenian Finance,” 109-10. See Part II, Chapter 2. 
50 Kagan, Archidamian War, 251; French, “Growth of the Athenian Economy,” 168. 
51 Kagan, Archidamian War, 251. 
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original assessment in 478.52 Surely every community was inclined to claim financial 
hardship in this process, regardless of actual circumstances. Further, in Ionia payments 
had been rising slowly before 425. Thus, it is probable that at least by 430, a special court 
was standard procedure in the wake of a new assessment and the Athenians expected 
nothing exceptional in 425/4.  
The inscription also contains a fragmentary sum total for the entire assessment, 
which is either to be reconstructed as 960[---] or 1460[---] talents, based on the lost first 
digit, which is either five hundred or one thousand.53 The middle digits total 460 talents, 
and then there are three missing digits from the end of the number. The totals for the 
other districts are largely extant, so the question is how to read the lacuna that comprises 
the Ionian district. The stele included enough space for one hundred and sixty-nine 
entries in the Ionian and Carian district, but, unlike the other districts, most are lost and 
the remaining entries lack the actual assessment.54 Meritt and West argue, reasonably, 
that this number generally matches the composition of the district on other lists and, 
using those entries, they apply a scattershot method to create a minimum (using the 
smallest attested payments) and a maximum (using the largest) sum of phoros payments 
for the district.55 Their calculation for the minimum Ionian assessment, 158 talents, when 
added to the known amounts for the other districts adds up to 966 talents, which closely 
matches the lower end of the total. The maximum, which is more likely given the general 
tendencies and the decree, increases the assessment for Ionia to 234 talents and the 
overall total to 1042—an amount too large, they say, to reconstruct the assessment as 960 
                                                 
52 Meritt and West, Athenian Assessment of 425, 79. 
53 Cf. Kagan, Archidamian War, 250-1. 
54 Meritt and West, Athenian Assessment of 425, 72. 
55 Meritt and West, Athenian Assessment of 425, 72, 88-9. 
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talents.56 They continue by saying that accepting the higher total allows “the restoration 
of large figures, some of which should probably be as large as 50 talents,” on the Ionian 
assessment in 425, even though there is no precedent for payments that large from the 
region.57 The new total assessment they assign to the Ionian-Carian district is therefore 
450 talents, nearly twice as large as the previously attested maximum of 234 talents. 
There is no precedent in the Ionian-Carian district for phoros payments this high and, as 
Kallet has demonstrated, not every assessment rose.58  Since there was not an universal 
increase in assessments, it is unlikely that the Ionian contribution was as large as Meritt 
and West claim. 
It is possible to close the supposedly insurmountable gap between known 
assessments and the lower figure for the total assessment by examining the Ionian-Carian 
district. First, the numeral for the sum total on the inscription is missing three digits, 
meaning that it could be as low as 963 talents or as high as 990 talents, if, as I believe 
more probable, the missing first digit was five hundred. If one takes Meritt and West’s 
calculation for the maximum phoros payment sum in Ionia, but reduces that by the three 
talents from Colophon and regresses the payments for Erythrae, Clazomenae and 
Lebedus from their maximums of twelve, six, and three talents, to the most common 
historical levels of nine, one and a half, and one talents, then this lowers the Ionian 
payment by more than twelve talents, falling from 234 to c.222. Thus, the overall 
maximum for the assessment is reduced from 1042 to 1030. When taken in light of the 
highest possible sum (990 talents) for the overall assessment, Meritt and West’s 
                                                 
56 Meritt and West, Athenian Assessment of 425, 89. 
57 Meritt and West, Athenian Assessment of 425, 89. 
58 Kallet, “Epigraphic Geography,” 492-5. 
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supposedly insurmountable difference of 82 talents between the assessment and income 
has shrunk to 42 talents. It is impossible to prove whether these specific payments are 
correct, and some Ionian poleis surely paid a higher phoros, but in the lacunae on the 
stone it is as easy for one to envision the remaining difference as it is for Meritt and West 
to imagine the additional revenue. Further, Merritt and West admit that the income from 
the phoros payments capped at about 1,000 talents, despite the assessment of 1,500 as 
they reconstruct it, which means the Athenian system was wildly inefficient or Merritt 
and West are too aggressive in supporting the higher figure.59 I find the latter is more 
probable. 
My focus is not on the Athenian financial systems during the fifth century, but 
how those systems affected Ionia. I also have erred on the side of caution and prefer the 
records of collection to those of assessment because they represent a more realistic 
account of the impact of empire on Ionia. However, given supporters of the larger 
payments rely on the exceptionally high assessment on Ionia, I believe that the smaller 
figure more likely. There is no evidence from the lists that the largest and wealthiest 
Ionian poleis experienced a dramatic increase in assessment and it is improbable that the 
smaller states faced a weightier burden. In 425, the phoros payments from Ionia were in 
sum as high as they had ever been, but not substantially higher than ever before. 
 
VI. Conclusions and Limitations 
                                                 
59 ATL 1, 345. Kallet, “Epigraphic Geography,” 493-4, likewise notes the difference 
between assessment and collection and regards the Athenian assessment as overly 
optimistic. 
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Balcer asserts that Ionia-Caria was the poorest of the principal tribute districts, but 
this is misleading.60 The Ionian phoros was roughly equivalent to the Nesiotic (Island) 
district after the latter underwent a large increase in assessment (163 talents, to the 
Ionian-Carian level that was in the range of 158-234 talents).61 Both districts pale in 
comparison to the Hellespont and Thrace, regions with at least as much arable land poleis 
rich in natural resources and with a high volume of trade in grain and precious metals.62 
Further, Ionia’s total phoros payment did not include either Samos or Chios, two of the 
largest poleis in the region in terms of population and land, because both contributed 
ships. Chios continued to contribute ships until 412/11, but the Athenians confiscated the 
Samian ships in 440 after the war between Athens and Samos (Thuc. 1.117.3; Diod. 
12.28.3; Plut. Per. 28).63  
The Athenians also levied a fine of 1200 talents on the Samians, to be paid back 
in annual installments as large as 50 talents per year and was not included in the tally of 
phoros payments.64 The Samian repayment plan was probably intended to be harsher than 
the regular phoros, but each installment was more than four times that of the largest 
Ionian payment, a testament to the wealth of Samos, even without the resources of 
Anaea, which was occupied by exiles hostile to the Delian League.65 None of these 
payments appears on the Athenian Tribute Lists and at no point is there an indication that 
                                                 
60 Balcer, Sparda, 414. This is also true if one regards the Atektia “district” as a part of 
the Hellespontine district, see Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 193. 
61 On the increase in the Nesiotic assessment, see Wallace and Figueira, “Notes on the 
Island Phoros,” 66. 
62 French, “Tribute of the Allies,” 9. 
63 B.D. Meritt, Documents on Athenian Tribute (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1937), 36. See Part II, Chapter 2. 
64 Unz, “Surplus of Athenian Phoros,” 30 n. 26, believes both that the Samians paid less 
than 50 talents per year, but also that the 50-talent figure was low. 
65 Carusi, Isole e Peree, 158-60. 
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Samos was assessed for payment.66 On the one hand, Samos was contributing money to 
the Athenian war effort, but, on the other, this means that it was neither in the category of 
military allies nor among the phoros-paying members. Perhaps the stark contrast between 
the two categories needs to be rethought, or there is another level to what the lists 
record.67 
Finally, there is no evidence that there was an unusual increase in the phoros 
payments made by the Ionian communities after 425. Other than making wild leaps based 
on a lack of information, the only way to conclude that the increases happened is to 
follow French or Unz in arguing that the aparche lists record dedications from only the 
amount of phoros that reached Athens and that the majority of the league dues were spent 
by military commanders.68 Ionians contributed to the Athenian forces with soldiers and 
ships and the Peloponnesian War disrupted their communities. Colophon contributed its 
small payment of five hundred drachmae throughout the 420s and the consequences of 
dissatisfaction with the Athenian Empire elsewhere in Ionia do not appear on the tribute 
lists. Punitive assessments and non-payments alike emerge from the lacunae on the stones 
rather than from actual evidence. 
                                                 
66 In contrast to Thera, which paid both indemnity and phoros. Meritt, Documents on 
Athenian Tribute, 35; Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 187. 
67 French, “Tribute of the Allies,” 7, argues that Samians did pay a phoros since his view 
is that payment included costs and services not on the lists.  
68 I do believe that much of the phoros never reached Athens, but that the aparche still 
constituted a dedication from the entire amount since there is no evidence of a ritual 
separation with the entire amount present.  
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15. Ionian Coinage and the Delian League: Economic Imperialism and the Standards 
Decree 
 
 
I. The Standards Decree 
The so-called “Standards Decree” is traditionally dated to the mid 440s and 
interpreted as an Athenian imperial edict that forced the allies in the Delian League to use 
Athenian coins, weights, and measures (ML 45).1 This reading posits the decree as part of 
the metastasis of the Delian League into an Athenian Empire, since it further limited the 
autonomy of the allies and made those who violated it subject to trial in Athens. The 
Standards Decree indubitably had an impact on the Ionian poleis, but because of the 
sizes, locations, and influences of these poleis, the effects were not uniform. The 
scholarship on the decree revolves around three debates, the date, the intent, and whether 
it was ultimately enforceable. While I will begin this study with a brief review of the 
scholarship on the Standards Decree, including the supposed ties between Athenian 
legislation and Ionian discontent, what follows is not a revision of the decree itself, but an 
analysis how it reshaped the histories of coinage in the Ionian poleis. 
The Standards Decree was enacted at Athens and posted in the allied poleis with 
stelae appearing in Syme, Aphytis, Cos, and Siphnos (ML 45). No copies of the 
inscription have been found in Ionia, but the tribute district is specifically listed so it 
certainly applied there (ll. 25-6). At face value, the decree mandated that all Delian 
                                                 
1 For epigraphical reconstructions of the decree, see Figueira, Power of Money, 319-423; 
for a synopsis of debates about the decree, see D.M. Lewis, “The Athenian Coinage 
Decree,” in Coinage and Administration in the Athenian and Persian Empires, ed. I. 
Carradice (Oxford: B.A.R. International Series, 1987), 53-63, and, more recently, A. 
Hadji and Z. Kontes, “ The Athenian Coinage Decree: Inscriptions, Coins and Athenian 
Politics,” in Proceedings of the XIII Congress of International Numismatics, edd. C.A. 
Asins, C.M. Alonso, P.O. Morán (Madrid 2005), 263-8, with bibliography. 
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League members use Athenian coins, weights, and measures, and banned all allied poleis 
from independently minting silver coins. Further, it required the masters of the mint at 
Athens to convert foreign currency into Attic coin and violators of the new order be tried 
in Athens. Despite these seemingly severe restrictions and the provision that, except 
where there was none, the Athenian officials in the allied poleis were charged with 
enforcing it (ll. 9-12), the decree itself did not add any new overseers.2 In line with the 
tightening of Athenian imperial regulations, the consensus interpretation of these 
provisions is that they were designed to eliminate the creation and circulation of non-
Attic coin, which would symbolically curb autonomy and make the allies economically 
reliant on Athens.3 However a revisionist view posits that the decree had the much more 
limited goals of converting a limited amount of foreign coinage to Athenian owls and to 
ensure that allied states accepted the Athenian coinage, but never banned the production 
of silver.4 Certainly, Figueira demonstrates that allied states continued to mint coins in 
the fifth century.5 
There are three proposed dates for the Standards Decree, the conventional high 
chronology placing it in the early 440s, a revisionist low chronology supporting a date in 
the 420s, usually 425/4, and an even later one of 415/14 when phoros payments gave way 
                                                 
2 Figueira, Power of Money, 333, observes that, “for a decree that is thought to supervise 
allied affairs highhandedly, it is surprising that orders to the allies and to allied authorities 
are not more in evidence.” 
3 For instance, J.B. Bury and R. Meiggs, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander 
the Great4 (New York: Macmillan, 1975), 226; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 172-4; Sealey, 
History of the Greek States, 306. 
4 Figueira, Power of Money, 551-8. 
5 Figueira, Power of Money, 21-197. 
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to a harbor tax.6 There is no unambiguous means of dating the decree such as the 
preserved name of a known archon, so all camps date the decree based on supposed 
contextual hints and letterforms (as is often the case with Attic decrees).7 The extant copy 
of the decree from Cos was written in the Attic script and contains the so-called three-
barred sigma, which was long thought to necessitate an early date. Thus the Standards 
Decree was thought to correspond to the spasms of discontent in the Delian League in the 
440s, part of the Athenian tightening of regulations in response to early revolts.8 The 
decree is supposed to have been effective, since, it is argued, irregular amounts of the 
phoros payments disappear until about 430.9 However, the three-barred sigma did not fall 
out of use in Athenian decrees.10 With the cornerstone of the early dating removed, other 
commentators argue that the context of the 420s is more appropriate. The decree allowed 
tribute to be immediately transferred to Athenian generals, a necessary financial 
expedient after the onset of the Archidamian War (431-421) when the plague and the 
revolt of Mytilene in 428 stretched Athenian resources thin.11 Further, Lewis observes 
                                                 
6 Hadji and Kontes, “The Athenian Coinage Decree,” 263-8. Caria is not listed among the 
tribute districts, which precludes a date between 446 and 438, see E.S.G. Robinson, “The 
Athenian Currency Decree and the Coinages of the Allies,” Hesperia Supplements 8 
(1949), 324; Cf. Figueira, Power of Money, 436-41. 
7 See Part II, Chapter 1. 
8 Balcer, Sparda, 396-405; S.K. Eddy, “Some irregular amounts of Athenian tribute,” 
AJP (1973), 47-70; Meiggs and Lewis GHI, 111-16; Robinson, “The Athenian Coinage 
Decree and the Coinages of the Allies,” 328-40; M. Segre, “La Legge Ateniese sull’ 
Unificazione della moneta,” Clara Rhodos 9 (1938), 151-78. 
9 Eddy, “Some irregular amounts of Athenian tribute,” 47-70. On phoros payments and 
Ionia, see Part III, Chapter 14. 
10 Rhodes, “After the Three-Bar “Sigma” Controversy,” 500-6, see Part II, Chapter 2. 
11 Salmons, Empire of the Owl, 330-1; Cf. C. Howgego Ancient History from Coins 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 44; H.B. Mattingly, “New Light on the Athenian Standards 
Decree,” in From Coins to History: Selected Numismatic Studies (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 2003), 24-9; M. Vickers, “Fifth Century Chronology and the Coinage 
Decree,” JHS 116 (1996), 171-4. Kallet, Money and the Corruption of Power, 205-26, 
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that the Athenian need to regulate coinage is probably a sign of weakness rather than one 
of strength, which fits with a context immediately after 428 or in 415/14 during the 
campaign to Sicily.12 The later camp does not deny the development of an Athenian 
empire in the period after 454, but holds that imperialism does not stem from a single 
policy directive; Salmons, in particular, argues that the decree had little impact on the 
actual function of the Athenian imperial finances.13  
A second contextual point is that the decree is sometimes considered a distinctly 
un-Periclean show of overweening imperialism toward the allies and that it therefore was 
part of Cleon’s imperial policy in the later 420s, with the Chian appeal to Athens in 425 
caused by the change (Thuc. 4.51).14 Figueira’s revisionist account of the decree as a 
softer policy linking Athens with its allies would similarly exonerate Pericles and 
seemingly eliminate the “bloody minded” Cleon from proposing the legislation.15 While I 
believe that the Standards Decree had less of an effect on Ionia than might be assumed at 
first blush, the provisions concerning financial expediency of the decree is a stronger case 
for the 420s (or 415/14) than the personality traits of the Athenian leaders. 
                                                                                                                                                 
argues that the decree should date to 415/14. On Ionia and the Archidamian War, see Part 
II, Chapter 2. 
12 Hadji and Kontes, “The Athenian Coinage Decree,” 264-5; and Lewis, “Athenian 
Coinage Decree,” 63, though he accepts a 440s date for the decree. 
13 Salmons, Empire of the Owl, 330-2; Cf. H.B. Mattingly, “The Athenian Coinage 
Decree and the Assertion of Empire,” in Coinage and Administration in the Athenian and 
Persian Empires, ed. I. Carradice (Oxford: B.A.R. International Series, 1987), 65-71. 
14 Mattingly, “The Athenian Coinage Decree,” 44-52; Mattingly, “Periclean 
Imperialism,” 165-7; T.J. Figueira, Excursions in Epichoric History (Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1993), 272-4. argues that the disagreement never led to a “genuine breach 
of Chian autonomy.” Thucydides says that the Athenians called for the destruction of 
Chios’ walls because they suspected the polis to be on the brink of revolt, but also 
indicates that they would not alter the deal further, Part II, Chapter 2. 
15 Figueira, Power of Money, 436. 
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Members of the Delian League such as Chios (see section II, below.) continued to 
mint their own coins throughout the fifth century, so the questions are whether the decree 
banned minting or whether there were exemptions to the rule or whether it was merely 
unenforceable.16 First, the decree makes no mention of electrum (a gold and silver alloy, 
see below), so, regardless of the interpretation of the rest of the decree, electrum coins 
probably continued to circulate, albeit at levels that had already diminished by 
inauguration of the Delian League in 478.17 The Standards Decree explicitly called for 
the reminting of silver coins produced by the allies and put in place legal penalties for 
infractions, so there is a high likelihood that minting silver was discouraged, but not 
prohibited. The cost for reminting the allied coins also implies that the purpose of the 
decree was to encourage tribute to be paid in Attic coinage, so Chios, which did not make 
phoros payments, was not under the same immediate pressure to close its mint. The 
decree had to have been considered overly imperialistic for Aristophanes to effectively 
parody it in Birds of 414 (1040-1),18 which also serves as the terminus ante quem for the 
decree. Thus, Salmons argues it is improbable that Chios, for instance, received 
exemptions.19 Yet, in the same play, Aristophanes also satirizes such a special 
relationship by having the hero, Pisthetairus, exclaim, “I am pleased that the Chians are 
                                                 
16 Figueira, Power of Money, 175-9. 
17 Figueira, Power of Money, 92-110. The value of electrum coins was not as predictable 
as silver because small variations in amount of gold in a coin would significantly alter the 
value and many users were likely unable to reliably identify the variations. 
18 “Decree-peddler: The citizens of Cloudcuckooland must use the same measures, 
weights, and decrees as the Olophyxians” (Ψηφισματοπλης : χρσθαι 
Νεφελοκοκκυγις τοσδε μέτροισι κα σταθμοσι κα ψηφίσμασι καθάπερ 
λοφύξιοι.) 
19 Salmons, Empire of the Owl, 331. 
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always placed in our prayers!” (880).20 Chios was an exception in many regards and 
continued to mint silver coins, but so too did other poleis.21  
In addition to the states that continued to mint silver and electrum coins in the 
Delian League, other Greek and Persian issues circulated in these markets. For Ionia, this 
particularly meant Persian coin. It is unlikely therefore that the decree was meant as a 
quixotic tilt against foreign symbolism and autonomy,22 but neither does this mean that it 
was an entirely superfluous piece of legislation since it also required it to be posted 
throughout the league. Is there a middle ground where Ionian standards aligned with 
Athens before the Standards Decree went into effect? First, the decree did place 
restrictions on allied states minting new silver coins, but these were both less far-reaching 
and less needed than is usually assumed. Athenian Owls had already largely supplanted 
local issues before the decree was enacted for reasons other than legislative dictate (see 
below). The regulations formalized a de facto situation, gave procedures for re-minting 
foreign coins, and allowed phoros payments to go directly to generals in the field. Using 
the decree to remove foreign coin, in turn, provided an infusion of money for the 
Athenian war effort. Further, while the first choice for enforcement was Athenian 
officials, the Athenians clearly expected the local magistrates to enforce the decree. Thus, 
the use of the decree to discourage minting new silver coins was intended to help secure 
unity after war had begun. 
 
II. Stater, Siglos, and Drachma: Coinage in the Aegean  
                                                 
20 Χίοισιν σθην πανταχο προσκειμένοις. On this passage on the relationship between 
Chios and Athens, see Part II, Chapter 1 and Part III, Chapter 11. 
21 Howgego, Ancient History From Coins, 16. 
22 Figueira, The Power of Money, 245-58. 
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Ionia, located between Athens and Persia, was comprised of some of the smallest 
and some of the largest Delian League poleis and had a long history of coining. The 
earliest minted coins entered Ionia from Lydia in the second half of the seventh century 
and were made of copper or electrum.23 The value of these archaic Greek coins was based 
on the metal composition regardless of the stamp. Electrum, an alloy of gold and silver in 
a range of mixtures, was problematic because the value varied from coin to coin based on 
the ratio of gold to silver.24 By the Classical period, electrum was joined by the more 
ubiquitous silver, while Persia continued to produce gold issues and satraps produced 
silver coins.25 There was no direct value added by a minted coin outside of trust in the 
metal composition and the coins were not created to facilitate commercial transactions,26 
so there must be another motive for coinage. One thesis is that minting coins was a 
declaration of autonomy. However, the equation of coinage and autonomy has come 
under attack and Martin notes that fourth century Greeks did not recall the Standards 
Decree as a notably harsh measure on the part of the Athenians.27 Coins could indicate 
independence, but were not a necessary component. A second, more likely, thesis is that 
                                                 
23 G.K. Genkins, Ancient Greek Coins2 (London: Seaby, 1990); D.M. Schaps, The 
Invention of Coinage and Monetization of Ancient Greece (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2004), 93-9 
24 C. Kraay, “Coinage,” in CAH2 V, 433; Schaps, Invention of Coinage, 99. 
25 Howgego, Ancient History from Coins, 4. 
26 J.D. Sosin, “Agio at Delphi,” NC7 160 (2000), 67-80, cautions, however, that the 
exchange rates between different standards did not always correspond simply to the 
weight of the coin. 
27 T.R. Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), particularly 203-6. 
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coinage represented the leftover savings for a polis saved for times of emergency28 or 
corresponded to periods when poleis needed to make large payments.29 
Beyond metal composition, coinage varied in denominations and weight 
standards. The Athenian, western Aegean system was based on the drachma with the obol 
as a fractional coin at one-sixth of a drachma and larger denominations in multiples of the 
base drachma (i.e. tetradrachm, didrachm). In contrast, the standard in the eastern Aegean 
was the electrum stater and its fractions ranging from one-third stater to one-ninety-sixth 
stater.30 By the sixth century, Ionian poleis such as Chios minted coins from both 
systems. There were at least three standard coinage weight systems in early fifth-century 
Ionia other than Attic, namely the Chian (also known as the Rhodian), the Aeginetan, and 
the Lydian-Persian.31 The siglos, the standard Persian coin, weighed between 5.40 and 
5.67 grams, while an Aeginetan drachm weighed c.6.3 grams, a Chian drachm c.3.8 
grams, and an Attic drachm c.4.3 grams. During the second half of the fifth century, non-
Attic coins fell out of circulation within the Delian League sphere, only to return at the 
tail end of the fifth century. The main questions, then, are what motivation lay behind the 
transformation and can it be connected to be the Standards Decree. 
 
III. Ionian Coinage  
                                                 
28 Kraay, “Coinage,” 444. 
29 C.M. Kraay, Greek Coins and History (London: Methuen, 1969), 62. 
30 Kraay, “Coinage,” 434-5. The 1/96th stater coins may in fact be one-half of 1/96th 
staters, see K. Konuk, From Kroisos to Karia: Early Anatolian Coins from the Muharrem 
Kayhan Collection (Istanbul: Ege Yayinlari, 2003), 33. 
31 A.R. Meadows, “A Chian Revolution,” in Nomisma. La circulation monetaire dans le 
monde grec antique, BCH suppl. 53, edd. T. Faucher, M.-C Marcellesi and O. Picard 
(Athens, 2011), 285; C.M. Kraay, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), 247-8. 
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III-1. Chios 
In the early- and mid-fifth century, Chians continued to mint coins on the local 
standard in the denominations of stater and titrae (third-staters), which was the archaic 
convention.32 Unlike Athenian Owls, examples of Chian coins are found throughout the 
regions dominated by Athens and issues only gradually fade from the record through the 
fifth century.33 There was a gradual refinement of imagery on Chian coins, thus the 
sphinx coins added amphorae, and then grapes suspended above the amphorae.34 
Sometime in the mid-fifth century the Chian mints ceased production of the stater and 
began to produce tetradrachms instead, albeit still on their own weight standard.35 This 
change was once thought to indicate that the Chians closed their mint in the early 440s 
and were permitted to reopen it in the 430s, but it is more likely that the mint never 
actually closed. 36 
Complicating the dating of Chian coin issues is that the shapes of Chian amphorae 
changed, both in the archeological record and on the Chian coins. The bulbous necked 
amphorae gave way to a similar “Atticizing” type that corresponded to Attic 
                                                 
32 Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” 96. The “stater” is frequently referred to as a 
“didrachm” and “tritae” is listed as “tetrobol,” which muddles the distinctions. 
33 Figueira, Power of Money, 153-4. On the range of finds, see N.M.M. Hardwick, “The 
Coinage of Chios, 6th-4th century BC,” in Proceedings of the XIth International 
Numismatic Congress, edd. C. Courtois, H. Dewit, V. Van Driessche (Louvain: 
Séminaire de Numismatique Marcel Hoc, 1993), 213-16 and 221. 
34 Figueira, The Power of Money, 154; Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” 97. 
35 Meadows, “Chian Revolution,” 275; Figueira, Power of Money, 155. 
36 In favor of a break in silver coins: Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 116; Kraay, Archaic and 
Classical Greek Coins, 242-3; Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” 96-100; 
continuous production: Figueira, Power of Money, 154-5. 
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measurements, before being replaced by straight-necked amphorae.37 However, the 
transitions from wholly Chian measurements and denominations to Attic were not 
contemporaneous. The change in volume, but not shape, of the amphorae probably came 
first, without a corresponding change on coins. Then the straight-necked amphorae 
replaced the bulbous-nick ones, but the Chian stater remained, since early stamps on the 
new amphorae type represented the stater and pictured the old amphorae type.38 Finally, 
the tetradrachm replaced the stater. The transition between bulbous-neck and straight-
neck amphorae took place in the 430s, during which time there was an overlap of the 
styles.39 It therefore follows that the Chian electrum stater and its depiction of the 
stereotypically Chian bulbous-neck amphora was in production and circulation at least 
through the 430s.40  
Hardwick has proposed that the tetradrachm did not begin to be circulated until 
400 because that is the date at which the coins begin to appear in coin hoards.41 However, 
coin hoards are unreliable chronological markers because, by definition, they can only 
mark when a particular coin fell out of use. The lack of positive evidence is difficult to 
ignore, but the peripheral evidence indicates a more likely introduction around 430, 
possibly in 431. Barron and Figueira reasonably point to an inventory from the Treasurers 
of the Other Gods at Athens in 429/8 that records an offering of 485 Chian drachmae and 
                                                 
37 H.B. Mattingly, “Coins and Amphoras—Chios, Samos and Thasos in the Fifth Century 
B.C.,” in The Athenian Empire Restored (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1996), 437-41; Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” 98-9. 
38 Mattingly, “Coins and Amphoras,” 437-41; Cf. Figueira, Power of Money, 156-7. 
39 Mattingly, “Coins and Amphoras,” 438. 
40 H.B. Mattingly “Chios and the Athenian Standards Decree,” in The Athenian Empire 
Restored (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 521, concedes the dating on 
the change in standards, but not the dating of the coins. 
41 N.M.M. Hardwick, The Coinage of Chios from the 6th to the 4th Century B.C. (Ph.D. 
Diss., Oxford, 1991), 160-5.  
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4 obols—a sum that is much more easily reached if it included a mix of the old and new 
issues, both silver and electrum, rather than just the old denominations.42  
In 411 the Chians gave sailors in the Spartan fleet a “fortieth” consisting of three 
Chian coins (Thuc. 8.101.1).43 What this means is debated, and Hardwick argues that the 
term refers to an exchange rate where forty of the Chian third-staters were equivalent to a 
daric, the Persian gold coin.44 While the Chian standard did bridge easily with Persian 
coin,45 Hardwick’s proposal is improbable because it vastly reduces the value of the 
payment. The most common explanation is that it was three Chian tetradrachms and 
referred to as a fortieth because they were equivalent to a fortieth of an Aeginetan coin 
mna.46 Figueira also reasonably argues that this new standard had to have been 
introduced far enough in advance of 411 for the term “fortieth” to become common.47 In 
a similar episode in 406, the Chians gave a five-drachma subsidy to Callicratidas’ sailors 
(Xen. Hell. 1.6.12);48 it has been argued that this subsidy was five Aeginetan drachmae, 
but the simplest explanation is that the Chians provided a tetradrachm and a drachma of 
                                                 
42 Figueira, Power of Money, 155; Barron, “Chios in the Athenian Empire,” 97. 
43 παρ τν Χίων τρες τεσσαρακοστς καστος Χίας. Hornblower, CT 3, 1043-4, notes 
that a scholiast believed it the fortieth was an antiquated coin. Cf. Part II, Chapter 3. 
44 Hardwick, Coinage of Chios, 147-8; N.M.M. Hardwick, “The Solution to Thucydides 
VIII 101.1: The ‘Chian Fortieths’,” Quaderni ticinesi di numismatica e antichitá 
classiche 25 (1996), 59-69, followed by Kallet, Money and the Corrosion of Power, 280. 
45 Meadows, “Chian Revolution,” 288. 
46 Figueira Power of Money, 158; Andrewes, in HCT 5, 346. 
47 Figueira, Power of Money, 160.  
48 Callicratidas received κ Χίου πεντεδραχμίαν κάστ τν ναυτν φορδιασάμενος. 
Krentz, Hellenika I-II.3.10, 148 and W.E. Thompson, “The Chian Coinage in Thucydides 
and Xenophon,” NC7 11 (1971), 323-4, note that it is unknown whether this subsidy also 
consisted of one or multiple coins, but reasonable posit that the payment was more than 
thirty-three talents. 
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their own coin.49 The second subsidy is less than half of the first, but indicates the dire 
financial straits of the anti-Athenian forces before Cyrus’ intervention in the war. Both 
subsidies fit neatly with Chians paying with their own tetradrachms,50 so the Chians 
probably switched from didrachms to tetradrachms between 430 and 411, and I believe a 
date of 430 or just before is most likely. 
There is a pattern here wherein the Chians gradually converted to Athenian 
measures and denominations in the second half of the fifth century. However, the 
spasmodic transition makes it impossible that the decision was in response to a single 
decree. This is also Figueira’s conclusion, as he dates the beginning of the process to c. 
440, shortly after he says the Standards Decree went into effect. His Standards Decree is 
much more mild than the version proposed by other scholars, claiming that the transition 
was gradual and voluntary, with the decisions made for principally economic reasons.51 
However, even if one accepts that a more severe decree was passed in the 420s, the same 
considerations and chronology for the Chian conversion to Athenian weight standards 
hold true. In all probability, the changes had already taken place before the Standards 
Decree took effect. However, the Chian coinage weights survived and indeed became the 
standard currency in the eastern Aegean in the fourth century. Meadows, I believe rightly, 
posits that the homogenization owes its origin to the influx of money from Cyrus.52 
Lysander likely instigated the production of a ΣΥΝ series of coins on the Chian standard, 
both because of the polis’ import to the war and because it bridged easily with both the 
                                                 
49 Figueira, Power of Money, 159, floats the counter-argument that the Chians referred to 
their coins as “staters,” but the source for this is Xenophon, rather than a Chian receipt. 
50 On Cyrus’ intervention on behalf of Sparta, see Part II, Chapter 3. 
51 Figueira, Power of Money, 177. 
52 Meadows, “A Chian Revolution,” 285-92. 
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Aeginetan and Persian standards.53 Likewise, Lysander was closely connected with other 
early adopters of the coinage standard such as Ephesus, Rhodes, Byzantium, and Samos 
(after 404).54 Once the Chian standard took hold in the Eastern Aegean, it continued to 
gain traction throughout the fourth century. 
 
III-2. Samos 
Samos, like Chios, had a long numismatic tradition and the polis also continued to 
mint silver coins throughout the fifth century.55 For my study, the most important series is 
a lettered class with oxen bearing ornamental collars on the obverse that spans at least 
fourteen years attested by a combination of dies and surviving coins.56 Seemingly during 
the same period, there were also Samian coins bearing ivy leaves on the obverse, and 
others with a panther’s head instead of a letter. Barron argues that this letter series began 
in 453, and was a new class of coins that was inaugurated after an oligarchic coup in the 
wake of the proposal to move the Delian League treasury to Athens.57 This start date 
allows the series to conclude neatly in 440/39 at the end of the war between Samos and 
Athens, which resulted in the Samians being required to pay back the Athenian cost of 
the war.58 This chronology is not universally agreed upon, particularly because this series 
precludes a 440s date for the Standards Decrees unless there was an exception for 
                                                 
53 Meadows, “A Chian Revolution,” 286-7. 
54 Meadows, “A Chian Revolution,” 287-8. 
55 For an overview of Samian coin issues, see Barron, Silver Coins of Samos, 80-93 and 
Figueira, Power of Money, 166-7. 
56 Figueira, Power of Money, 168-9. 
57 Barron, Silver Coins of Samos, 81; see Part II, Chapter 2. 
58 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
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Samos.59  One certainty is that the war in 440 caused a clear caesura in the numismatic 
history of Samos. Barron’s reading is based on the misleading premise that the Athenians 
stripped Samos of its autonomy after 439, a privilege of which was minting coins. Thus, 
he argues, the Athenians closed the Samian mint and ended an exemption from the 
Standards Decree at the same time that Samos had to pay a steep restitution.60 However, 
these reservations may be withdrawn by down-dating the decree.  
It is unknown what coin the Samians used for the reparation payments, but it has 
been proposed that the lettered series was created specifically for the annual fifty-talent 
payments. This chronology for the series places the final issue in 426/5, assuming that the 
first issue came in 438/7, the year after the siege and in time for the first payment.61 Thus, 
this chronology suggests a Standards Decree enacted in the early 420s. Figueira, 
however, argues that there was a gap of a few years in the early 430s in which the 
Samians tried to restore their economy and hoarded Athenian tetradrachms with which to 
pay the indemnity.62 Both interpretations place the break in Samian coinage during the 
Archidamian War. While it is impossible to prove an exact date therein, I find 
Mattingly’s direct correlation of this with the Standards Decree implausible because it is 
more likely that Samos, like the other Ionian poleis, made the decision to cease minting 
for economic reasons.63 
                                                 
59 Figueira, Power of Money, 173, uses the existence of Samian coinage as evidence for a 
weak Standards Decree. 
60 The Samians probably had to pay 1400 talents in annual installments of talents, see 
Part II, Chapter 2. 
61 Mattingly, “Coins and Amphoras,” 441-9. 
62 Figueira, Power of Money, 172-3.  
63 Mattingly, “Coins and Amphoras,” 441-9. 
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The Samians continued to mint tetradrachms on their traditional standard, only 
changing to an Attic weight c.411.64 The Samian silver series discussed above ends in the 
early 420s, around the same time as the Standards Decree was enacted and when 
financial resources were becoming scarce. Since there was no direct bureaucratic action 
to coerce the use of Attic measures, it is more remarkable that Chios made the switch 
than it is that Samos did not. Moreover, it likely that the scarcity of resources was a more 
important calculation in the cessation of minting than was the decree. Samos did not mint 
new coins until 412, when, like other Ionian poleis, it minted a new series of coins on the 
Attic weight standard.65 The new coins appeared after the Athenian fleet installed a pro-
Athenian junta.66 The decision to mint coins on the Attic standard was probably made 
with an eye toward the Athenian fleet stationed on the island, and emphasizes the close 
relationship between the two poleis.67 The iconography of an ox and an olive branch 
likewise indicates a strong connection with Athens, which produced coins with 
comparable images in 407/6.68 However, the case of Samos indicates that the impetus for 
coinage in Ionia after 411 was the onset of the Ionian War rather than a declaration of 
autonomy. 
The chronology of Samian coinage has several ramifications for the impact of the 
Standards Decree on the polis. First, the Samians ceased minting silver coins for about 
fifteen years after the institution of the decree and only resumed in 411. It is possible that 
the end of the phoros payments and an ebb in Athenian power after the disaster in Sicily 
                                                 
64 Figueira, Power of Money, 173. 
65 Figueira, Power of Money, 171, reasonably posits that an Anaiitai class of tetradrachms 
was put out by exiles at Anaia at the same time. 
66 See Part II, Chapter 3. 
67 Barron, Silver Coins of Samos, 97-101; Figueira, Power of Money, 173. 
68 Figueira, Power of Money, 171. 
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(415-411) wiped out the efficacy of Standards Decree, but, if there was anywhere that the 
Athenian fleet could have ensured compliance, it was Samos. Second, the change to the 
Attic standard only noticeably took place more than a decade after the Standards Decree, 
and at a time when there was an economic incentive to do so—in this case, commerce 
with Athenian sailors. Nowhere in mainland Ionia was there a consistent large-scale 
minting program in the second half of the fifth century, though Figueira speculates that 
these poleis continued to mint more regularly than is usually assumed.69  
 
III-3. Teos 
The best evidence for coins produced in mainland Ionia comes from Teos, which 
minted silver coins on the Aeginetan standard continuously until the middle of the fifth 
century. Balcer argues that this break in Teian silver coins belongs in 449,70 but, more 
recently, Hurter proposes that the Teian mint ceased production after 440, and 
MacDonald dates it to 445-435.71 Balcer’s date stems from his vision of Athenian 
imperialism in the region and has the virtue of fitting with an early 440s date for the 
Standards Decree.72 However, one extant Teian silver coin, belonging to the series in 
question, probably dates to c.445.73 This coin is an overstruck Tanagran issue that has 
                                                 
69 Figueira, Power of Money, 114-16. 
70 J.M. Balcer, “The Early Silver Coinage of Teos,” SNR 47 (1968), 51-84. 
71 S. Hurter, “Teos over Tanagra,” in Florilegium Numismaticum: Studia in honorem U. 
Westermark edita, edd. H. Nilsson and U. Westermark (Stockholm: Svenska 
numismatiska fören, 1992), 171-3; D. MacDonald, “A Teos/Abdera Overstrike,” SM 44 
(1994), 37-40; Cf. Figueira, Power of Money, 114; H.B. Mattingly, “A New Light on the 
Early Silver Coinage of Teos,” in From Coins to History: Selected Numismatic Studies 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 16-22. 
72 See Part II, Chapter 1 for Balcer on Athenian imperialism. 
73 Hurter, “Teos over Tanagra,” 171-3; Mattingly, “New Light on the Early Silver 
Coinage of Teos,” 16-22. 
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been supposed to date to the Athenian domination of Boeotia from 457-446.74 When the 
coin was overstruck is impossible to know, but it is reasonable to assume that it dates to 
the period after the end of the Athenian control of Tanagra and, since the coin does not 
show signs of being the last in the series, minting likely continued until c.440.  
This slim evidence suggests that Teos continued to mint coins throughout the 
440s, again supporting either a later date or Figueira’s contention that the decree was 
weak, but it must be acknowledged that this is scant positive evidence. There is no 
reason, for instance, that the series had to continue after the overstruck Tanagran coin, 
regardless of whether the Athenians closed the mint or the impetus for the series ended. 
If, as I argued above, the Standards Decree belongs to the 420s, it necessarily follows that 
the decree did not end the series. There is another gap in Teian coins after c. 425, with the 
next series usually being dated to 412 at the outset of the Ionian War.75 Figueira declares 
that date “entirely arbitrary,” and says that Teos’ revolt could have been the end of the set 
of coins, but offers little in the way of evidence.76 Despite this objection, Figueira also 
observes a break in Teian coinage in c.430-425 until after 411. I am inclined to agree 
with the view that the mint fell into disuse closer to 440, but, as was the case elsewhere, 
the motive for this change was probably economic and local rather than an Athenian 
regulation. 
 
III-4. Elsewhere in Ionia 
                                                 
74 Hurter, “Teos over Tanagra,” 171-3. 
75 Balcer, “Early Silver Coinage of Teos,” 15-16. 
76 Figueira, Power of Money, 115. 
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Ephesus also probably continued to mint coins intermittently through the fifth 
century, but the evidence barely allows this to be documented and thus means that it is 
mostly speculation until a wave of silver coins appeared after 411.77  
After the Persian Wars, Clazomenae minted silver coins on the Milesian weight 
standard, but converted to the Attic in c.460 and ceased production altogether in c.450.78 
Balcer interprets the closing of the mint again as Athenian imperialism run amok, but he 
also noted that Clazomenaeans adopted Athenian coins for foreign exchange at the same 
time as they converted local issues to the Attic standard, so it is probable that the 
redundancy was simply unnecessary and they voluntarily closed the mint.  
Other coin issues in mainland Ionia, including at Colophon, Erythrae, and 
Miletus, consisted of small denomination coins.79 The two remaining poleis, Myus and 
Lebedus, were the smallest Ionian communities and there is no evidence that either 
regularly minted coins, so the absence in the fifth century does not indicate a change.  
Despite the general lack of evidence for coinage from mainland Ionia, the cases of 
Erythrae and Colophon are worth examining in more detail because both rejected 
Athenian hegemony, and it is assumed that the restrictions placed in the wake of those 
revolts included the closure of their mints. Colophon had traditionally minted coins on 
the Persian standard, which likely reflected its location away from the coast and 
commercial ties with Sardis, both of which also made it susceptible to Persian 
                                                 
77 Figueira, Power of Money, 114; Robinson, “Athenian Currency Decree and the 
Coinages of the Allies,” 330-1. On Ephesus, see Part III, Chapter 9. 
78 J.A. Dengate, “The Coinage of Klazomenai” (PhD Diss., University of Pennsylvania 
1967), 132-3; Balcer, Sparda, 404-5. 
79 Figueira, Power of Money, 114; Balcer, Sparda, 405, argues that the Milesian mint had 
ceased to produce coins before the 450s.  
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influence,80 and Colophon is thought to have revolted twice from Athens, once in 450 and 
once in c.430. A surviving treaty between Athens and Colophon traditionally is dated to 
the conclusion of the “first revolt” in 447/6 (ML 47),81 but the date of this treaty is 
disputed. The early date, as often happens, hinges on the appearance of the three-barred 
sigma and the revolt is testified by the absence of recorded payments for the years 450-
447 on the Athenian Tribute Lists. Yet, a revised chronology of the Athenian imperial 
regulations places those at Samos in 339 as the first to be inscribed, so the treaty more 
likely dates to the revolt of Colophon in 430 that is corroborated by Thucydides (3.34).82 
Nor does the inscription make any reference to the mint at Colophon. Dating the 
inscription to c.427 does not preclude the Athenians from having closed the mint in 
c.447, particularly if the lacuna in Colophonian phoros does indeed represent an 
otherwise unattested conflict with Athens.83 Yet, this is entirely speculative and I believe 
that no such conflict existed. There is also tentative evidence that Colophon minted coins 
during the brief revolt c.430, with an implication that the community continued to 
produce coins thereafter.84  
Many of the same problems arise when interpreting stasis at Erythrae (ML 40).85 
The Athenian regulations are traditionally dated to c.453/2, and even Mattingly conceded 
                                                 
80 Robinson, “Coinage of the Allies,” 331. 
81 The supposed revolt corresponds to a period when Colophonian payments are not 
recorded on the ATL, see Part III, Chapter 14. 
82 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
83 See Part III, Chapter 14. 
84 Robinson, “Coinage of the Allies,” 331. 
85 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
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to the consensus after a brief flirtation with dating it to the 430s.86 Recently the date of 
the decree has again come under scrutiny, with Mattingly’s proposal of 435/4 being 
revived.87 Moroo argues that inscriptions detailing regulations only began to appear after 
the Athenian suppression of Samos and thus that this treaty belongs immediately before 
the Erythraean syntely began to make a collective payment in 433/2.88 But more 
important than the date here is whether the treaty marked any changes in the minting of 
Erythraean coins. Until the middle of the century the Erythraeans had minted silver coins 
on a modified Persian standard that was heavier than the Athenian coins, but lighter than 
the Persian coins, which Balcer speculates was designed to split the difference between 
the two, so as to be “acceptable to a myriad of markets and upon the scales of shrewd 
merchants.”89 Yet, the treaty does not mention the Erythraean mint and there are local 
reasons for the community to cease production without resorting to Athenian fiat. 
Erythrae only briefly made collective phoros payments from 450/49-447/6, while the 
minor communities that composed the Erythraean syntely paid independently until 435/4. 
This decentralization likely contributed to an inability to produce coins. Further, it has 
already been argued that other Ionian poleis voluntarily ceased to mint their own coins or 
adopted the Attic standard as part of the development of an Athenian economic sphere 
and it is probable that, by the time Erythrae was a united community again, the incentive 
for a local currency had waned. 
                                                 
86 Mattingly “Periclean Imperialism,” 169, with n. 80. There is also one attempt to date 
the regulations to 406 based on letterforms, see J.D. Smart, “Review: The Athenian 
Empire,” Phoenix 31 (1977), 250-1.  
87 Moroo, “The Erythrai Decrees Reconsidered,” 97-119. 
88 Moroo, “Erythrai Decrees Reconsidered,” 111; I am inclined to support this 
chronology, see Part II, Chapter 2. 
89 Balcer, Sparda, 205. 
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IV. The Fate of Ionian Coinage in the Fifth Century 
The principal objection to the thesis that the Athenian Owls supplanted other 
coins in the fifth century is that, despite the quantities minted, few Athenian coins from 
this period have turned up in coin hoards in the Aegean region while a disproportionate 
number have been found in Egyptian and Levantine hoards.90 Further, there were 
fundamental shifts in the circulation of coins in the eastern Aegean in the fourth century, 
among which was a general adoption of the Chian standard for coin weights.91 It is this 
very disparity that prompts Robinson to suggest that the Standards Decree was meant to 
give Athenian silver a monopoly, but that other silver coins were tolerated to supplement 
the Athenian issues because Athenian coins drained from the Aegean to Egypt and the 
Levant.92 In addition to this accumulation, it is probable that within the Delian League the 
Athenian coins regularly circulated and, encouraged by the Standards Decree, generally 
returned to Athens in the form of the phoros, while local issues that circulated 
domestically or fell out of use were more likely to accumulate and survive in hoards. 
Ionian poleis with traditions of minting silver coins continued to produce local 
issues during the fifth century. Yet, every polis also went through a lull in production that 
                                                 
90 P.G. van Alfen, “The Coinage of Athens, Sixth to First Centuries B.C.,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage, ed. W.E. Metcalf (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 94. Recently, 7,000-10,000 Athenian coins (between four and six talents) 
turned up in a hoard in south-eastern Turkey, see R. Buxton, “The northern Syria 2007 
hoard of Athenian owls: Behavioral aspects,” AJN 21 (2009), 1-27. J.H. Kroll and A.S. 
Walker, “The Greek Coins,” The Athenian Agora 26 (1993), 4, note that Athenian silver 
pieces at the Agora make up only a small percentage of the coins found. 
91 Meadows, “Chian Revolution,” 273-95. Clazomenae was one of the few poleis to 
continue using the Attic standard, Dengate, “Coinage of Klazomenai,” 153. For the close 
relationship between Athens and Clazomenae, see Part II, Chapter 2. 
92 Robinson, “Coinage of the Allies,” 340. 
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overlapped with at least part of the Archidamian War (431-421), only to resume 
production after the start of the Ionian War (412/11). These gaps in Ionian coinage do not 
share start dates, so it is unliky that they can be attributed to a single Standards Decree. 
The more likely cause of this monetary convergence, then, is an economic calculation to 
use Athenian Owls for most transactions that actually required coins. In addition to the 
simplification of the use of money in the Athenian sphere, which facilitated commerce,93 
the readily available source of silver at Laurium meant that the sheer quantities of 
Athenian coins overwhelmed anything the Ionian poleis were capable of producing.94 
However, since coins were not primarily created to facilitate economics and actually had 
a production cost, 95 the incentive for the Ionian poleis to acquire silver from Lydia, 
Thrace, or by reminting other coins, did not exist for much of the fifth century. Nor does 
the appearance of Athenian coins to the general exclusion of Ionian coins in the Levant 
necessarily indicate that poleis such as Chios ceased to trade in the region, but rather that 
the merchants conducted commerce using Athenian coin.96 The combination of economic 
incentives and lack of a pressing need to assert political independence meant that the 
Ionian poleis did not issue coins through much of the 420s and into the 410s, but not that 
they could not. After the Athenian disaster in Sicily, the Ionian poleis again began to 
                                                 
93 Figueira, Power of Money, 236-9. 
94 For a survey of Athenian silver coins, see Kraay, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins, 
55-77; Kroll and Walker, “The Greek Coins,” 4-23. 
95 T.E. Rihill, “Making Money in Classical Athens,” in Economies Beyond Agriculture in 
the Classical World, edd. D.J. Mattingly and J. Salmon (London: Routledge, 2001), 115-
42. 
96 Contra M. Thompson, “Hoards and overstrikes: the numismatic evidence,” Expedition 
21 (1979), 44-6, who believes the Athenians monopolized the trade.  
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issue their own coins, which was both a declaration of autonomy and a necessary 
economic expedient.97
                                                 
97 On the Ionian place in the Aegean economy, see Part III, Chapter 16. 
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16. Ionian Commodity Networks: A Tumultuous Fourth Century? 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Evidence for Ionian economic activity is sparse, which makes it difficult to chart 
how trading networks changed in the Classical period. The many problems include the 
few reliable accounts of this activity, that the archeological record does not record “soft,” 
decomposable objects, and that it is likely that people, including slaves, mercenaries, 
artisans, and intellectuals, were the single most common item exchanged.1 Nevertheless, 
it is possible to sketch what is known about Ionian economic activity and then to map that 
image against the upheavals of the fourth century. The resultant picture is that while the 
tumultuous century caused an unequal distribution of profits there was neither abnormal 
prosperity nor poverty. I believe that the economy was highly volatile, but that Ionian 
commerce was nevertheless resilient.  
For this study, I will focus on a balance of Ionian-produced exports and imports 
even though it was certainly possible for Ionian merchants to make money transporting 
non-Ionian goods, and for non-Ionian merchants to be actively engaged in these same 
networks. Focusing on exports and imports (loosely defined), however, allows us to 
consider how Ionia and Ionians fit into the wider economic world. 
 
II. Ionian Exports 
                                                 
1 S.P. Morris, “The View from East Greece: Miletus, Samos and Ephesus,” in Debating 
Orientalization, edd. C. Riva and N.C. Vella (London: Equinox, 2006), 66-9. Cf. 
Greaves, The Land of Ionia, 89-94. Chios was reputed to be the first polis to import 
foreign slaves, (Athen. 6.92), see below. 
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Ionia was well endowed with agricultural goods suitable for export, including oil, 
wine, and wool. Ionian poleis also likely exported a small number of other products, 
including mastic from Chios (Pliny, HN 12.17.72)2 and scented woods (Theophrastus, 
Hist. Pl. 4.2). Greaves reasonably implies that all the Ionian poleis possessed a similar 
mix of products, but that the larger ones became synonymous with the commodity 
because they were able to produce larger quantities.3 Given the lack of better data, I will 
follow Greaves’ schema, modified by testimony particular to a given polis.  
The geography of Ionia, like much of the Aegean world, lent itself to the 
cultivation of grapes and olives, both of which are able to tolerate arid climates. Wine 
composed a significant portion of the Greek diet,4 and soil samples in both the residential 
and artisan sections of Miletus show evidence of viticulture.5 Greaves reasonably 
assumes that most Ionian wine production met local demand and thus that only excess 
production, possible principally at large poleis like Chios and Samos, was exported.6 
Chian wine was particularly praised in antiquity (Pliny, HN 14.4, 9; Strabo, 14.15), 
becoming a byword for living well (Athen. 5.64).7 The importance of this trade may also 
be seen on coinage, since the polis stamped coins with the distinctive Chian amphora.8 
                                                 
2 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 75. 
3 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 69-71. 
4 T.W. Gallant, Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece: Reconstructing the rural domestic 
economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 68. 
5 H.-P. Stika, “Pflanzenreste aus dem archaischen Milet: Vorbericht zur Kampagne 
1992,” AA 2 (1997), 157-63, though the clear distinction between industrial and domestic 
neighborhoods is probably a misnomer.  
6 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 73. 
7 Davidson, Courtesans and Fishcakes, 42. By the first century CE, Pliny (14.7) says that 
the most esteemed Greek wine came from Clazomenae. Strabo (14.1.14) also lauded 
Ephesian wine and (14.15) dismissed Samian wine as inferior. 
8 Davidson, Courtesans and Fishcakes, 42. On these coins, cf. Part III, Chapter 15. 
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There is a notable absence of Chian amphorae in Anatolia outside of Pergamum,9 but 
Greaves posits that the wine made and consumed locally or even regionally would have 
been made and stored in barrels or skins rather than amphorae, which makes the relative 
importance of local trade hard to reconstruct.10 The distribution of Chian amphorae, from 
Naucratis in the south to the Cimmerian Bosporus in the North, as well as to Athens and 
Corinth in the west, indicates widespread trade, but it probably circulated in small 
quantities with the result that scarcity drove demand and price.11  
Archaic Chian pottery has been found along the Black Sea littoral and as far west 
as Marseille.12 Circulation around the Black Sea continued at least to c. 300, where 
pottery fragments have been found in settlements at the mouth of the Dniester River and 
on the Chersonese.13 It is necessary, though, to put these discoveries into context. The 
traditional assumption about amphorae was that their usual contents were either wine or 
olive oil, with the ones full of wine being lined on the inside with resin.14 However, the 
                                                 
9 Sarikakis, “Commercial relations between Chios and other Greek cities in antiquity,” 
123; R.M. Cook, The Greeks in Ionia and the East (London: Thames&Hudson, 1962), 
59-60. 
10 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 73. 
11 Sarikakis, “Commercial relations between Chios and other Greek cities in antiquity,” 
123. 
12 R.M. Cook, “The Distribution of Chiot Pottery,” ABSA 44 (1949), 154-61. 
13 M.J. Treister and Y.G. Vinogradov, “Archaeology on the Northern Coast of the Black 
Sea,” AJA 97 (1993), 532; M.I. Zolotarev, “A Hellenistic Ceramic Deposit from the 
North-eastern Sector of the Chersonesos,” in Chronologies of the Black Sea Area, C. 400-
100 BC, edd. L. Hannestad and V.F. Stolba (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2006), 
194-5; V.P. Bylkova, “The Chronology of Settlements in the Lower Dnieper Region 
(400-100 BC),” in Chronologies of the Black Sea Area, C. 400-100 BC, edd. L. 
Hannestad and V.F. Stolba (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2006), 218-20. The finds in 
the Chersonese also indicate a revival of Samian commerce in the area around the same 
time. 
14 B.P. Foley, MC. Hansson, D.P. Kourkoumelis, and T.A. Theodoulou, “Aspects of 
ancient Greek trade re-evaluated with amphora DNA evidence,” JAS 39 (2012), 391, n.1, 
where their literature review of 27 articles found that 95% of the 5860 amphorae 
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survey of a shipwreck off the eastern coast of Chios, dated to the early third century, 
reveals that some of the amphorae carried olives and oregano, and not wine, which 
indicates the reuse of amphorae.15 Subsequent DNA analyses of other Greek amphorae 
revealed evidence for grape, mastic, oregano, mint, thyme, olive, and juniper, with the 
last being the most common among the nine amphorae tested.16 The authors of the study 
point out that the spices have antibacterial and antifungal properties that could have 
preserved other cargo without leaving behind residue. Further, they suggest that grape 
DNA can indicate wine, grapes, or vinegar, and argue that this evidence requires that 
amphorae carried a wider range of products than typically assumed, as well as that 
amphorae were frequently reused.17 Another shipwreck found between Chios and the 
Anatolian coast supports this conclusion, since amphorae on the ship contained beef 
bones and pine tar, and the ship’s cargo included Chian cups probably meant for sale as 
votive offerings.18 
Despite the ubiquity of wine, another fluid commodity, olive oil, was likely the 
more important export in Ionia. Olive trees famously go through bear and bull cycles 
with periods of limited harvests followed by glut years. Aristotle recounts that Thales of 
Miletus purchased the oil presses at Miletus just before a bumper harvest and thereby 
cornered the market (Pol. 1.4.5). As Greaves points out, the anecdote shows both the 
                                                                                                                                                 
analyzed were said to contain wine. The studies identify the materials carried in the 
amphorae by analyzing residual DNA. 
15 B.P. Foley, et al., “The 2005 Chios Ancient Shipwreck Survey: New Methods for 
Underwater Archeology,” Hesperia 78 (2009), 294.  
16 Foley, et al., “Aspects of ancient Greek trade re-evaluated,” 389-98. The amphorae in 
the study originated from Mende and Corcyra. Cf. Polybius 4.38, on Greek commercial 
products and the Byzantine and Rhodian domination of sea-lanes. 
17 Foley, et al., “Aspects of ancient Greek trade re-evaluated,” 398. 
18 D.N. Carlson, “The Classical Greek Shipwreck at Tektaș Burnu, Turkey,” AJA 107 
(2003), 587-92. 
 325
wisdom of philosophers and provides a warning about how a single clever individual 
could fleece the community of its means of income.19 Greaves suggests that the olive 
presses Thales acquired were likely of the same sort found cut into the bedrock at 
Clazomenae,20 and were more likely to have been owned by families or communities 
dependent upon oil production than large-scale facilities controlled by the elite for 
export.21 However, it is probable that the communities were already beginning to produce 
large quantities of oil in the fifth century, if not on the same scale as later periods, since a 
Hellenistic papyrus from 259/8 indicates that Miletus and Samos shipped 25,000 liters of 
oil to Alexandria.22 Pseudo-Aristotle’s Oeconomica also records how a community could 
exploit the oil industry to purchase grain in times of emergency (1348b 17-23):23 
Κλαζομένιοι δ᾽  ν σιτοδεί ντες χρημάτων τε ποροντες ψηφίσαντο 
παρ᾽  ος λαιόν στι τν δωτν, δανεσαι τ πόλει π τόκ, γίνεται δ 
πολς οτος  καρπς ν τ χώρ ατν. Δανεισάντων δ μισθωσάμενοι 
πλοα πέστειλαν ες τ μπόρια, σθεν ατος κε στος, ποθήκης 
γενομένης τς το λαίου τιμς. 
 
The Clazomenians at a time of sitodeia [food-shortage], when they had no 
money, voted that all private individuals who had oil should lend it with 
interest to the city; being there many olive crops in their land. Thus 
borrowing, they leased ships and set them to the emporia from where they 
brought grain providing as collateral the price of the oil. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 79-80. 
20 Y. Ersoy, “Notes on the History and Archeology of Early Clazomenae,” in: Frühes 
Ionien: Eine Bestandsaufnahme, edd. J. Cobet, V. von Graeve, W.-D. Niemeier, and K. 
Zimmermann (Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 2007), 47-70. 
21 Greaves, The Land of Ionia, 79-80; contra C. Roebuck, Ionian Trade and Colonization 
(New York: Archaeological Institute of America, 1959), 41. 
22 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 79-80; Miletus, 27; L. Casson, Ships and Seamanship in the 
Ancient World (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 162-3, n. 36. 
23 Trans: E.M.A. Bissa, Governmental Intervention in Foreign Trade in Archaic and 
Classical Greece (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 203.  
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It is no surprise that olive cultivation was a feature of the Clazomenaean economy, but 
this passage indicates that the community was able to relieve the food emergency, and 
thus the value of olive oil production in Ionia. 
Miletus, foremost among Ionian poleis, was known for its woolen cloth.24 Raising 
sheep and other animals was part of the regular agricultural cycle, wherein the animals 
were fed household agricultural waste, allowed to graze in the marginal land and in the 
cultivated fields after the harvests so that the manure replenished the soil.25 The trade in 
wool was therefore a byproduct of other agricultural practices rather than the primary 
objective of animal husbandry.26 Nevertheless, Ionia became known for wool from its 
sheep, which were probably the progenitor of the modern Merino imported from central 
Anatolia.27 Aristophanes makes reference to Milesian wool in two plays, Lysistrata and 
Frogs. In the former it appeared packed and stored, but at risk of being eaten by moths 
(729), while in the latter Dionysus spins out a hypothetical scenario about his slave 
decadently reclining on Milesian blankets (ν στρώμασιν Μιλησίοις, 542).28 Ionians 
                                                 
24 Miletus was usually associated with wool, but Theocritus links it with both Samos and 
Miletus (15.115-17). 
25 H. Forbes, “The Identification of Pastoralist Sites within the Context of Estate-Based 
Agriculture in Ancient Greece: Beyond the ‘Transhumance versus Agro-Pastoralism’ 
Debate,” ABSA 90 (1995), 325-38. How great an effect this actually had on food 
production has been questioned by R. Sallares, The Ecology of the Ancient Greece World 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 385. In addition to sheep, faunal remains show 
the Ionians kept pigs, cows, and goats, see Greaves, Land of Ionia, 75-6. 
26 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 75-6. Wool cloth is not the only by-product of animal 
husbandry to have a lasting legacy since cheese probably has a similar origin, see P.S. 
Kindstedt, Cheese and Culture: A History of Cheese and its place in Western Civilization 
(White River Junction: Chelsea Green, 2012), 9-11. 
27 M.L. Ryder, Sheep and Man (London: Duckworth, 1983), 149. 
28 On the luxury of Milesian wools, see Part III, Chapter 19. 
 327
wove cloth for commercial, private, and ritual use,29 so, unsurprisingly, inscribed loom 
weights have been found as dedicatory offerings at the temples of Athena at both Miletus 
and Erythrae.30 It is also probable that Ionian artisans produced woolen products of 
Persian type and clothing, rather than necessarily importing these goods for resale.31 
There is no evidence for large-scale textile production in Ionia, and while that does not 
exclude small-scale operations, it also suggests that cloth woven in Ionia was sold locally 
or at most regionally, rather than contributing significantly to long-distance trade. The 
reference in Frogs probably refers to blankets made from Milesian wool since it is 
reasonable to assume that most wool was transported in bales of cleaned fleeces as a bulk 
commodity rather than finished as cloth.32 Therefore Greaves is correct to say that it was 
“the inherent quality of this wool and not its dyeing or weaving that gave it value.”33 
The reference in the Lysistrata indicates that the Ionians exported raw wool to 
Athens where weavers made finished products. Two pieces of evidence in particular 
attest to the scale and ubiquity of wool working in fourth century Athens outside of the 
                                                 
29 On loomweight types and find distributions, see M.L. Lawall, “Transport Amphoras 
and Loomweights: integrating elements of the ancient Greek economies,” in Greek and 
Roman Textiles and Dress, edd M. Harlow and M.-L. Nosch (Oxford: Oxbow, 2014), 
172-3. 
30 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 83.  
31 Alcibiades received a Persian tent from Ephesus, Plut. Al. 12.1; Athen. 12.47. Cf. 
Miller, “Clothes and Identity,” 29-30. 
32 In Aristophanes’ Lysistrata (570-87) Lysistrata offers weaving as an allegory for 
government and the state, and notes that it is necessary to removed dung and burrs from 
the raw wool. The metaphor does not include the source of the wool and it is reasonable 
to assume that there was at least a preliminary cleaning done by importers, at least to 
ensure the quality of the product. On this metaphor for the state and its iconography, see 
S.D. Bundrick, “The Fabric of the City: Imagining Textile Production in Classical 
Athens,” Hesperia 77 (2008), 283-334. 
33 Dyed cloth from Miletus is attested in Diocletian’s Price Edict, but this is likely a much 
later development and Greaves, Land of Ionia, 83, points out that murex shells crushed to 
create dye are found elsewhere in Anatolia, but not in Ionia.  
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domestic space. First, a set of inscriptions records manumitted female slaves and lists 
their profession as wool workers (ταλασιουργοί), which was likely a euphemism for 
prostitution. The moniker, however, is indicative of a secondary profession.34  Second, 
Plato describes male wool workers producing cloth for commercial sale as one of the 
essential industries for a community (Rep. 369b-370c).35 Athenian weavers used more 
wool than was produced in Athens and Ionia was not the only source,36 but it is 
reasonable to assume that there was a niche market for the high-quality Ionian wool.  
 
III. Ionian Imports: Grains 
The primary component of the Ionian diet was a variety of cereal crops that were 
locally produced, under ideal circumstances. It is probable, however, that Ionian poleis 
had to import grain on a regular basis in order to feed the population. The history of this 
cereal cultivation is fraught. It was once thought that pre-modern farmers cultivated a mix 
of cereal crops similar to nineteenth and early twentieth century farmers and, 
simultaneously, that durum wheat replaced barley as the staple foodstuff starting in the 
fifth century, with the transformation complete by the end of the fourth.37 Barley, which 
was widely cultivated because it can tolerate the arid climate of the Aegean, was cheaper 
than grain and was frequently derided in antiquity as a food for livestock and slaves (e.g. 
                                                 
34 K.L. Wrenhaven, “The Identity of the “Wool-Workers,” in the Attic Manumissions,” 
Hesperia (2009), 367-86. 
35 W. Thompson, “Weaving: A Man’s Work,” CW 75 (1982), 217-22. Cf. S.B. Pomeroy, 
Xenophon Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 61-5. 
36 E.g. Cretan wool, Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae, 730. 
37 N. Jasny, “Competition among grains in Classical Antiquity,” AHR 47 (1942), 747-64. 
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Athen. 5.52; 8.1; 7.67).38 Of course, barley was the primary staple food for most Greeks. 
Pliny recorded that they often prepared barley gruel (HN 18.14) and references to barley-
cakes are frequently preserved by Athenaeus.39 In addition to barley, typical fields around 
the Aegean (except Thessaly) grew small amounts of so-called “naked wheats.”40 These 
other wheat varietals required more water and a longer growing season than barley and 
offered a lower return.41 
In contrast to the Aegean basin, the two breadbaskets from which Ionian traders 
sourced wheat, Pontus and Egypt, had a reputation for high quality grains.  In Egypt, 
intensive cultivation of emmer wheat, the ancestor of modern durum, led to a looser husk 
than grain from other regions, which made the wheat easier to thresh and therefore more 
desirable.42 Pontic grain was much closer to modern bread flour. There was little 
transplanting of cereal crops.43 Despite the import of high-quality grains from Pontus and 
Egypt, there is no evidence that the imports were turned into seed and these wheat 
varietals never supplanted barley either as the main cereal cultivation around the Aegean 
or as the main staple of the diet for most people, free or slave. 
                                                 
38 Athen. 7.67, quotes Lysanias who himself quoted Hipponax and the reference perhaps 
should be dismissed since it specifies small barley loaves (κρίθινον κόλλικα). 
39 3.77 (preserving Archestratus’s Gastronomia); 3.82; 3.97; 5.73; 8.8; 9.53; 14.53; 15.33 
are among the positive or neutral references to barley. At 5.50, Athenaeus preserves a 
fragment of Timon’s Silloi that is dismissive of Teian barley-cakes and Lydian sauces, 
preferring the lentil soup of the Greeks. However, Athenaeus goes on to praise the quality 
of Teian barley cakes. 
40 Sallares, Ecology, 318. Durum, a high-quality naked wheat was not grown because it 
probably did not develop until the first or second century BCE. 
41 The possible exception is Chios, which Pliny, HN 18.17 records as having good quality 
wheat, but this may be a Hellenistic development. 
42 Sallares, Ecology, 370-1. On the difficulties in threshing Greek wheat, see Pliny HN 
18.20.92 and Theophrastus HP 8.9.2. 
43 Sallares, Ecology, 350-2, contra Jasny, “Competition Between Grains,” 747-64. 
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Farmers in Ionia grew products known to succeed and practiced crop rotation 
between cereals,44 legumes, and leaving plots fallow.45 This rotation, combined with 
some level of fertilization from animal manure, was designed to reduce the chance of 
crop failure, which was a persistent threat to Aegean communities. The need to leave 
fields fallow reduced the overall cereal yield and inevitable bear harvests meant that local 
supply rarely fully met the demands of populations after the Aarchaic period. Moreover, 
there was likely an active resale market of imported grain throughout the Aegean.46 The 
most extreme example of grain imports was at Athens where the polis imported grain on 
enormous quantities (up to 800,000 medimnoi),47 but other poleis likewise imported grain 
throughout the fifth and fourth centuries on a regular basis, not just as an emergency 
measure.48 A state grain reserve, however, ought to be considered an aspiration rather 
than a standard practice and there were likely shortages in weeks leading up to the 
harvest in an average year.49 Crop failure, too, was particularly important because, 
despite the typical arid climate, the Aegean tended to fluctuate between excessively dry 
and excessively wet years, both of which could cause crop failure—and too wet was 
frequently worse than too dry.50 In Attica, for instance, crops failed an average of once 
                                                 
44 Mostly barley; the ratio of barley to wheat may have been as extreme as 9.3:1, Sallares, 
Ecology, 314; Cf. Greaves, Land of Ionia, 74-5; Stika, “Pflanzenreste aus dem 
archaischen Milet,” 157-63. 
45 Hesiod, Works and Days 464; Pindar, Nemean 6.10-12; Theophrastus, HP 8.5.3-4; 
Pliny, HN 18.50, 18.52; Sallares, Ecology, 331, 385-6. 
46 G.J. Oliver, War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 26-7. 
47 Bissa, Governmental Intervention in Foreign Trade, 169-77; Oliver, War, Food, and 
Politics, 36-40. 
48 Sallares, Ecology, 353. 
49 P. Erdkamp, “Food Security, Safety and Crises,” in A Cultural History of Food in 
Antiquity, ed. P. Erdkamp (London: Berg, 2012), 62-4. 
50 Sallares, Ecology, 393; Jameson, “Famine in the Greek World,” 7-8. 
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every four years.51 In this context, extreme measures to procure grain were sometimes 
necessary, but there was also a long-term impetus to have a regular conduit. Ionia was 
reputed to have a good climate and fertile soil (Hdt. 1.149; Xen. Hell. 3.2.17; Strabo 
15.1.16),52 but its unpredictable rivers frequently flooded and changed course (Strabo 
12.8.19),53 which posed an additional hazard for farmland. 
The earlier belief that Greeks gradually shunned barley as their staple of choice is 
not necessarily spurious, however. In addition to the erroneous assumptions about 
planting practices, the pervasive view emerged from statements made by ancient authors. 
There is a clear preference for imported grains, which probably played a part in sourcing 
and acquiring them. Sallares is right to caution against ascribing too much importance in 
planting practices to consumer preferences, particularly since there was a recognized 
difference between Egyptian and Pontic grains and both were considered better than 
regional options.54 The imports from Egypt and the Black Sea should not, however, be 
seen as a preference for types of grain so much as its availability. Particularly with regard 
to the bread wheat, the Greeks were probably ignorant about the type of grain and chose 
the sources first based on quantity, with the judgements about quality developing later. 
The population in the Aegean basin probably rose in the fourth century and there was a 
demographic shift toward dispersed settlements and intensive agriculture that presented 
                                                 
51 W. Broekaert and A. Zuiderhoek, “Food and Politics in Classical Antiquity,” in A 
Cultural History of Food in Antiquity, ed. P. Erdkamp (London: Berg, 2012), 77. 
52 Followed by, for instance, E.C. Semple, “Geographic Factors in the Ancient 
Mediterranean Grain Trade,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 11 
(1921), 51; M.J. Metcalfe, “Reaffirming Regional Identity,” 154. 
53 On the changing course of the Maeander river, probably the result of active faults in 
the region, see: R.T. Marchese, The Lower Maeander Flood Plain: A regional settlement 
study (Oxford: BAR International Series, 1986), 29-36. 
54 Sallares, Ecology, 351. 
 332
more risk in return for higher yields.55 The larger population required a higher volume of 
imports, but if farmers were simultaneously able to coax higher returns from their fields, 
then the imports should not have increased to such extreme heights unless the preferred 
diet began to shift away from barley toward wheat.  
Ionia did not rely on imports to the same extent as Classical Athens, but it is 
notable that Ionian colonial and commercial ventures were prominent in Egypt and 
around the Black Sea and the grain deficits may have also been more severe than is 
sometimes assumed. Estimating the population of Samos at 50,000, following Shipley, 
Bissa calculates that the polis suffered a continuous deficit despite a reputation for 
agricultural fecundity, even using the highest rate of cultivation and lowest 
consumption.56 He posits, reasonably, that the extensive Samian investment at Naucratis 
in Egypt and Egyptian objects dedicated at the Heraion on Samos indicates that Samos 
imported most of its grain from the southern Mediterranean. The resultant picture is that 
of a complex grain trade in the Aegean. 
Teos is also notable because an early fifth-century inscription records a public 
declaration concerning the import of grain (ML 30, ll. 6-12):57 
στις : ς γν : τν Τηίην : κ|ωλύοι : στον : σάγεσθαι : | τέχνηι :  
μηχανι :  κατ| θάλασσαν :  κατ᾽  πειρο|ν :  σαχθέντα : νωθεοίη, 
: | 
πόλλυσθαι : κα ατ|ν : κα γένος : τ κένο 
 
Whoever in the land of Teos stops grain from being imported by sea or 
land, by trick or device, or when imported forces the price up, let him 
perish and his family. 
                                                 
55 W. Scheidel, “The Greek Demographic Expansion: Models and Comparisons,” JHS 
123 (2003), 124-6; I. Morris, “The Athenian economy twenty years after The Ancient 
Economy,” CPh 89 (1994), 362-4. 
56 Bissa, Governmental Intervention, 197-8; Shipley, Samos, 15.  
57 Trans. Bissa. 
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The problems with the inscription are manifold. The language of the message is blunt and 
clear, but the phrasing does not conform to any known legislative formula and has to be 
interpreted either as a curse or an imprecation, with one of the principal questions being 
whether the declaration addresses a single specific incident, or as an ongoing 
preoccupation with ensuring the food supply.58 There are two suggestions for the former 
scenario. The first is that the Aegean suffered from a prolonged drought, which prompted 
the Teians to pass legislation.59 Yet droughts were not simply one-time events, but a 
regular feature of Aegean ecology. The second hinges on a literal reading of aesymnete as 
one who desires to become tyrant (Arist. Pol. 1285 A 31), rather than as the eponymous 
official of Teos; in this scenario there would an official who aspired to tyranny by 
persuading the wealthy members of the community to hoard grain in order to create a 
crisis.60 More probably the imprecation is in fact Teian legislation, but where a large polis 
with a sizable population of citizen and metic merchants could impose “positive” 
legislation to ensure grain imports, Teos had to rely on foreign traders and therefore 
                                                 
58 See discussion in Bissa, Governmental Intervention, 199-202. 
59 B. Bravo, “Le commerce des cereals chez les Grecs de l’époque archaïque,” in Trade 
and Famine in Classical Antiquity, edd. P. Garnsey and C.R. Whittaker (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Philological Society, 1983), 23; M. Jameson, “Famine in the Greek World,” 
in Trade and Famine in Classical Antiquity, edd. P. Garnsey and C.R. Whittaker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, 1983), 12; P. Garnsey and I. Morris, “Risk 
and the Polis: the Evolution of Institutionalised Responses to Food Supply Problems in 
the Ancient Greek State,” in Bad Year Economics: Cultural Responses to Risk and 
Uncertainty, edd. P. Halstead and J. O’Shea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 103. 
60 The eponymous magistracy in Teos was the prytanis, see R.K. Sherk, “The Eponymous 
officials of the Greek Cities IV,” ZPE 93 (1992), 250. 
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installed “negative” legislation that forbade anyone from hindering trade.61 Grain 
shortfalls were not rare events in Ionia and it was necessary to ensure it could be 
imported. 
An inscription dated to 387/6 that is primarily concerned with the relationship 
between Clazomenae and Athens also lists the poleis from which the Clazomenaeans 
purchased grain: Phocaea, Chios, and Smyrna (RO 18, ll. 17-18).62 On the one hand, it is 
likely that the local sources could make up temporary shortfalls, but, on the other, the 
inscription leads to the conclusion that grain imports were a regular feature of the 
Clazomenaean existence since it records a guarantee that these ships would be able to 
make use of the harbor.63 More importantly, though, it is likely that the grain which 
Clazomenae imported did not originate in those communities but rather that they served 
as intermediaries for grain from Egypt, Pontus, and, in the case of Smyrna, up the 
Anatolian river valleys.64 Theophrastus makes special mention of woods suitable for 
river-craft (Hist. Pl. 4.3), which likely indicates that the rivers were plied for a variety of 
goods on a regular basis.  
It follows, then, that a polis like Chios, with its large population and extensive 
mercantile relationships, also served as a regional grain hub, particularly for imports from 
                                                 
61 Bissa, Governmental Intervention, 202. On Athenian regulations for importing grain, 
see Broekaert and Zuiderhoek, “Food and Politics,” 82-3; T. Figueira, “’Sitopolai’ and 
‘Sitophyslakes’ in Lysias’ ‘Against the Graindealers,’: Governmental Intervention in the 
Athenian Economy,” Phoenix 40 (1986), 149-71; Bissa, Governmental Intervention, 169-
91, with bibliography. 
62 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
63 Following Bissa, Governmental Intervention, 203; contra P. Garnsey, Famine and 
Food Supply in the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 72. 
64 Bissa, Governmental Intervention, 203; contra Rhodes and Osborne, GHI, 79, who 
find it remarkable that the grain sources were local, in contrast to the Athenian model. 
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Pontus in the fourth century.65 In addition to the Clazomenaean inscription, Demosthenes 
in Against Lacritus complains that Chian moneylenders active in the Black Sea region 
diverted a cargo of grain from Athens to Chios (35.52-3).66 Demosthenes spins this as a 
hazard for Athens because a threat to the grain supply could be potentially catastrophic 
and an affront because the Phaselites had already borrowed money from Athenians. But 
does the Chian interference need to be interpreted as either a deliberate subversion aimed 
at Athens, prompted by lingering hostility after the Social War (356-355), or an 
emergency procurement for Chios? If Chios was an entrepôt for grain, then it is more 
likely that the Chian agent in the Bosporus made a long-standing practice of routing grain 
to Chios.67 Moreno has emphasized the role played by elite networks between Athens and 
the Bosporan kingdom in acquiring grain imports in the fourth century, with Isocrates’ 
school forming one of the key links.68 It is probable that a similar process was at work 
between Chios and the Bosporan kingdom and even that Isocrates’ school was a point of 
intersection between Chians and Bosporans.69 
 
IV. Economic Interference in the Fourth Century? 
Thus far I have provided an overview of the commodities known to have been 
traded into and out of Ionia. Underlying this overview have been four main assumptions: 
1) that at no point between c. 550 and 200 BCE was there a radical transformation in 
agricultural commodities, but that the scale changed; 2) that the unpredictability of the 
                                                 
65 C. Roebuck, “The Grain Trade between Greece and Egypt,” CPh 45 (1950), 236-47, 
posits extensive Chian investment at Naucratis as well.  
66 On this passage, see Part III, Chapter 11. 
67 For how the Attic orators manipulated references to Chios, see Part III, Chapter 11. 
68 Moreno, Feeding the Democracy, 145-208, particularly 192-3. 
69 On Isocrates and Chios, see Part III, Chapter 11. 
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climate and regular crop failures meant that cereals had to be imported on a regular basis 
for most large communities and that this demand resulted in a constant, multi-directional 
grain trade in the Aegean; 3) that almost all regulation of trade took place on the level of 
the polis; and 4) that there was a relatively stable level of imperial taxation on Ionian 
poleis, but not one so heavy that citizens could not procure grain.70 
There can be no doubt that the upheavals of the fourth century affected the 
economies of the Ionian poleis. From roughly 404 to 336, Ionians themselves were not 
actively involved in fighting. The notable exception was between 404 and 392 when they 
were involved in the conflict between Cyrus and Tissaphernes and fought alongside 
Spartan expeditions to Asia,71 but it was more common for the Ionians, their territory, 
and possessions to be collateral damage in armed conflicts, including the revolt of the 
renegade Persian admiral Glos in 384.72 Moreover, the Chians fought in the Social War 
against Athens in 356-355 and it is likely that at least the Athenians made a practice of 
capturing neutral merchant vessels and foraging supplies from wherever they could find 
them, which was also known to have happened at Timotheus’ siege of Samos in 366/5.73 
Invariably, these disturbances would have disrupted the regular agricultural practices and 
trade in the fourth century, but to what extent? Excluding the expulsion of the Samians in 
the 360s, only the revolt of Glos, which had limited impact on Ionia, lasted for more than 
two or three campaign seasons at a time, and after 355 the recorded conflicts that reached 
                                                 
70 The form of the imperial levies changed over time but included some combination of 
harbor fees and tribute payments. See Part II, Chapters 2 and 3. 
71 It is also possible that the Spartan campaigns gave a boost to the local economy 
supposing both that the soldiers were paid and paid for their goods. See Part III, Chapter 
10. 
72 See Part II, Chapter 4. 
73 See Part II, Chapter 4. 
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Ionia tapered off almost entirely. There were surely conflicts that the source tradition 
barely records or leaves out altogether, such as Mausolus’ schemes to capture Miletus 
(Polyaenus, 8.8), bandits, and piracy, but the general picture remained the same. 
Moreover, it is probable that the single biggest problem with these conflicts for the 
Ionians was in hostile troops taking the harvest since there is no evidence that armies 
invested the time or effort in agricultural devastation.74 Even in the case of Samos, 
Timotheus is said to have harvested the fields and then sold the food back to the Samians 
in order to pay his soldiers ([Arist.] Oec. 2.23). 
Wars taking place far from Ionia caused greater disruption of trade. Most directly, 
Philip II captured a fleet of two hundred and thirty merchant vessels in the Bosporus in 
the summer of 340. The majority of the vessels were Athenian and those Philip 
confiscated, but he released the other fifty, which belonged to Byzantium, Rhodes, and 
Chios (Theopompus, BNJ 115 F 292; Philochorus, BNJ 328 F 162).75 Philip’s selling of 
the Athenian grain reputedly earned him some 700 talents, roughly a year’s income for 
Athens, which further demonstrates the resources that were invested in the grain trade. If 
the ships Philip released were divided equally among the three other poleis, then each one 
would have had roughly one-tenth the ships of Athens and therefore had potential profits 
of seventy talents each. However, Chares’ ships guarded the entire convoy so it is likely 
that all the ships were bound for Athens. This episode thus indicates that Chian 
merchants were intimately involved in supplying grain to Athens, and it likewise follows 
that there were other grain ships that would have been bound for Chios. Similarly, the 
                                                 
74 Hanson, The Western Way of War, 27-39, doubts the long-term efficacy of such 
devastation. See Part III, Chapter 18, for the Hellenistic parallel. 
75 Worthington, Philip II, 133-4; Moreno, Feeding the Democracy, 207-8; see Part II, 
Chapter 4. 
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relationship between Egypt and Persia probably dictated the volume of trade in the fourth 
century, and an inscription of Nectanebo found at Naucratis grants income from seaborne 
trade to the temple, thereby implying that he sought to increase trade.76 This independent 
Egyptian dynasty was short lived (Diod. 16.48-51).77 While it is unknown whether 
Persian control of Egypt enabled Ionian traders to reestablish networks that had fallen 
into disuse, the hostilities and military campaigns in the region surely impeded trade. 
It is also possible that there were environmental impediments to Ionian economic 
prosperity. In particular, it has been suggested that there were multiple periods of extreme 
drought in this period, with one drought lasting more than a generation in the second half 
of the fourth century.78 Camp shows that many wells in fourth century fell into disuse and 
were replaced by cisterns and extensive public works to ensure the water supply, which 
fits neatly within the context proposed by Myres where the overall rainfall in Greece 
declined, causing drought in regions with low average precipitation and prosperity in 
areas like Aetolia which usually received too much.79 As Sallares points out, however, 
there were years of torrential rain (Theophrastus, Hist. Pl. 4.11.3; 8.6.6-7; Dem. 55.11).80 
Thus it is more likely that a usual unpredictable cycle persisted throughout the fourth 
century and that there was regional variability even within a given year. There is no 
                                                 
76 J.G. Milne, “Trade Between Greece and Egypt before Alexander the Great,” JEA 25 
(1939), 183. 
77 On Artaxerxes III’s reconquest, see Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 685-8. 
78 J. McK.Camp II, “Drought and Famine in the Fourth Century B.C.,” Hesperia 20 
(1982), 9-17, with the parallel of a fifth-century drought severe enough to dry up lakes, 
Strabo 1.3.4; Jameson, “Famine in the Greek World,” 12. 
79 J.L. Myres, “The causes of rise and fall in the population of the ancient world,” ER 7 
(1915/16), 40. 
80 Sallares, Ecology, 392-34. 
 339
securely established dendrochronology for the Classical Greece,81 but it can be said with 
certainty that the ecology of the region was unpredictable in the fourth century. 
Isocrates said in the fourth century that while Greece suffered, Asia prospered 
(4.187).82 His dichotomy is rooted in the internecine warfare that sapped the strength of 
Greece. Certainly, the fourth century was a period in which most Ionian poleis were not 
directly targeted by conflicts and, though they were liable to be caught between warring 
parties, the impetus for building large defensive fortifications did not emerge in most 
poleis until the Hellenistic period.83 It is therefore likely that the upheavals, both human 
and environmental, that threatened prosperity were nothing extraordinary in the Aegean 
context. Moreover, Chios, and other poleis to a lesser extent, probably benefitted from 
the expansion of the grain trade and periods of high prices,84 while smaller poleis like 
Clazomenae had the capacity to import large amounts of grain quickly in times of 
emergency. However, the difference between Chios and Clazomenae should be noted. 
More so even than the Archaic period there was stratification of wealth between the 
larger poleis like Chios and smaller poleis who were more regularly forced to take 
extreme action to meet demand.
                                                 
81 The Cornell Tree-Ring Lab is working on it, according to its website.  
82 See Part III, Chapter 10. 
83 See Part III, Chapter 18. 
84 Sallares, Ecology, 394, points to exceptionally high prices in the 320s. 
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 17. Monuments to Commercial Prosperity? Construction and Reconstruction at 
Ionian Sanctuaries 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Cults—local, regional, and panhellenic—were central to life in Ionia, much like 
elsewhere in ancient Greece.1 Places of worship were considered necessary, regardless of 
the economic climate, but most were not constructed on a monumental scale. Many cults 
entailed sacrifices made and hymns sung at rural shrines, such as were detailed in the 
Molpoi decree at Miletus, where rituals included sacrifices to the local hero Chares, 
nymphs, Hecate, and Hermes Enkidou (I. Milet I.3),2 while other cults had small, 
sometimes intramural, temples, such as for Apollo Deliphinious at Miletus.3 Only a very 
small number of deities such as Artemis Ephesia and Apollo Didymaeus were housed in 
enormous monumental structures for which Ionia was famous. In this case study, I will 
examine how this last category was built and rebuilt in Ionia during the Archaic, 
Classical, and early Hellenistic periods. My principal interest is in how the poleis raised 
financial resources for construction because this speaks to the position of Ionia within its 
wider Aegean context. Unfortunately, temple financial accounts are rare and only one 
exists in Ionia,4 so it is impossible to conduct an audit of Ionian temple building accounts 
                                                 
1 J.K. Davies, “Religion and the State,” CAH2 IV, 368-88. 
2 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 183-4; Cf. Robertson, “Government and Society at Miletus,” 
356-98; Gorman, Miletus, 273; Fontenrose, Didyma, 74-5. See Part II, Chapter 1. 
3 A. Herda, “How to Run a State Cult: The Organisation of the Cult of Apollo Delphinios 
in Miletos,” in Current approaches to religion in ancient Greece, edd. M. Haysom and J. 
Wallensten (Stockholm: Stockholm Universitet, 2011), 65-74. 
4 B. Dignas, “’Inventories’ or ‘Offering lists’? Assessing the Wealth of Apollo 
Didymaeus,” ZPE 138 (2002), 238, with n. 37. These stelae are dated to 177/6. 
Inventories were rare before the classical period, see D.M. Lewis, “Temple Inventories in 
Ancient Greece,” in Pots and Pans, ed. M. Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 71-81.  
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the way we are able to for modern stadium construction. Yet, the source of funds for 
temple construction is of critical importance for how Ionia ought to be interpreted, both 
in terms of political relationships and economic prosperity. 
As we shall see, the construction of the enormous Ionian temples is typically 
attributed to commercial prosperity creating a surplus that went into ornamenting Ionia.5 
In this same narrative, these temples were destroyed as part of the Persian rampage at the 
close of the Ionian revolt in 494/3, and their ruins remained memorials to barbarian 
impiety (Isoc. 4.156)6 until Alexander liberated the region in 334. However, this narrative 
largely fails to deal with Ionia on its own terms. I believe that this account of Ionian 
temple construction both overstates and misunderstands Ionian commercial wealth in the 
Archaic period, promoting Greek genius without acknowledging the relationship between 
Ionians and their Anatolian neighbors. Accounting for regional situations and 
peculiarities locates Ionian temple construction within a larger network of interstate 
relationships. It is not a coincidence that both the erection of the Archaic temples and 
their reconstruction in the fourth and third centuries corresponded to periods when non-
Ionian dynasts cast long shadows on the region. In fact, the two developments are 
intimately linked. 
 
II. Sanctuaries in Archaic Ionia 
Archaic Ionia was particularly famous for its temples. The largest, including the 
temple of Hera on Samos, the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, and the temple of Apollo at 
                                                 
5 E.g. C. Roebuck, “The Economic Development of Ionia,” CPh 48 (1953), 9-16; Balcer, 
Sparda, 365. 
6 See Part III, Chapter 11. 
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Didyma (in Miletus), already had a series of reconstructions in the Archaic period. The 
scholarly consensus about these phases is that they represented a form of peer-polity 
competition, communities leap-frogging one another in a race to construct the largest and 
most magnificent edifice.7 Thus Osborne observes, “it is hard to believe that it is a mere 
coincidence that the fourth temple of Hera at Samos just surpasses the first temple of 
Artemis at Ephesos in ground area (6,038 m2 compared to 6,017).”8 These were not the 
only Ionian temples built or rebuilt on a monumental scale; excavations reveal that the 
temples of Aphrodite and Athena at Miletus were both rebuilt shortly before its sack in 
494.9 The foundations of the original temples are frequently difficult to observe because 
they went through multiple phases of construction, with each successive rebuild resulting 
in a larger temple.10 This competition did not result in a uniform style that expressed a 
common Ionian identity. For instance, instead of the fluted columns that were later 
associated with the “Ionic” style, the columns at temples of Artemis at Ephesus and of 
Apollo at Didyma were decorated with human figures and the Panionion had smooth 
columns.11 Likewise, while the earliest known Greek peripteral temple was the eighth-
                                                 
7 A.M. Snodgrass, “Interaction by design: the Greek city-state,” in Peer Polity Interaction 
and Socio-Political Change, edd. C. Renfrew and J. Cherry (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1986), 47-58; Greaves, Land of Ionia, 175. On architecture and the 
identity of a community, see Patronos, “Public Architecture and Civic Identity,” 21-37, 
with bibliography. On the early sanctuaries, see Cook, Greeks in Ionia and the East, 74-
82. 
8 R. Osborne, “Cult and ritual: The Greek world,” in Classical Archaeology, edd. S.E. 
Alcock and R. Osborne (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 256. 
9 V. Graeve, “Funde aus Milet XVIIL Fragmente von Bauskulptur aus dem archaischen 
Aphrodite-Heiligtum,” AA (2005), 41-8; Greaves, Land of Ionia 175, n. 30; Greaves, 
Miletos, 84; W. Held, “Zur Datierung des klassischen Athenatempels in Milet,” AA 
(2004), 123-7. 
10 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 175. 
11 Cook, Greeks in Ionia and the East, 81-2; Greaves, Land of Ionia, 175-6. 
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century Artemisium at Ephesus, that style was not uniformly adopted and did not exist at 
the Panionion.12 
Even in antiquity, many Ionian cult sites were considered pre-Greek sanctuaries 
(e.g. Paus. 4.31.8; 7.2.7-8),13 and large number of Anatolian “Phrygian” cult sites in Ionia 
were close by the location of Greek sanctuaries.14 On Chios, Bronze Age pottery shards 
indicate occupation of the site of the Archaic sanctuary at Kato Phano, though it may 
have been a lookout, rather than a place of ritual significance.15 More directly, the use of 
amber at the temple of Artemis at Ephesus is linked to the continuity of cult practice from 
the Bronze Age.16 The deities also show evidence of being Anatolian. The image of 
Artemis Ephesia, for instance, was that of a “many breasted” deity, which Christian 
authors condemned and more modern scholars saw as a representation of fertility. But 
these iconic bulbs were not originally breasts; since comparable iconography is found on 
images of Anatolian gods such as Zeus, it has been suggested that they convey martial 
                                                 
12 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 176; H. Lohmann “The Discovery and excavation of the 
Archaic Panionion in the Mycale (Dilek Daglari),” Kazı Sonuçları Toplantısı 28 (2007), 
575-90. 
13 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 174. 
14 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 195-6; W. Burkert, "Olbia and Apollo of Didyma: A New 
Oracle Text," in Apollo: Origins and Influence, ed. J. Solomon (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1994), 51. 
15 L. Beaumont, A. Archontidou-Argyri, and K. Whtibread, “New Work at Kato Phana, 
Chios: The Kato Phana Archaeological Project Preliminary Report for 1997 and 1998,” 
ABSA 94 (1999), 274-87. 
16 U. Muss, “Amber from the Artemision from Ephesus and in the museums of Istanbul 
and Selçuk Ephesos,” Araştirma Sonuçları Toplantısı 25 (2008), 13-26; Likewise, the 
Samian Heraion, see: J.D. Baumbach, The Significance of Votive Offerings in selected 
Hera Sanctuaries in the Peloponnese, Ionia, and Western Greece (Oxford: Archeopress, 
2004), 149-50. 
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significance.17  Both Apollo and Artemis also had epithets that identify them as Anatolian 
born, Lycian and Ortygian, respectively, and the idea that Apollo originated as an 
Anatolian sun god homonymous with the Trojan Appaliunas has been speculated since 
the nineteenth century.18 Thus, in addition to developing in a milieu of regional 
competition, Ionian sanctuaries were intimately linked with their Anatolian setting. 
One of the critical questions for the extramural sanctuaries in Ionia is what 
relationship the cults had with their poleis. The sanctuary and oracle at Didyma were 
likely founded before the development of Ionia’s Greek identity (Paus. 7.2.6) and, unique 
among sanctuaries in the Greek world, was administered by a single family, the 
Branchidae.19 Parke observes that this family became so associated with the sanctuary 
that the location became designated by their patronymic.20 There is no evidence for the 
origins of the Branchidae, and Fontenrose suggests that a mixed Hellenic and Carian 
population calling itself Ionian founded Didyma as a sanctuary of Apollo.21 Despite later 
Greek genealogies for Branchus, the beloved of Apollo, as the eponymous progenitor of 
                                                 
17 Morris, “The View From the Greek East,” 70-1; L.R. LiDonnici, “The Images of 
Artemis Ephesia and Greco-Roman Worship: A Reconsideration,” HThR 85 (1992), 389-
415. 
18 Herda, “How to Run a State Cult,” 58. 
19 Patronos, “Public Architecture and Civic Identity in Classical and Hellenistic Ionia,” 
46; H.W. Parke, “The Massacre of the Branchidae,” JHS 105 (1985), 59. Didyma’s 
combination of being dominated by a single family and its historic independence created 
this unique situation. On the relationship between the polis and the sanctuary and the 
parallel constructions in the archaic period, see N. Ehrhardt, “Didyma und Milet in 
archaischer Zeit,” Chiron 28 (1998), 11-20, contra K. Tuchelt, “Die Perserzerstörung von 
Branchidai-Didyma und ihre Folgen-archäologisch bettrachtet,” AA (1988), 427-38, who 
argues the sanctuary was not administered by the polis until its reconstruction in the 
fourth century. 
20 Parke, “Massacre of the Branchidae,” 59. 
21 Fontenrose, Didyma, 8; cf. Parke, “The Massacre of the Branchidae,” 60, with n. 7. The 
earliest archeological find, a Mycenaean pottery fragment, dates to the 14th century, see 
A.M. Greaves, “Divination at Archaic Branchidai-Didyma: A Critical Review,” Hesperia 
81 (2012), 178. 
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the Branchidae,22 the most probable suggestion is that the name derives from a non-
Hellenic Anatolian language and therefore that the priestly family was not Greek.23 
Miletus formally took control of the sanctuary and Apollo became the patron god of the 
polis around the same time that the earliest stone buildings were erected in the late 
seventh or early sixth century.24 Herodotus specifies the Branchidae when talking about 
Didyma, but he also links the sanctuary with Miletus (1.46, 1.92, 2.156, 6.19). Didyma 
was subordinate to Miletus, but it was still capable of asserting its autonomy, which it did 
when the polis fought against Persia in the 490s.25 Further, Didyma’s location in the 
chora meant that it was ideally suited to unify diverse populations, serving as a common 
ritual space for the Greek and non-Greek populations, as well as between Miletus and the 
other urban settlements in Milesia such as Teichoussa.26 Where Didyma was particularly 
autonomous, other sanctuaries in Ionia, both inside the urban walls and in the chorae, 
were more explicitly linked to their poleis.  
                                                 
22 Fontenrose, Didyma, 106-7; Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 66-8. In 
myth, Branchus was the son of Smikros, the son of a Delphian man and a Milesian 
woman who, while pregnant, dreamed of the sun entering through her mouth and exiting 
through her genitals. Branchus was so named for her throat (Conon FGrH 26 F 133). 
Conon’s version represents a manufactured genealogy either for Delphi to claim Didyma 
or, more probably, for the new Hellenistic oracle to derive legitimacy by a link to Delphi. 
23 Parke, “Massacre of the Branchidae,” 59-61; Greaves, Miletos, 111. 
24 Fontenrose, Didyma, 8-10. In earlier periods, the sanctuary probably included wooden 
buildings.  
25 Greaves, Miletos, 123; C. Morgan, “Review: Joseph Fontenrose’s Didyma,” 
Hermathena 144 (1989), 64-9; H.W. Parke, The Oracles of Apollo in Asia Minor 
(London: Croom Helm, 1985), 15-18. Cf. N.G.L. Hammond, "The Branchidae at Didyma 
and in Sogdiana," CQ2 48 (1998), 340-2, who argues the medism of the Branchidae was 
in 479. 
26 Greaves, Miletos, 122-3. On the separatist tendencies of Teichoussa, see Part II, 
Chapter 2 and Part III, Chapter 14. 
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Sacred ways linked the poleis and the extramural sanctuaries.27 Ionian sacred 
ways ranged from two to sixteen kilometers long in Ionia and frequently contained 
roadside shrines, tombs, sanctuaries, and statues that marked them as monumental 
arrangements in and of themselves.28 The purpose here is not to review the religious and 
ceremonial functions of the sacred ways or to review their construction or upkeep, but to 
identify the panorama of features connected to the sanctuaries, each of which would have 
added to the overall cost, and note the ways in which the interaction is simply 
unknowable. For instance, some of the Ionian sanctuaries were in marshy locations, but 
there is no evidence for potentially hazardous terrain and limited evidence for road 
surfaces.29 However, unlike the temple proper, but quite like other aspects of the 
sanctuary, the monuments along the sacred ways were erected piecemeal as dedications 
that lent a changing nature to the overall appearance and were certainly paid for by local 
notables. The most famous statues from the Milesian sacred way, the Chares, group, 
includes an inscription that reads, “I am Chares, son of Kleisis, archon of Teichioussa. 
This statue is for Apollo.”30 
It is commonly accepted that the construction of the monumental temples was 
made possible by overseas commerce that left the poleis with surplus revenue.31 
Flourishing commerce, then as now, could make individuals wealthy enough to 
                                                 
27 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 180-8. 
28 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 180-2. 
29 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 182-4. 
30 Χαρς εμι  Κλέσιος Τειχιόσης ρχς, | γαλμα το πόλλονος. T.J. Boardman, Greek 
Sculpture: the archaic period (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978), 96; Fontenrose, 
Didyma, 166; Greaves, Land of Ionia, 186-7. On comparable statue groups in Ionia, see 
Cook, Greeks in Ionia and the East, 103-6. Chians developed a reputation for carving 
exceptional sculptures. 
31 Balcer, Sparda, 365; Roebuck, “Economic Development of Ionia,” 12; Georges, 
“Persian Ionia under Darius,” 3-4; Greaves, Miletos, 126.  
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contribute lavish displays of piety. It is possible that a polis working with a unified 
citizen body, ample resources of stone, workers, skilled artisans, and draught animals 
may have been able to erect not only the small original temples and moderate-sized 
intramural sanctuaries, but also the enormous extramural structures; the sixth-century 
Heraion at Samos, built during the tyranny of Polycrates (c. 538-522), the last major 
phase of construction on the site, should be identified with this process.32 Polycrates 
funded his engineering projects through “piracy and unscrupulous politics,” but the 
centralization of Samian resources must have been at least as important, while the 
sanctuary also received dedications from Egypt.33 That there were only two small new 
temples built at the sanctuary in the fifth and fourth centuries testifies to its diminished 
importance.34  Nor is it a surprise that the largest temples are to be found at three of the 
four largest Ionian poleis. Chios, a polis with a long history of commercial prosperity, 
however, did not host a comparable sanctuary and thus it is necessary to reconsider the 
relationship between commerce and these construction projects. 
 
III. The Wealth of Sanctuaries 
Greek sanctuaries played an important role in the Greek economies and had a 
variety of sources of revenue.35 Sanctuaries frequently owned land, both in their 
immediate vicinity and in the chora, from which they received a portion of the profits. It 
                                                 
32 Baumbach, Significance of Votive Offerings, 150-1. 
33 P. Kaplan, “Dedications to Greek Sanctuaries by Foreign Kings in the Eighth through 
Sixth Centuries BCE,” Historia 55 (2006), 134; cf. Morris, “View From East Greece,” 
72-4. 
34 Baumbach, Significance of Votive Offerings, 152. 
35 B. Dignas, Economy of the Sacred in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 15. 
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was also possible for gifts from wealthy individuals to expand these holdings, as 
evidenced by Xenophon’s purchase of land at Ephesus that he dedicated to the goddess 
(Anab. 5.3.7-13).36  Endowed properties, while increasing the holdings of the sanctuary, 
were also designed to hide taxable assets since it was common for the land to be leased 
back to the original owner at reduced rates.37 At the same time, there were laws against 
taxing farmers working on sacred land (ML 12). Rural Ionian sanctuaries were often 
situated in marshy terrain and, even though there are no recorded prohibitions about 
agriculture or horticulture around the sanctuary, it is probable that the terrain, which was 
a deliberate choice as part of the sacred context, served as a limiting factor.38 There were 
prohibitions against exploiting the other resources such as timber in the vicinity of the 
sanctuary, though it is reasonable to assume that such operations took place on other land 
owned by sanctuaries.39 
Votive offerings and fees from visitors provided an additional source of revenue. 
By the Hellenistic period there was an established practice around the Aegean, though not 
from Ionia directly, for visitors to a sanctuary to make preliminary offerings by dropping 
coins into a thesauros (offering box). Traditionally thesauroi offerings were thought to 
have been a cult fee imposed by sanctuary officials to make up for shortfalls in revenue 
and either repealed when the endowment was restored or kept in place in order to 
                                                 
36 Dignas, Economy of the Sacred, 29; M.P.J. Dillon, “The Ecology of the Greek 
Sanctuary,” ZPE 118 (1997), 117. 
37 J.D. Sosin, “Endowments and Taxation in the Hellenistic Period,” Anc. Soc. 44 (2014), 
43-89. 
38 There may well have been prohibitions, too. A fourth-century inscription from Chios 
records a prohibition against sheep and pigs entering the sanctuary in order to prevent 
defecation, see F. Sokolowski, Lois Sacrées des Cités Grecques (Paris: Éditions E. De 
Boccard, 1969), 116.5-6, 11-12; Dillon, “Ecology of the Greek Sanctuary,” 120-1, 125. 
39 Dillon, “Ecology of the Greek Sanctuary,” 122. The inscription from Samos dates to 
the first century CE, so the how early the prohibitions began is unknown. 
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maximize their own profits.40 More recently, however, Pafford convincingly argues that 
the inscriptions regulating the deposit, storage, and use of the coins drew a distinction 
between money that would be used for the priestly sustenance and salaries and the 
income used for religious purposes.41 The monetary offerings, she says, were intended for 
purchasing sacrifices and other religious items, presumably including clothing for cult 
statues. It is impossible to know whether these funds were ever put toward temple repairs 
and upkeep, or whether there was ever a deep financial reserve. Upkeep of the temple 
itself was probably different than paying priestly salaries, but it is also necessary to note 
that thesauroi were only in place for established temples by the Hellenistic period, which 
means that they were of little use for collecting resources for the initial construction. 
Similarly, the epigraphical record demonstrates how sanctuaries had broad 
economic purview to collect and manage their resources. At Delos and in the Acarnanian 
League in the third century there were specific taxes on luxury items such as slaves and 
on harbor commerce for sanctuary use. A decree from the Acarnanian League specifies 
that harbor dues were charged during the festival at Anactorium in order to help rebuild 
the temple.42 There is no comparable decree where an Ionian sanctuary received a portion 
of harbor fees, but it is reasonable to assume that the method of funding sanctuaries 
nonetheless existed. At Miletus, one of the early third-century dedications was the 
construction of a stoa marketplace that instructed the profits be given to Apollo at 
Didyma (McCabe, Didyma 7, see below). Further, a Hellenistic law on Samos regulated 
                                                 
40 F. Sokolowski, “Fees and Taxes in the Greek Cults,” HThR 47 (1954), 153-64. 
41 I. Pafford, “Priestly Portion vs. Cult Fees—the Finances of Greek Sanctuaries,” in 
Cities and Priests, edd. M. Horster and A. Klöckner (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 51. 
42 T. Linders, “Sacred Finances: some observations,” in Economics of Cult in the Ancient 
World, edd. T. Linders and B. Alroth (Uppsala: Almquist and Wicksell, 1992), 9-12; cf. 
Davies, “Rebuilding a Temple,” 218-19. 
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the sale of grain that the sanctuary received as a tithe, which Gargola convincingly argues 
was meant to simplify the conversion of non-monetary revenue into a type that could be 
spent on upkeep of the temple.43 
The last source of income for a sanctuary, and the one I am most concerned with 
here, was donations from foreign potentates. I separate these from domestic votives as far 
as the evidence allows for two reasons. First, conspicuous offerings were large enough 
that ancient authors and Hellenistic inscriptions made note of them. Lydia and Phrygia, in 
particular, were noted for gold in a way that Ionia was not (Strabo, 14.5.28; Ovid, 
Metamorphoses 11.85-90). Thus, Boardman declares, “the great Ionian building 
programmes owed no little to Lydian gold.”44 Second, these donations are a way of 
identifying the regional influence of a given sanctuary, which, in turn, is a way to roughly 
measure the range from which it could draw offerings. The gifts were not necessarily a 
sign of piety, but were given as a way to demonstrate power.45 
Midas of Phrygia supposedly made the first foreign donation to a Greek sanctuary 
when, according to Herodotus, he gave his throne to Delphi (1.14.2-3). There have been 
attempts to identify material remains with Midas and it is reasonable to assume that 
Herodotus did indeed see Phrygian items at Delphi, but the story about Midas is probably 
ahistorical.46 The most famous donations, and probably more historical than the Midian 
offerings, were made by the Mermnad kings of Lydia, whose wealth was proverbial in 
                                                 
43 Gargola, “Grain Distributions and the Revenue of the Temple of Hera on Samos,” 12-
28. 
44 J. Boardman, Persia and the West (London: Thames and Hudson, 2000), 37. 
45 Greaves, Miletos, 124-7. 
46 On the development of the Midas myth, see L.E. Roller, “The Legend of Midas,” CA 2 
(1983), 299-313; Kaplan, “Dedications to Greek Sanctuaries by Foreign Kings,” 130. 
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ancient Greece (Archilochus F 22; Plato, Rep. 2.359c-360b).47 The Lydian kings gave 
extravagant donations to the temple of Apollo at Delphi, starting with Gyges’ large 
amounts of silver and six kraters made of thirty talents of gold in the seventh century 
(Hdt. 1.14; Athen. 6.20), which Strabo says were melted down during the Third Sacred 
War (of 356-346; 9.3.7-8).48 The second recorded Mermnad king, Alyattes (c.619-560), 
is also said to have made a donation to Delphi of a magnificent krater made by the Chian 
craftsman Glaucus (Hdt. 1.25; Athen. 5.45).49 Likewise, Alyattes’ son Croesus donated a 
silver krater made by Theodorus of Samos (Hdt. 1.51.2-3).50 But the Lydian kings did not 
make dedications only at Delphi. Alyattes obeyed an oracle to rebuild the temple of 
Athena at Assessus in Miletus.51 Croesus also made offerings at Didyma to purchase 
favorable oracles in the mid-sixth century, and offered two golden cows and columns at 
the Artemisium at Ephesus (Hdt. 1.92).52 Hecataeus proposed melting Croesus’ 
extravagant offerings at Didyma to pay for a fleet during the Ionian revolt of 499-494 
(Hdt. 5.36). The dedication of columns at the Artemisium, which is attested by Lydian 
inscriptions on column drums, speaks directly to the monarch underwriting the 
construction costs of the enormous building.53 
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Although there have been a large number of votives found at Ionian temples, there 
are very few inscriptions of inventories, offering lists, or building accounts for any 
period. Most of the inscriptions that exist come from the Hellenistic Didymaeum, and, as 
Dignas argues, these were probably public records of donations from important 
benefactors rather than complete inventory lists.54 Thus it is almost certain that the 
sanctuaries had additional resources, but the actual wealth is unknown. 
 
IV. The Cost of Temple Construction  
Although sanctuaries such as Delphi, Olympia, and Artemis at Ephesus receive 
more attention, the most detailed accounts of temple construction in the Greek world 
come from the fourth-century Asclepium at Epidaurus. This cult, likely founded at the 
end of the sixth century,55 had come into international prominence after 430 in 
conjunction with the plague at Athens, but construction on the site did not begin until the 
370s. On the one hand, the project was delayed by the limited funds and the interference 
of intermittent warfare, but, on the other, Burford argues that there was no substantial 
change in the sanctuary’s status in the 370s that could have increased the rate of offerings 
and Epidaurus remained neutral in the major conflicts of this period.56 While these issues 
contributed to the delay in construction, she suggests that the real reason was a scarcity of 
skilled laborers during a period of economic depression, which resulted in few public 
works anywhere in the Greek world between 430 and 375.57 Indeed, the workers at 
                                                 
54 Dignas, “’Inventories’ or ‘Offering lists’?,” 235-44.   
55 A. Burford, The Greek Temple Builders at Epidaurus (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 1969), 19. 
56 Burford, Greek Temple Builders, 32. 
57 Burford, Greek Temple Builders, 33-5. 
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Epidaurus came overwhelmingly from elsewhere in Greece.58 While it is unknown how 
widely skilled workers travelled, intermittent warfare and economic recession probably 
reduced mobility, adding another limiting factor to construction.59 Further, it must be 
acknowledged that much of the cost for building temples was bound up in labor of 
moving and erecting large quantities of stone, including both human labor and the cost of 
ox teams, and therefore varied depending on from where the materials were sourced.60 
Acquiring stone was a particular issue in Ionia and a late-Hellenistic shipwreck carrying a 
column drum that matches the temple of Apollo at Clarus suggests that the stone was not 
local.61 
Using the inscriptions recording building contracts at Epidaurus, Burford 
estimates the cost of the Asclepium complex at between 240 and 290 talents.62 This 
money was spent over more than a century, so the whole amount did not have to be 
collected up front. Indeed, the contracts for the earliest building, the temple of Asclepius, 
are straightforward payments for services rendered, while the later contracts frequently 
show payments in installments, which likely indicates that the initial reserve for 
construction had been depleted.63 While it is impossible to know whether Epidaurus 
supplied most of the money, Burford situates the sanctuary finances within an 
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(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 26-7, argues that architects and workers largely 
stayed within their regions under ordinary circumstances. 
60 Salmon, “Temples the Measures of Men,” 200-1. 
61 D.N. Carlson and W. Aylward, “The Kizilburun Shipwreck and the Temple of Apollo 
at Claros,” AJA 114 (2010), 145-59. 
62 Burford, Greek Temple Builders, 35; Salmon, “Temples the Measure of Men,” 202-3. 
63 Burford, Greek Temple Builders, 109-18. 
 354
international context and suggests that the broad influence engendered temple 
construction.64 The cost of the Asclepium was not out of the ordinary for sanctuaries, and 
the sixth-century temple of Apollo at Delphi is said to have cost 300 talents, and the 
Parthenon between 460 and 500 talents.65 It is plausible that the enormous Ionian temples 
had price tags at the top of, or exceeding, this scale. 
One other fourth-century temple project needs to be addressed: the temple of 
Apollo at Delphi, which had collapsed in 373/2.66 Construction needed to begin before 
the oracle could again function (Xen. Hell. 7.1.27).67 The Amphictyonic commission for 
the project met annually between 370 and 356, and included even members such as 
Athens, which was boycotting the Pythian games at the time.68 The most famous 
sanctuary in ancient Greece, Delphi both had a large amount of collected wealth, 
particularly in the form of dedicated plunder (Xen. Hell. 4.3.21; Plut. Ages. 19.3),69 and 
was able to call on the Amphictyony for financial support. However, these taxes drew in 
paltry sums, with the largest, from the Dorians of the Peloponnese, totaling just over 
three talents.70 Construction continued throughout the middle of the fourth century, but it 
was only after receiving the Phocian indemnity payments after the end of the Third 
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Sacred War in 346 that the speed of construction picked up.71 The general picture at 
Delphi is that there was a consensus that the temple needed to be reconstructed, but that 
the process was political and in large part dependent upon fungible assets. At the same 
time, reconstruction offered opportunities, both in that the plans could be expanded if the 
resources came available, and because it gave a window to articulate or re-articulate the 
mythic history of the sanctuary,72 which also proved true in Hellenistic Ionia. 
 
V. Temple Construction in Classical Ionia 
The history of Archaic temples in Ionia is accentuated by the combination of 
violent destruction in 494 and an acute absence of new monumental construction 
throughout the fifth-century.73 Cook explained this pattern by positing that “Ionian city 
life” went into eclipse during the fifth century, impoverished because the poleis paid 
tribute to both Athens and Persia.74 In a review of Cook’s book, Boardman offered a 
single-sentence rebuttal, saying “Cook suggests that there was no substantial new 
building in Ionia…but there seems to be evidence for new temples or significant 
reconstruction in Chios, Samos, and Didyma.”75 Osborne notes that if the field at large 
shared Boardman’s reservations of Cook’s thesis based on archeological evidence, it did 
so quietly.76 Further, there is evidence of continued construction, but there were no new 
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colossal temples and only a few stone temples constructed in the fifth century.77 Yet, as 
Osborne also observes, these large temples were not common even in the sixth century. 
He ascribes the construction in the Archaic period to peer-polity competition and thus 
argues that Cook misinterpreted the contrast between the sixth and fifth centuries as a 
product of poverty, saying instead that it was a decision not to construct or reconstruct the 
monumental temples and that this decision should be interpreted as an indication of 
overall satisfaction with the Athenian empire because the Ionians willingly patronized the 
Delian League cults at the expense of their own.78 
Osborne is likely correct to argue that “both sixth- and fifth-century patterns of 
building make more sense in terms of competition within and between communities, of 
neighborly rivalry and ‘peer polity interaction,’ than in term of economic boom and 
slump.”79 It necessarily follows, then, that the construction of monumental structures 
entailed choice. However, peer-polity competition was not eliminated by the Delian 
League and the re-foundation of Miletus had explicit provisions for the construction of 
new monumental buildings.80 Yet, the temple of Apollo at Didyma lay in ruins. 
Not all Ionian temples were destroyed as a result of the Ionian Revolt. Where the 
temple of Apollo at Didyma and other sanctuaries were razed, the temple of Artemis at 
Ephesus remained intact (Strabo 14.1.5).81 All of the major sanctuaries had relationships 
with dynasts in Anatolia and Egypt, but none so strong as the Artemisium, where aspects 
of the cult show signs of Persianization. Persian items appear as votives, mirroring the 
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Egyptian goods at the Heraeum on Samos, but there was also a temple official who took 
the Persian title Megabyxus (Xen. Anab. 5.3.6) and the friezes show figures in Persian 
garb participating in rituals.82 The appearance of figures in non-Greek garb here is not 
unusual, but their participation in sacrifices is, and there is evidence that they reflect 
common practice. There is a long history of non-Greek potentates offering sacrifices at 
Ephesus, including Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.109), who also used Artemis as a rallying cry 
(Xen. Hell. 1.2.5-6), and Cyrus the Younger (Xen. Anab. 1.6.7). Moreover, there was a 
network of devotees of Artemis Ephesia at Sardis during the Persian period, and a fourth-
century inscription attests to Ephesian sacred envoys who were attacked while in the city 
conducting rites.83 This regional prominence likely helped the temple of Artemis avoid 
destruction in 494 and was in turn redoubled by the survival. The sanctuary was also 
home to an athletic competition (Thuc. 3.104), the Ephesia, which likely attracted 
contestants from all around Ionia (Dionysius, Ant. Rom. 4.25).84  
There were two building phases at the Artemisium in the fourth century.  The 
second, more famous, repairs are connected to the sanctuary’s relationship with 
Alexander the Great, but there was another phase of construction in the 390s. The only 
record of the latter is column drums that bear an inscription dedicated by “Agesilaus,” 
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which most likely indicates a phase of repairs, though not necessarily to the columns, that 
overlapped with Agesilaus’ expedition in 397/6.85 No written account records a 
dedication, but we are told that Agesilaus sought out a relationship with the sanctuary 
while using Ephesus as his base of operations in 396 (Xen. Ages. 1.27; Hell. 3.4.18). He 
probably subsidized repairs already underway, but, I believe, work progressed slowly 
because of a lack of funds. 
In 356, the temple of Artemis at Ephesus burned, reputedly on the same day that 
Alexander the Great was born (Plut. Alex. 3.3), prompting a second phase of 
construction.86 It is probable that the reconstruction of the temple was already underway, 
if not nearly complete, by 336 when an Ephesian faction sided with the Macedonian 
vanguard force invading Asia. The Ephesians erected a statue in honor of Philip II in the 
sanctuary,87 and in the subsequent conflict in 336/5 when Memnon restored Persian 
authority in Ionia, the looting extended to the treasures of Artemis (Arr. 1.17.11). When 
Alexander captured Ephesus in 334, he supposedly offered to pay all costs for the temple 
in perpetuity, only to be rebuffed by the Ephesians (Strabo 14.1.22), likely as a way of 
                                                 
85 See Part III, Chapter 10. 
86 Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesos, 33, n.6; Herostratus took the blame for 
burning the temple, but it was also speculated that the temple burned after being struck by 
lightning, and D. Knibbe Ephesos-Ephesus: Geschichte einer bedeutenden antiken Stadt 
und Portrait einer modern Großgrabung (Berlin: Peter Lang, 1998), 88-9, proposes that 
the temple administration deliberately sabotaged the temple, which was struggling 
against the floodplain, in order to build the new temple on more solid ground. On the 
environmental pressures and Ephesus’ move to a more suitable location, see Part II, 
Chapter 6. 
87 See Part II, Chapter 5. 
 359
hedging lest Alexander lost.88 The king responded by ordering the Ephesians to pay their 
phoros to the sanctuary (Arr. 1.17.10-12).89 
There are issues with this particular episode. When Alexander crossed into Asia 
he only had enough money to fund the expedition for a month (Plut. Alex. 15.2),90 but, 
even before capturing the Persian treasuries in Syria, he probably could have afforded the 
expense because he was able to appropriate the tribute from the Anatolian communities.91 
So, first, did the Ephesians refuse the generous offer because the rebuild was complete, 
for their pious claims, or out of spite? Second, was Alexander’s ordering of the phoros to 
be paid to the sanctuary an act of vengeance where the Ephesians paid his syntaxis on top 
of the (Persian) phoros to the sanctuary, or an oblique way to pay for the upkeep of the 
sanctuary by redirecting, not redoubling, the Ephesian tribute? Alexander is often linked 
with the Greek sanctuaries in Ionia as part of the “crusade” against Persia, but, once 
again, the Artemisium is an exception because it was not destroyed by the Persians. 
Alexander probably offered to pay for upkeep of the sanctuary as a means of repairing 
the portent that heralded his coming, but the act was almost certainly as much 
propagandistic as realistic.92 While at Ephesus, Alexander sacrificed to Artemis, led his 
soldiers in procession, and extended the range at which the sanctuary could offer asylum 
(Arr. 1.18.4).93 There is no evidence of local anger at new impositions, so the most 
probable scenario is that he redirected the Ephesian payments without adding in a second 
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tribute.94 These were privileges that Alexander could afford to offer, and the Ephesians 
did not commit themselves to the Macedonians, in case the Persians won.95 
There is no information about how much the Ephesians paid as phoros in the 
fourth century. In the time of the Delian League they were assessed a payment of 7.5 
talents and without other evidence it is necessary to assume that the amount remained 
relatively constant after the region reverted to Persian control.96 Without evidence to the 
contrary, it is reasonable to assume that the new arrangement was faithfully executed by 
both the ruling Macedonians and the Ephesians at least until the end of Alexander’s 
reign. While the annual Ephesian phoros was a paltry sum compared to the likely overall 
cost of the sanctuary repairs, the annual infusion, which would have amounted to more 
than 80 talents over the course of his reign, must have aided upkeep and construction.  
Alexander still attached his name to a temple in Ionia, underwriting the costs of 
the temple of Athena Polias at Priene. The building may have been originally 
commissioned by Artemisia of Caria (Pliny, HN 36.30-1)97 and Vitruvius says that the 
architect for the temple was Pytheus, who also worked on the Mausoleum at 
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Halicarnassus (On Architecture 1.1.12).98 It is reasonable to assume, then, that the project 
was commissioned in the mid 340s after the Mausoleum was complete and was not yet 
dedicated in 334/3 when Alexander campaigned in Anatolia. Alexander’s donation at 
Priene, along with the offer at Ephesus, was part of his effort to ensure the loyalty of the 
Ionians. However, the dedication at Priene was inscribed only on the uppermost block of 
the anta, the highest available spot on the temple, but one that limited its visibility. The 
temple of Athena at Priene was only significant in that it was for the patron goddess of 
the community and Alexander had only a limited relationship with the Ionian sanctuaries. 
 
VI. Hellenistic Reconstructions 
There was a renaissance in early Hellenistic Ionia as the poleis began construction 
on new monumental buildings in earnest.99 Despite the deserved accolades of the temple 
of Artemis at Ephesus (see below), the most notable Hellenistic temple-building project 
in Ionia was the temple of Apollo at Didyma. The sacred spring, barren since 494, and 
oracular utterances supposedly began to flow in 334 after Alexander passed through, with 
the Milesians bringing word of this miracle to him in Egypt in 331 (Strabo 17.43).100  
Patronos may be correct that the plans for new construction were formulated parallel to 
new construction at the intramural Delphinium between 340-320,101 but it is notable that 
very little links Alexander to the sanctuary except isolated anecdotes and a concerted 
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effort on the part of the Milesians. I believe, therefore, that Callisthenes exaggerated the 
relationship between the king and the oracle.102 
Unlike at Priene and Ephesus, Alexander is never said to have offered to pay for 
reconstruction at Didyma. It is possible he refrained in 334 because the Branchidae were 
still alive, but he did not donate to the sanctuary after supposedly slaughtering them, 
either (Curt. 7.5.28-35).103 Moreover, Didyma is not listed among the sanctuaries to 
receive money in Alexander’s hypomnemata.104 None of this is conclusive and the 
veracity of the hypomnemata is a problematic issue in and of itself,105 yet, the prominence 
of Didyma by the time Diodorus wrote in the first century did not cause it to be included 
in the list. The most probable explanation is that it is not an oversight. Alexander became 
associated with just one aspect of Didyma, the renewal of prophecy, first because the 
Milesians appealed for funds, and then because another tradition, that of Seleucus I, 
required the oracle to be active. However, the new phase of construction did not begin 
until c.305 after Seleucus supposedly found the original cult statue in the Persian palace 
at Ecbatana and returned it to Didyma (Paus. 1.16.3).106 Sifting fact from fiction in 
Seleucus’ relationship with Didyma is nearly impossible. The oracle supposedly declared 
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that he would become king as early as 334 and the story circulated that he was conceived 
when Apollo visited his mother Laodice in a dream (Justin 15.4).107 These are certainly 
inventions, but Seleucus did cultivate a relationship with Didyma (see below). It is not a 
coincidence that construction began just as the first inscriptions recording his family’s 
donations to the sanctuary went up. 
The new temple of Apollo at Didyma was to be the largest temple in Ionia, at 
60.13 x 118.34 m. (7115.78 m2), and was to have a double row of columns, each of 
which was 19.7 m. tall.108 Around the outside of the temple were monumental steps that 
that served as grandstands overlooking the processional way.109 In size it would outstrip 
the temple of Artemis, and the interior was unique. The prodomos (entryway) did not 
lead directly into the central chamber, but to a wall, 1.495 m. high, topped by an 
enormous window through which the naiskos (inner sanctuary) was just visible. The 
visitor entered the courtyard by first going down to an interior room at ground level and 
from there down a monumental staircase into the heart of the temple. The adyton was 
nearly 5 m. below ground level and the inner courtyard, surrounded by solid walls that 
rose between 22 and 25 m., contained a grove of bay trees.110 Construction on the temple 
would continue until the third century CE, but the temple and oracle functioned from late 
in the fourth century. Parke posits that, in general appearance, the temple was largely 
completed in the third century BCE.111 
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Greaves, whose primary focus is Archaic Miletus, emphasizes the parallel 
between Hellenistic Miletus and Didyma in the shared visions of grandeur that never 
came to pass, but offers no further explanation for the centuries of construction.112 In 
contrast, Parke argues that the unpredictable political situation of Miletus slowed 
construction, including that Seleucus’ offerings were looted in the Gallic incursions in 
278 and that Lysimachus exacted a heavy indemnity on the polis in 283, which forced the 
community to take out a loan from Cnidus in order to pay the second installment.113 
Some of Didyma’s treasurers were involved in guaranteeing the loan, but they did not 
draw on the sacred treasury to do so.114 Unlike the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, which 
was still functioning while it was being rebuilt, the temple of Apollo at Didyma had to be 
constructed anew, which meant that there was neither a financial reserve nor broad 
regional influence on which to draw. Further, the limited number of inscriptions 
recording offerings at Didyma indicates that the restored oracle was not immediately 
popular or prosperous. Nor were the Milesians, though they were reorganizing the 
mythology to link Didyma with Miletus,115 in a position to invest heavily in the 
sanctuary. Their financial issues are recorded by Antiochus becoming stephanophoros in 
280/79 and Apollo Delphinious appearing on the list six times between 276/5 and 
263/2.116 What Didyma did have was the Apolline oracle and Seleucus, as one of the 
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Diadochoi, was in need of divine validation. The offerings made by Seleucus and his 
family did not provide all the costs for construction, but, as noted above, Miletus only 
needed to fund the first phase. In turn, Seleucus’ announcement of the correct predictions 
from the oracle validated the claims that the gift of prophecy had returned. 
Three inscriptions erected between 300 and 287 record the relationship between 
Didyma and Seleucus’ immediate family. The first two, in 300/299 and 299/8, 
respectively, were honorary inscriptions for Antiochus and Apame, his son and wife.117 
The decree for Antiochus praises his goodwill toward the sanctuary and his construction 
of a stoa in Miletus, the revenues from which were dedicated to furnishing the temple 
(McCabe, Didyma 7, ll. 7-11).118 In return, the Milesian demos erected a bronze statue of 
a mounted Antiochus at Didyma (1. 30) and standard honors such as the right to sit in the 
front row at the theater and at the Didymaean choruses, and the right to consult the oracle 
(ll. 38-41).119 The second inscription praises Apame for helping to fund construction of 
the naos at Didyma (McCabe, Didyma 8, l. 9) and again refers to the benefactions 
undertaken by Seleucus and Antiochus (ll. 11-12). The donations from the mother and 
son were similar, but the honors in return were markedly different. Where Antiochus 
received political rights, Apame only received public recognition, probably because of 
her gender. The stele honoring Apame was to be placed in the temple of Artemis at 
Didyma (ll. 21-1), which also had dedications from the Milesian demos on behalf of 
Apame (McCabe, Didyma 182), Phila, Selecus’ second wife (McCabe, Didyma 183), and 
                                                 
117 Grainger, Seleukos, 163-6. 
118 Patronos, “Public Architecture and Civic Identity,” 68-71. 
119 Patronos, “Public Architecture and Civic Identity,” 74. He also notes that the decree is 
contemporary with the temple of Dionysus being rebuilt on a larger scale and suggests 
that Antiochus may have contributed funds. There is no direct evidence for this. 
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Ptolemy I’s daughter Philotera (McCabe, Didyma 186). The third inscription is an 
inventory of Seleucus’ offerings, including highly-wrought lamps and chalices worth 
hundreds of drachmae apiece, a two handled wine vessel worth 9,000 drachmae, seven 
nut-bearing trees, ten talents of frankincense, one talent of myrrh, and smaller amounts of 
cinnamon and spices (McCabe, Didyma 19).120 Only the third inscription, listing the 
ornaments and aromatic resins and spices, items meant to be displayed and used, gives 
the actual value of the donations, but the first two inscriptions indicate that these 
offerings were not the only gifts, just the most ostentatious ones. It is also possible to see 
the gifts as Seleucus’ rewarding the Milesians for their support and compensation of sorts 
for the impositions of Lysimachus, while strengthening his ties with the sanctuary and 
displaying his wealth.121 
The Artemisium at Ephesus provides a telling counter-example to Didyma. As 
described above, the sanctuary had been rebuilt after its destruction in 356 and likely 
continued having regional influence. However, as part of his destruction of Ephesus and 
foundation of Arsinoeia in the 290s, Lysimachus also changed the status of the 
Artemisium, whose supporters in the polis had sided with Demetrius in 301.122 The 
sanctuary itself was untouchable since Lysimachus could not be seen to commit sacrilege 
against the most famous Ionian temple. Instead, he underwrote the costs of a new temple 
complex at Ortygia for Artemis Soter.123 The new cult, probably founded in honor of his 
victory, also corresponds to Lysimachus’ refoundation of the polis as Arsinoeia and 
                                                 
120 Welles RC 5; Parke, Oracles of Apollo in Asia Minor, 53-6; Dignas, “’Inventories’ or 
‘Offering Lists’?,” 238-43; Dignas, Economy of the Sacred, 40-2. 
121 See Part II, Chapter 6. 
122 Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesos, 57-8, 61-3, see Part II, Chapter 6. 
123 Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesos, 80-1. 
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included stripping the Artemisium of its religious autonomy. Lysimachus took some of 
the religious authority for himself and granted the Arsinoeian Gerousia the right to 
mediate between the two sanctuaries and therefore oversee the festivals for Artemis.124 
This process was a liberation of Ephesus from the Artemisium because in so doing 
Lysimachus gave the Ephesians control over their sanctuary.125 The new location was 
also notable because this martial goddess’ new home was located southeast of the 
settlement, close to the border with Pygela, which was formally annexed by Ephesus in 
the third century. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Commercial prosperity, as proposed by Roebuck and Cook, must have had an 
effect on the construction of temples, shrines, and other sanctuary features in Ionia, and 
Rhodes and Snodgrass are invariably correct that the impetus for erecting enormous 
monuments was peer-polity competition. But none of these conditions changed so 
dramatically in the Classical period that it explains Ionia’s lack of new monumental 
construction. Poleis continued to compete and provisions were made for new monuments, 
but none on the same scale as the earlier temples until the later fourth century. Burford’s 
explanation that there was a dearth of skilled labor between c.430 and c.380 is 
provocative, and it is perhaps the case that in the fifty years before 430 the skilled 
laborers were employed in Athens. However, the availability of artisans alone is 
insufficient explanation for Ionian temple construction. Taking a broader perspective on 
when each temple was built or rebuilt, there emerges a pattern wherein the largest 
                                                 
124 Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesos, 61-7; 85-8. 
125 See Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesos, 85. 
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temples were constructed in correspondence with the relationships the poleis and 
sanctuaries had with foreign rulers. Kings used donations to purchase goodwill in and 
loyalty from the Ionian poleis instead of installing garrisons. Cash provided a fleeting 
benefit that needed to be renewed, while architecture both took longer to complete and 
offered more reliable returns.126 If the Ionian sanctuaries cannot be seen as the product of 
Greek economic and architectural genius that kings such as Croesus wanted to be 
associated with, then how should they be interpreted? 
All Ionian poleis had temples built as lavishly as they could afford, but only three, 
Samos, Miletus, and Ephesus, had the enormous temples for which the region was 
known. These were among the largest Ionian poleis, but if construction was principally 
the result of commercial prosperity and available manpower for construction, then it 
would be expected that Chios would have also had a temple. Instead, the construction 
projects were in large part aided by foreign gifts and regional influence that extended up 
the Anatolian river valleys. The Ionian temples were not Greek in a traditional sense, but 
were part of Anatolian religious networks that included Caria, Lydia, Phrygia, and Ionia, 
and were absorbed by the Persian administration. In the early Hellenistic period, the 
sanctuaries took on renewed importance, helping to form the relationship between the 
poleis and the Diadochoi. As Patronos shows, one of the most direct ways in which the 
kings forged ties with the poleis was through the funding of architectural projects.127 
However, the interaction varied from location to location, frequently based on whether or 
not the polis was formally incorporated into the kingdom. Thus, the Ionian sanctuaries 
                                                 
126 Patronos, “Public Architecture and Civic Identity,” 174-93. 
127 Patronos, “Public Architecture and Civic Identity,” 174-93. 
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were a microcosm of Ionia itself, straddling the line between Greek and barbarian and 
negotiating a balance between dependence and autonomy.
 370
18. Hellenistic Kings, War, and the Economy in Ionia 
 
I. Introduction 
 “Among the factors that shaped the Hellenistic world, war seems without a doubt 
to be the most important,” says Chaniotis.1 It is not a surprise therefore that the wars of 
the successors permeate the scholarship on nearly every aspect of the early Hellenistic 
period. Although controversies about chronology, state-building, and interstate relations 
form a large part of work on the period, the relationship between these wars, the 
economy, and the Greek cities has a long history. Rostovtzeff, for instance, treated war 
not as a productive economic mode, but as an unstoppable force that “stunted and then 
gradually atrophied” the economic capacity of the Greek communities.2 Nevertheless, 
there has been a tendency to make declarations concerning the Hellenistic poleis. There 
was a habit, as Austin notes, to study the wars and economies of the Classical Greek 
poleis on the one hand and, on the other, to study Hellenistic kingship. In rectifying this 
oversight, Austin characterizes Hellenistic kings as pirates who used war as a means to 
gather both money and legitimacy, justifying their rule as “spear-won territory” in 
emulation of Alexander.3 Austin’s focus on the Hellenistic kings, however, comes at the 
expense of the effect of the wars on the poleis. More recently, there have been excellent 
                                                 
1 A. Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 2. Cf. P. Baker, 
“Warfare,” in A Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. A. Erskine (Malden: Blackwell, 
2003), 374-5. 
2 Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire 2e, 4. 
3 M.M. Austin, “Hellenistic Kings, War, and the Economy,” CQ2 36 (1986), 464-5. 
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synoptic studies on war in the Greek world generally and Anatolia specifically of which 
Ionia played only a part.4 
Scholarship about early Hellenistic Ionia also examines the wars of the successors 
in order to assign blame to one or more of the rival dynasts for impoverishing the region. 
Lysimachus of Thrace is the traditional scapegoat, but Lund exonerates him of the charge 
of installing new taxes, pointing at Antigonus instead.5 Burstein likewise relieves 
Lysimachus of sole blame, accusing all of the Diadochoi who raided or taxed the region 
for stunting regrowth.6 Billows, in contrast, rejects the premise and argues that tax 
exemptions and donations laid the foundation for future prosperity.7 I agree with Billows’ 
overall argument, but, as we will see, there is good reason to believe that the wars did 
temporarily stunt Ionian prosperity since the longest period during which the region was 
free from military campaigns was from 311 to 302/1. But the foundation of prosperity 
remained nothing more than a foundation so long as the wars continued. I am also 
sympathetic to Burstein’s argument because all of the Diadochoi were willing to extort 
Greek communities. Blaming one or more dynast, however, does not reveal how Ionia 
                                                 
4 Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World; A. Chaniotis, “The Impact of War on the 
Economy of Hellenistic Poleis: Demand Creation, Short-Term Influence, Long-Term 
Impacts,” in The Economies of Hellenistic Societies, Third to First Centuries BC, edd. V. 
Gabrielsen, J.K. Davies, and Z. Archibald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 122-
41; T. Boulay, Ares dans la cite: les poleis et la guerre dans l’Asie Mineure hellénistique 
(Pisa: Fabrizio Serra editore, 2014); J. Ma, “Fighting poleis of the Hellenistic World,” in 
War and Violence in Ancient Greece, ed. H. van Wees (London: Duckworth, 2000); J. 
Ma, "Une culture militaire en Asie Mineure hellénistique?" in Les cités grecques en Asie 
Mineure à l'époque hellénistique, edd. J.-C. Couvenhes and H.L. Fernoux (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires François-Rabelais, 2004), 199-220. 
5 Lund, Lysimachus, 128-52. Ptolemy is excused for the purposes of this study because 
his interaction with Ionia came later in the Hellenistic period. 
6 S.M. Burstein, “Lysimachus and the Greek Cities of Asia: The Case of Miletus,” AW 3 
(1980), 73-5. 
7 Billows, “Rebirth of a Region,” 33-43. For a narrative of this period, see Part II, 
Chapter 6. 
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fitted into the new world of large-scale military conflicts. I will therefore draw on the 
work of Chaniotis, Ma, and Bouley, but focus on the early Hellenistic period to show the 
interaction between Ionian poleis, the Diadochic wars, and prosperity. 
 
II. Attacks and Attrition of the Chora 
Ionian poleis were subject to attacks from Galatian invaders and raids from each 
other by the mid third century, but in between 323 and 294 the only groups explicitly 
known to have attacked Ionian towns were the Successors. There are seven attested 
sieges of Ionian poleis between 323 and 294, with two each at Erythrae and Ephesus, and 
one at Clazomenae, Miletus, and Colophon. McNicoll charts the proliferation of 
increasingly costly defensive fortifications along with the growing efficiency of 
Hellenistic siege warfare in the latter quarter of the fourth century (see below).8 Overall, 
McNicoll shows that attackers were successful in sixty-five out of ninety-two sieges, 
between 322 and 303.9 His count excludes the attested sieges that were part of Prepelaus’ 
campaign in 302 when Lysimachus’ forces conquered much of the Anatolian coast.10 
However, in Ionia none of the four successful sieges was the result of a battle. Prepelaus’ 
conquest of Ephesus in 302 is typical of these engagements. Diodorus declares that 
Prepelaus laid siege, frightened the inhabitants, and captured the polis (τν δ᾽  φεσον 
πολιορκήσας κα καταπληξάμενος τος νδον παρέλαβε τν πόλιν, 20.107.4), but 
what the siege actually entailed is unknown. Prepelaus burned the ships in Ephesus’ 
harbor, but left the polis free and minimized the destruction of other property. It is 
                                                 
8 A.W. McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications from the Aegean to the Euphrates, rev. N.P. 
Milner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 46-8, with table 7. 
9 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 47. 
10 Lund, Lysimachus, 71-2; see Part II, Chapter 6. 
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therefore likely that the show of force, along with partisans inside the walls, persuaded 
the Ephesians to surrender. 
In contrast to the events at Ephesus, reinforcements arriving by sea prevented 
Prepelaus from capturing Clazomenae and Erythrae (Diod. 20.107.5). Diodorus’ narrative 
of this expedition appears within a series of overviews that set the stage for the campaign 
that culminated with the battle of Ipsus in 301. There is a problematic lack of detail, but it 
is clear that Prepelaus could not conduct extended sieges in Ionia. The increasing 
sophistication of Hellenistic siege warfare was accompanied by an increase in costs, so it 
is likely that even if Prepelaus had equipment he did not have a large enough war chest to 
conduct extended sieges, particularly when the defenders could be reinforced by sea.11 
Prepelaus probably arrayed his army in preparation for a siege in front of the Ionian 
poleis, but was not prepared to wait, instead relying on the threat of force and promise of 
liberty to encourage capitulation.  
Diodorus’ description of Prepelaus’ campaign fits with the tendency of Ionian 
poleis to, as Pausanias described it, “paint both sides of the walls” (τος τοίχους τος 
δύο παλείφοντες, 6.3.15).12 Pausanias ascribed this tendency primarily to the fifth 
century Samians, but Davies suggests that the Ephesians were particularly adept at the 
practice.13 I believe the tendency applied to every Ionian community, where the citizens 
                                                 
11 J. Serrati, “Warfare and the State,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman 
Warfare vol. 1, (edd.) P. Sabin, H. van Wees, and M. Whitby (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 464-8. 
12 Cf. Burstein, “Lysimachus and the Greek Cities of Asia,” 79, who persuasively argues 
that Miletus fluctuated between Demetrius’ and Lysimachus’ control in the 290s and 
280s. 
13 J.K. Davies, “The Well-Balanced Polis: Ephesos,” in The Economies of Hellenistic 
Societies, Third to First Centuries BC,” edd. V. Gabrielsen, J.K. Davies, and Z. 
Archibald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 193-4. 
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sought to avoid being attacked and have property destroyed by capitulating to whichever 
force appeared. Prepelaus reasonably did not expect Ionia to resist and, plausibly, must 
have been surprised when other forces beat him to Erythrae and Clazomenae. The 
constant inconsistency protected the Ionians from the worst destruction, but the threat of 
looting was ever-present, so we are told that the Ephesians feared that Demetrius would 
sack the temple of Artemis when he captured the polis (Plut. Demet. 30.2).14 
The Ionian poleis largely managed to avoid large-scale property damage, but 
attacks put other strains on the communities. Military campaigns frequently damaged the 
agricultural output of the poleis. It is important not to overestimate the long-term 
devastation of farmland, as cautioned by Hanson, but Chaniotis is correct to point out that 
even when the crops were not destroyed, they had to be used to feed a parasitic 
population that included large numbers of men, horses, and pack animals.15 Even friendly 
soldiers had to be fed. Further, the campaigns interrupted agricultural activity because the 
farms were abandoned temporarily when potentially hostile forces were in the vicinity, 
and it is probable that unfree labor such as slaves took the opportunity to escape, while 
livestock were liable to be confiscated.16 A third-century inscription records an appeal 
from the Milesian colony of Chios in Anatolia to its mother city asking for existing debts 
from the aparche owed to Apollo be forgiven (Milet I.3 141).17 The Milesians rejected 
                                                 
14 Davies, “The Well-Balanced Polis,” 181, see Part II, Chapter 6. 
15 Hanson, Western Way of War, 27-39; Chaniotis, “The Impact of War on the Economy 
of Hellenistic Poleis,” 126-7; Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World, 122-8. G. Reger, 
“The Economy,” in Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. A. Erskine (Malden: 
Blackwell, 2003), 337-8, notes how expanding populations put challenged the food 
supply of Hellenistic poleis. 
16 Chaniotis, “The Impact of War on the Economy of Hellenistic Poleis,” 127; Chaniotis, 
War in the Hellenistic World, 128. 
17 Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World, 122. 
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this request, declaring both that it contravened a religious law and that Miletus itself 
suffered from wars. The inscription rebuts the claim that war-induced penury would stand 
in the way of obligation, and further testifies to the struggles that the polis faced. It is 
therefore not a surprise to find honorific decrees in Ionia (as elsewhere, including the 
Greek mainland) for individuals who supplied grain, such as the Samian grant of 
citizenship for Gyges of Torone in 322/1 (SEG 1 361)18 and the Ephesian decree for 
Archestratus of Macedonia in 302 (OGIS 9).19 
Piracy was common in and around Ionia in the early Hellenistic period, 
exacerbated by the lack of centralized authority. A portion of Demetrius Poliorcetes’ fleet 
is described as being composed of pirates in his siege of Rhodes in 304 (Diod. 20.97.5) 
and again at Ephesus in 287 (Diod. 19.73.6; Polyaenus, 5.19).20  There is limited 
evidence about who these pirates were or where they came from, with only a few names, 
such as Andron and Timocles, being recorded in Anatolia. Gabbert argues that the pirates 
were nothing more than mercenaries, unemployed by the Dissolution Decree, who 
exploited the turmoil of the age to procure social standing.21 Similarly, de Souza argues 
that “Andron and his men were camp followers exploiting the conflicts…[owing] no 
particular allegiance to either side, and so they were happy to betray their erstwhile allies 
                                                 
18 MDAI(A) 72 (1957), 173-4, no. 6. 
19 R. Billows, “Cities,” in Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. A. Erskine (Malden: 
Blackwell, 2003), 212; Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World, 129; L. Migeotte, “Le 
pain quotidian dans les cités hellénistiques: À propos des fonds permanents pour 
l'approvisionnement en grain,” Cahiers du Centre G. Glotz 2 (1991), 19-41; Rathbone, 
“The Grain Trade and Grain Shortages in the Hellenistic East,” 45-55. 
20 P. de Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 43-7. 
21 J.J. Gabbert, “Piracy in the Early Hellenistic Period: A Career Open to Talents,” G&R 
33 (1986), 157-8. 
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and customers to their opponents.”22 De Souza distinguishes these pirates from the 
mercenaries, characterizing them as voluntary opportunists who flocked to any campaign 
that offered a promise of loot.23 Gabbert’s definition of pirates as “political and military 
entrepreneurs,” largely echoed by de Souza, is clearly correct,24 but, as Gabrielsen 
argues, it was political opponents who identified a particular group as “pirate.”25 These 
definitions revolve around an essential truth of the early Hellenistic period, that there 
were large numbers of men with military experience who took opportunities to find 
employment in Hellenistic fleets. But more than just serving in the pay of the Diadochoi, 
the chain installed across Miletus’ Lion Harbor testifies to the increasing threat of 
seaborne raids on Ionian settlements—as well as against outlying farms and merchant 
vessels.26 
 
III. Kings and Walls 
One of the most permanent effects of war on the Ionian poleis was the 
construction of circuit walls and fortified towers. Most of the fortifications represented an 
enormous outlay of resources, but were rarely used. The walls at Priene, which 
Rostovtzeff described as  “unsurpassed in technical efficiency and sober beauty,” show 
no evidence of damage from violent conflict, but likely served as a deterrent against 
                                                 
22 de Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World, 47. 
23 de Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World, 45. Note that piracy 
24 Gabbert, “Piracy in the Early Hellenistic Period,” 162. 
25 V. Gabrielsen, “Piracy and the Slave Trade,” A Companion to the Hellenistic World, 
ed. A. Erskine (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), 400. 
26 C.R. Backman, “Piracy,” in Companion to Mediterranean History, edd. P. Horden and 
S. Kinoshita (Malden: Blackwell, 2014), 170-83, argues that pirates in the Mediterranean 
tended to be part and parcel with local political and social institutions. 
 377
potential threats.27 Walls themselves are fraught structures for Ionian poleis since their 
construction may indicate autonomy or insubordination against a ruling power, as well as 
the existence of external threats to the community.28 Thus, McNicoll declares that “the 
right of a city to defend itself, and so to build walls, was a vital aspect of its 
independence.”29 Within this interpretive framework, he posits that “the independence 
requisite to the construction of defenses was a rarity in western Asia Minor” during the 
fifth and fourth centuries.30 Starting in the latter third of the fourth century there is 
evidence of substantial wall construction in Ionia, including at Ephesus, Miletus, Teos, 
Colophon, and Erythrae. Although it is possible to interpret these projects principally as a 
declaration of independence, the fact that the Ionian poleis were neither entirely 
independent nor entirely within any one sphere of influence means that these construction 
projects were a practical outlay of resources in response to the threat of violence in the 
period. 
McNicoll identifies two rough categories of Ionian urban walls, so-called “Great 
Circuit” walls and “democratically built fortifications.” The “democratically built” walls, 
so called because much of the impetus and budget came from the community,31 were 
constructed at Colophon, Priene, and Erythrae between 334 and 300. The walls were at 
most 4.8 m. thick and often as thin as 2.15 m., and included 5x5 m. towers, which were 
too small for artillery emplacements.32 It is likely that the comparatively small-scale of 
                                                 
27 Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World I, 179. 
28 This is the assumption for fifth century fortifications in Ionia, see Part II, Chapter 2. 
29 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 71. 
30 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 71; cf. Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World, 
26-9. 
31 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortification, 46. 
32 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 71-4. 
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the fortifications was because of the prohibitive cost of construction. 33 Modern estimates 
place the cost of construction of a single tower at more than twenty thousand drachmae 
(three and a third talents),34 which underscores that the construction and maintenance of 
walls were among the largest civic expenditures.35 
The walls at Miletus and Teos also belong in McNicholl’s category of 
democratically constructed fortifications.36 The curtain walls at Miletus average 4.5 m. 
thick, 7 m. high, and are punctuated by towers of about 10x10 m., siege-engine stands, 
and sally ports, which allowed the defenders to actively harass attackers.37 These towers 
are large enough to hold artillery, and there is evidence of ramps that probably enabled 
the engines to be hauled up to the walkway above the walls. Moreover, the engine stands 
are larger than those at Ephesus. The southern wall at Miletus, which guarded the 
peninsula on which the settlement sat, allowed the defenders to sally out from the walls, 
and did not rely on passive defenses for protection. McNicoll argues that the unevenness 
in construction techniques between portions of the wall was not the product of multiple 
rebuilds, but the haste to erect the wall.38 The date of this construction is unknown, 
though this southern land wall replaced the earlier wall that Alexander’s forces punctured 
during the siege in 334 (Arr. 1.18-19).39 The new wall had the added effect of shrinking 
the size of the settlement, despite an increased population in the early Hellenistic 
                                                 
33 Migeotte, Les souscriptions publiques dans les cités grecques, 106, n. 11; F.G. Maier 
Griechische Mauerbauinschriften: Zweiter Teil, Untersuchungen (Heidelberg: Quelle & 
Meyer, 1961), 66. 
34 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 72 n.181. 
35 Maier, Griechische Mauerbauinschriften: Zweiter Teil, 55-68. 
36 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 157-60, 164-9, lists them in a different category 
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37 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 167. 
38 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 168. 
39 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 166-7. 
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period.40 The Milesians also established defenses for the Lion Harbor, which cut into the 
middle of the settlement. In the third century, there was construction around the harbor 
mouth so as to constrict the entrance, putting a 23-ton marble lion on each side of the 
harbor mouth and strung a chain between them in order to close the harbor.41 
The walls at Ephesus were of the so-called “Great Circuit” type in McNicoll’s 
classification and traced a nine-kilometer path around the settlement, enclosing about 
four square kilometers (Strabo 14.1.21).42 The walls at Ephesus, which McNicoll calls of 
“megalomaniac proportion,”43 averaged a width of 2.9 m. and rose to a height of 8.5 m. 
The length of the walls put them more in line with other examples in this category than 
with other Ionian fortifications. In addition to enclosing a much larger circuit than the 
walls elsewhere in Ionia, the main difference is found in the number and size of the 
towers, which were larger and more numerous. The towers averaged approximately 10.9 
m. deep by 9.2 m. wide, but were as small as 7x7 m. and as large as 15x30 m.44 The 
towers probably housed artillery, since they had apertures on the second story from which 
the devices could be fired.45 There were also restrictions that obliged people who leased 
public land to leave empty fifteen meters outside of the walls and twelve inside in order 
to ensure clear lines of vision and fields of fire.46 McNicoll also calls the walls of 
Ephesus a “Great Circuit” because he accepts that Lysimachus ordered their construction 
                                                 
40 Greaves, Miletos, 136-7. 
41 A.M. Greaves, “Miletus and the Sea,” in The Sea in Antiquity, edd. G.J. Oliver, R. 
Brock, T.J. Cornell and S. Hodkinson (Oxford: John and Erica Hedges Ltd, 2000), 55. 
42 Billows, “Rebirth of a Region,” 37. 
43 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortification, 69. 
44 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 98. 
45 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 98-9. 
46 F.G. Maier, Griechische Mauerbauinschriften: Erster Teil, Texte und Kommentar 
(Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1959), no. 71. 
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when he moved the community in c.294. By the same token, he assumed that Lysimachus 
contributed a large part of the funds for the walls at Ephesus,47 but the community had 
probably relocated of its own volition, so crediting Lysimachus with establishing the new 
defenses may be presumptuous.48  
The “democratically built” walls in Ionia had only local funds allocated for the 
construction of fortifications. Two fragmentary inscriptions from Erythrae (I.Ery. 22A 
and B) record the list of citizens who contributed funds for the walls, in amounts as small 
as twenty drachmae (l. 125) and as large as five hundred (l. 38 and 40) and one 
fragmentary line in which only “χιλ” remains, which probably indicates that at least one 
citizen contributed a payment a thousand drachmae or more (l. 48).49 Another inscription 
at Erythrae from the later fourth century records the appointment of a superintendent 
(πιστάτης) to oversee ντιπλάδη, the process to protect the walls from moisture 
damage (I. Ery. 23).50 Positive evidence at Erythrae for funds and offices to construct and 
maintain the walls does not indicate that nothing comparable existed at Ephesus, where, it 
is reasonable to assume, the same precautions were necessary. McNicoll connects 
Lysimachus’ reputation for excessive taxation to the construction of the large circuit of 
fortifications around Ephesus, arguing that Lysimachus paid for the construction by 
taking the money from the citizens themselves in the form of taxes.51 Most Ionian poleis 
                                                 
47 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 96, with n. 109. 
48 On the relocation, see Part II, Chapter 6. 
49 It is unknown whether these funds were raised for construction of the walls or for 
repairs. L. Migeotte, Les souscriptions publiques dans les cités grecques (Quebec: 
Librairie Droz, 1992), 336, estimates that the stele contained 170 contributions totaling 
around 16,000 drachmae (more than two and a half talents), which was probably only for 
one part of the construction. 
50 Baker, “Warfare,” 381; McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 64. 
51 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 103. 
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appointed commissioners to collect and oversee funds for wall construction and 
maintenance,52 and an inscription at Colophon records the collection of more than 
200,000 drachmae (close to 35 talents) from private donations for the construction of 
their walls.53 This inscription from Colophon is particularly revealing because some of 
the largest donors were Macedonians living in the community, such as Stephanus of 
Amphipolis, who contributed 300 golden staters (l. 143).54 It is also important to note that 
not all of the citizens lived within the walls, particularly at Ephesus and Miletus where 
the poleis were actively expanding their territory during this period.55 In the same period, 
forts and watchtowers appeared in the chora of these poleis, as well as on Samos where 
there is no evidence for a substantial wall-building project.56 
 
IV. Soldiers, local and foreign 
Royal armies did occupy Ionian communities intermittently, but it is unlikely that 
the garrisons were ever large or perpetual.57 There were three sources of manpower for 
these garrisons: civic militias, armies of Hellenistic dynasts, and mercenaries hired by the 
communities, though the third group is only attested as starting in the second half of the 
                                                 
52 Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World, 32; the officers were τειχοποίοι at Miletus 
and Priene, πίσταται τεχον at Teos and Erythrae. 
53 Migeotte, Les souscriptions publiques dans les cités grecques, 337; cf. Chaniotis, War 
in the Hellenistic World, 116-7. 
54 A.B. Tataki, Macedonians Abroad (Athens: Melethmata, 1998), 61. 
55 Davies, “The Well-Balanced Polis,” 184-7. 
56 Shipley, Samos, 246-7; Baker, “Warfare,” 381; see Part II, Chapter 6. 
57 On the precedent for these practices during Alexander’s reign, see: Kholod, “Garrisons 
of Alexander the Great,” 249-56. Cf. J.-C. Couvenhes, “Les Cités Grecques d’Asie 
Mineure et le Mercenariat å l’époque Hellénistique,” in Les cités grecques en Asie 
Mineure à l'époque hellénistique, edd. J.-C. Couvenhes and H.L. Fernoux (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires François-Rabelais, 2004), 77-113. 
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third century.58 There is no mention of standing garrisons during Prepelaus’ campaign in 
302. It is possible to interpret the reinforcements at Erythrae and Clazomenae as a small 
garrison supported by other detachments stationed in Ionia, but it is more likely that the 
reinforcements were temporary garrisons of royal troops who arrived before Prepelaus so 
that the poleis did not surrender. Likewise, it is probable that Antigonus’ soldiers 
garrisoned the towers on the western side of Samos during the 310s in response to the 
immediate threat of Athenian attack, but were not a permanent arrangement.59 In both 
cases the dynasts expected the Ionians to pay for the soldiers’ upkeep. 
Most of the time, civic militias garrisoned the new defenses. Mainland Ionians 
had not conducted military operations since the 390s when their troops fought alongside 
Agesilaus.60 However, it is probable that the Ionian poleis had continued to possess 
militias to protect against brigands. In addition, the most impressive fortifications are 
impotent without guards and were probably occupied by citizen militias who themselves 
would have had to be paid. There is little information about this transaction, but at Teos 
an inscription attests that the citadel of Cyrbissus, a nearby town whose inhabitants 
gained Teian citizenship in the third century,61 had a garrison of twenty citizen soldiers 
who received a salary of one drachma per day, while the commander received four 
                                                 
58 I. Milet 33-8, records grants of land at Ephesus for more than a thousand Cretans, 
including the families of mercenaries at Miletus, see Metcalfe, “Reaffirming Regional 
Identity,” 165-6, with n. 183. 
59 Shipley, Samos, 246-7 
60 See Part III, Chapter 10. 
61 Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World, 92-3. Despite the treaty of sympolity, the 
Teian garrison was still seen as foreign occupation (SEG XXVI 1306). Cf. L. Robert and 
J. Robert, “Une inscription grecque de Téos en Ionie. L'union de Téos et de Kyrbissos,” 
JS (1976) 188-228; Couvenhes, “Les Cités Grecques d’Asie Mineure et le Mercenariat å 
l’époque Hellénistique,” 92-3. 
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drachmae (SEG XXVI 1306).62 Chaniotis therefore calculates the annual cost of 
garrisoning this single citadel at 8,760 drachmae (nearly one and a half talents).63 
The advent of sophisticated fortifications meant that the garrisons of Hellenistic 
Ionia did not have to be large. For instance, one estimate of Miletus’ southern wall is that 
it was entirely garrisoned by only about 400 troops, including fifteen men per tower, 
twenty per wall section between the towers, and a reserve of 50 soldiers.64 This section of 
the wall only made up about half of the landward walls at Miletus, but, while McNicoll 
assumes a high degree of professionalism, the day-to-day activity on the walls must have 
required far fewer soldiers—perhaps as few as two or three men per tower at any time 
and fewer than ten over the course of a day. It is therefore reasonable to assume that, on 
the low end, Miletus employed about 150 soldiers per day on the wall. If the evidence for 
the Teian garrison at Cyrbissus is a reasonable guide to the pay for these soldiers, and 
adding one commander for every thirty soldiers, then Miletus spent at least 62,050 
drachmae (more than 10 talents) every year on defending the settlement before 
considering that gates, harbors, and rural watch-towers would have required additional 
soldiers, and without a threat that necessitated greater mobilization. 
While the Ionian poleis generally avoided active participation in the Diadochic 
wars, individual Ionians enlisted as mercenaries. For instance, a Milesian was among the 
mercenaries Ptolemy employed to defend Aspendus in southern Anatolia between 301 
                                                 
62 Robert and Robert, “Une inscription grecque de Téos en Ionie,” 188-228; Chaniotis, 
War in Hellenistic World, 116. 
63 Chaniotis, War in Hellenistic World, 116. In comparison, Teos’ phoros payment in the 
fifth century was six talents, see Part III, Chapter 14. 
64 McNicoll, Hellenistic Fortifications, 169. 
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and 298,65 and a list of 150 mercenaries at Athens between 316 and 300 includes at least 
seven Ionians, one from Ephesus and Priene, two from Colophon, three from Miletus, 
and an indeterminate number of Erythraeans (IG II2, 1956, l. 73).66 In 314, Themison of 
Samos joined Antigonus’ fleet at Samos with a contingent of forty ships (Diod. 19.62.7) 
and remained with the dynast’s forces at least until 306 when he was attested fighting 
alongside Demetrius at the battle of Salamis (Diod. 20.50.4).67 These instances are not 
merely anecdotal, but demonstrate that Ionians served as mercenaries away from home 
and were indubitably paid for their services, but there is limited evidence as to the 
relationship between the mercenaries and their homelands. One Samian inscription 
honors Hipparchus of Cyrene, one of Antigonus’ officers, for his treatment of Samian 
soldiers, probably mercenaries, serving with him in Caria.68 
 
V. Conclusion: were there any benefits to war for Ionia? 
The picture we have of the situation in Ionia is incomplete and fragmentary. It is 
probable that the wars of the early Hellenistic period placed a greater economic burden 
on Ionia than had the weight of phoros payments in the fifth century. On the one hand, 
the Hellenistic monarchs were directly involved in population movements and political 
settlements in Ionia; on the other, there is no evidence for widespread violence and 
destruction at any polis. The economic problems that stemmed from war, therefore, lay 
somewhere other than the violent destruction most associated with it. While it is unlikely 
                                                 
65 M. Launey, Recherches sur les Armées Hellénistiques (Paris: Bibliotheque des ecoles 
Francaises d’Athenes et de Rome, 1949), 429. 
66 Launey, Recherches sur les Armées Hellénistiques, 429. 
67 Billows, Antigonus, 436; Shipley, Samos, 173. Some, though probably not all, of the 
ships’ crews consisted of Ionians. 
68 Habicht, “Samische Volksbeschüsse,” no. 22; Billows, Antigonus, 212, 392. 
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that the royal benefactions that Billows identifies did much to help the Ionian poleis at 
the moment, he is probably correct that these actions and the up-front costs placed on the 
Ionians in the early Hellenistic period laid a solid foundation for renewed prosperity. For 
instance, the massive building projects in the region were an imposition, but the 
payments to workers redistributed funds within the community so most of the money 
probably stayed local and the walls likely saved the poleis when Galatians invaded Ionia 
in the 270s and attacked Erythrae, Priene, and possibly Miletus (I.Priene 17; I.Ery. 24).69 
War did not immediately benefit the Ionian poleis in an economic sense and it is for this 
reason that the Ionians avoided conflict whenever possible and were eventually rewarded 
with renewed prosperity.  
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the prosperity was uneven. Ephesus, 
which absorbed Pygela and expanded its chora up the Cayster River valley in the early 
Hellenistic period,70 also benefited from the accumulation of silt around the mouths of the 
Ionian rivers because its location resulted in more farmland, whereas Miletus and the 
poleis within its sphere of influence, gradually lost access to the sea.71 Ephesus also 
remained the principal terminus to the overland trade routes through Anatolia, so the 
expansion of settlements in the hinterland reinforced its importance in regional politics.72 
In contrast, the combination of environmental challenges in and around Miletus and the 
growth of Greek communities inland that did not rely on the polis as a market meant that 
                                                 
69 Metcalfe, “Reaffirming Regional Identity,” 31, with n. 60, 61. The Erythraeans 
restored peace by bribing the Galatians, who took hostages to guarantee payment. I.Ery. 
28, ll. 12-18, records that the Erythraeans secured the freedom of the hostages. I.Priene 
17 records that the Prieneans withdrew their citizens into the walls, but also that the 
Galatians pillaged outlying properties and captured some Prieneans. 
70 Davies, “The Well-Balanced Polis,” 184-8. 
71 Davies, “The Well-Balanced Polis,” 195. 
72 Davies, “The Well-Balanced Polis,” 199. 
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it was never became anything more than a regional power center.73 These developments 
were not the direct result of wars in and around Ionia and, in fact, became most evident 
when the wars subsided.  
Ionia was a dynamic region in the early Hellenistic period and the Ionians were 
active participants in the developments rather than passive victims. Despite the long-
standing factionalism in Ionian poleis, at no point during the frequent shifts in loyalty is 
there evidence of factional violence. The Ionians were united in the desire to stand apart 
from the wars of the Diadochoi.
                                                 
73 Greaves, Miletos, 137. 
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19. Accustomed to Obedience: “Decadent” Ionia and the reputation for martial weakness 
 
 
I.  Introduction: accustomed to obedience 
While negotiating with Rome in 193, the Seleucid king Antiochus III promised to 
leave the Greek poleis of Asia Minor free and autonomous, but insisted that the Aeolians 
and the Ionians should be excepted on the grounds that they were “accustomed to 
obedience to barbarian kings” (App. Syr. 3.12.1).1 On the one hand, this declaration was 
Antiochus grasping at straws to keep control over a small part of the greatly diminished 
Seleucid realm, but, on the other, the rationale struck at a core fact about, and the 
reputation of, the mainland Ionians and Aeolians, who inhabited the region immediately 
to the north of Ionia.2 Non-Ionian powers had directly or indirectly ruled the region 
continuously since at least the early sixth century. It is possible to question whether an 
extended period of domination by foreign powers meant that the Ionians were actually 
“accustomed to obedience,” particularly because local civic rights were rarely curtailed, 
but there is a more potent issue at play in this passage. Antiochus’ claim flies in the face 
of traditional Greek rhetoric about the freedom of the Greeks of Asia wherein, if the 
Ionians were subject to the barbarian kings, the fault lay as much with the other Greeks 
for betraying their kin.3  
                                                 
1 Αολέας δ κα ωνας ο συνεχώρει ς κ πολλο κα τος βαρβάροις βασιλεσι τς 
εθισμένους πακούειν. Antiochus ruled between 222-187, Appian’s work treats 
Antiochus’ wars with Rome 192-188. 
2 R.M. Errington, A History of the Hellenistic World (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), 209-16. 
The citizens of Teos had appealed to Rome. 
3 See Part III, Chapter 11.  
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Philip II, followed by Alexander the Great, proclaimed the campaign against 
Persia to be one of liberation,4 and Antiochus’ ancestors Seleucus I and Antiochus I 
touted their euergetism to Miletus among the Ionian poleis.5 The second century CE 
Roman historian Appian has Antiochus III reverse the dynamic on two counts: first, he 
implies that the Ionians were at fault for developing characteristics that invalidated their 
rights to freedom; second, probably influenced by his Roman context, Appian implies 
that Antiochus belonged on the list of barbarian kings. It is impossible to know whether 
Antiochus actually claimed the Ionians were accustomed to obedience and what the 
Roman response was, but what is of interest is the argument presented: that the Ionians 
and Aetolians were somehow separated from the other Greeks. 
The foundation myths in Ionia were often brutal. At Miletus women reputedly did 
not eat or speak with their husbands because the invaders slaughtered their families and 
forcibly took them as wives (Hdt. 1.146.3).6 Mac Sweeney shows that the accounts of the 
Ionian migration depict widespread violence and waves of migration, but do not describe 
the conflict as being between Greeks and Anatolians.7 But Mac Sweeney also argues that, 
more than just describing Milesian military prowess, Herodotus’ passage also shows that 
                                                 
4 Worthington, By the Spear, 161-2. 
5 See Part II, Chapter 5. 
6 Greaves, Miletos, 77. This story was repeated and adopted by Pausanias for the 
foundation of Miletus (7.2.1-3) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ version of the 
foundation of Rome (2.30). Cf. A.M. Greaves, “The Foundation of Miletus: Herodotus 
1.146 and Dionysius of Halicarnassus 2.30,” CQ2 48 (1998), 20-2. 
7 N. Mac Sweeney, “Violence and the Ionian Migration: representations and reality,” in 
Nostoi: Indigenous Culture, Migration and Integration in the Aegean Islands and 
Western Anatolia in the Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age, edd. Ç. Maner, K. 
Kopanias and N. Stampolidis (Istanbul: Koç University Press, 2014), 211-28. 
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every Ionian family was of mixed Anatolian and Ionian stock.8 Yet, although the Ionian 
migration was not a military campaign as such, it was taken as proof of Ionian superiority 
over the aboriginal Carian population from whom they wrested the land and turned into a 
subservient caste (Mimnermus F 10; Hdt. 1.146.2-3).9 The appearance that Ionian power 
went into decline after the Archaic period both implicitly and explicitly informs much of 
the modern scholarship on the region. 10 This aura of martial prowess and wealth is 
overblown, even in the Archaic period. The earliest accounts of conflict between Ionia 
and the Anatolian kingdoms show the Ionian fields being burned and the communities 
entering into treaties with the Lydians as the weaker partner (Hdt. 1.17-26).11  
The only explanation for this decline in Classical sources is that the Ionians fell 
out of practice with war, precisely at a time when soldiering was becoming a professional 
career.12 Each Ionian polis continued to have a militia and individual Ionians continued to 
serve as mercenaries, but Ionian military successes were rare in the fourth century. Yet, 
authors such as Xenophon make it clear that this failing is something that could be 
rectified through training. In the succeeding centuries in Hellenistic and Roman 
                                                 
8 Mac Sweeney, “Violence and the Ionian Migration,” 221; cf. J.N. Coldstream, “Mixed 
Marriages at the Frontiers of the Greek World,” OJA 12 (1993), 93-6, who interprets the 
story as a critique of Milesian pretensions to racial purity. S. Pomeroy, Goddesses, 
Whores, Wives, and Slaves (New York: Shocken Books, 1975), 34, takes the story at face 
value. 
9 Mimnermus from D.A. Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry (New York: Bloomsbury, 1982). 
10 For an overview of the treatment of Ionians in modern scholarship since 1750, see R. 
Vaessen, “Cultural Dynamics in Ionia at the End of the Second Millenium BCE: New 
Archaeological Perspectives and Prospects” (PhD Diss., University of Sheffield, 2014), 
43-97. On the intellectual achievement of Ionia, see Part III, Chapter 11. 
11 Greaves, Land of Ionia, 154-5. 
12 Trundle, Greek Mercenaries, 104-31; G.R. Bugh, “Hellenistic military developments,” 
in Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. G.R. Bugh (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 265-9; P. Baker, “Warfare,” in A. Erskine (ed.), A Companion to 
the Hellenistic World (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 377-9; see Part III, Chapter 18. 
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historiographical traditions, two other explanations for Ionian weakness arose: that the 
fabled wealth of Ionia corrupted the Ionians and that barbarian influence weakened 
them.13 Later authors observed the apparent Ionian impotence after a period of strength 
and ascribed moral causes to the change, explanations that continue to shape our 
interpretation of Ionia.  
 
II. Corrupting Luxury 
Ionia was known for luxury products in antiquity. Milesian wool was renowned 
for its softness and was much desired and Chian wine was held in high regard and sold at 
a high cost.14 Even the food in Ionia was supposed to be luxurious, as indicated by the 
apocryphal story about Lysander being offered a cake made of cheese and honey, which 
he rejected, saying it was food for helots (Aelian, VH 3.20). The culinary delights also 
included plentiful fish, a food with which the Greeks were obsessed.15 Literary references 
include Milesian mullet and other fish at Erythrae (Athen. 7.127; 7.87), and there is 
evidence of plentiful fish life along the coast of Anatolia, fed by nutrients deposited by 
the rivers that flowed through Ionia and into the Aegean.16 While Hellenistic and Roman 
books of historical miscellany, such as Pliny’s Natural History, Aelian’s Varia Historia, 
                                                 
13 Despite the supposed difference between luxurious Ionians and frugal Dorians, the 
distinction never arises as an explanation for the Ionian fall.  
14 On wool: Aelian On Animals, 17.34; Athen. 12.57 = Alexis of Samos, BNJ 539 F 2 and 
Klytos of Miletus, BNJ 490 F 2; Virgil Georgics 3.306; Eubulos F 90.2; Theocritus 
15.126-7, Aristophanes Frogs 542; on wine: Aelian VH 12.31; Strabo 14.1.15. See Part 
III, Chapter 16. 
15 Davidson, Courtesans and Fishcakes, 3-26, 30-5; Roisman and Worthington, Lives of 
the Attic Orators, 256-7. 
16 C. Broodbank, The Making of the Middle Sea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
73; D. Mylona, “Fish,” in A Companion to Food in the Ancient World, edd. J. Wilkins 
and R. Nadeau (Malden: Blackwell, 2015), 147-59. 
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and Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistae, preserve a significant number of these literary 
references, the reputation developed much earlier and probably owed its existence to an 
unusually high number of high-quality commodities. Thus, Athenaeus quotes Antiphanes 
(12.31): 
πόθεν οἰκήτωρ, ἤ τις Ἰώνων 
τρυφεραμπεχόνων ἀβρὸς ἡδυπαθὴς 
ὄχλος ὥρμηται; 
 
Where is your home, does someone of Ionia 
from that group, graceful with soft robes 
and luxurious lifestyle approach? 
 
This reputation is not in question; the connotation of the reputation and the testimonies 
that attest to the reputation is. In short: is there a valid correlation between the reputation 
for luxury and Ionian weakness? 
It has long been assumed that the idea of corrupting luxury was a fundamental 
principle in most, if not all, Greek and Roman literature. The primary example of this 
topos is Sybaris, a Greek polis in southern Italy that was destroyed in 510/9 by the 
neighboring community of Croton, came to be a byword for excessive luxury (τρυφή).17 
The destruction of Sybaris supposedly sent shockwaves through the Greek world, most 
notably at Miletus where the citizens performed public displays of mourning (Hdt. 
6.21).18 Sybaris was renowned for its wealth and power and Herodotus’ account of its fall 
attributed the collapse to hubris of the Sybarites, as testified by the lack of reciprocity for 
                                                 
17 Hdt. 6.21.1; Diod. 10.23; 12.9-10; Aelian VH 1.19; R.J. Gorman and V.B. Gorman, 
“The Tryphê of the Sybarites: A Historiographical Problem in Athenaeus,” JHS 127 
(2007), 38-60; Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 14-25, 316-24. 
18 L. Scott, A Historical Commentary on Herodotus Book 6 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 124-6. 
Scott also observes that there is no reason to condemn the Sybarites for failing to mourn 
Miletus since the commercial relationships had ceased to bind the two communities. 
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the suffering of others.19 Diodorus attributes it to the inability of the Sybarites to cope 
with success (10.23; 12.9-10), while Aelian blames the defeat on corruption caused by 
luxury (VH 1.19). In addition to these explanations being later inventions, Gorman and 
Gorman argue that the shock that overwhelmed the Greek world was a hyperbolic 
mirage.20 They do not doubt the public remorse at Miletus, but credit it to the commercial 
relationship between the two communities, which is attested by the accounts of Milesian 
wool cloth in Sybaris (Athen. 12.17).21 That it is possible to condemn, mistakenly, the 
Milesians specifically and the Ionians generally as tainted for their association with the 
Sybarites because Milesian products contributed to the corruption, 22 makes the story an 
appropriate starting point for a discussion of “corrupt” Ionian luxury. 
Recent work by Gorman and Gorman, however, has shown that the causal 
connection between luxury and corruption, femininity, weakness, and inefficacy, does not 
feature in Herodotus’ history or anywhere else in Archaic or Classical Greece, but 
developed in Roman literature and is picked up by Greek authors of the Roman period, 
such as Athenaeus, Aelian, and Plutarch.23 This is not to say that luxury and criticism of 
luxury is absent in Greek, but rather that its relationship between luxury and morality 
                                                 
19 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 3, 15-19. 
20 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 13-14. 
21 Gorman, Miletos, 52-3, 194; and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 14. Cf. Scott, Herodotus 
Book 6, 125-6. 
22 Gorman, Miletos, 104-6. 
23 R.J. Gorman and V.B. Gorman, Corrupting Luxury (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2014), 3, 24. They also note that the earliest reference to truphê as a 
cause for the downfall of Sybaris is the first century BCE. Cf. J. Wilkins, “Athenaeus the 
Navigator,” JHS 128 (2008), 132-52; D.C. Braund, “Learning, luxury and Empire: 
Athenaeus’ Roman Patron,” in D.C. Braund and J. Wilkins (edd.), Athenaeus and his 
World (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2000), 3-22. 
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lacks a simple pattern and can be positive or negative.24 A luxurious lifestyle may lead to 
strife, but the problems emerge when a person or community lives beyond his or its 
means.25  
Evidence from Athens reveals these mixed accounts of attitudes toward luxury. 
Truphê was sometimes used to indicate “presumptuousness,” such as in Aristophanes’ 
Lysistrata (387-90),26 and featured in fourth century demagogic rhetoric about Athenian 
foreign policy (e.g. Dem. 8.32-4),27 but could also be regarded as a reward from the gods 
for good deeds and personal excellence (e.g. Thuc. 1.6.1-4).28 An easy lifestyle is 
regarded as a source of strength in Pericles’ Funeral Oration (Thuc. 2.38-42). This usage 
probably indicates that some Athenians identified Spartan eudaimonia (prosperity and 
stability) with its austerity because otherwise there is no reason to rebut that point, but 
also that the two were not inextricably linked.29  Fashion, particularly from outside 
Athens, was fertile ground for commentary.30 Persian slippers (Περσικά) were a sign of 
luxury (Aristoph. Lys. 229; Th. 734; Clouds 149) and Plato describes the wealthy wearing 
Persian Belts (Hippias Minor 368C).31 Similarly, Demosthenes claimed in the fourth 
century that Aristides and Miltiades had lived modestly in accordance with the 
                                                 
24 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 8-75. 
25 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 48. 
26 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 39. This instance indicate “wantonness” or 
“licentiousness,” since the Magistrate is complaining about women being fond of 
potentially orgiastic rites, A.H. Sommerstein, Aristophanes: Lysistrata (London: 
Aris&Phillips, 2007), 172-3.  
27 J. Roisman, The Rhetoric of Manhood (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2005), 156-7. 
28 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 39-44. 
29 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 45-6. 
30 M.C. Miller, Athens and Persia in the fifth century BC (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 153-87. 
31 Miller, Athens and Persia, 153. 
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constitution in the fifth century (3.25-6; 23.207).32 He uses this example to decry 
contemporary statesmen who lived in houses more majestic than public buildings while 
Athenian power waned (νιοι δ τς δίας οκίας τν δημοσίων οκοδομημάτων 
σεμνοτέρας εσ κατεσκευασμένοι, 3.29). Although Demosthenes declares in this case 
that frugal living is a democratic value, the distinction he draws is between being a civic-
minded citizen and spending money on private indulgences.33 Both literature and 
iconography testify to conspicuous luxuries imported from the east, including peacocks 
(Aristoph. Acharn. 61-4; Birds 102), parasols (Aristoph. Knights 1347-8) and saffron 
robes (Aristoph. Clouds 47-52; [Plut.] Mor. 839a).34 Persian items symbolized wealth and 
prestige and so were ripe fodder for jokes, but the equal access to luxuries was an 
egalitarian ethos that underpinned the ideology of democracy.35 
 
III. Corrupting Luxury in Ionia 
There was a Greek proverb preserved in Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistae, “long ago 
the Milesians were brave” (πάλαι ποτ᾽  σαν λκιμοι Μιλήσιοι, 12.26), which was a way 
to say that times have changed. There is a clear distinction between the martial prowess 
of an earlier period and the reputation of the Milesians that developed probably by the 
fourth century. However, the proverb alone does not explain how times changed. 
According to Athenaeus, the Milesians were corrupted by the truphê of their lifestyle and 
                                                 
32 Miller, Athens and Persia, 188. 
33 Cf. Roisman, Rhetoric of Manhood, 89-95; Roisman and Worthington, Lives of the 
Attic Orators, 166-7. 
34 Miller, Athens and Persia, 188-217; Roisman and Worthington, Lives of the Attic 
Orators, 167.  
35 D.C. Braund, “The Luxuries of Democracy,” G&R 41 (1994), 41-8. Yet, note the 
tropes concerning elite excess, Roisman, Rhetoric of Manhood, 89-90. 
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so he says: “when they were yoked by pleasure and luxury, all the valiant character of the 
polis disappeared” (ώς δ πήχθησαν δον κα τρυφ, κατερρύη τ τς πόλεως 
νδρεον, 12.26).36 Athenaeus cites Heraclides Ponticus for evidence of this truphê, but 
he leaves this as a blanket statement. Heraclides goes on to describe a bloody conflict 
where the poor drove the wealthy from the community, and then had the children of the 
exiles trampled to death by oxen on a threshing floor (12.26). This passage refers to the 
poor as the Gergithae, who have been identified with a class of serf-like laborers 
supposedly derived from the village of Gergis in the Troad (Hdt. 5.122).37  When the 
wealthy regained control, they covered the Gergithae in pitch and set them alight. 
Heraclides Ponticus did probably include the account of civil strife in the text cited by 
Athenaeus, and Gorman points out that it serves as an exegesis for an oracle of dubious 
historicity that predicted the sack of Miletus.38 
There are some peculiarities to this story of civic strife, which is one of several 
such accounts from Archaic Miletus (Hdt. 5.28). Gorman rejects the story of the 
Gergithae because she holds that there is no evidence for a Carian population in 
Miletus.39 However, the fragment preserved by Athenaeus does not indicate that the 
Gergithae identified themselves by cultural or ethnic characteristics, but economic ones. 
Likewise, Plutarch names the groups Plutis (wealth) and Cheiromacha (hand-workers) 
                                                 
36 On the moral implications of truphê, see Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 46-
65. 
37 Gorman, Miletos, 106; How and Wells CH 2, 147. Greaves, Miletos, 25, only mentions 
the episode in conjunction with the threshing of grain. Cf. Schütrumpf, Heraclides of 
Pontus, 80-3. See Part II, Chapter 2. 
38 Gorman, Miletos, 103-8. Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 315-16; 421. 
39 Gorman, Miletos, 106-7. 
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(Mor. 298c-d).40 It is notable that these accounts of truphê show how stasis fractured the 
polis and explains its inability to function as a well-governed community. Indeed, the 
civil strife at Miletus, a typically Greek account of a community falling apart from 
within,41 is a type of weakness, but not the sort of indolent decadence that stereotypically 
saps martial prowess.  
Lastly, Athenaeus quotes Clearchus in saying that the Milesians did not learn their 
love of luxury directly from the barbarians, but picked it up by imitating the 
Colophonians (12.26). Athenaeus cites Phylarchus and Xenophanes about how the men 
of Colophon previously lived hard lives, but that their proximity to, and friendship with, 
the Lydians led them to adopt useless luxuries (βροσύνας νωφελέας), including 
golden hair ornaments, expensive clothes, and nice-smelling oils.42 So extreme was this 
corruption, he says, that the Colophonians passed laws that required female musicians to 
be paid during the daylight hours, but even they received the evenings off for drunken 
revelry (12.31). Similarly, Colophon was one of the poleis to serve as a stand-in for 
Sybaris in an account of culinary extravagance leading to hubris (Aelian, VH 1.19).43 
Despite his condemnations, Athenaeus relies on another citation, to Theopompus to 
locate the tyranny and factionalism that brought about Colophon’s downfall. But 
                                                 
40 Greaves, Miletos, 95-6; Greaves, Land of Ionia, 92; Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths 
and Politics, 63. 
41 On the preoccupation with internal changes in Greek political thought, see P.T. 
Manicas, “War, Stasis, and Greek Political Thought,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 24 (1982), 673-88. 
42 Xenophanes is often thought to condemn luxury, see R. Bernhardt, Luxuskritik und 
Aufwandsbeschränkungen in der grieschen Welt (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2003), but L. 
Kurke, “The Politics of ἁβροσύνη in Archaic Greece” CA 11 (1992), 92-103 and Gorman 
and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 47-8, argue that this is an anachronistic reading of 
fragmentary evidence. 
43 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 24. 
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Theopompus’s passage again has little to do with effeminacy or weakening of the bodies 
of the Colophonians. Instead, he says that a thousand men from Colophon used to go 
about the town in expensive purple robes that cost their weight in silver (BNJ 115 F 117). 
Theopompus invariably ridicules the arrogance of the Colophonians for coveting items 
that were rare even for kings, but the problems are rooted in their living beyond their 
means, not in physical weakness. Further, as Morison points out, Colophon continued to 
exist until it was synoicised with Ephesus by Lysimachus in 302, so Theopompus could 
not have claimed, as Athenaeus does, that the Colophonian behavior brought about their 
ruin.44 Nevertheless, Colophon also had a reputation for martial valor such that Strabo 
praised the quality of its cavalry and says that the great success of the Colophonians in 
battle led to the proverb “he put Colophon to it” (τν Κολοφνα πέθηκεν, 14.1.28).  
Polycrates’ court at Samos, like that at Sybaris, had a reputation for collecting the 
finest things.45 While Polycrates’s tyranny (535-525) is clearly dateable to a period in 
Ionian history before the Persian Wars, his court is nevertheless important to examine 
because the same sources that discuss Ionian luxury in general also condemn Polycrates. 
The first extant account of Polycrates’ rise and fall is provide by Herodotus, who says 
that all of his military ventures succeeded and that he captured Lesbos and dominated 
Ionia until he was expelled by a Spartan-led expedition (3.39-60). For Herodotus, 
Polycrates’ failure is a product of his overreaching ambition. Herodotus does not offer 
moral judgment about Polycrates’ treatment of his brothers, having murdered one and 
                                                 
44 Morison, Theopompos, BNJ 115 F 117, commentary.  
45 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 268-9. On Polycrates’ tyranny, see A. 
Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1974), 118-23; 
J.M. Cook “The Eastern Greeks,” in CAH2 3.3, 218-19. 
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banished the other.46 In this narrative, Polycrates’ failure is the result of hubris because 
uninterrupted success caused him to engage in ever-wilder ventures. Nowhere does 
Herodotus mention Polycrates’ reputation for luxury, decadence, or wanton cruelty that 
the later sources fixate on. Herodotus’ narrative surrounding Polycrates’ death suggests 
that the tyrant died because he refused to listen to the advice of those around him, but he 
also casts the episode in a sympathetic light, saying that Polycrates died οκ ξίως 
(3.125).47 
In contrast, Athenaeus cites Clytus of Miletus, Alexis, and Clearchus for accounts 
of Polycrates’ luxury. Clytus says that Polycrates sought out the best of all things, 
including Milesian sheep, Scyrian goats, Sicilian pigs, and Epiran dogs (BNJ 490 F 2); 
Alexis’ account of Polycrates’ court is more fanciful, both in expanding the sources of 
Polycrates’ imports to other locations and that he attracted artisans with high pay (BNJ 
539 F 2). Athenaeus juxtaposes these stories with one from Clearchus who, he says, 
accused Polycrates of rivaling the Lydians in indulgence and that the situation brought 
about his downfall.48 The accounts of appropriating exceptional animals demonstrate 
Polycrates’ power and wealth, which contributed to his ability to extend patronage.49 
Athenaeus similarly reports that Polycrates was known for his collection of books (1.4) 
and Aelian says that he had an obsession with poetry (VH 9.4). In both cases, the later 
author manipulates depictions typical of a tyrant, casting Polycrates in a negative light in 
order to make a moral judgment.  
                                                 
46 Andrewes, Greek Tyrants, 118. 
47 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 133-4. 
48 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 268. 
49 A. D’Hautcourt, Alexis, BNJ 539 F 2 commentary.  
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Athenaeus’ other descriptions of Ionian luxury are not necessarily negative. He 
quotes Antiphanes in describing the Ionians as wearing long, luxurious robes and being 
habros (βρός). This adjective may be disparagingly translated as “dainty,” but can also 
mean “graceful” (Solon F 24.4; Theognis 474) and is used to describe the Greeks of Asia 
(Hdt. 1.71).50 The adjective also appears in Athenaeus’ quotation of Duris on a 
description of lavish processions that were traditional on Samos (Duris, BNJ 76 F 60). 
The fragment describes a procession preserved by the poems of Asios, in which the 
processants walk with braided hair, beautiful garments, armbands, and golden hairpieces 
in the shape of cicadas. The description testifies to the wealth and prosperity of Samos, 
but it describes a religious rite in which sparing no expense is a virtue, rather than 
depicting everyday life.51 The passage is then taken out of context by Athenaeus to decry 
Samian decadence.  
There are records of Ionian courtesans, prostitutes, and trade in young castrati,52 
but surprisingly few accounts of Ionian decadence are linked to sexual license. The 
accounts of luxury focus instead on expensive items that were spun by later authors as 
corrupting, but likely only indicated the wealth of the region, of its tyrants and 
sanctuaries, and the piety of the male inhabitants. Women hardly feature into these 
accounts. Moreover, there is no indication that the accounts of luxury led to bodily 
                                                 
50 Clearchus also uses abros to describe Samos. Cf. Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting 
Luxury, 31-2. Solon and Theognis in Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry. 
51 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 205-6; Pownall, Duris, BNJ 76 F 60 
commentary. 
52  For instance: Plangon of Miletus (Athen. 13.66), Archaianassa of Colophon (Athen. 
13.56), and Aspasia of Miletus (e.g. Aristoph. Acharnians, 523-7; Xen. Mem. 2.6.36; 
Athen. 13.56). Herodotus 8.105 preserves the story of Panionius of Chios, who castrated 
beautiful boys to sell as slaves. Although Herodotus singles out this single Chian, his 
name suggests that the practice was more widespread. On the slave trade in Ionia, see 
Part III, Chapter 16, on Aspasia, see Part III, Chapter 20.  
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weakening or effeminacy. Intemperate luxury often led to destructive civil strife that, in 
turn, weakened the community, but there is no necessary teleological link between luxury 
and weakness, nor are there explicit descriptions of overt luxury at every polis, with 
anecdotes largely being restricted to Samos, Colophon, and Miletus. Further, except 
when recording the stereotypical descriptions of Ionians, the references to luxury are 
typically cast back into the prosperous Archaic period. On the one hand, this provides 
evidence to support the thesis that the Ionians were once wealthy, an outgrowth of their 
power. On the other, there is no explicit connection between the free Ionians, Ionians 
under Persia, and the stereotypes, nor is there any reference to the Ionian revolt or the 
Persian conquest. 
 
 IV. Barbarian corruption? 
 The most direct link between barbarians, Ionia, and the corruption of the 
inhabitants, noted above, was the idea that the Ionians became enervated after adopting 
barbarian customs.53 The second danger given by Plutarch is that the Ionian communities 
were at risk of becoming non-Greek in their culture. In his Life of Lysander, Plutarch says 
that Ephesus in the late fifth-century “was in danger of becoming barbarized by mixing 
with Persian customs since it was surrounded by Lydia and the Persian king’s 
commanders had frequently resided there” (3.2).54 Plutarch explains this situation as the 
product of penury and implies that Lysander “saved” the hellenicity of Ephesus by 
                                                 
53 For a recent account of Greek literary and ideological constructions of barbarians, see 
Vlassopoulos, Greeks and Barbarians, 179-200, with bibliography. 
54 κα κινδυνεύουσαν κβαρβαρωθναι τος Περσικος θεσι δι τς πιμιξίας, τε δ 
τς Λυδίας περικεχυμένης κα τν βασιλικν στρατηγν ατόθι τ πολλ 
διατριβόντων. 
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ordering merchant ships to the polis and dispensing government contracts for trireme 
construction (3.3). The result he says is that Ephesus was allowed the opportunity to grow 
into the magnificent Greek city of the Roman period. The implicit assumptions in this 
episode are that the merchants brought an infusion of Greek culture to Ephesus and that 
once the Ephesians experienced an economic recovery they were once again able to 
afford their Greek cultural identity.55 Plutarch does not elaborate on what he means by 
the contemporary size of Ephesus, which, in turn, glosses over that cultural identity is not 
necessarily determined by prosperity. 
Plutarch’s juxtaposition of Greek and barbarian cultures in Ephesus rings false 
from the outset. Even while implying that Lysander’s actions saved the Greek identity, 
Plutarch’s actual conclusion to the passage merely says that he made it possible for 
Ephesus to achieve its future state of greatness, and ignores that Lysimachus had moved 
and refounded the polis more than a century after Lysander’s efforts.56 Further, Plutarch 
sets the contrast between poor barbarity and wealthy hellenicity and places the rhetorical 
weight on the contrasting adjectives, as though a flourishing economy was sufficient to 
make the community culturally Greek. This reverses the luxury-frugality trope, which 
presumes that the more expensive items are the frivolous ones that only wealthy 
foreigners could afford.  
There is, however, a more fundamental disconnect between Plutarch’s Greek-
barbarian binary in Ephesus than his rhetorical inversion of the trope of luxury, which is 
the culture of Ephesus specifically and Ionia generally. The Ionian poleis along the 
Anatolian coast historically had populations of indigenous Anatolian peoples who were 
                                                 
55 Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 41. 
56 See Part II, Chapter 6. 
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variously incorporated into the communities. At Priene, there was a population of 
agricultural laborers called pedieis who were distinct from the citizens,57 while the 
traditions at Miletus included both forced integration through rape and political 
integration through religious festivals.58 All Ionian populations were probably of mixed 
Anatolian and Greek descent.59 The Anatolian stratum of Ephesian culture was 
particularly pronounced and, by the end of the fifth century, Persian culture had also 
become inextricably intertwined with local identity, including that the Priest of Artemis 
had the Persian title Megabyxus (Xen. Anab. 5.3.4; Pliny, HN 35.36, 40).60 Plutarch gives 
the Persian flavor of Ephesus a negative connotation, while classical authors such as 
Xenophon (Hell. 1.5.1) indicate that there were Persian elements at Ephesus without 
making judgment about its identity or prowess. 
 
V. Inexperienced in Warfare? an explanation of Ionian “weakness” 
Xenophon describes an encounter in 397 between a Greek army under the 
command of the Spartan Dercylidas and an army commanded by the Persian satraps 
Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes (Hell. 3.2.14). Dercylidas’ army blundered into the 
Persian force drawn up in battle array and straddling the road. The Spartan ordered his 
army to deploy for battle and the Peloponnesian troops, Xenophon says, “prepared for 
battle in a quiet and orderly fashion” (συχίαν εχε κα παρεσκευάζετο ς 
                                                 
57 Metcalfe, “Reaffirming Regional Identity,” 159-61. It is unlikely that there was a sharp 
distinction between the Greeks and native populations on the plain. 
58 Greaves, Miletos, 122-3; Mac Sweeney, “Violence and the Ionian Migration,” 211-28. 
59 Mac Sweeney, “Violence and the Ionian Migration,” 228. 
60 Miller, “Clothes and Identity,” 18-38; Morris, “View from East Greece,” 70-1; contra 
Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 115, who argues that there was evidence of a notable Persian 
presence in Ionia when Lysander arrived. Cf. Greaves, The Land of Ionia, 193-7; On the 
Anatolian influence in Ephesus, see Part III, Chapter 9. 
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μαχούμενον). In contrast, many of the Ionian troops dropped their weapons in the wheat 
fields of the Maeander plain and fled, while those who remained, did not look like they 
would stay for long (Hell. 3.2.17).61 
Although the Ionians were not the only group to flee, this scene is a particularly 
poor showing. They were in Ionian territory and while the Peloponnesians formed up to 
fight ostensibly on their behalf, the Ionians fled before the battle began. Xenophon is 
clearly unimpressed. He had recounted Ionian military failures before (Hell. 1.2.2-3), but 
this time the soldiers did not even fight.62 Nevertheless, Xenophon offers no explanation 
or condemnation for the cowardice of the Ionians, and it is possible to read the episode as 
more critical of Dercylidas’ generalship and leadership qualities than of the soldiers’ 
bravery. Xenophon indicates that Dercylidas put his forces at a disadvantage and, more 
importantly, he gives no indication that the Spartan took the time to train his forces, and 
thus that he was taking inexperienced, unprepared soldiers into battle. In contrast, when 
Agesilaus conducted a comparable campaign in 394 and, like Dercylidas, summoned 
Ionian recruits, he took the time to train them, with better results (Hell. 3.4.11-19; Nepos, 
Ages. 3).63 For Xenophon, the military ineptitude of the Ionians was not the product of a 
soft country, innate cowardice, or corrupting luxury, but of poor leadership and 
inexperience. 
                                                 
61 σοι δ σαν π Πριήνης τε κα χιλλείου κα π νήσων κα τν ωνικν πόλεων, 
ο μέν τινες καταλιπόντες ν τ σίτ τ πλα πεδίδρασκον. κα γρ ν βαθς  στος 
ν τ Μαιάνρου πεδί. σοι δ κα μενον, δλοι σαν ο μενοντες. Krentz, 
Xenophon, 17; Westlake, “Spartan Intervention,” 414. 
62 See Part II, Chapter 3 and Part III, Chapter 10. 
63 See Part III, Chapter 10. 
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Herodotus presents a similar picture of the Ionians in their preparations for the 
battle of Lade in 494 (6.11-12).64 Dionysius, a general of the Phocaeans, convinced the 
Ionians that they had to undergo a rigorous training regimen if they were to defeat the 
Persians, but, after a week of maneuvers, the Ionians refused to continue and defeat soon 
followed. As Gorman and Gorman point out, the subtext to this account shows the 
Ionians as people for whom hard work is an anathema, but Herodotus underlines that the 
training program created by Dionysius recreated the rigors of battle for seven straight 
days—toils that few Greeks were accustomed to.65 Thus Herodotus shows the suffering 
of the Ionians, but not by casting aspersions on their lifestyle. 
Thus far I have been examining anecdotes and stories that offer explanations for 
the decline of the Ionians in the Classical and Hellenistic periods without being specific 
as to whether the slump was military, physical, economic, or moral. This is because the 
sources critical of Ionia are unspecific, frequently applying multiple categories, changing 
the one referred to, or treating the categories as interconnected. Nor was I exhaustive in 
covering the Classical sources. Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon show Ionian 
successes and failures in their histories, but the closest any comes to offering a judgment 
about the decline of Ionia is Thucydides’ eulogy for Chios in 412/11, in which he praises 
its eudaimonia, the stability of a well-governed community (8.24.4), and compares Chios 
favorably to Sparta.66 The military and political importance of the Ionian poleis in the 
Aegean world began to diminish at the end of the sixth century and continued in decline 
through the fourth century. Yet this generalization is not a consistent pattern. Chios, 
                                                 
64 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 135-9. 
65 Gorman and Gorman, Corrupting Luxury, 136-7. 
66  See Part II, Chapter 2. 
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notably, was a considerable economic and naval power in the fifth and fourth centuries.67 
Nor did contemporaries claim that the Ionians were corrupted by their proximity to 
barbarians or their access to luxury goods.68 Authors during the Roman period used 
Ionian prosperity as either a cause of its corruption or of its salvation, but this is not 
something discussed by the contemporary authors, who instead focus on military 
successes and failures or civil strife. 
Since contemporary authors were still largely dismissive of Ionian fighting 
capabilities, it is necessary to ask to what extent this opinion was based in fact. The 
region did continue to provide mercenaries in Hellenistic armies and fleets, though 
probably not to the same extent as the Peloponnese, but the hiring of individuals cannot 
be taken as commentary about the military training or experience of a community. There 
is also indication that the Ionians were aware of their lack of civic preparation to wage 
war, including that the communities began to hire mercenaries from outside the region. 
Likewise, Miletus and Teos were among the earliest poleis outside Athens to institute 
ephebic educational programs that included military training with spears, bows, and 
catapults.69 It is therefore probably not a coincidence that Teos was one of the Ionian 
poleis to extend a degree of local imperialism during this period over the nearby town of 
Cyrbissus (SEG XXVI 1306).70 These changes to the preparation for war first appear in 
the early Hellenistic period and indicate that Ionians had gone through a period where 
                                                 
67 See Part II, Chapters 3-4. 
68 A claim distinct from more straightforward corruption such as bribery, e.g. Thuc. 
1.109. 
69 Teos: SEG II (1925) 640; Milet I.3 139; N.M. Kennell, Ephebeia (Hildesheim: 
Weidmann, 2006), xi. 
70 Robert and Robert, “Une inscription grecque de Téos en Ionie,” 188-228; Chaniotis, 
War in Hellenistic World, 116; See Part III, Chapter 18. 
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they had little to no experience in war, but also clearly demonstrate that they were in no 
way accustomed to obedience.
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20. Between Local and Global: Ionian Intellectuals and the Aegean World, 454-294 
 
I. A Dearth of Activity in Classical Ionia? 
Ionia was one of the epicenters of Greek intellectual and literary development in 
the Archaic period. The earliest manifestation of this was in poetry. Homer was reputed 
to be Ionian and both Chios and Colophon (Strabo 14.1.35; Suda omicron 251) claimed 
him.1 Other stories intimately linked Homer with Creophylus of Samos, who claimed to 
have hosted Homer, but may have imitated him, or have been his teacher (Strabo 
14.1.18). Along with the Aetolians to the north, Ionian poets contributed extensively in 
the development of lyric poetry, with fragments surviving from the poets Phocylides of 
Miletus, Callinus and Hipponax of Ephesus (Strabo 14.1.25), Anacreon of Teos (Strabo 
14.1.30), and Xenophanes and possibly Mimnermus of Colophon (Strabo 14.1.28). 
Further, Polycrates’ court on Samos attracted other poets such as Ibycus from Rhegium in 
Magna Graecia. Some of this early activity is certainly attributable to commercial 
prosperity, but equally important were the relationships between Ionia and the older non-
Greek civilizations in Anatolia and the Near East. Ionia was likewise crucial for the 
development of other intellectual activities, being the home of numerous pre-Socratic 
natural philosophers such as Bias of Priene (Strabo 14.1.12), Pythagoras of Samos 
(Strabo 14.1.16), Anaximenes and Thales of Miletus (Strabo 14.1.7), and Heraclitus of 
Ephesus (14.1.25). 
                                                 
1 On Homer’s birthplace, see T.W. Allen, Homer: the Origins and the Transmission 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), 11-41; M. Heath, “Was Homer a Roman?,” 
PLLS 10 (1998), 23-56. 
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In a deliberately hyperbolic description of Classical Ionia, Hanfmann described 
the region thus:2  
The lives and the works of these [Ionian] poets seemed to prove that the 
Ionians were bringing civilization from the Near East to the Greek 
mainland. They were followed in the archaic period by the great galaxy of 
Ionian philosophers, scientists, and historians, who laid the foundations of 
Western Civilization. 
Hanfmann’s description is meant to describe a canonical narrative for Archaic Ionia 
based on the literary sources. He argues that the picture is misleadingly simple in terms of 
economic history and the history of Greek art and proceeds to offer a reassessment of 
Archaic Ionia in those fields. Hanfmann nevertheless accepts that the picture that he calls 
“coherent and satisfying” may be correct for Greek intellectual and literary history.3 I will 
not reassess this classic picture of Archaic Ionian literary and intellectual activity, but re-
examine the inherent assumption that the Ionian achievement ended with suppression of 
the Ionian revolt.  
Classical Ionians are not generally considered to be on a par with their Archaic 
predecessors and Athenian contemporaries in intellectual achievement. However, the fact 
that no complete speech, treatise, play, or other work survives from any Ionian author 
who wrote in this period does not mean that the region was intellectually barren; quite the 
opposite, in fact. In this case study, I will show that the region remained a wellspring of 
activity throughout the Classical and early Hellenistic periods and greatly contributed to 
the reputation of Athens as a cultural center.  
                                                 
2 G.M.A. Hanfmann, “Ionia, Leader or Follower?,” HSCPh 61 (1953), 1. 
3 Hanfmann, “Ionia, Leader or Follower,” 1. Cf. R.M. Cook, “Ionia and Greece in the 
Eighth and Seventh Centuries B.C.,” JHS 66 (1946), 92. 
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Ionian authors wrote in a large number of genres although the extant fragments of 
their work often lack sufficient context to critically evaluate them.4 Further, despite the 
number of fragments, there is no way to say how much is missing, either in the works 
known or from authors unknown. Instead, I will undertake a different, admittedly still 
fraught, task: looking at the careers of Ionian authors to situate Ionia in the Aegean world 
c.454-c.294. Evaluating the curriculum vitae of any Greek author is a task riddled with 
conflicts, and some can only be assumed to belong to this time period. Intellectuals in the 
Greek world were itinerant and travelled more than most people, but nevertheless they 
can still give an indication of at least one type of immigration.5 It is possible to draw too 
many conclusions from the fates of individuals who were as apt to face punishment for 
personal reasons as for political ones. However, I believe that in times of war it was 
likely that their reception would have been more hostile than in times of peace or 
alliance.6 Through these people, Ionia continued to play a prominent role in the 
intellectual culture in Classical Greece. 
I have divided my analysis into three sections. The first looks at the Ionian 
intellectuals in the second half of the fifth century; the second examines fourth-century 
individuals linked by their relationship to Isocrates, who, despite being Athenian, was 
one of the most important individuals in Ionian intellectual life; and the third contains the 
remaining authors from the fourth and early third centuries. The division is imperfect and 
                                                 
4 D. Lenfant, “The Study of Intermediate Authors and its Role in the Interpretation of 
Historical Fragments,” Anc. Soc. 43 (2013), 289-305. 
5 Garland, Wandering Greeks, 169-73.  
6 A modern instance of this dynamic is the hostility toward families with German-
sounding names in England during World War 1, when Prince Louis, the First Sea Lord 
resigned his post and Anglicized his surname Battenberg to Mountbatten over 
accusations that the Royal Family was pro-German.  
 410
authors frequently bridge the periods, but since the objective in this chapter is to examine 
the changing position of Ionia through the lens of the intellectual elite, the distinctions 
both reveal discontinuities and show that, while the specific circumstances changed, the 
need for both teachers and patrons did not. 
 
II. Ionian Intellectuals in the Fifth Century 
The most striking feature of Ionian intellectuals in the fifth century is the extent to 
which they are embedded in the Aegean networks, particularly those fostered by the 
Delian League. One fanciful story tells how Hippocrates of Chios, a Pythagorean 
mathematician, got to Athens. The proprietor of a merchant vessel, Hippocrates, was said 
to have been waylaid by pirates and had his cargo stolen, so he travelled to Athens in 
order to bring charges against the perpetrators. However, as the proceedings in Athens 
dragged on, he began attending lectures and developed an interest in geometry. The 
source for this story is the sixth-century CE Aristotelian commentator John Philoponus, 
and it is most likely embellished, including in suggesting that it was only after going to 
Athens that Hippocrates started learning about geometry.7 In contrast, Aristotle says that 
harbor officials at Byzantium cheated Hippocrates when collecting his harbor dues 
(Eudemian Ethics 8.2.5). Aristotle’s story is more likely and, since it happened under the 
auspices of the Delian League, explains why Hippocrates visited Athens to file a suit, 
bringing his mathematical skills with him. 
Athens, the economic, political, and judicial center of the Delian League, became 
the principal cultural center of fifth-century Aegean, and a destination for a large number 
                                                 
7 John Philoponus Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics I 185a16; M.Ostwald, “Athens as a 
Cultural Center,” CAH2 5, 350. 
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of non-Athenians.8 In the middle of the fifth century, metics, non-Athenian residents, 
comprised up to forty percent of the population and Ostwald argues that Pericles’ 
citizenship law of 451/0 was in response to their numbers ([Arist.] Ath.Pol. 26.4).9 
Athenian law prohibited metics from owning land, so they turned to commerce, industry, 
and, frequently, intellectual and artistic production that contributed to the reputation of 
Athens for being a center of learning. However, as will become evident, these Ionian 
intellectuals were not limited to Athens and followed opportunities wherever they could 
be found. 
Ion of Chios’s life is more well-known than most Ionian authors, with testimonia 
placing him at symposia held by Cimon in Athens (BNJ 392 T 5a), sitting alongside 
Aeschylus at the Isthmian games (BNJ 392 F 22), hosting Sophocles in Chios (BNJ 392 F 
6),10 and winning both dithyrambic competitions and a tragic competition at the Dionysia 
(BNJ 392 T 1, 2).11 Some of these details are probably traditions invented to link Ion with 
the preeminent literary circles of his day, but they are all inherently plausible. 
Contemporary evidence such as his mention in Aristophanes’ Peace (832-7), and his 
victory at the Dionysia and subsequent gift of a jar of wine for every citizen (Ion, BNJ 
                                                 
8 Ostwald, “Athens as a Cultural Center,” 307-8. 
9 Ostwald, “Athens as a Cultural Center,” 307-8; J.H. Blok, “Perikles’ Citizenship Law: 
A New Perspective,” Historia 58 (2009), 141-70; cf. Rhodes, Commentary on the Ath. 
Pol., 331-5. The citizenship law did not ban marriages between Athenian citizens and 
foreign women, it in fact banned the offspring of such unions from being full citizens, see 
R.F. Kennedy, Immigrant Women in Athens (New York: Routledge, 2014), 15-22. 
10 Geddes, “Ion of Chios and Politics,” 117-18. 
11 A. Katsaros, Ion of Chios, BNJ 392, biographical essay; T.B.L. Webster, “Sophocles 
and Ion of Chios,” Hermes 71 (1936), 263-74; K.J. Dover, “Ion of Chios: His Place in the 
History of Greek Literature,” Chios, edd. J. Boardman and C.E. Vaphopoulou (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 27-37. Dithyrambic competitions were regularly open to 
non-Athenians; the tragic victory is more remarkable, see Katsaros, BNJ 392, T 2 
commentary, with bibliography. 
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392 T 2), indicates that Ion was particularly close to Athens.12 This intimacy is usually 
offered as further evidence for a special relationship between Athens and Chios, and the 
cutting remarks in comic poetry only work if that relationship exists.13 However, Ion also 
traveled to Corinth for the Isthmian games and probably to poetic competitions at the 
Asclepium at Epidaurus and elsewhere (Plato, Ion 530a 1-5).14 
More than any other Ionian author, Ion is known for his versatility, having 
composed a ktisis story about Chios, at least one Satyr play, the Omphale, up to ten 
tetrologies of tragedies,15 including, reportedly, one about Gyges and Candaules, as well 
as dithyrambs, a hymn to Kairos, mythography, biography, and the Triagmos, a treatise 
on Pythagorean philosophy.16 In his work, Ion was not blindly supportive of Athenian 
policies or willing to commit to the narrative of the Ionians as descendants of Athenian 
colonists. Instead, he linked the two by triangulating the Chian founder Oenopion, 
usually thought to be the son of Ariadne and Dionysus, with Crete and Athens, saying 
                                                 
12 A scholiast on Aristophanes (BNJ 392 T 2) says that this was meant as an obituary for 
the poet. A. Stevens, “Ion of Chios: Tragedy as Commodity at the Athenian Exchange,” 
in The World of Ion of Chios, edd. V. Jennings and A. Katsaros (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 
243-65. 
13 Blanshard, “Trapped Between Athens and Chios,” 158-67, see Part II, Chapter 2. 
14 T.W. Boyd, “Where Ion Stood, What Ion Sang,” HSCPh 96 (1994), 109-21. The 
veracity of Plato’s dialogues it dubious, but there is no reason to doubt that Ion 
participated in competitions beyond Athens. 
15 The Suda says that his tragedies said to have numbered “twelve or thirty or forty,” 
which G. Olding, “Shot from the Canon: Sources, Selections, Survivals,” in The World of 
Ion of Chios, edd. V. Jennings and A. Katsaros (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 45, suggests means 
he presented ten tetrologies—thirty tragedies and forty plays overall. There are eleven 
attested titles. 
16 Katsaros, BNJ 392 biographical essay; Ostwald, “Athens as a Cultural Center,” 324-5. 
On the issue of source survival, see J. Henderson “The Hocus of a Hedgehog: Ion’s 
Versatility,” in The World of Ion of Chios, edd. V. Jennings and A. Katsaros (Leiden: 
Brill, 2007), 17-44 and Olding, “Shot from the Canon,” 45-63; On his seriousness as a 
philosopher, see H. Baltussen, “Playing the Pythagorean: Ion’s Triagmos,” in The World 
of Ion of Chios, edd. V. Jennings and A. Katsaros (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 295-318. 
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that Theseus was the father (BNJ 392 F 1).17 Ion was committed to the alliance with 
Athens, which likely resulted in the execution of his sons in 411 when the Chians aligned 
themselves with Sparta about ten years after Ion’s death (Thuc. 8.38.3).18  
Ion only dallied with philosophy, but other Ionians are credited with introducing 
its study to Athens. Themistocles is said to have attended lectures given by both Melissus 
of Samos, the philosopher who led the Samian fleet against Athens in 440,19 and 
Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, who lived in Athens until c.437/6.20 It is possible that 
Themistocles met Melissus was in exile in Anatolia (Thuc. 1.137.3-4; Diod. 11.56.4-5), 
but it is more likely that the passage indicates a meeting between the men in Athens 
where Melissus spent time before becoming a political leader on Samos.21 Melissus was 
reputedly the student of Parmenides and knew Heraclitus, who introduced him to 
Ephesus (Diog. Laert. 9.4). The connection between Anaxagoras and Athens is clearer. 
After his land fell into disuse, the philosopher known for his study of natural phenomena 
such as comets, meteors, and eclipses from Mount Mimas in Ionia (Philostratus, Life of 
Apollonius 2.5), was forced to leave Clazomenae.22 Once in Athens, Anaxagoras was the 
teacher of the first Athenian philosopher Archelaus, as well as Pericles and Euripides.23 
                                                 
17 G. Olding, “Ion the Wineman: The Manipulation of Myth,” in The World of Ion of 
Chios, edd. V. Jennings and A. Katsaros (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 144-9; Mac Sweeney, 
Foundation Myths and Politics, 80-91. 
18 See Part II, Chapter 3. 
19 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
20 S. Dmitriev, Stesimbrotos of Thasos, BNJ 107 F 1, commentary; Ostwald, “Athens as a 
Cultural Center,” 339-40. 
21 Dmitriev, Stesimbrotos of Thasos, BNJ 107 F 1, commentary, contra A. Tsamakis, 
“Das historische Werk des Stesimbrotos von Thasos,” Historia 44 (1995), 142. 
22 P. Curd, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: Fragments and Testimonia (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2007), 129-30. 
23 Archelaus: Diogenes Laertius, 11.16; Pericles: Isoc. 15.235; Plato Phaedr. 269e; Diod. 
12.39; Euripides: Diod. 1.7.7; Aulus Gellius Attic Nights 15.30; L. Woodbury, 
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His time in Athens came to an end in c.437/6 when he was put on trial, either for Medism 
or impiety, though the target of the attack may have been Pericles, who defended 
Anaxagoras in court.24 He left Athens after either a narrow acquittal or before conviction 
and spent the rest of his life back in Anatolia, though in Lampsacus, not Ionia.25 Curd 
argues that Anaxagoras’ philosophy bridged the gap between that of Parmenides and 
Anaximander in the fifth and sixth centuries and Plato and Aristotle in the fourth.26 
Another Ionian figure associated with Pericles is Aspasia. Although not an 
intellectual in the same sense as many of the men in this chapter, Aspasia belongs in this 
conversation of Ionian intellectuals because of the legacy that became attributed to her in 
the fourth century. Milesian by birth (Diodorus, BNJ 372 F 40; Plut. Per. 24.2), Aspasia 
probably came to Athens in c.450 when her sister’s husband Alcibiades (the grandfather 
of the Peloponnesian War’s notorious general and turncoat Alcibiades) returned from his 
ostracism.27 Unlike her sister who married before Pericles’ citizenship law of 451/0, 
Aspasia was deprived of an opportunity of a full marriage and instead became a 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Anaxagoras and Athens,” Phoenix 35 (1981), 299-300; Curd, Anaxagoras of 
Clazomenae, 132-3, 136-7; Ostwald, “Athens as a Cultural Center,” 339-40; C.B. 
Patterson, “Other Sorts: Slaves, Foreigner, and Women in Periclean Athens,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to the Age of Pericles, ed. L.J. Samons II (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 165. 
24 Josephus Against Apion 2.265; Olympiodorus Commentary on Aristotles Meteorica 
17.19; Woodbury, “Anaxagoras and Athens,” 301-5,with bibliography; cf. J. Mansfield, 
“The Chronology of Anaxagoras’ Athenian Period and the Date of His Trial, Part II,” 
Mnemosyne4 (1980), 17-95; Curd, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, 86-7; 131-2. 
25 Curd, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, 129-30; Dmitriev, Stesimbrotos of Thasos, BNJ 107 
F 1, commentary; Stadter, Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles, 288, 298-9. 
26 Curd, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, 142-52. 
27 M.M. Henry, Prisoner of History: Aspasia of Miletus and Her Biographical Tradition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 9-10; A.J. Podlecki, Perikles and his Circle 
(London: Routledge, 1998), 109-10; K. Wider, “Women Philosophers in the Ancient 
Greek World: Donning the Mantle,” Hypatia 1 (1986), 40-2. On Alcibiades and Ionia, 
see Part II, Chapter 3. 
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παλλακή.28 Her most famous relationship was with Pericles, as most of the evidence 
attests. In the comic tradition Aspasia is charged with perverting Pericles, while the 
Socratic tradition suggests that she was responsible for his political career. The 
relationship was probably political because it further bound Pericles to the family of 
Alcibiades.29 Typically, though, the poets referred to it as a love match and accused her 
of acting as a madam by subverting free women and supplying prostitutes for Pericles, as 
well as suggesting a negative comparison to Helen in that she was the cause of wars.30 
After Pericles’ death, Aspasia became a παλλακή of Lysicles (Diodorus, BNJ 372 F 40; 
Plut. Per. 24.6), which again cemented a political alliance and likely helped the political 
fortunes of her son.31 Other than that her relationships were at the center of Athenian 
politics, it may be apt to describe Aspasia’s life as typical for a metic woman at Athens. 
Likewise, the idea that Aspasia corrupted Athenian men was a trope about foreign 
women more generally who were often presented as concubines, prostitutes, or slaves.32 
                                                 
28 Pallake was a formal relationship akin to marriage between a wealthy male citizen and 
either a female metic or a citizen who could not afford a dowry to produce free, though 
non-citizen, children, see Kennedy, Immigrant Women in Athens, 21; Henry, Prisoner of 
History, 14; C.B. Patterson, “Those Athenian Bastards,” CA 9 (1990), 41-2; R. Sealey, 
“On Lawful Concubinage in Athens,” CA 3 (1984), 111-33. Diodorus the Periegete, BNJ 
372 F 40 refers to her Pericles’ γυν (wife), and J.P. Sickinger’s commentary suggests 
that Pericles’ law did not ban marriages, but only restricted the status of the children. Cf. 
A.W. Gomme, “The Position of Women in Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries,” 
CPh. 20 (1925), 15-16. 
29 Henry, Prisoner of History, 13; Podlecki, Perikles and his Circle, 110-11. 
30 Henry, Prisoner of History, 19-28; Kenney, Immigrant Women in Athens, 83; Podlecki, 
Perikles and his Circle, 111. On starting wars: Cratinus Dionysalexandros 115K-A; 
Aristoph. Ach. 516-39; Duris of Samos, BNJ 76 F 65. This trope is frequently dismissed 
as a comic fantasy, see Kagan, Outbreak, 255-6; W. Ameling “Komoedie und Politik 
zwischen Kratinos und Aristophanes: Das Beispiel Perikles,” QC 3 (1981), 411. On the 
accusation that she caused the war between Athens and Samos, see Part II, Chapter 2 and 
Part III, Chapter 12. 
31 Henry, Prisoner of History, 16. Kennedy, Immigrant Women in Athens, 76-7. 
32 Kennedy, Immigrant Women in Athens, 59. 
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Contemporary sources almost exclusively refer to Aspasia in insultingly sexualized 
terms, without making reference to her intellect.33 Nevertheless, Aspasia may be termed 
“a key figure in the intellectual history of fifth-century Athens.”34  
The evidence for Aspasia’s intellectual credentials primarily appears in the fourth-
century Socratic corpus, where Pericles and Socrates are represented as speaking with her 
voice. Frequently, these accounts maintain the gendered concerns that appeared in 
comedy and offer her influence as corrosive.35 In the Menexenus, Plato parodies the 
epitaphios (funeral oration) genre by having Socrates recite a speech dedicated to 
Athenian andreia composed by a foreign woman, and includes a barb at logographers by 
equating their livelihood to another person who is, by definition, a purchasable 
commodity.36 However, Aspasia is still presented as a teacher who is not only capable of 
composing an effective speech, but also one whose lessons are memorable, if by force 
(235e-236d). Nor are all presentations of Aspasia layered with hostility. Aeschines of 
Sphettus wrote an Aspasia, framed in much the same way as the Menexenus, in which he 
has Socrates unironically suggest that Callias hire Aspasia to teach his son.37 Henry 
argues that the dramatic date of 420-410 means that Socrates was not implying that she 
would give the son an erotic education, but rather that she was genuinely capable of 
                                                 
33 Henry, Prisoner of History, 10. Yet, the classical references did not refer to Aspasia as 
a hetaera, see Kennedy, Immigrant Women in Athens, 75. 
34 Henry, Prisoner of History, 3. 
35 Henry, Prisoner of History, 30-4. 
36 Henry, Prisoner of History, 33; Podlecki, Perikles and his Circle, 112-13; Wider, 
“Women Philosophers in the Ancient Greek World,” 43-4; L. Coventry, “Philosophy and 
Rhetoric in the Menexenus,” JHS 109 (1989), 1-15; S.S. Monoson, “Remembering 
Pericles: The Political and Theoretical Import of Plato’s Menexenus,” Political Theory 26 
(1998), 489-513; S.G. Salkever, “Socrates’ Aspasian Oration: The Play of Philosophy 
and Politics in Plato’s Menexenus,” The American Political Science Review 87 (1993), 
133-43. 
37 Henry, Prisoner of History, 41-2; Podlecki, Perikles and his Circle, 113. 
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teaching him rhetoric and politics.38 It is impossible to know if this biography depicting 
her as an intelligent person is accurate, and Henry rightly focuses on the interplay of 
gender, sexuality, and citizenship in the presentation of Aspasia, but she is overly 
simplistic in supposing that Aspasia represents foreigners in the Socratic dialogues.39 In 
this tradition, she represents Ionia specifically and it is likely that the preponderance of 
Ionian intellectuals active in Athens gave Aspasia’s reputation for intelligence further 
credibility.40 
The evidence for the Homeric scholar and historian Anaximander of Miletus is 
limited. The Suda says that Anaximander was at the height of his powers in the reign of 
Artaxerxes Memnon (404-358), which likely means that he was forty years old in 404.41 
The principal evidence that links him to Athens is Xenophon’s Symposium, which is set 
in c.420.42 In this dialogue, the speakers lament the superficiality and inadequacy of the 
rhapsodes, professional story-stitchers who recited epic poetry, often in costume (Xen. 
Sym. 3).43 The speakers reassure themselves that their knowledge is superior to that of the 
rhapsodes because they have paid large quantities of silver to Anaximander and 
Stesimbrotus of Thasos to enlighten them to the meaning behind the poems and to point 
out the important parts (Anaximander, BNJ 9 T 3).44 Węcowski argues that this near-
contemporary evidence indicates that Anaximander spent time as a transient intellectual 
                                                 
38 Henry, Prisoner of History, 41-5. 
39 Henry, Prisoner of History, 34. 
40 Podlecki, Perikles and his Circle, 112. 
41 Węcowski, BNJ 9 T 1, commentary, and biographical essay. 
42 A.J. Bowen, Xenophon’s Symposium (Warminster: Aris&Phillips, 1998), 9. 
43 M.L. West, “Rhapsodes at Festivals,” ZPE 173 (2010), 1-13; J.S. Burgess, 
“Performance and the Epic Cycle,” CJ 100 (2004), 1-23; Bowen, Xenophon’s 
Symposium, 102-3. 
44 Bowen, Xenophon’s Symposium, 103. 
 418
in Athens, and it also indicates that the Delian League offered a market for this sort of 
work.45 Indeed, Aristophanes offers a parody of the Ionian reputation for this profession 
in the first scene of the Peace when he has an Ionian in the front row offer commentary 
on why there is a dung beetle on stage (46).46 It is unknown how long Anaximander 
stayed in Athens, but the Suda links his dates to Artaxerxes Memnon at a time when 
Miletus was the plaything of Persian satraps, which may indicate that he had returned to 
his native polis by 404. 
The surviving fragments of Anaximander’s work focus on the mythological past 
and do not refer to Athens, preferring to record the Cretan foundation of Miletus. In 
these, he used an archaizing Ionic dialect that harkened back to the Archaic Ionian 
intellectual tradition, but also foreshadowed Hellenistic scholarship.47 The blend of old 
and new traditions also marked Scythinus of Teos, who put the philosophy of Heracleitus 
into verse.48 It is likely that Scythinus did not merely convert Heracleitus’ philosophy, 
but wrote parodic verses, and, in his prose history of Ionia, he turned Heracles into a man 
driven by philosophical ideals.49 Any link between Scythinus and Athens is entirely 
speculative because there is no evidence that he visited the polis, but the closest parallel 
was the work of the comic poet Hermippus, and it is probable that this style of poetry 
                                                 
45 Węcowski, Anaximander, BNJ 9 T 3, commentary. 
46 A.C. Cassio, “Attico ‘volgare’ e Ioni in Atene,” Aion 3 (1981), 91; R.M. Rosen, “The 
Ionian at Aristophanes Peace 46,” GRBS 25 (1984), 389-96. Rosen argues that the 
scatological and sexual nature of the commentary is something that Aristophanes 
expected the audience to associate with Ionian intellectuals rather than part of the parody. 
47 Węcowski, Anaximander, BNJ 9, biographical essay. 
48 M. Cuypers, Skythinos, BNJ 13 T 2 Commentary. 
49 Cuypers, Skythinos, BNJ 13, biographical essay. It is unknown whether this portrayal 
was meant as a parody. 
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developed within the Delian League context. However, it is also notable that the butt of 
Scythinus’ parody is a local Ionian intellectual tradition independent of Athens. 
Timotheus, a dithyrambic poet from Miletus born in the mid-fifth century, was 
also closely connected with Athens.50 He is said to have had a particularly close 
relationship with Euripides, who was supposed to have written an introduction for 
Timotheus’ Persae and for whom Timotheus may have written an epitaph.51  Timotheus 
competed in Athenian musical competitions and boasted of a victory in the Panathenaic 
cithara performance over Polyidus, the most prominent musician of his generation.52 
There are also dubious anecdotes about his relationship with the Macedonian king 
Archelaus ([Plut.] Mor. 177b), but there is no reason to doubt that he did frequent the 
Macedonian court since Stephanus of Byzantium explicitly says that Timotheus died 
there ([Plut.] Mor. 334b).53 Archelaus (r. 413-399) had a reputation for patronizing 
artists, including Euripides, who likely wrote The Bacchae and a play called the 
Archelaus in Macedonia (Aelian VH 2.21, 31.4; [Plut.] Mor. 177a).54 The Macedonian 
king is also said to have paid the Samian Choerilus four minae every day, which the poet 
spent on fish (Athen. 8.35, see below).55  
                                                 
50 J.H. Horden, The Fragments of Timotheus of Miletus (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 3-4; Ostwald, “Athens as a Cultural Center,” 328. 
51 Horden, Fragments of Timotheus 4-5; Thucydides is a second attributed author for the 
epitaph, see I. Plant, “Thucydides, Timotheus and the Epitaph for Euripides,” CJ 110 
(2015), 385-96. Euripides is supposed to have identified Timotheus’ talent and 
popularized music again. See [Plut.] Mor. 795d. 
52 Horden, Fragments of Timotheus, 4.  
53 Horden, Fragments of Timotheus, 4-5.  
54 Walbank, History of Macedonia, 36; Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 174-6; Worthington, 
By the Spear, 20. 
55 On the consumption of fish, see Davidson, Courtesans and Fishcakes, 11-20. 
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There is little testimony that links Timotheus with Miletus, and it is probable that 
he traveled wherever patronage was to be had. After going to the Macedonian court, he 
probably continued to compete at Athens, where Polyidus boasted that his student 
Philotas defeated Timotheus (Athen. 8.45) and at Sparta, where tradition records, likely 
apocryphally, that the Spartan ephors were hostile to him, which caused him to be 
dismissive of the Spartans at the end of his Persae.56 Athens clearly attracted Timotheus, 
but it is probable that this was the product of opportunity for men of his particular talents, 
so when prospects arose elsewhere he followed the money. Timotheus lived well into the 
fourth century and while it is possible to attribute some of his travels with the period after 
the end of the Delian League, his association with both Euripides and Archelaus’ court 
suggest that he left Athens for a time before the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404. 
Whether the division between Miletus and Athens after 412 caused his sojourn to the 
north or is merely coincidental is impossible to know, and I believe that it was not the 
immediate cause, but was a contributing factor.57 
Choerilus, the Samian in Archelaus’ retinue with an expensive taste for fish, was 
an epic poet who reportedly was friends with Herodotus and lamented having been born 
too late.58 His innovation was to reject myth as a subject of epic poetry and instead to 
                                                 
56 Horden, Fragments of Timotheus, 7. This poem was in the “New Style” of music and 
fell out of favor in Athens, see K.A. MacFarlane, “Choerilus of Samos’ Lament (SH 317) 
and the Revitalization of Epic,” AJPh 130 (2009), 232. 
57 On the Ionian War, see Part II, Chapter 3. 
58 MacFarlane, “Choerilus of Samos’ Lament,” 219, with n. 1. Cf. A.S. Hollis, “The 
Reputation and Influence of Choerilus of Samos,” ZPE 130 (2000), 13-15. MacFarlane 
reasonably argues that the lament about the current state of poetry is a rhetorical device to 
demonstrate the advantages of his “historical epic” style. On Choerilus, see G. Huxley, 
“Choirilos of Samos,” GRBS 10 (1969), 12-29. 
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memorialize historical events.59 Choerilus first performed his Persica in Athens near the 
end of the fifth century, probably before the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404, and it 
was met with such praise that the Assembly voted it should be performed alongside the 
Homeric poems at the Panathenaia.60 As mentioned above, Choerilus also enjoyed the 
patronage of Archelaus and he probably traveled as an itinerant poet elsewhere in the 
Greek world. As was the case with Timotheus, Athens likely offered him more 
opportunities, but, in contrast, war between his homeland and Athens is not used to 
explain his move to Macedonia. Athenaeus’ anecdote about Choerilus’ gluttony likely 
stems from a tradition of mercenary behavior on the part of the poet, and Lysander added 
him to his retinue so that the Samian would compose a poem in his honor (Plut. Lys. 
18.4-7).61 This itinerary explains why Ostwald describes Choerilus as having “a tenuous 
relationship to Athens,” but neither does it indicate an absence of a relationship.62 
Choerilus’ poetry was held in high esteem, though, and he was mentioned in Alexis’ 
Middle Comedy play Linus alongside Orpheus, Hesiod, and Homer, only for the pupil 
Heracles to reject his work in favor of a book about food.63 
Other Samian intellectuals, while still embedded within the Delian League, show 
a more limited relationship with Athens. Euagon was a fifth century local historian who 
                                                 
59 Ostwald, “Athens as a Cultural Center,” 326. 
60 MacFarlane, “Choerilus of Samos’ Lament,” 219, with n. 2; Huxley, “Choirilos,” 14-
25. The alternate title given in the Suda is “The Athenians’ Victory over Xerxes,” which 
suggests the content of the poem. 
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Comedy 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1959), 437. 
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composed a Samian Annals.64 His work, which was probably first cited by Aristotle’s 
Samian Politaea,65 recorded legends and myths about Samos, and surviving fragments 
refer to the Nile (BNJ 535 F 1) and to Meles as the father of Homer (BNJ 535 F 2).66 
Euagon’s history also supported Samos’ claim to territory in the ongoing dispute with 
Priene (BNJ 535 F 3), but no surviving fragments discuss Athens and there is no record 
that he ever went there. Another local historian, Aethlius, wrote a Samian Chronicle, but 
it does not appear in the Rhodian arbitration and so likely did not mention Priene 
(I.Priene 37). There are too few fragments of Aethlius’ work to date it reliably, but the 
most common suggestion is that he wrote in second half of the fifth century.67 While 
nothing definitive may be said about Aethlius, none of the surviving passages refers to 
Athens. The silence in these two authors most likely does not indicate hostility to Athens, 
but rather that Samos had its own literary tradition and the resources to support producers 
locally. Nevertheless, Choerilus’ career indicates that Samian poets participated in 
festivals in the wider Greek literary world. 
The last author in this survey of fifth-century Ionian literary life is Antimachus of 
Colophon, who, with Choerilus of Samos, was one of the pre-eminent epic poets of his 
day.68 Callimachus called Antimachus’ poem the Lyde κα παχ γράμμα κα ο τοπόν 
(“a writing both turgid and unclear”), but this was a rare hostile reference.69 Antipater of 
Sidon compared the difference between Homer and Antimachus to the one between Zeus 
                                                 
64 On the fifth century date, L. Bertelli, Euagon, BNJ 535 TT 1, 2, and biographical essay. 
65 Bertelli, Euagon, BNJ 535, biographical essay. 
66 In the BNJ commentary, Bertelli notes that the river Meles was near Smyrna and the 
variations on stories that put Homer’s birth on the riverbank. 
67 Fowler, “Herodotus and His Contemporaries,” 68; D’Hautcourt, Aethlius, BNJ 536, 
biographical essay. 
68 On their rivalry, see Huxley, “Choirilos,” 25-7. 
69 Matthews, Antimachus, 74. Trans. 15=Callimachus F 398.  
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and Poseidon, the Suda says he ranked third or fourth after Homer, Hesiod, and 
sometimes Panyassis, and, according to Duris of Samos, Plato preferred his poetry to that 
of Choerilus (BNJ 76 F 83).70 Colophon was set inland and therefore thought to be 
vulnerable to Persian influence,71 but Antimachus nevertheless developed a reputation for 
being among the greatest Greek epic poets and was particularly praised for his Thebaid 
about the Seven against Thebes.72 There is no direct evidence that Antimachus visited 
Athens, but he may have studied there with Stesimbrotus of Thasos, who wrote 
pamphlets about Athenian politicians and was Plutarch’s source for the scandalous detail 
about Pericles seducing his daughter-in-law (BNJ 107 F 10a).73 Most likely, Antimachus 
participated in a circuit of poetic competitions that included Athenian festivals and the 
Lysandreia on Samos in 404/3, which he lost (Plut. Lys. 18). Antimachus was 
participating in a vibrant local poetic tradition even as he composed epics about stories 
set in places across the Aegean.74 Despite the high repute, his poems were unavailable in 
Athens in the fourth century, and Plato had to dispatch his student Heraclides to 
Colophon in order to collect them.75 
 
III. Isocrates and Ionian Intellectuals in the Fourth Century 
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71 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
72 Matthews, Antimachus, 20-1. 
73 Matthews, Antimachus, 16-17; Cf. Dmitriev, Stesimbrotos of Thasos, BNJ 107 F 10a, 
commentary. 
74 Matthews, Antimachus, 18-19. Nicander of Colophon wrote a treatise called On the 
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75 Matthews, Antimachus, 17. 
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 Despite being an Athenian, Isocrates is one of the most important figures for 
fourth-century Ionian intellectual life.76 He was reputed to have taken more than a 
hundred pupils in his career and exacted a tuition fee of one thousand drachmae ([Plut.] 
Mor. 837c-d).77 Isocrates’ closest relationship with Ionia was on Chios, where he is said 
to have redesigned the constitution and founded a school ([Plut.] Mor. 837b). Most likely, 
Isocrates stayed at Chios 392-391 with the sponsorship of Conon, whose son Timotheus 
was his most infamous student.78 Very little is known about the school and it may be that 
the tradition sprang up because he took students while there, including the local politician 
Metrodorus who later taught the orator Theocritus (BNJ 760 T 1, see below).79 Dušanić 
speculates that the families were related since this Metrodorus was also the son of one 
Theocritus.80 The school on Chios probably did not continue after Isocrates left the 
island, but he opened one in Athens, probably upon his return in 391/0, where he 
                                                 
76 On Isocrates’ life and work, see Y.L. Too, The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates: Text, 
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80 Dušanić, “Isocrates, the Chian Intellectuals, and the Political Context of the 
Euthydemus,”2-7. 
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accepted Ionian students, including Philiscus of Miletus and possibly Theopompus of 
Chios.81 
 Philiscus (BNJ 337B), born between 405 and 400, is one of the earliest known 
fourth-century Ionian authors.82 [Plutarch]’s life of Lysias says that he was a student of 
Isocrates and a companion of Lysias, and it records an epigram that Philiscus was said to 
have composed for Lysias’ funeral ([Plut.] Mor. 836c). Both men were metics in Athens 
and shared an interest in oratory and rhetoric, but the relationship is attested nowhere else 
and it is suggested that Philiscus was too young to have known Lysias.83 It is likewise 
unknown whether Philiscus would have been in Athens before Lysias’ death in 379-377, 
but it is plausible that Philiscus was a student of Isocrates’ at Athens as a young man in 
the mid-380s and knew Lysias at that time.84 It is tempting to date Philiscus’ move to 
Athens before 387 when the King’s Peace gave Miletus to Persia, but the new 
arrangement did not interfere with the movement of individuals.85 The intersection of 
Lysias and Isocrates, as well as the supposed date of birth, likely indicates that Philiscus 
studied in Athens rather than at Isocrates’ school in Chios. 
 Little is known about Philiscus’ political life other than that he wrote an 
Amphicyonic Speech and a Milesian Speech (BNJ 337B T 1b). Engels argues that, while 
it is possible that he gave these speeches at the Milesian Assembly, it is more likely he 
                                                 
81 M. Ostwald and J.P. Lynch, “The Growth of Schools and the Advance of Knowledge,” 
CAH2 6, 595-602. 
82 J. Engels, Philiscus, BNJ 337B T 8 commentary, with biographical essay. Lysias died 
in c.379. 
83 F. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit2 i (Leipzig: Teubner, 1887), 353. 
84 Roisman and Worthington, Lives of the Attic Orators, 135. 
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composed them at Athens in 338/7 and 334/3, respectively.86 No fragments of either 
speech survive so it is impossible to know the content or much about the context, but 
there is no evidence for Milesian interest in the Amphictyonic Council and it is more 
likely that a speech named after a polis was given in Athens than in the eponymous 
community. Moreover, it would be reasonable to employ an eminent logographer from 
Miletus in order to address the Assembly on the position of the Anatolian Greek 
communities after Alexander’s conquest. Philiscus made his living composing treatises 
on rhetoric and taking on pupils, including Timaeus of Tauromenium (BNJ 337B T 6) 
and Neanthes of Cyzicus (BNJ 337B T 7), and he composed a biography of the Athenian 
politician Lycurgus, who rose to prominence after the battle of Chaeronea in 338.87 Other 
than that Philiscus was born in Miletus and the one speech about the polis, nothing in the 
surviving testimonia demonstrates a relationship with Ionia. In contrast, the fragments 
repeatedly indicate close ties between the orator and Athens.88 
 Isocrates’ influence also manifested in his relationship with Metrodorus and 
Theopompus. These two men, while both from Chios, represent two sides of Chian 
relationships with both Isocrates and the wider Aegean world. In particular, Metrodorus 
and his student Theocritus were prominent politicians on Chios, while Theopompus went 
into exile with his family on the charge of laconism probably in 394/3 and only returned 
                                                 
86 Engels, Philiscus, BNJ 337B T 1b commentary. 
87 On Timaeus, see BNJ 566. On Lycurgan Athens, Worthington, Demosthenes, 307-8; 
Roisman and Worthington, Lives of the Orators, 189-211, with bibliography.  
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to Chios after Alexander conquered it in 334/3.89 Accordingly, Metrodorus was Isocrates’ 
student probably in 392/1 on Chios, while, if the relationship is genuine, Theopompus 
was his student in Athens.90 Isocrates probably had other Chian students both in the 390s 
and later in Athens, but their names are unknown. Further, the Social War (357-355) 
drove a wedge between Athens and Chios, as indicated by Demosthenes’ Against 
Lacritus, though commerce did continue thereafter. It is likely inappropriate to read into 
the rivalry between Theopompus and Theocritus anything more than political 
disagreements or personal distaste.91 
Dušanić posits that the Chian embassy to Athens in 384 consisted of “relatives, 
intellectuals and party friends who had entertained close relations and collaborated 
politically along pro-Athenian lines, with Isocrates after c.393.”92 Theopompus’ family, 
whether it went into exile in 394/3 or in 384, was on the outside of this group. While the 
Theocritean faction found a relationship with Athens advantageous in the 380s, it 
undoubtedly remained a powerful core in Chian politics even after the Social War. 
Further, this puts to lie Theopompus’ claim that Theocritus came from a poor 
background, though the other claims to independent wealth may indicate that 
                                                 
89 On Theopompus’ birth, see Flower, Theopompus, 12-17, and 31; Morison, 
Theopompos, BNJ 115 T 1 commentary; contra Shrimpton Theopompus, 3-5; Lane-Fox 
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Theopompus was wealthier and exaggerating his opponent’s poverty so as to dismiss 
him. 
 While in exile, Theopompus is known to have studied in Athens, lived in 
Macedonia, and traveled widely giving lectures, including an Encomium of Mausolus 
(BNJ 115 T 48).93 His first historical work is reported to have been an epitome of 
Herodotus, which is speculated to have been for Philip or possibly a youthful Alexander 
(BNJ 115 T 51).94 Morison and Flower, however, argues that the work was meant for a 
public audience, suggesting that Theopompus composed it as a political pamphlet, which 
Philip commissioned to stir up support for his Persian campaign in 336.95 He also 
attended the funeral games arranged for Mausolus in Halicarnassus, along with many of 
Isocrates’ other students such as Naucrates of Erythrae (BNJ 115 T 6a).96 It is striking 
that, although Mausolus probably had influence in Chios, it was Theopompus, an exile, 
who attended the event.97 The orator Naucrates of Erythrae was also invited and more 
plausibly attended as a representative of his native polis (BNJ 115 T 6 and 6a).98 
 Nothing is known about Metrodorus’ death, but the traditions about the deaths of 
the two younger Chians, Theopompus and Theocritus, are illuminating. Theopompus was 
again exiled, refused admission in Egypt on the charge of being a πολυπράγμων 
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(meddlesome busybody), and only just avoided execution (BNJ 115 T 2). This account, 
which is the last evidence for Theopompus, is highly suspect since both the choice of 
destination and Ptolemy’s clemency foreshadow Alexandria as a center of literary 
production,99 but it is notable that it describes Theopompus as a man without a home and 
implies that his plight was the result of his individual action rather than anything to do 
with Chios. He likely wrote hostile tracts against the Athenians and Thebans, and it is 
said that his rival Anaximenes circulated a pamphlet called the Trikaranos or “Three-
Headed One” in Theopompus’ name that turned the Athenians, Thebans, and Spartans 
against him; Morison reasonably argues that Theopompus had already made enemies of 
the Athenians and Thebans, and that Anaximenes wrote the parody for Philip rather than 
for distribution among the Greek poleis.100 Theopompus also sought asylum at the 
Temple of Artemis at Ephesus in the late 320s, from which he wrote letters to Alexander 
that praised the king and criticized the Chians (BNJ 115 T 8).101  Though he also is said 
to have written a treatise critical of Alexander, Theopompus generally supported 
Alexander’s rule, probably hoping to garner support against political enemies on Chios 
(BNJ 115 T 8).102  
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 Theocritus, who was famous enough that the Hellenistic poet of the same name 
saw the need to distinguish himself, reputedly fell afoul of Hellenistic politics.103 He was 
an incessant critic of the expansion of Macedonian power and of anyone who obeyed 
monarchs, famously attacking Aristotle for leaving Athens to the court of Hermias of 
Atarneus and criticizing Alexander the Great for instructing the Ionians to send him 
purple cloth with which to dress his companions.104 Theocritus’ arrest supposedly came 
when Antigonus Monophthalmus sent his cook to invite the orator to dinner, and was met 
with the acerbic quip ε οδ᾽ ...τι μόν με θέλεις τ Κύκλοπι παρατηεναι (“I am well 
aware that you want to serve me raw to the Cyclops,” [Plut.] Mor. 11 b-c). Antigonus was 
famously tolerant about his appearance, but, when Theocritus was told he would have to 
plead for his life before the king’s eyes, he responded that that was impossible to do with 
a one-eyed king and so was put to death ([Plut.] Mor. 633c).105 Roller argues that the 
exchange belongs in 319/18 when Antigonus came into possession of Chios, but if it is 
appropriate to refer to Antigonus as a king then it belongs in 306-301.106 
 Two other fourth-century Chian intellectuals merit discussion. One, an orator 
named Caucalus was supposedly the brother of Theopompus (Kaukalos, BNJ 38 F 1, 
Theopompos, BNJ 115 T 4). The name is attested only for this individual, but all that is 
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known about him is that he composed an Encomium for Heracles. The speech was a 
rhetorical eulogy, rather than mythography, and he likely delivered additional speeches 
on mythical subjects.107 If it is appropriate to link Theopompus and Caucalus, then is 
likely that he also went into exile and would have had access to the same rhetorical 
schooling as his brother, but it is impossible to know where or when he delivered his 
speeches. The second, another Metrodorus, is recorded as the student of Democritus of 
Abdera and as the teacher of Diogenes of Smyrna (BNJ 43).108 Dušanić argues that his 
father was a Theocritus who was an ambassador to Athens with Metrodorus, Isocrates’ 
student, in 384.109 He produced a Troika (BNJ 43 F 1 and 2) and an Ionika (BNJ 43 F 3), 
both of which dealt with the mythical past and likely focused on the Greeks of Anatolia. 
The mechanics of his pedagogical genealogy are unknown, but it links Abdera, Chios, 
and Smyrna. Abdera prospered in Thrace independent of Ionian fortunes, but had been 
founded by Teian citizens fleeing Persia (Hdt. 1.168), and maintained active commercial 
ties with Ionia in the fourth century even after being captured by Philip in 355/4.110 In 
contrast, Smyrna was an Ionian polis on the Anatolian coast subject to Persia. Thus Chios 
remained a hub that linked communities across the Aegean. 
 
IV. Ionian Intellectuals beyond Isocrates in the Fourth and Early Third Centuries 
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The fragments attributed to Maeandr(i)us and Leandr(i)us of Miletus (BNJ 491-2) 
are frequently identified as being composed by the same person, though this is entirely 
speculative since there is no genuine biographical information about either. Sato suggests 
that they are two individuals who both wrote about Milesian history, with Maeandrius 
writing in the late-fifth and early-fourth centuries since he is said to have written later 
than Callias (BNJ 491-2 F 6), and Leandrius writing before the third century since he is 
cited by Callimachus, who was born about 320 (BNJ 491-2 F 14, 15, 18).111 Second 
century Rhodian judges arbitrating a land dispute between Priene and Samos cited 
Maeandrius, but they dismissed his testimony as unreliable (BNJ 491-2 F 1= IPriene 37). 
Neither author wrote about contemporary issues directly, but their presentation of 
Miletus’ mythic past is of note. In particular, Leandrius said that Cleochus, the 
grandfather of the eponymous Miletus, was buried at Didyma (BNJ 491-2 F 10). Alone, 
the statement is innocuous, but it draws on the variation of the Milesian myth that 
attributes the foundation of the polis to Crete, rather than Athens or claiming 
autochthony.112 Sato also notes that none of the stories about the eponymous Miletus 
links him with Didyma or says that his father was buried there, and none of the pre-
Ionian myths about Didyma is connected to the founding of the polis.113 It is therefore 
likely that Leandrius was particularly involved in the re-establishment of the oracle at 
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Didyma c.305-300 and manipulated the account of the foundation to link the two sites 
even though no earlier author did so.114 
The remaining Ionian intellectuals on mainland Anatolia are notable in that they 
composed treatises about places that were not Greek. Aristagoras of Miletus wrote an 
Aigyptiaka that was intended to correct Herodotus on Egypt, detailing the Canopic branch 
of the Nile up to Memphis, as well as Egyptian religion, military, and the Pyramids.115 
Aristagoras was said to be not much younger than Plato (BNJ 608 T 2) and most likely 
wrote between 375-325, though little else is known about his life.116 For this discussion 
the most salient, albeit unanswerable, question is whether he actually went to Egypt or 
had to rely on secondary witnesses. The surviving fragments indicate that Aristagoras at 
least presented himself as having gone to Egypt and therefore that he was reporting from 
actual experience.117 It is impossible to know if Aristagoras made the journey, but it is 
plausible that the turbulent relationship between Persia and Egypt in the fourth century 
actually stimulated contact between the two because thousands of Greek mercenaries 
served in Egypt and the Pharaoh Nectanebo granted privileges to Greek merchants in 
Naucratis in an effort to stimulate maritime commerce.118 
Two fourth century Colophonians composed Persicae, Hermesianax in verse, 
Dinon in prose. Little is known about Hermesianax’ Persica. He also wrote a three-book 
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collection of love poetry called Leontion, allegedly in honor of his mistress.119 One 
surviving fragment that could belong to either the Persica or the Leontion is an account 
of the fall of Sardis, which Dinon attributes to Croesus’ daughter Nannis turning the 
citadel over to Cyrus in return for marrying her (BNJ 691 F 1). Dinon composed his 
Persica in the early 330s and covered Persian history from the reign of Semiramis until 
the reconquest of Egypt by Artaxerxes III in 343/2.120 Like Ctesias, on whose work he 
modeled the Persica, Dinon wrote a “petite histoire” that investigated court society and 
dynastic intrigue, but his work received more acclaim in antiquity than Ctesias.121 The 
veracity of this work has been called into question, and Stevenson claims that Dinon 
invented passages from whole cloth, “not with the intention of misleading or simply 
amusing, but rather of filling in gaps in his sources.”122 These sources, she says, included 
a member of Tiribazus’ household.123 There is no way of proving this hypothesis, but 
Colophon was a Persian subject close by Sardis so it is at least plausible. Dinon’s son 
Cleitarchus is associated with Alexandria in Egypt, rather than Colophon, where he 
published the most popular history of Alexander’s campaign.124 
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Ionian intellectuals were also, unsurprisingly, involved in Alexander’s expedition 
against Persia. The Ephesian orator Delius, one of Plato’s students, was sent by the 
Ephesians to Alexander to argue on behalf of the crusade against Persia (Plut. Mor. 
1126d).125 Alexander needed little convincing, so this episode was probably a piece of 
political theater designed to show that the Ionians were eager for liberation. Another 
Ionian, Andron, was one of Alexander the Great’s trierarchs in the Indus Fleet in 326 
(Arr. Ind. 18.4-8). His brother, Hagnon was a member of Alexander’s inner circle and is 
named as a navarch under Antigonus Monophthalmus in an Athenian inscription of c.316 
(IG II2 682; Plut. Alex. 22, 40).126 Hagnon received Ephesian citizenship in 322/1 for 
petitioning Craterus on the community’s behalf (IEph. 1437). Heckel believes that the 
two individuals should just be one, a wealthy and influential courtier of Alexander, but it 
is equally plausible that they were brothers.127 Andron’s career after serving with 
Alexander is unknown, except that he, like Nearchus, turned to writing history. Cuypers 
suggests that the surviving fragments indicate “time spent in the library more than a navy 
career.”128 Where Nearchus wrote an account of the voyage from India to Babylon, 
Andron’s work was a Periplus of the Black Sea that scholiasts on Apollonius’ 
Argonautica referred to for its geographical landmarks.129 Much about Andron’s later life 
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inspiration for his Periplus was Andron. P.A. Stadter, Arrian of Nicomedia (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 35-41, argues that Arrian modeled the 
Periplus on Xenophon’s writing. 
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is unknown, but he probably returned to the Aegean after Alexander’s death, and while 
he plausibly never travelled into the Black Sea, would have been in a position in Ionia to 
collect stories about people and places to compile the Periplus. 
Three Samians, Ouliades and the brothers Duris and Lynceus, all of whom wrote 
after returning to the island in 322/1, round out this survey of Ionian authors.130 Ouliades 
was the less-well known of the three, the bearer of the more common name in the third 
and fourth centuries BCE, and only the second-century Rhodian inscription citing Samian 
histories attests to his work (IPriene 37 l. 118-23). His history probably celebrated Samos 
as a sort of public history, but did not record the Samian claim to Carion (BNJ 538 F 1). 
It is impossible to date Ouliades with any certainty, but the four Samian historians who 
did not support the Samian position all wrote after the restoration of the polis, which 
suggests that Ouliades probably did, too.131  
Duris is said to have studied in Athens under Theophrastus of Eresus, perhaps in 
304/3, but it is most likely that this was only true of his brother Lynceus (BNJ 76 T 1, 2, 
4),132 who reportedly composed a treatise about and befriended the New Comedy 
playwright Menander (Athen. 6.40).133 Lynceus’ primary interests, however, were in food 
                                                 
130 On the Samian nostos, see Part II, Chapter 6. 
131 Euagon BNJ 535 and Olympichos, BNJ 537 were third or second century historians, 
and Duris BNJ 76 was likely a rough contemporary of Ouliades. On the dating of 
Ouliades, see A. D’Hautcourt, BNJ 538 biographical essay, with bibliography. It is 
possible that Ouliades was a later historian who drew on Duris. 
132 F. Pownall, BNJ 76, biographical essay; Kebric, In the Shadow of Macedon, 5-6; R.B. 
Kebric, “A Note on Duris in Athens,” CPh 69 (1974), 286-7; R.B. Kebric, “Duris of 
Samos: Early Ties with Sicily,” AJA 76 (1975), 89; A. Dalby, “The Curriculum Vitae of 
Duris of Samos,” CQ2 41 (1991), 539-41. Cf. F.W. Walbank, “History and Tragedy,” 
Historia 9 (1960), 218-19; Shipley, Samos, 178.  
133 Kebric, In the Shadow of Macedon, 27; Shipley, Samos, 178. Shipley resolves the 
conflict by suggesting that Duris left Athens for Samos c.310, while Lynceus, the 
younger brother, remained past 307. 
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and drink. He reportedly wrote a treatise about the best way to navigate fish markets and 
choose the best fish.134 Lynceus also attended the banquets that Demetrius held for his 
mistress Lamia (Plut. Demet. 27.2), as well as for Antigonus and Ptolemy II, and he made 
a pact with Hippolochus that he would write letters describing the feasts (Athen. 5.1).135 
The brothers Duris and Lynceus were raised in exile, likely in Magna Graecia during the 
period of Athenian domination of Samos, but their exile did not stop the family from 
participating in Panhellenic events, and their father was an Olympic victor in his youth 
(Duris, BNJ 76 T 4).136  
Duris, a more sober author than his brother, was a politician in the restored 
Samian polis, becoming tyrant likely with Lysimachus’ support in the third century.137 
Duris had a reputation for tragic history and wrote on a wide range of topics, including a 
biography of the Sicilian tyrant Agathocles (BNJ 76 FF 16-21, 56-9),138 Macedonian 
history (BNJ 76 FF 1-15, 35-55), and a history of Samos (BNJ 76 FF 22-26 and 60-71), 
as well as about Homer, Euripides, Sophocles, and art in general. The extant fragments 
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135 M.R. Falivene, “At the table of kings: Lynceus, the brother of Douris, and his 
friends,” in De Samos à Rome: personnalité et influence de Douris, edd. V. Naas and M. 
Simon (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Paris Ouest, 2016), 71-90. 
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indicate an anti-Athenian bias, probably stemming from the years spent in exile and the 
Athenian determination to reclaim Samos.139 Duris’ focus on Macedonia is notable, both 
because it is indicative of the new world he was negotiating, but also because he tended 
to exaggerate their faults (F 12), while praising the sobriety of Persian kings (F 5).140 
Further, his accounts of Asian flora, fauna, and customs, in contrast to his statements 
about Sicily, probably emerged from his writing of the Macedonica and stories that 
flowed back to the Aegean from Alexander’s campaign rather than from autopsy. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Ionia continued to have a diverse intellectual and literary culture in the Classical 
and early Hellenistic periods that not only drew upon and perpetuated Archaic traditions 
but also innovated and reinvigorated them. These authors did celebrate Ionia and Ionians, 
but were limited neither to Ionia nor even to Athens. In the fifth century, patronage was 
most conspicuous in Athens, which had a larger market for scholars, intellectuals, and 
artists than anywhere else in the Aegean. This does not mean that every Ionian interaction 
went through Athens or that the city was the principal location of circulation and 
publication. While it is probable that most, if not all, of the individuals spent time at 
Athens, neither did they hesitate to follow opportunity elsewhere. In the fourth century, 
opportunities outside Athens increased, but it continued to be the intellectual destination 
for Ionians, irrespective of the King’s Peace, which indicates that the dynamic in the fifth 
                                                 
139 Pownall, Duris, BNJ 76 biographical essay. 
140 Gattononi, “Duride, Samo e i Diadochi,” 52-5. Duris also says that Agamemnon’s 
downfall was the product of a passion for drinking (F 15) which Pownall argues was 
included in his account of Demetrius’ death, while the passage about Persian sobriety 
belonged to an account of Alexander’s invasion. 
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century was not strictly a product of the Delian League. In the second half of the fourth 
century, though, Ionian histories of Persia began to appear and the Hellenized 
Hecatomnid satraps extended patronage, which probably speaks more to a change in the 
Persians than in the Ionians since the authors had always been following the money. The 
larger change, albeit one that perpetuated the earlier trends on a larger scale, was the one 
that followed in the wake of Alexander’s conquest of Persia. Some Ionian authors such as 
Melissus, Theocritus, and Duris were prominent politicians in their home poleis, but only 
Theocritus probably received his education there. All of the remaining individuals were 
likely educated abroad and most sought employment beyond Ionia, including Zenodotus 
of Ephesus, an editor of Homer and Hesiod and the first head librarian at the Library of 
Alexandria.141 Far from intellectually impoverished, Ionia remained a vibrant region and 
one remained deeply embedded within the Greek cultural tradition.
                                                 
141 C.M. Schroeder, “Zenodotus’ Text of Hesiod,” CQ2 59 (2009), 271-4; Cf. R. Nünlist, 
Zenodotus, BNJ 19 biographical commentary. 
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It is a standard assumption in Greek history that the acme of Ionia, characterized 
particularly by artistic innovation and the colonizing moment, took place in the Archaic 
period. The division between the Archaic and Classical periods in Greek history is 
marked by the Persian Wars (490-478), but the revolt against Persia in 499-494 that 
ended with the sack of Miletus (Hdt. 6.18) is treated as a clear caesura between old and 
new periods in Ionia.  By 480, though, the region had begun to recover as Ionians fought 
in Xerxes’ invasion of Greece. Themistocles famously urged them to to fight badly (Hdt. 
8.22), but they nevertheless served with aplomb at the battle of Salamis (Hdt. 8.90). 
However, it is generally agreed that the new epoch did not begin in earnest until after the 
battle of Mycale in 478 when the Greeks destroyed a Persian fleet in Ionia and 
“liberated” the region. The next twenty years saw Athenian hegemony develop and 
metastasize, replacing Persian rule.  
For the remainder of the Classical and early Hellenistic periods, Ionia was subject 
to a succession of imperial powers. This history lay at the heart of Antiochus III’s 
declaration that the Ionians were accustomed to obedience (App. Syr. 3.12.1), and causes 
it to be cast aside from most accounts of this period, which focus on either the 
interactions between the premier political actors or the cultural efflorescence of Athens. 
Ionia lay on the periphery of the Greek world and of the Persian Empire. In the latter, it 
was both distant from the imperial heartland and small enough that it did not provide a 
serious threat to the empire except in conjunction with more powerful agents such as 
Cyrus the Younger. Thus, the traditional narrative for events of the Classical period 
marginalizes Ionian contributions. 
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My closer examination has demonstrated that characterizing Ionia as the passive 
victim of imperial aggression is deeply misleading. Where some ancient commentators, 
for instance, constructed tropes concerning liberty and slavery in terms of a binary 
between Greek and Persian, the Ionians were more pragmatic in their decision-making.  
Although not always incorporated into a formal imperial apparatus, they were partners in 
the imperial endeavor, abetting or resisting the external powers for political, rather than 
ideological, reasons.  Moreover, many of the twelve member poleis of the Panionion used 
their size to extend local control over other people in the region, while small communities 
such as Pygela manipulated other Ionian poleis and imperial powers to preserve their 
independence. 
The interactions with imperial powers also shaped domestic politics. During the 
Classical and early Hellenistic periods, almost all Ionian poleis were rife with political 
stasis as factions vied for local power by appealing for foreign aid. The currents of 
domestic politics are difficult to track with certainty in Ionia because the evidence is 
scarce. Only one set of inscriptions, a list of stephanephoroi at Miletus (McCabe, Miletus 
103-11), preserves a substantial record of eponymous officials, but even that evidence 
allows only a speculative reconstruction of political families. Further onomastic research 
may offer additional insight into the relationships, both by mapping the connections with 
the Mediterranean world using resources such as the Pleiades Project (a digital gazetteer) 
and by further tracking the influx of non-Ionian names into the region. Such an endeavor, 
however, is more feasible for Hellenistic Ionia because there are a significantly larger 
number of surviving inscriptions after the Classical period. Nevertheless, the frequent 
references to Ionian exiles testify to the turbulent nature of domestic politics.  
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Unlike previous studies that describe these exiles by their outside affiliation (e.g. 
pro-Persian) or the type of constitution they supported (e.g. democratic), I invert the 
paradigm, regarding these descriptors not as defining traits, but as choices determined by 
resistance to the dominant faction in the polis. For instance, there was nothing inherently 
pro-Persian about the group that seized power on Samos in 440, but the ringleaders of the 
coup appealed to Persia because the dominant faction had the support of Athens.1 
Likewise, treating the vicissitudes of Ionian politics as the result of local concerns, I am 
not committed to statements regarding whether the broad populace was pro-Greek or pro-
Persian, which is necessary for two reasons. First, the evidence for such declarations does 
not exist and thus they are inferences that rely on preconceived opinions about the 
relationships between Greeks and non-Greeks that do not stand up to scrutiny. Second, I 
believe that most Ionians did not think of themselves in these terms and to the extent that 
they did, they regarded their communities as part of a broad web of relationships that 
included both Greeks and non-Greeks. 
I have also shown how much our interpretation of Ionia and Ionians is dependent 
on non-Ionian source material. The epigraphical and archaeological record, particularly 
for the Classical period, is inconsistent and, while the region was intellectually vibrant, 
only fragments written by Ionians survive. The result is that we must rely on sources 
composed by people who neither directly observed events in Ionia nor were primarily 
concerned with recording its history. The dearth of contemporary sources provides a 
serious challenge for studying Classical Ionia and leaves it particularly susceptible to 
preconceived notions about Greek history, some of which developed in antiquity, and 
                                                 
1 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
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others that are the product of modern scholarship. The limitations in the source material 
dictate the sorts of inquiry that can be conducted, but also provide a unique opportunity to 
reexamine Ionia in relation to the political and economic networks in the Mediterranean 
world. Moreover, with this approach, my dissertation contributes to the growing body of 
literature that seeks to break the dominant conceptual framework that posits the polis as 
the primary lens through which to understand Greek history.2 
Another objective of my dissertation has been to bridge the divide between the 
studies of Archaic and Hellenistic Ionia by, for the first time, offering a history of 
Classical Ionia. I have done this by showing how Ionia continued to influence 
developments of Greece civilization. Equally important, though, I have challenged some 
of the assumptions, such as the one concerning construction of monumental architecture, 
which inform the pictures of Archaic Ionia as uniquely advanced and Hellenistic Ionia as 
newly rejuvenated. By necessity, I have not covered every aspect of Ionian interactions 
during the Classical and early Hellenistic periods. There is only rare mention of colonies, 
for instance, even though they continued to have economic, social, and religious 
relationships with their mother cities. Such a study would further enhance our 
understanding of Ionia's position in the Mediterranean world during this period, but I 
have largely excluded the Ionian colonies from my project because they did not have a 
direct impact on the region in a way that imperial competition did. 
There is a risk of an a priori flaw in this study: that I am arguing for the 
importance of Ionia in the Aegean system because it is the subject of my study rather than 
                                                 
2 See C. Taylor and K. Vlassopoulos, “Introduction: An Agenda for the Study of Greek 
History,” in Communities and Networks in the Ancient Greek World, edd. C. Taylor and 
K. Vlassopoulos (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1-31. 
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because of its actual importance. Indeed, Ionia is hardly the only part of Asia Minor to 
suffer the same trajectory in scholarship, and some nearby poleis such as Rhodes and 
Mytilene may be of equal import to the largest Ionian poleis. What sets Ionia apart, 
however, is the confluence of systems: it possessed a level of common identity, but 
consisted of poleis of different sizes, and had unusual levels of connection to the Persian 
administrative center at Sardis and to Athens. The result is that focusing on Ionia 
illuminates not only regional interaction between the local poleis but also the interplay 
between regional issues and the Aegean and Mediterranean worlds. Ionia is unique in this 
respect, but its story, at the confluence of obedience, exploitation, and resistance, holds 
equal importance for other Greek poleis in Anatolia. 
  Ionia was part of a dynamic web of relationships in the ancient Mediterranean 
world. Modern scholarship tends to overlook Classical Ionia, leaving the impression that 
the region was dormant between two antheses, the Archaic and Hellenistic periods. As 
my dissertation has shown, however, marginalizing Ionia in the larger context of the 
Aegean and Mediterranean worlds not only fails to appreciate continued Ionian activity, 
but also creates a serious blind spot in terms of understanding the history of Classical 
Greece and the eastern Mediterranean. Ionia continued to influence developments. It was 
a primary zone of interaction for each of the successive imperial powers that came to 
dominate the region, and, as my dissertation demonstrates, despite being politically 
subordinate, it helped to drive cultural and economic developments in this area of the 
ancient Mediterranean.
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VITA 
Among the hills and forests and snowbanks of Vermont there was a clearing and 
in that clearing a house reached only by a dirt track. According to the old maps, this 
house was in the township of Woodbury, but it was difficult to tell; those documents also 
preserved record of roads long since overgrown. In this house lived a cat and a wolf 
(pronounced “woof”) that together raised three children of the forest. The oldest of the 
three, Josh, often ran through the forest with his brothers, becoming acquainted with the 
trees and streams. They often returned covered in mud. They always returned with stories 
of adventures...lost soldiers, portals to other worlds, etc. But Josh would also frequently 
lose himself in books that conjured invisible, imaginary, or long lost worlds. 
These worlds intrigued and unsettled him, so Josh hitched a ride to Brandeis 
University in Waltham, Massachusetts. At Brandeis, Josh found himself pulled ever 
deeper into the depths of the library where he was exposed to an array of worlds that was 
beyond anything he had previously imagined. In these books he discovered the wisdom 
of the ancients and so sought initiation. This taste of forgotten knowledge, however, left 
him craving more. 
Having read widely, Josh knew the dangers of Faustian obsessions, but he also 
knew that he would need to go on a quest to harness this knowledge. So Josh packed up 
his belongings and headed west. He settled in Columbia, Missouri, where has spent the 
last eight years greedily drinking up knowledge, honing his skills, and baking bread. 
Many bagels died to bring you this dissertation. 
